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Abstract
Cinema into the Real is the practice of creating an affect based encounter between film and 
the lived world where their thresholds shift. It is an inquiry into the possibility for navigating 
what Gilles Deleuze calls the 'not-yet-thought' brought into existence by an irrational form of 
cinema comprised of crystalline time-images. How does the schema of normative cinema 
fiction and documentary stand in for the lived world, and how might the statements, maps and 
spaces of this cinema be made fluid to form a more radical moving image, one that is further 
implicated in, and may open up insightful gaps for, our experience?
There are three facets to this inquiry: first, the emergent and imaginative situation of 
filmmaking itself, where the very intention to make moving images produces a new frame 
through which to practise everyday life, a cinema of action and alteration; secondly, the 
invention of my conceptual persona as filmmaker, an uncommon self that I have cultivated in 
order to approach filmmaking as in part alien to its methods of production; thirdly, the 
exploration of a limit in thought (which is the state of affect, commonly experienced as panic) 
by way of a mental gap brought into being by aberrant moving images. Twelve films (and 
cinema interventions) were made, and these are thinking spaces in themselves. Between the 
theoretical text written, and the films produced, I have extended the flight line projected in 
Deleuze’s two cinema books, in an attempt to do film as an art practice of experimental 
philosophy, and to navigate a space between cinema and the lived world. This minor cinema 
of which I speak, and which I practise, is acquired by destratification and drifting, courts 
affect, and can, I will argue, enable new aspects of (non-habitual) thought.
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Prologue.
Sc 1. Lines of flight into the cinema as situation
In a parable by Jorge Luis Borges there is a map that is the same scale as the territory 
it depicts.1 Brought into relation with cinema, Borges paradoxical cartography invokes 
questions such as: what is the schema of normative cinema fiction and documentary, how 
does it stand in for the lived world, and how might the maps and spaces such a cinema creates 
be extended to become implicated in and even indistinguishable from our experience of the 
real?
Cinema into the Real is an inquiry into the possibility for navigating what the 
philosopher Gilles Deleuze calls the 'not-yet-thought' brought into existence by an irrational 
form of cinema comprised of time-images (Deleuze 1989). Cinema into the Real is also the 
practice of encountering the lived world with the very difference of directing one’s self, as 
filmmaker, towards it In total, twelve films/film interventions were produced during the 
course of the research, each working with the contingency of the film shoot and the 
possibilities of the edit, often utilizing accident, improvisation and irrationality in their 
construction. These films question the distinction between a factual and fictional image, and 
follow a willful line of departure from narrative and representation into reflexivity, pure 
duration, and moments of temporal absence. The films are awkward; they seek to occupy a 
place of discomfort between the binaiy oppositions of film and not-film, fiction and non­
fiction, and an audience's engagement and disengagement. They incorporate aberrant 
continuity and diegetic collapse in order to open up an interval that I will argue can enable 
cinematic and mental states that would previously have been relegated to either narrative or 
abstraction.
What happens when a distinction between film and thought is compromised, and 
what emerges when a distinction between film and world is abolished? What follows in this
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text bring together concepts from philosophy, cognitive science and behavioural psychology, 
and post-structural theories of identity and the nature of the moving image. I enter into a 
dialogue with theorists, filmmakers and films as philosophical friends. Principally, I have 
extended the flight line projected in, and projecting through, Deleuze’s two cinema books, 
Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (Deleuze 1986) and Cinema 2: The Time-Image (Deleuze 
1989), towards the very limit of the capabilities of the moving image. Here, then, between the 
text I have written and the films I have made, is my attempt to navigate a space between 
cinema and the lived world.
There are three facets to this inquiry: first, the situation of filmmaking itself - the 
emergent and imaginative attitudes of those who are filmmaking; secondly, my conceptual 
persona (a term borrowed from Deleuze and Felix Guattari2), which is filmmaker - an 
uncommon self that I have cultivated in order to approach filmmaking as, in part, alien to its 
methods of production; thirdly, the possibility for an encounter with a limit in thought which 
is commonly experienced as distressing, by way of a mental gap brought into being by 
irrational moving images. The relationship I draw between thought and image, between 
cinema and the lived world, is predominantly not based on spectatorship, although there are 
specific areas of the text where I explore the relationship between film and viewer. Rather, 
what follows is a theory of an embodied moving image that collapses distinctions between 
film and the real. What I mean by this is how an image can become unstable within its own 
system and eventually stray from its screen mooring and enter the lived world; how 
filmmaking might be practiced in actual contexts with a more tactile and improvisatory 
attitude; and, how the moving image as a virtual plane can confuse the limit of our 
physicality, and take our thoughts to the point of exceeding habitual response.
The thesis does follow a narrative of sorts, one that progresses from cinema (Act 
One) to the real (Act Two). In Act One (scenes 2-6) the text is concerned with the distressing 
of the classical cinema form, what Deleuze terms the movement image. Scene 2 looks at the
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period which Deleuze terms the 'first modem' of the cinema, unity of structure is the goal, and 
this is achieved through the rational linkage of images in montage, where time is subordinate 
to movement.3 Deleuze's philosophy says that when movement-image rationality is 
compromised, time-images emerge, and he finds these time-images in the post-war period, 
particularly in Italian neo realist cinema, where both characters and camera drift from the 
anchor of logical arrangement. These itinerant images originate from filmmaking as 
promenade, and make the viewer a thinking wanderer. When the expression of the camera 
and of the editing (in picture, and in sound) becomes more crystalline and dislocated, these 
films have the potential to dismpt the mechanism of our cognition and make possible an 
encounter with a limit situation or a gap in thought. It is this gap in articulation in the film that 
brings about a gap in reception in the viewer, and at this point both are effectively thought­
less. And so Deleuze concentrates his attention on films that become lost, that challenge the 
authority and structural integrity of the system of the cinema's established vernacular; films 
that bring about a shock to thought either by providing thought-like temporalities or by 
straying from order.
Deleuze regards the cinema as the twentieth-century’s greatest philosophical 
machine, in that, by presenting thoughts other than our own, it demonstrates how we 
habitually think and shows to us what kinds of thoughts we have yet to think. From within the 
framework of the movement-image, the filmmaker can offer models of human cognition 
(such as recognition and recollection) but these are not in themselves emergent engines of 
thought. And so Deleuze looks to filmmakers who utilize the apparatus of cinema to fashion 
fragmented time and identity and who quite literally think in their time-images in a way that 
they cannot in their own minds. Deleuze does not have any interest in developing a theory of 
the subject, certainly not in the Freudian or the Lacanian sense, but, like Henri Bergson, 
regards artists (read, filmmakers) as individuals who freely collapse aspects of their 
psychological make-up into the texts of their own design. Artists think with their materials, 
and for Deleuze the supreme material is the cinematograph. The film image and its
arrangement are thought-like but uncommon to our own thoughts, and will think differently to 
the thoughts of the filmmaker that were its origin. The filmmaker has certain knowledge of 
the film she or he creates, but this knowledge is not total, and the way in which their thoughts 
have emerged cannot be generalized as the same as the film or of the viewer. The viewer has 
new thoughts which are, by the time of the film's completion, more likely to be emergent than 
the filmmakers, for no filmmaker can encounter his or her own film as alien to it. All we can 
safely say, then, is that any and all films comprise of complex sheets of thinking.
Scenes 3 and 4 use the films O f Camera (2003) and Like a House on Fire (2006) to 
examine the specific temporal and architectural disruptions brought about by irrational and 
aberrant moving image arrangements, using Luce Irigaray's terms 'mucous' and 'fluidity' to 
develop a philosophy for a cinema of the gap. In Of Camera the character and the audience 
are simultaneously encountering temporal uncertainty. Fissures appear in the filmic text, 
providing the viewer with the opportunity for moments of novel dissociation - positive states 
of slippage rather than a breakdown in cognitive stability. These peculiar shifts in space and 
in time are disorienting and, if they were not delivered by moving images, would usually be 
categorized by the thinking subject as panic attacks. Here is the intensity of connection I 
make between panic and what Deleuze terms the nooshock that time-image cinema brought to 
the twentieth century mind.4 This is what I take Brian Massumi to mean when he finds in 
Deleuze's concepts the possibility for hovering in an affect situation of not-yet-thinking.5 
Scene 5 looks at the relationship between cinema and disequilibrium, outlining a number of 
methods for how the moving image can make possible an encounter with a pre-hodologicaf 
or affect7 space, with the unthinker in thought, that which is ordinarily qualified as panic, the 
distressing experience of losing situatedness. The disposition of affect has intellectual, social 
and political implications, for the affect or panic state does not- (yet) recognize categories, 
boundaries or teleologies, and can therefore never be discriminatory or habitual. How might 
we encounter this interval with confidence and without trauma? I look to film(ed) and filming 
events that are affect in nature, where the moving image generates confusion between what is
interior and exterior, between subjective and objective points of view. Occasionally my 
argument in the text and my articulation in the films purposefully incorporates repetition and 
slippage as devices, in order to re-situate panic positively, as affect, in the situation-as-gap 
encounter that is the cinematic experience. In addition to this, I include personal accounts of 
panic attacks (some induced by films, and others not) and other encounters with limit 
situations.8 I do so in order to propose an extraordinary temporal territory, partly 
cinematographic, partly lived in actuality, partly imagined, and partly not possible. I do not 
suggest that any film can represent a lived encounter with such limits - this is not my aim as a 
filmmaker and neither is it the remit of this research. Act One ends with Scene 6, an 
exploration of the unknown cinematic body suggested by Deleuze and by feminist readings of 
phenomenology. This unknown body is the film and the actual, a space between the identities 
that are making a film, the identity that is watching the film, and the event that is like identity, 
the film itself - its body, the occurrences it evinces on the screen, and the multiplicity of 
voices and comprehensions it creates. Such a cinema is a body without organs (Artaud's term, 
redeployed by Deleuze) that moves beyond physical limits, let loose in the physical world 
from which it derives; a cinema that is without the cinematograph, and only possible in 
thought. The physical body remains, as does the body of the apparatus of the cinema, but 
these bodies become increasingly conflated, and their respective possibilities are extended 
into absurdity as a body without organs in the mind.
It is important to stress that the moving image as a storytelling medium is not entirely 
the enemy - narrative remains a bedfellow and is referred to throughout the two principle Acts 
as a pivot for levering out differences to schemas of meaning. My inquiry retains an interest 
in story structures in order to shore up ideas about possible and navigable departures from the 
narratives of cinema and the narratives of our conduct in social space. In O f Camera, the 1 
Make Things Happen trilogy (2001-3), and Like a House on Fire the coherent central subject 
or narrator is destabilized, and the threshold of the classical film system is closely navigated. 
The way in which these films come close to contravening the materials and systems which
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contain them is explored in relation to Janet Cardiff s experiments with the cinematic form as 
lived, the crystalline time-images of Alain Resnais (and Alain Robbe-Grillet), Maya Deren 
and Andrei Tarkovsky, and the ontology of the edit in Gary Hill’s Incidence o f Catastrophe 
(1987-88) and in the films of Peter Tscherkassky, amongst other contemporary film and video 
examples. There is not room within these pages to fully outline the classical cinematic 
practices these films tamper with and surpass, nor is there space to properly consider the 
supremacy of the film theory paradigm still dominant in spite of numerous post-structural 
alternatives.9 The research has concentrated on surplus and excess rather than on unity and 
resolution; on what the fissures or cracks inherent in any film text can offer to thought and to 
behaviour. All of the films referred to use narrative, some more explicitly than others. Certain 
pieces, such as Like a House on Fire, depend on the narrative search engines in the minds of 
the audience for their completion (what Bergson calls our sensory-motor schema). This is all 
fine, and any audience member is supremely skilled in extracting meaning from disparate 
events and signs. The greater desire, though, is to give the audience sufficient confidence (in 
the filmmaker and in the film) to remain in the state of extracting, of mining, rather than to 
hurry towards the dead conclusion of whether the film does or does not make sense, or 
whether it does or does not stimulate and entertain. What I mean by this is that I am 
principally interested in the mental state and the emotional state where both the person 
filmmaking (myself) and the person film watching, is oscillating between the sensible and the 
irrational.
Often, for the viewer, narrative-like events are enough, and this is what is transpiring 
in O f Camera and Like a House on Fire. Both films give the impression that narrative 
coherence is just around the comer, a few shots from now, although every comer turned 
offers another comer. During this thwarting of expectation for story the audience either 
becomes irritated, or switches to a different access point to the flow of images in sequence. 
This, I argue, is how narrative remains a potent material for modification, because films that 
stray from this mooring bring about a shock to thought -  a shock in which the thinker loses
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stable ground and becomes receptive to other, non-linguistic signs. Without narrative-like 
elements, however, it is less possible to explore this state, and so the films I have produced 
ofien use the same building blocks as classical cinema: actors, scripts, suggestive scores, 
motifs, in fact almost all of the tropes and vernacular of the form. I use these materials fluidly, 
and with aberration, attempting to give myself to the film that is exterior to me, and to that 
which is exterior to the film. Whether or not giving ones' self to an exterior using the cinema 
is a realizable goal is not of consequence. The endeavour to play with language and resist 
territories or definitions creates unexpected ruptures, and the cinema of ruptures can offer us 
unique absences from habitual thought and conduct, whilst not robbing our minds of agency. 
Certainly, when cultivated within the possibility of my own thoughts, the cinema of rupture 
has such potency that the physical limitations of the medium become transgressed, so that 
frames collapse and the film spills; it becomes what Deleuze terms a life.10 But this is only 
possible in thought. Although a filmmaker, or any person imagining a film can think this kind 
of a film, physically we can only make assertions towards it, and this is true even of an 
entirely digitally generated image. The cinema shows us its own limits as it reveals to us the 
possibility for exceeding the limit of our habitual thought. This is the first meaning of the 
term cinema into the real: a cinema of thought. Here then I am asking, what kinds of thoughts 
cinema can be?
However, as Deleuze argues in Cinema 2, every film builds upon the legacy of 
cinema, every film sits within the manifold discourses and associations of the larger term, 
'Cinema,' even when it is commenting on or rejecting cinema and presented as video or film 
art in a white cube. As a filmmaker, can one be untimely, without family, and not determined 
by the past? Can the filmmaker create temporary uprisings without recuperation? In The Nick 
o f Time Elizabeth Grosz asks, 'How to create without reproducing prevailing models and 
practices, except to take what has been unutilized, undeveloped, from the past and make it a 
force that breaks through the strictures and limits on the present?' (Grosz 2004: 120). The task 
I have set for myself is to make films anew whilst not opposing the vernacular of the
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cinematic - to find a plane for identity as filmmaker so as to transform cinema's language and 
its operations. Such an attempt at becoming-filmmaker11 is to be alien to one's origins as 
filmmaker and to the cultural history of cinema. Instead of abandoning language altogether, I 
have treated the cinematic as a block that enables a different kind of moving image, what I 
term here as film. To propose and maintain this distinction, film, within the broader trope of 
Cinema is difficult. Deleuze gives no ontological definition of film in his two cinema books 
although his philosophy is an ontology of film, in that he declares the being of film is 
movement and time. Here, my use of the word film encompasses celluloid, digital and 
analogue video, performed actions and installations, and the virtual of thought. That is not to 
say this definition accounts for the entirety of Film or of Cinema. Analysis of Classic cinema 
centres on Film as an operation; it is an operation because it adds something to pre-existing 
codes.12 We can thus think of Classic cinema as essentially a strategy that operates from the 
place of the studio system and the economic order of production, distribution and exhibition. 
film  is a tactical application of the moving image; it is in departure from the hegemonic mode 
of classical narrative cinema, documentary as Truth, Film as art, or the debates within 
Structural-Materialism. By my definition, film  is neither the maintenance of an order and 
unity as exemplified by Hollywood, nor the expulsion of narrative as argued over by the 
Structural-Materialists. film  is the oneiric and crystalline mental and behavioural negotiation 
of world and not-world, but more than this, it is the encounter of a blurring between these 
distinctions, film  is a means by which the lived world and what we understand to be time can 
be (re)-envisioned outside of regimes of meaning and habitual forms of processing and 
reception.
To this end, or rather, to this middle, I have developed a film tactic, a film practice of 
the actual, what I describe as 'lived film.' The film tactic is ad hoc, in the moment, the series 
of'nomadic operations' (Michel De Certeau 198413). This 'way of making' is an anti-discipline 
of micro-operations, an art of becoming lost in a film operation between production and 
exhibition, between intention and chaos, between a film thought and an act of filmmaking: a
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modulation, an open set of intercessors and irrational interstices. The process of the film tactic 
is without locality and sets out to 'rent' space (de Certeau's term) in the place of the 
institutions of film & video art, narrative cinema and the documentary, in order to tamper 
with and collapse these terms from within. The rental of space in this place of the dominant 
order affords the social self die possibility of living out novel and self-authored narratives of 
the everyday, temporarily freed from institutions of work, leisure, and culture. This 
effectively means to assume the guise of, or occupy the order of existing conventions, with 
difference and without becoming co-opted into their institutional frames. This is an attitude, 
when filmmaking, which is comparable to Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis, a concept 
developed from Antonin Artaud which rejects the way in which identity as self is achieved 
through the pressures exerted by social structures. In The Brain is the Screen, Gregory 
Flaxman explains that 'Deleuze does not advocate schizophrenia or use of chugs but he does 
look to the schizophrenic experience as a model of thought and life that forces us to look 
beyond the confines of our own limited notion of reality' (Flaxman 2000: endnote 59,108).
A film's body without organs may be immaterial, but the actuality of filmmaking 
articulates an embodied form of thinking. Such a model for the realization of a counter mode 
of thought in this context advocates assuming the guise of filmmaker in order to harness an 
untamed and fractured way of thinking in regard to the situation at hand. Becoming 
filmmaker, and entering into a “lived film,” can offer transformative possibilities for social 
conduct and for perception, although it is problematic to make any attempt to regiment this. 
Such a practice refutes the ontological error of representation and inventively denatures 
rather than represents our customary experience of the lived world. The second half of the 
text, Act Two (scenes 7-10), outlines the film tactic as a response to the resemblance complex 
at the heart of the documentary. These chapters focus on the situation of filmmaking, and on 
the conceptual persona I have developed, which is filmmaker. Scene 7 does for the 
documentary what Scene 2 does for the fiction film, establishing the various normative forms 
before giving attention to factual films which are crystalline in construction, thick in
description and employ subjective devices. Two specific films were produced using the film  
tactic: The Film (2004) and The Film We Didn't Make (2006). Scenes 8 and 9 describe the 
concept and process for the production of The Film, which was is to make use of interiority, 
fabulation and excess in the factual form. The Film resembles a documentary, although it does 
not perform or inform like one, and the par hasard method it utilises is compared with 
Gallivant (Andrew Kdtting 1996), The Gleaners and I  (Agnes Varda 2000) and the film 
poems of Margaret Tait. The follow-up to The Film, The Film We Didn't Make, resembles a 
fiction, although it does not deliver as one (an additional and purposefully incomplete chapter 
on this film is included here as an appendix to the main text). Two additional films, Different 
Systems o f Chaos (2003) and Come As You Are (2005) transform or reinvent the order of the 
situation they direct themselves towards. In the production of these four films I have enacted 
filmmaking, often foolishly, willfully attempting to forget the proper of a classical 
filmmaking process in order to become this other filmmaker. Here, the rubric that is cinema is 
brought to bear on the real, so that the act (actuality) of making a film introduces new 
situations, and ways of thinking about those situations to the participants and the small film 
production team. This tactic is a frame, a frame that is neither the film/video material itself 
nor the final edited teleological outcome, nor a filter attached to the camera or projector, but 
rather an ongoing ‘virtual’, placed over the real, so that the real is lived differently. We can 
call this frame filmmaking, a license to act-out, to open life onto the new.
For this filmmaking tactic I have adopted the Situationist International (SI) tactic of 
the derive (to drift, without schema or plan). There is a strong and enduring spirit of 
resistance that flows through the drift tactics of the SI and the urban and suburban psycho­
geographers of the everyday about whom Guy Debord, Michel de Certeau and Hakim Bey 
write. I have placed emphasis on the complex ways in which cinema interacts with life and on 
the emergent mental and social attitudes of those in the act of filming - their minds and bodies 
wandering - rather than on the film object itself.14 It is a desire, the desire to be propelled into 
unforeseen situations. Such a tactic courts failure but failure provides the thrust. This way of
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operating is a form of thinking where the activity of wandering generates the space for 
discovery. The film tactic responds to what emerges from the outside of the planned film. I 
have been drifting, cinematically 'making do,' producing films as a means to make sense of 
the films being produced. Methodologically, the tactic is a response to Deleuze's idea of a 
minor cinema, one that is detached in process from the movement-image of normative fiction 
and documentary film and does not seek to make representations of and for an other. This 
cinema is the utterance of a minor voice that necessarily uses and misuses a dominant 
language, although, I will argue, the time-image films Deleuze gives readings of do not fully 
actualize this concept of a minor cinema, which remains, as a potentiality.
The chief weapon of a minor cinema is falsity and tabulation: the complex and often 
forged interrelationship between documentary, fiction and the social world. Scene 10, "Close- 
Up, the film practice of intervening in reality,’ places the film tactic in a dialogue with what I 
describe as contingent films that fluctuate between fact and fiction, including Here to Where 
(Paul Luchford/Glenn Berczeller 2001), Double Blind (Sophie Calle & Greg Shepherd 1992), 
and, principally, Close-Up (Abbas Kiarostami 1990) which is subject to a close reading, 
particularly for the way it makes transparent the novel frame for alterity that a film in 
production provides, for both the subject of the film and the production team. These are 
deterritorialized film encounters with the actual, in which the nature of the encounter and the 
transformation of the subject determines on-screen content; where the very reality of making 
a film alters the life-trajectory of those participating. Films of this nature are double 
palimpsests that involve the constant rewriting of the actual they direct themselves at, and in 
turn, the re-writing of their own process and schema by the actual they have written over. The 
subset of their making enables a specific form of invention, where the social self can utilize 
cinema as fabula to perform other narratives. In The Film and The Film We Didn't Make a 
group of people, as filmmakers, direct themselves towards the actual so as to alter its 
emergent and contingent properties. The doing has greater prominence than the result, and the 
very intention to make moving images produces a new frame through which to practice
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everyday life. This is the second meaning of the term cinema into the real: a cinema of action 
and alteration. Act Two posits filmmaking as not only a fantastical space for our 
entertainment and cognitive expansion, but also a social manner in and of itself - a form of 
localized speech act.
Deleuze writes that the cinema is 'a new practice of images and signs, whose theory 
philosophy must produce a conceptual practice. For no technical determination, whether 
applied (psychoanalysis, linguistics) or reflexive, is sufficient to constitute the concepts of 
cinema itself (Deleuze 1989: 280). Deleuze engages critically with a range of film theories, 
but ultimately his objective is the greater agency for thought. Borrowing from Bergson and 
from Peirce, Deleuze identifies that the moving image has produced three signs: the lectosign, 
which is linked to description, the chronosign, which is linked to narration, and the noosign, 
which is linked to thought. But for Deleuze the image of thought is not a method for the use 
of thought, nor a procedure for communicating knowledge. The objective of generating a new 
film theory is redundant to thought. We must instead turn our attention to how film 
illuminates our comprehension of the relationship between image and thought, and image and 
body. As Tamsin Lorraine writes, Deleuze's project is 'changing the image of thought from 
that of a model of recognition to one promised on a logics of difference and multiplicity' 
(Lorraine 1999: 137). And so Deleuze produces his own exhaustive, and often contradictory 
taxonomy of cinema signs and practices to point out how limiting the present taxonomy is - 
for with a new taxonomy, comes a certain liberation of form.15 But Deleuze's film philosophy 
is far from a mission statement for radical filmmakers, and, like Deleuze's two cinema books, 
this document is not an instruction for use. It does not constitute an expertise, or knowledge 
offered as concluded, as totality. My practice is complimentary to Deleuze's theory, but I 
would suggest that what is missing from Deleuze's theory is practice; although in numerous 
ways transformative, it does not give attention to the situation of filmmaking and in this sense 
remains conspicuously in line with the film theory paradigm it resists. Although an innovative 
and contentious departure from psychoanalytical and semiotic film theory, Deleuze's film
philosophy still concentrates on the film object itself and the nature of its reception. It is this 
gap in his thought that I have sought to principally occupy, giving privilege to the very 
eventfulness of filmmaking.
What it is, is figuring out what it is.
(T.R.Uthco Collective Member, The Eternal Frame, 197516)
To isolate and execute a particular research methodology for Cinema into the Real 
has proven difficult. Deleuze and Guattari stress experiential and sequential, or process-based 
knowledge, over teleological or empirical knowledge. In many ways, Deleuze himself is anti- 
hermeneutic; he gives the reader only indeterminate directions, vectors, if you will, or lines of 
flight. The dominant hermeneutics for the twentieth century was psychoanalysis, and this is 
one particular paradigm that Deleuze, with Guattari, vehemently challenges. We are desiring 
machines, and before we can ask 'What does it mean?' we must first ask 'How does it mean?' 
Not what we desire, then, but how we desire - the act itself, rather than the goal or intention. 
There is no Deleuzian hermeneutics because for Deleuze all frames are provisional and 
vibrating and meaning is secondary to momentum. Throughout the body of his philosophy, 
Deleuze's transcendental empiricism exceeds the so-called hermeneutic circle in that it 
declares that there is no Whole that can be understood, no Whole that can be reached through 
the examination of contingent constituent parts.
Deleuze shares with his forebears Bergson and Nietzsche disinclination towards 
empirical details such as catalogues and historical chronologies. In The Creative Mind: An 
Introduction to Metaphysics (1923) and Creative Evolution (1907), Bergson suggests that the 
schism between doing and knowing is the result of the emergence of intelligence within the 
human, which is in essence the impulse to freeze, to spatialize, and to control. For Bergson, 
intuition is the encounter with objects and environments that are not yet spatialized. Nietzsche 
writes that, 'Physiologically [...] science rests on the same foundation as the ascetic ideal: a
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certain impoverishment of life is a presupposition of both of them - the affects grown cool, 
the tempo of life slowed down, dialectics in place of instinct, seriousness imprinted on faces 
and gestures' (Nietzsche, The Genealogy o f Morals, 3: 25). In Nietzsche, doing and knowing 
are two opposing powers. As Elisabeth Grosz elaborates in The Nick o f Time, one expands the 
sphere of possible actions; the other reduces it, by regulating activity in order to make it 
understandable. For Deleuze, as it is for Nietzsche, thinking must be an activity, a creativity. 
Theory must be an application of force as emergence, not a science of the appraisal of data 
brought back from the field (what Grosz describes as 'the scientific robbery of activity from 
life' [Grosz 2004: 11017]), but ideation in die field itself.
The philosopher Gilbert Ryle makes the phenomenological distinction between 
'knowing-how' and 'knowing-that.' Deleuze’s process of transcendental empiricism involves 
detaching one's self from orderly knowledge in order to retrieve details from the space of 
knowing how, what he terms affect. In Collected Papers (1973) Ryle offers the term 'thick 
description,' for the more complex ways in which a thinking subject acquires and makes sense 
of evidential knowledge. In terms of an art practice of moving images this thick description 
would be to work directly with affect.18 In Brian Massumi's reading of Deleuze, affect bears 
close similarity to Barthes' jouissance and Sontag's erotics, an embodied sense of the 
inexplicable that is rich in potential and precedes meaning and the psychological (Massumi 
2002). This is to be in the Kantian unfamiliar, entrusted to the senses without intellectual 
filters and without the secure place of institutional expertise and process. What might we 
speculate is missed out by scientific methodologies of research, by intellectual schemas of 
narrative cinema production, and by what Bill Nichols calls the 'discourses of sobriety' used 
by the documentary film? (Nichols 1991). Primarily, what is lacking is the embodied form 
and utterances of the film (even if this utterance has as its intention a place within a 
narrative). Although the image that the filmmaker renders has the appearance of the lived 
world, this image is arguably no more like the lived world than any other art form, 
particularly in terms of its inherent dislocation of time and space. The filmmaker is faced with
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whether to condition the moving image into percepts (expressions as statements or 
suggestions, the combinatory value of its likeness), and thereby restrict the special attributes 
of the cinema, or to embrace its complexity, its wild meaning and sheer difference. By 
examining various models for the moving image as indexical and factual I give criticism to 
the limitations of representation and look towards a minor documentary cinema of affect and 
thick description.
Deleuze's desires for the philosopher to make philosophy, by creating concepts in the 
way that an artist or filmmaker makes material modifications to the lived world, what Deleuze 
calls blocks of space-time' or affects.19 Concepts are in the field of philosophy, percepts are in 
the territory of art, and affects are without field or territory, they are neither meaningful nor 
representational. Philosophy creates concepts that transform chaos into uniformity. It loses 
out against art in this respect, and so Deleuze sets out to make of philosophy an art practice.
... philosophical theory is itself a practice, just as much as its object. It is no more 
abstract than its object, and it must be judged in the light of the other practices with 
which it interferes. A theory of cinema is not about cinema, but about the concepts 
that cinema gives rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts 
corresponding to other practices... It is at the level of interference of many practices 
that things happen, beings, images, concepts, all the kinds of events... So that there is 
always a time, midday-midnight, when we must no longer ask ourselves, 'What is 
cinema?' but 'What is philosophy?'
(Deleuze 189:280)
The cinema is Deleuze's philosophical companion, one of his means to think as other 
than Deleuze who is thinking: a philosopher who has died and returned to the manner of the 
world and to the art of thoughts about it. This is a philosopher of difference and complexity, 
for whom resonance rather than explication is the basis of philosophical engagement. Artists 
and filmmakers are not necessarily philosophers, although they do think with images and 
objects and with sounds. Here, the text and the films attempt to do film as an art practice of 
philosophy. And so a Cinema into the Real involves following a heuristic technique of 
placing ideas into the movement of making, and arriving at announcements (whether
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meaningful or not) by a process of trial and error rather than through a set of rules or by way 
of dialectical, Hegelian deduction. This heuristic approach recognizes doing as an embodied 
form of thinking. It does not constitute a rigorous methodology and is opposed to scientific 
deductive methods. We go wrong. The film is ahead of those who are making it and then 
either lost or interwoven with the contingency of its own making.
The filmmaker who attempts to work outside of schema brings together, in crystalline 
form, elements of the film in progress with unregulated powers of falsity, notes and 
sketches.20 This text follows intensities and networks of idea. At times there are irrational 
thought-cuts and voice breaks in the body of the text and a multitude of voices speak between 
and over each other: the academic argument; quotes from theorists and filmmakers; 
observations from the time of shooting; unannounced and freely indirect text lapses that 
switch between subjective and objective points of view. Throughout the document the font 
switches from Times New Roman to Courier New to point to the interplay between academic 
voice and the text as personal voice or art expression (courier is also the standard font for film 
scripts). In places I adopt a model of writing that is based on accumulated knowledge; at other 
times the intensities gain impetus and the ideas emerge, from the place of making, where they 
are not-yet theorized or concluded. This is what I understand by the term rhizome coined by 
Deleuze and Guattari, perhaps their most radical proposition: the between state of affect, the 
movement of thought before the thinker has contained it, that which rises from inspiration and 
has not yet slumped into declaration or completion.
It is for this reason that I have included within the text notebook entries, 
commentaries from observers, and why I have treated the films as thoughts in themselves, as 
continuations of, and companions to, the written argument. It is in this way that a film can 
become a venue for debate as well as a friend that can help us think thought. The space of 
writing (writing a film; writing this text) is not so readily open to becoming as filmmaking. 
There are ways of thinking in film and there are ways of thinking in writing, and although
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they are not readily compatible, these differing spaces are not incompossible. And so I 
approach here the 'telling' of the films I have produced in crystalline form, rather than 
observing teleological events or an historical unfolding. This is how they were made, by 
creating tears in the fabric of the documentary and interruptions in the ordering of fictional 
exposition. Instead of describing the content of the films, I draw attention to the various 
procedural, spatial and temporal attributes to each. As the text progresses it begins to drift in 
itself, involving note-form and speculative ideas in the self-consciously unfinished chapter on 
The Film We Didn't Make (Scene 12) and a thought for the cinema played out into incendiary 
absurdity in Scene 13, provocatively titled The Film To Come.
This research looks towards a nature of film (both actual, possible and not-yet 
possible) that enables new thought. Every time we make something, or react intuitively to an 
encounter, we experience a new thought, and yet the producers of cinema and television 
production work to deny this agency. The process of filmmaking (unlike painting, or playing 
a musical instrument) is so hyper-schematized and procedural that the filmmaker rarely gets 
to be in the practice of making films.21 The tactic I have developed for the realization of 
moving images de-emphasizes the primacy of a completed film object and instead thinks in 
cinema and lives the everyday of a film in the making as it unfolds. This is to place film in 
front of one's self as a destination, and to generate a text that is not yet the film but is, rather, 
the life that is die film as it is being made. Such a tactic gives privilege to the bodies of the 
cast and crew (who are in the pre-filmic space), the film and video apparatus, the body of the 
film during its assemblage (including its cinematic detritus), and the bodies of the viewer and 
the screen. By adopting a tactic of drifting, away from schema or plan, and by renting space 
in the place of the other (the place of the institutions of art, cinema and of the documentary), I 
have been able to occupy a film form of making do. What follows is a drift, an absence even, 
through the between that is filmmaking, offering another film subject matter: the actuality of 
experiencing mediation and of occupying the interval between the actual and the invented.
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1 Borges writes that 'the College of Cartographers evolved a Map of the Empire that was of the same Scale as the 
Empire and that coincided with it point for point' (Jorges Luis Borges, O f Exactitude in Science: 131, in A 
Universal History o f Infamy, London: Penguin, 1984). Borges advocated stealing, re-appropriating and 
misappropriating ideas in literature and may have appropriated this idea from Bellman's blank map of the sea in 
Lewis Caroll's The Hunting o f the Snark.
2 In What is Philosophy? (1991) Deleuze and Guattari stated that philosophy needs conceptual personae who are 
philosophical friends to the thinker. The philosopher is in fact the concept's friend; she or he is the conduit for, and 
the potentiality of, the concept.
3 In the two cinema books, Deleuze identifies two modem periods in the cinema, the first, which he identifies as 
the movement-image, roughly spans the first thirty years of the medium. The second modem Deleuze identifies as 
the time-image, and this occurs in the ten or so years following the trauma of the Second World War.
4 Nooshock is an image of thought which produces a shock to thought (my definition).
5 According to Massumi, who draws upon the philosophical works of Deleuze, affects exert a bodily shock and 
hold the key to 'rethinking postmodern power after ideology' (Massumi 2002: 42). In our image-saturated world, 
the power of images produces the forces that potentialize, transfer and change, and in which the affect is able to 
induce the 'new,' wherever such potential might be revealed. One arena where this 'new* might be perceivable is in 
experimental films, where our recognition becomes strained to its edges, to the limits of our perception. The will 
becomes a zone of vector forces that invent the landscapes of thought-events and then, in an opposing move, 
deterritorialize and break open these thought-events in artistic explosion.
A
The term Tiodological space' is derived from the Greek word Tiodos', meaning path or way. In contrast to the 
mathematical concept of space as presented on maps, plans, etc. Tiodological space' is based on the factual 
topological, physical, social, and psychological conditions a person is faced with on the way from point A to point 
B, whether in an open landscape or within urban or architectural conditions. Deleuze speaks of a pre-hodological 
space, which he associates with the young child, where spatial and temporal properties are not yet fixed or defined. 
7 In Ethics (Works of Spinoza V.II [1955]) Spinoza defines affect as the modifications of the body whereby the 
active power of the said body s increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such 
modification' (Spinoza [1955]: 130). In Matter and Memory (Bergson 1911: 60) Henri Bergson develops Spinoza's 
link between cognition and affect. Deleuze (1991) uses the term affect to describe the state in which the thinking 
subject has lost any distinction between exteriority and inferiority, between before and after. This state of affect is 
ordinarily brought about by a shock.
p
See the text Caught up in Loops in the appendices.
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9 By the film theory paradigm I mean the use of psychoanalytic, linguistic, semiotic and Marxist theories as tools 
to analyze and/or deconstruct the film as text. Film theory began as psychoanalytical but progressed to 
phenomenological readings before shifting towards textual, semiotic and economic analysis. In the past decade 
there has been a return to embodied attitudes. Raymond Bellour argues that the cinema is in fact an unattainable 
text, and that the goal of film theory to find methods for interpreting the cinema-as-text, can therefore never be 
completed (Bellour. [1975] 2000). Certainly Deleuze wants nothing to do with structural semiotics, or with 
analysis for that matter, and makes no distinction between avant-garde film (and video), documentary or fiction 
features, if each practice retains the use of montage as the means of linking indirect images of time. He therefore 
replaces a platonic version of history with a genealogical approach (after Foucault), using parody and powers of 
the false to proliferate a theory of film and film histoiy that never has its goal the reduction of cinema to 
constituent parts or stable meanings. Raymond Bellour writing about Deleuze's philosophy, quotes Roland 
Barthes, 'the novelistic without the novel,' linking this description to Deleuze's mobilization of concepts, which he 
believes give a novelistic rather than a historical account of the cinema (Bellour 1997).
10 Gilles Deleuze (2001) Pure Immanence, Essays on a Life.
11 'Becoming' is Deleuze's term for when an identity is divorced from history and embraces a state of change which 
produces an opening on to what Bergson named the plane o f immanence.
12 See Robert Stam, Robert Burgoyne and Sandy Flitterman-Lewis (1992) for a comprehensive breakdown of these 
cinema codes, principally those postulated by Christian Metz.
13 These are what de Certeau calls 'cross-cuts, fragments, cracks and lucky strikes in the framework of a system' 
(deCerteau 1984).
14 The phrase '...on the complex ways in which cinema interacts with life' is borrowed from Godfrey Cheshire, 
Abbas Kiarostami: A Cinema o f Questions. 1996 41-42.
15 For example, categories for the factual moving image are limited to the documentary; the news report; the 
political feature; the video diary; the cinematic essay; and, at a stretch, the film poem. At a 2007 conference at 
Loughborough University called The Cinematic Essay the entire plenary session was devoted to the question: 
What is a cinematic essay?
16 The Eternal Frame is a videotaped reenactment of the assassination of John F. Kennedy. The comment came in 
response to the question What are you making here?' posed by a passer-by.
17 Grosz adds that What the scientific spirit seems unable to tolerate is its own will to power, its own reactive 
requirement of the freezing of (biological or temporal) becoming into the form of knowable being, determinable 
identity, predictable structure - the impulse of much contemporary Darwinism' (Grosz 2004: 111).
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18 B. Narahari Rao (1994: 8) writing on Ryle, suggests that 'one has to find a way of presenting the thesis that 
exemplifies the thesis, i.e. for the reader the process of coming to understand the thesis must be such that he 
simultaneously comes to appreciate the insight meant to be conveyed by it.'
19 According to Deleuze and Guattari, in What is Philosophy? (1991), three elements are needed to do philosophy: 
the spiritual automaton (non-habitual, machinic thought); the plane of immanence (the space for becoming; the 
arena for new thought; and the conceptual persona (an intermediary agent with which to generate thought).
20 Robin Nelson, speaking at the Articulating Media As Research conference (South Bank University 2005), uses 
the film The Divine Horsemen: The Living Gods o f Haiti (Maya Deren, Teiji Ito, Cherel Winett Ito 1985) as an 
example of how the social sciences triangulation model can accommodate embodied knowledge. The practitioner 
sits at the top comer of the triangle with tacit knowledge of art (as intention) and unfolding phenomenological 
experience. In the bottom left comer is the artists’ critical reflection of their tacit knowledge, and also of events 
and outcomes as they arise. In the bottom right comer is the conceptual framework for the art that is being made. 
All comers of the triangle are knowledge producing and at the centre of the triangle is the artwork itself. There are 
constant relational encounters between each comer, and also, with outside elements (for example, changes in the 
artists’ personal life). Maya Deren travels to Haiti, in the established role of avant-garde and ethnographic 
filmmaker. She shoots numerous reels on location, but also keeps a detailed notebook, filled with diaiy entries to 
do with African ritual dance and her own experience. When combined, the notebooks and the potential film (the 
film rushes) become an embodied, practised theory of filmmaking. In fact The Divine Horsemen was edited by 
Teiji Ito and Cherel Winett Ito after Deren's death, assembled on the basis of her notebooks. Nelson argues that 
process of art when intertwined with its object and the documentation of its making (including hesitancies and 
revisions) equals practice as research, and any art object is lacking a dimension if the process and context of its 
making is not evident in some way in its final outcome.
21 The result of this is that many do not feel that they are filmmakers unless they are in the act of making a film.
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WOMAN
You're staring again.
MAN
I feel awkward. 1 don't know what I'm supposed to be doing.
The WOMAN s ta r e s  a t  him . He lo o k s  e x tr e m e ly  s h in y , ( b e t t e r  g ra d in g )  
and e v e n ly  l i t ,  i n  p e r f e c t  fo c u s .
WOMAN
Say that again.
MAN
( s t i l t e d )
I - I don't say anything now.
WOMAN
Don't you think the way you talk is false? Listen to you.
The MAN s ta n d s  up. Lens f l a r e  d i s t o r t s  h i s  fa c e  a s  he a p p ea rs  to  be
r e - la c e d  i n t o  a p r o je c to r .  -The WOMAN hoarc  coughing o f f  camera  *
She ta k e s  th e  MAN'S head i n  h e r  hands and k i s s e s  h im , 
c la s p in g  h i s  fa c e  -  u s in g  th e  k i s s  to  g e t  c lo s e  enough to  w h isp e r .
WOMAN
Sssh.
MAN
I - I don't say anything now.
WOMAN
-sshhh! There is someone here.. I am not making it up.
The WOMAN p la c e s  h e r  hand o ve r  h i s  mouth (h er  v id e o  hand a g a in s t  
h i s  f i l m  fa c e ) .  She lo o k s  around th e room s u s p i c io u s l y  a s  sh e  edges  
him  a lo n g , a lm o s t as though he i s  h e r  c a p t iv e .
WOMAN
Sshh. Stop. Stop- don't do anything.
She lo o k s  a c r o s s  th e  room, h e r  f e a tu r e s  q u iv e r in g  in  a v id e o  p a u se  
in  which th e  v e r t i c a l  h o ld  ju d d e r s .  S lo w ly  th e  door r e - p o s i t i o n s  
i t s e l f  a ja r ,  to  a g a f f e r  c r o s s  on th e  c a r p e t .  The WOMAN g la n c e s  
back a t  th e  MAN. He i s  p a u sed  a b s o lu t e ly  s t i l l .  H is image b e g in s  to  
m e lt  i n  th e  l i g h t  o f  th e  f i l m  p r o je c to r  b u lb .  The WOMAN sh a k e s  him . 
The MAN ju d d e r s  i n t o  m o tio n , s c r a tc h e d  and fa d e d  -  an o ld  f i l m  
p r i n t ,  w ith  c u ts  and j o i n s .  H is  so u n d tra ck  w arps. H is body s l i p s  in  
th e  p r o je c to r  g a te ,  r e v e a l in g  b la c k  sp a c e r . He s t e a d ie s  h im s e l f .
WOMAN
Are you all right? You look exhausted.
MAN
I don't feel well.
A c la p p e r-b o a rd  c la p s  i n  f r o n t  o f  him and he f l i n c h e s .
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Act 1, Sc 2. Compression - the establishment of a classical cinema form
There's something wrong with the position of things.
(The Woman, O f Camera)
1895. L'arrivee d'un train a la Ciotat (Lumiere Brothers). The moving image arrives as 
an eruption for cognition, both thought-like and world-like in its arrangement, an anomaly for the 
brain, a gap in perceptual regulation that makes a fissure in thought possible by way of a virtual 
plane, where time is given within time and space within space. It was this trick of resemblance 
(principally through the medium's indexical properties) that, when coupled with persuasive 
narrative forms, gave the cinema such tremendous psychological, cultural and economic power. 
The staged play, the touring sideshow and magic show, the literary narrative, renaissance 
perspective and other aspects of the visual arts combine in the cinema to form a peculiar and 
phantasmagorical captive space for our senses. But this is an art form whose temporality is most 
unlike the rising and lowering of theatre backdrops, or the recital of a musical score - a film can 
be freeze-framed and still remain legible, whereas a stage play or music track cannot. Above all 
other influences, it is the particular directions photographic technologies took towards the end of 
the nineteenth century that most significantly shaped the cinematic form. Muybridge's 
photographic mobile sections and Marey's slices of marine time are the root of the twenty-four 
frames per second cinematographic mechanism - Zeno's paradox at last given form, in autopsy. 
Time is under the knife. The cinema, beneath the apparel of the theatre and other high and low 
culture, is a machine for devastating time, for suspending and reanimating its flow. Its greatest 
capability is the denaturing of the lived world, from the place of bearing a striking likeness to it. 
Let us first of all give our attention to the conventions developed for taming this rogue 
temporality, before moving on to the potential for affect in such rogue moving-image 
arrangements, and the possible methods available to moving image makers for overcoming what I 
will argue is the trap of resemblance.
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Perhaps the most striking convention the cinema adopted in its infancy was its general 
attitude towards temporal distension. As William Uricchio has stated, the history of early cinema 
is in fact the sustained suppression of cinematographic temporal anomalies in relation to the lived 
world (Uricchio. 1997: 6-81). Concepts and invented applications for cinematic liveness, 
simultaneity, time-extensivity, and the unaltered durations of actuality that sprang up in the last 
part of the nineteenth century were all quickly passed over by film producers, in favour of 
canned, truncated, end-of-the-pier styled plots. Words such as ’canned,' 'truncated,1 and 'sutured' 
(the stitching together of spaces in time) connote a body forced into being and required to fit, and 
this is one way in which we might look upon die rapid advancements and modifications to 
cinema technology over the period of the medium's first twenty-five years: as a potential that 
became customized at the behest of forces that found little commercial value in irregularity. This 
was a concerted effort to develop an identifiable cinematic 'proper1, a mechanism that could tame 
and regulate the profound displacement produced by the cinema's acoustic and optical presence 
but physical absence.
This is what Tom Gunning refers to as the 'new sense of anxiety' (Gunning 1990: 58-592), 
brought about by the medium. One example of this anxiety is the much mythologized account of 
an audience running from an auditorium when confronted with the Lumiere Brothers' image of a 
train approaching. As David Rodowick has proposed, rather than the threat of impact provoking 
the audience to react with fear, it might have been the experience of witnessing a 'cut' in space, 
tearing the viewer's perception from one shot of time and space to another through the end of one 
shot and beginning of the next (Rodowick 1997). The 'cut' heralded a new fragmentation of time, 
a fragmentation that had to be rendered as subordinate to movement in order to delimit audience 
distress. Actions, movements and narratives were needed to bridge what was always at origin a 
shock to thought: the edit interval. Therefore, Action imperatives formed the basis of classical 
cinema, where any wayward movement was recognized and corrected. No sooner than the cinema 
emerges, than its movement in time is delivered to the viewer as sensible.
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I can no longer think what I want, the moving images are substituted for my own
thoughts.
(Georges Duhamel, quoted in Deleuze 1989: 166)
The producers of cinema quickly looked for a closed set of innovations that would 
constitute this cinematic proper - a system that could either contain or erase the absences and 
aberrant qualities of the moving image. Syntaxes of looks and joins were formulated by 
filmmakers, who developed specific formats for stories that would suspend the minds of the 
audience whilst giving momentum and structural integrity to the film as a unit. This 
superimposed syntax included the suturing of shot to reverse-shot, the evolution of complex 
levels of narration, and the deployment of tried and tested narrative arcs which are all now 
familiar to us as 'cinematic.' A mental form of consumption was produced for the audience, so 
that a large portion of thinking is already being done by the film text, as story, and as mise-en- 
scene. What Deleuze terms the action-image, or movement-image, became a viewing habit, and 
the semiotics of cinema a set of approximate signs. It is as though producers and directors formed 
a mutual agreement with the collective viewer: we will regard cinema as having a language if you 
do, especially as it suits our apparatus. And yet there is nothing rational or linguistically sensible 
about the way in which the cinematograph conjures movement from a series of still images, or 
abbreviates time and conflates topographies. Rationality is something that was impressed upon 
the moving image, with the compression of lived experience into scenarios populated by 
recognizable faces, and reinforced by what Eisenstein termed 'impossible continuities' of 
movement in space and time, where the camera is always where it must be, a perfect eye that 
disregards architectural order and physical or temporal causation. The invention of the edit made 
day become night, far become near, tomorrow become yesterday, perception become recollection, 
all in an instant. Once cameras became light and portable enough to leave behind the fixed, front­
on view of the shooting stage, the jib crane and dolly brought omnipotent movements and 
positioning to the image. We do not question the movements of a camera on a crane or moving 
smoothly along a track because the film as a text is thinking and acting for us, along a teleological 
continuum that, although not sensible from the outside, appears to have sense during the act of
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viewing. The frame of this cinematic proper is psychologically acceptable, even though it is 
rarely or never physically possible within either the on-screen diegesis3 or the world of our own 
experience. Not one of the aberrant attributes listed above has a correlate in the lived world and 
yet these new shifts and movements were rarely articulated as phantasmagorical values in 
themselves; seldom do we find an instance in this period where a shot tracks through space 
simply because it can. The cinema's wild utterances, what Marinetti, in his 1916 Manifesto on 
Film, celebrated as the 'anti-graceful, deforming, impressionistic, synthetic, dynamic, free- 
wording14 properties of the moving image, were systematically made to speak reasonably. And so 
the cinema as an idiom became naturalized to consciousness.
Although experimentation for the most part was determined by political and economic 
pressures, ideological beliefs, psychological suggestion, and the consensus that the cinema be a 
popular form of entertainment, the rate of innovation in the moving image between the turn of the 
century and the mid-1920s is nonetheless remarkable, perhaps unparalleled by any other 
emergent form in the history of art. In Edwin S. Porter there is the discovery of the syntactical 
unit of cinema as the shot (rather than the theatrical scene), and the groundbreaking invention of 
crosscutting. His re-edit of The Life o f the American Fireman (1903) took concurrent events that, 
previously, were situated before and after one another in the timeline of the film, and made them 
appear parallel to one another. This is now one of the most familiar tropes of the fiction film. The 
'narrator system' (Gunning 1990) found its form in the logically unfolding screen spaces of D.W. 
Griffith's films, where the film operates as though told to us, providing select information, 
binding space through corrected eye line matches, and extending space into concurrent activities 
and flashbacks whose use and arrangement is always sensible. We observe that time palpably 
lapses in Georges Meli&s' films, images are condensed, dissolved and superimposed. Meli&s was 
one of the first to identify the inherent difference between screen-time and real-time, a difference 
that he recognized could lead to misrepresentation. The camera takes on a vibrant physicality in 
the work of F.W. Mumau, strapped to moving objects, distorted by mirrors; it was Mumau who 
discovered the first and third person camera, which was pivotal in terms of generating a narrative
style still observed by Hollywood today, a century later. In short, an encyclopedia of cinematic 
effects was written, not only for die shot but also for its assemblage. Lev Kuleshov developed the 
metaphorical and associative power of montage, noting that shot-to-shot relations could create 
unity in the mind of the viewer even though the image sources were not always themselves 
contiguous. Kuleshov's student Eisenstein made a behavioural science of dialectical montage, 
what he called a 'montage of attractions' that would assure specific thought responses in the 
viewer. This is why Deleuze dubs Eisenstein cinema's Hegel. His five-tier system of montage: 
metric, rhythmic, tonal, over-tonal and intellectual, deployed a form of dialectical montage as 
Kabuki series (borrowing from the Japanese pictogram). These series, Eisenstein declared in The 
Film Form (Eisenstein 1949), would produce chains of conditioned reflexes in the viewer, a 
comprehensive theory of film editing constructed for the education of minds, what Eisenstein 
termed the 'potentialities of dialectical development' (Eisenstein 1949: 55).s Battleship Potemkin 
(1925) contained 1346 shots, more than twice that of an average Hollywood feature of the same 
length, and advanced hitherto unknown sensations resulting from the cut.
All of these filmmakers have in common the fact that they regarded the cinematograph as 
a tool for mental and emotional persuasion, and each, to varying degrees, attempted to develop a 
model for production that would suspend customary mental activity and elicit specific thoughts in 
the minds of the viewers. In Gilles Deleuze’s Time-Machine, David Rodowick elects Buster 
Keaton’s Sherlock Jnr (1924) as emblematic of a classical cinema that had 'perfected its 
geometry of forms, its logic of spatiotemporal exposition and its “laws” for linking up actions 
through montage' (Rodowick 1997: 3). Keaton’s character Sherlock Jnr is a down on his luck film 
projectionist who, in one famous sequence, falls asleep at the projector and ethereally enters the 
film he is projecting. In his analysis of this sequence, Rodowick describes how Keaton’s on­
screen activities from shot to shot are linked not by diegetic physical logic but rather by a 
'rational' division based entirely on action and movement. Sherlock becomes quite literally 
carried along by each edit, so that, for example, we see him stand up on a rock in the sea and dive 
into the water, only to be 'cut' to a winter landscape, where his body plunges into snow. This
sequence is the logical extreme of physically incommensurable spaces connected through an 
interval that is the edit and by the imperative of character action, through narrative progression.
As Rodowick observes, the fact that audiences identified fully with the movement of a 
character, rather than concentrating on the incommensurable slicing of space, assured filmmakers 
that 'the continuous unfolding of adjacent spaces' would not be received as abstraction or as 
skews in temporality (Rodowick 1997: 3). In Sherlock Jnr, irrational arrangements are made 
rational through movement linkages, always subordinate to a rhythmic totality. Sherlock may be 
passing through impossibilities, but the method of his physical conduct is that of edits which are 
consistent within a closed set. His objective as a character presents a plane of identification 
superior to the on-screen irrationality. And so, although extraordinarily sophisticated on a level of 
experimentation with the possibilities of the medium, ultimately the experiment is contained. 
That is not to say that this period is without exceptions. Germaine Dulac, for instance, in The 
Seashell and the Clergyman (1928), which was conceived by Antonin Artaud, executed an 
impressive array of camera movements, lens alterations, and melodic first person editing in order 
to convey disorientation and uncertainty.6 But predominantly the ambiguous mental and spatial 
relations made possible by the cinematograph and the edit interval remained either under­
explored or subservient to narrative, which became the normative element. Moreover, the system 
for producing narrative unity in the cinema sought compatibility with the preexistent system for 
producing cognitive unity in the viewer’s mind.
Cinema is the sole experience where time is given to me as perception.
(Jean Louis Schefer 19807)
'The Mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind' wrote Henri 
Bergson, who used the cinematographic apparatus as an analogy for how the intellect arrives at a 
comprehension of reality (Bergson 1907: 332). Bergson's philosophy states that reality is 
movement itself; there is no discontinuity between consciousness and matter because all matter is 
in a constant flux of becoming along what Bergson terms a plane o f immanence, which is
39
duration, 'Matter [...] is an aggregate of "images." And by "images" we mean a certain existence 
which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the 
realist calls a thing - an existence placed halfway between the "thing" and the "representation"' 
(Bergson 1911: 9). It is only our perception that produces immobility and immutability in forms, 
for, beneath the apparatus of our own perception, matter, as it emerges in time, is an infinite sheet 
of an interwoven material, a sheet that we, as perceivers, are only separated from by our habitual 
thoughts. Bergson gave this instrument for perceptual separation the name sensory-motor schema, 
what Zi2ek has called a distorting screen that always 'falsifies' our access to external reality.8
The sensory-motor schema is close to something Bergson terms habitual recognition; 
through perception and action a person is always looking to progress productively, and progress 
comes through making approximate causal links based on prior experience. The sensory-motor 
schema is a spatialising mechanism that adapts the body to the erratic nature of image 
movements, a cause-and-effect tool used by the brain to regulate the signs presented by the lived 
world, separating and then re-connecting consciousness with matter, re-presenting sense as 
meaningful data by projecting pre-existing order onto sense perceptions.9 This act of necessary 
compression,10 given the obvious scale of available sense material, performs a ‘written’ of the 
real that edits out pure duration, and the image thus constantly sinks to the state of cliche, 
reconstituted as approximation, precisely so that we do not perceive everything (everything being 
the sheet of matter and time which is Bergsonian immanence). Deleuze writes: 'The sensory- 
motor schema effectively retains from the thing only what interests us or what extends into the 
reaction of a character [...] it is grass in general that interests the herbivore [...] It is in this sense 
that the sensory-motor schema is an agent of abstraction' (Deleuze 1989: 4511). So, too, is the 
cinema an agent of abstraction, more exact and more predictable than the real world, an 
arrangement of orderly units prescribing a response. Bergson disparages any commonality 
between film and the intellect; he states that both systems take 'snapshots of reality,' each forming 
habitual representations rather than intuitive ones, editing out 'the form which the succession of
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our conscious state assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its 
present state from its former state' (Bergson 1889: 100).
Normative classical cinema reinforces a mode of lived time that came into being around 
the beginning of the twentieth century, when time took on a particular palpability following the 
advent of industrial timekeeping. As Mary Ann Doane states in The Emergence o f Cinematic 
Time, '"temporality" was structured in modernity' (Doane 2003: 4). Industrial time, labour time, 
the wristwatch, and the classical cinema are all markers for a normative bracket of experience. 
The very duration of the commercial feature film is an agreement in time, with its optimum one 
hundred minutes. By extending the subordination of time to movement, the developing narrative 
cinema replicated the logic of the sensory-motor schema. It is for this reason that Bergson did not 
regard the cinematographic process as having anything to do with duration. Like his model of 
habitual thought, its technology involved a before and after lineage, the result of which could 
only ever be clichd Bergson said that the real life of cinema is in the motor of the projector, not 
in the film. His comprehensive dislike of cinema was predominantly material (photographic); he 
did not like the conception of static frames advanced by a machine to produce the illusion of 
movement. The cinema, for Bergson, was nothing but a sub-standard replica of the 
commonsensible mind, a purveyor of crude sensations titillating the viewer with the pleasure of 
being presented with apparent coherence. Commonly, habitually, we experience pleasure when 
presented with coherence and continuity, which, in the cinematic transaction, is given in story 
form. The structuring and articulation of cinema evolved in line with the most pleasurable and 
compatible form of reception, that which perpetually looks for order and for recognizable 
movement. We experience displeasure at unresolved things, for example, when a story is 
interrupted or left unfinished, and so a classical film works to re-clarify and resolve events. It 
labours to maintain spatial properties, always in terms of the human, or, more accurately, the 
more than human. Classic film narrative involves constructed characters operating in accordance 
with narrative directives, their movements called into action in response to direct situations, with 
all superfluity removed. Similarly the mechanism of the sensory-motor schema has taken control
of aberrant movement, so much so that it has become the most routine kind within our everyday 
perception. The 'sameness' of the sensory-motor schema is extended and completed in the 
sameness of the cliched film text - the cinema impresses a regularity onto its shots that is in many 
ways consistent with a regulated nature of thought in the mind of the viewer. Bergson's turn away 
from the medium in this respect is prophetic in terms of the turn dominant cinema made away 
from the aberrant and transformative, towards the habitual and proscriptive.12 Action comes in 
response to stimulation but is informed by association; movement is that which responds to being 
moved, where perception, through affection, becomes action. The movement-image closes down 
the possibility for an affect-based response, which, in Deleuze is a movement in response to a 
movement before such a transaction can be mastered by thought. Although we as viewers are 
continually offered what Deleuze calls affection images - the most striking among affection 
images being the emoting human face, seen in close-up, in the Hollywood star system13 - there is 
very little or no possibility for a reactive, fluid movement of thought or of body, for the face 
registers as meaningful almost instantaneously, owing to its position in relation to the following 
and the preceding shot. This is why films lacking characters in close-up often fail to emotionally 
engage an audience, but instead provide space for thought.
Deleuze maintains that the sensory-motor schema had no precedent frame of reference 
when first confronted with the movement and the interval of the moving image, and so it created 
two systems, or new signs, what he calls noosigns. The first sign was tamed and made compatible 
with the movement-image, an image that, for Deleuze, has long been an exhausted one, but one 
that endures through repetition in capitalism. According to Deleuze the first modem of the 
cinema, which spanned thirty years (what Deleuze refers to as the civilization of the cliche), 
defaulted to generic ideas of an unconscious, simplifying the lived world and making generic 
assertions as to the nature of its inhabitants. As Virginia Woolf said in her disapproving and 
astute remark on the cinema, 'All of romance is reduced to the image of a kiss.' The trick of 
classical cinema is to use sleights-of-hand that erase the origin of their articulation as they 
proceed, producing engagement based on a familiarity of content and the utilizing of absent
signs.14 This is the cinema of persuasions and manipulations, which provokes Deleuze to group 
together Hitler and Hollywood, Eisenstein and Griffith, Soviet Realism and Capitalist hegemony. 
Paul Virilio, too, regards the movement image as being linked from the very beginning to the 
organization of war, state propaganda, fascism, an apparatus whose thoughts follow a 
predetermined path, one which leads ultimately to civil control. This cinema helped manufacture 
an image of a nation or of a State, together with an image of a people, and, the mode of thought 
and consumption of such a people, who are ultimately the servants of that nation or State: 
Newsreel footage; Leni Riefenstahl's The Triumph o f the Will (1935); the fear-mongering public 
information film Duck and Cover, Dick Tracy...
Deleuze takes from Bergson the concept of immanence and tries to find its existence, or 
at least its possibility, in the moving image. He discovers in Antonin Artaud a fervent voice of 
dissent against classical cinema. Artaud was fascinated by the idea of cinema as a kind of 
automated thought quite different to that of Eisenstein's dialectical montage, or the Surrealists' 
celebration of the cinema as hallucination. He writes, 'I shall not try to excuse the apparent 
inconsistency by the facile subterfuge of dreams' (Artaud 1976: 20). Artaud believed that 
Eisenstein, Bufiuel and Dulac were misguided in their models of montage and their depictions of 
mental states and interior self-representations (Artaud famously fell out with Germaine Dulac 
over her realisation of his screenplay for The Seashell and the Clergyman). He wrote a number of 
inflammatory texts on the cinema, outlining several existing types of film: dramatic Cinema 
(where poetry is suppressed); the Documentary (which was also lacking in poetry); the Cinema 
itself (which is yet to come). He stipulated that cinema must avoid two pitfalls: abstract 
experimental cinema (which was developing at the time of his writing) and commercial figurative 
cinema (as exemplified by Hollywood).15 'The human skin of things, the derm of reality -  this is 
the cinema’s first toy. It exalts matter and makes it appear to us in its profound spirituality, in its 
relationship with the mind from which it emerges' writes Artaud (1976: 21). What Artaud was 
looking for in his Cinema o f Cruelty, he eventually gave up on. Deleuze discovers what he 
believes Artaud had envisioned, in the post-war era: a cinema capable of provoking thought other
than into a tired realism or an image of the unconscious. He calls this time-image cinema, a 
fundamentally new form of editing based on irrational intervals. Deleuze outlines this irrational 
time-image as 'the unsummonable of Welles; the inexplicable of Robbe-Grillet; the undecidable 
of Resnais; the impossible of Marguerite Duras; the incommensurable of Godard (between two 
things)' (Deleuze 1989: 182). These attitudes and fragmented assemblages constitute a second 
modernism in Cinema, in which it is agreed that neither time, nor history, nor interiority can be 
represented, and where, rather than closed, the whole of the film is open and placed in direct 
relation to the outside; the pressures of time and the very limits of the medium are felt within and 
around the frame. This second noosign, however, appears in shocked response to the cinema of 
the time-image. This nooshock is time itself - a sign created by the movement of a rogue spiritual 
automaton (Deleuze borrows the term from Spinoza16) within the mind of the viewer - a cognitive 
machine of thought whose potential is precisely that of the cinema of displacement. Spiritual 
automata are the linkages of ideas, as they invent one another in the mind, outside of the 
psychological consciousness or the identity of the thinker. In their emergent form they are 
therefore not systemic or comparable to a self or to consciousness. The first nooshock produced a 
spiritual automaton that was contained and 'became fascist man' (Deleuze 1987: 164). The second 
nooshock let loose a spiritual automaton on the world that creates time-images which are free to 
roam as not-yet-thoughts. They have the propensity to take the thinking viewer closer to an 
immanence of unthought.
This is the regime of universal variation, which goes beyond the limits of the sensory- 
motor schema to a non-human world where movement equals matter, or else in the 
direction of a superhuman world which speaks for a new spirit... What has happened is 
that the sensory-motor schema is no longer in operation, but at the same time it is not 
overtaken or overcome. It is shattered from the inside. That is, perceptions and actions 
ceased to be linked together, and spaces are now neither co-ordinated nor filled.
(Deleuze 1987: 40)
Although the manifestation of time-images is uncommon, Deleuze seems to suggest that 
they are latent within all movement-images, in transitions and spatial impossibilities, and that 
they are available to consciousness if the nature of thought in relation to the image is changed.
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For Deleuze it is the time-image that will reclaim the very aberrations and discontinuities the 
movement-image sought to deny, and release the mind from rational thought in the film 
spectatorship dynamic. It is the unmotivated edits and instances of pure duration within such a 
cinema, and its capacity for suspending and interrupting habitual thought, that arouses Deleuze's 
interest so greatly. How can one think thought in relation to its temporality, Deleuze's philosophy 
asks, and what is it that calls forth thinking?17 One method is cinema, in that film  can help us 
think thought, provided that it resists thinking for us. These then are Deleuze's two cine-semiotics: 
the movement-image, which is Hegelian, dialectical, and always couched as a totality; and the 
time-image, which 'messes with time,' resists proscriptive thoughts via dialectical montage and 
instead is irrational and directed towards an open-whole, where uncommon and new thoughts are 
possible.
The actions of the movement-image derive from a belief in the possibility of action (its 
supremacy) and the stability of Truth. Deleuze argues that with the scarring events of WWII this 
belief changes. This, he says, can be evidenced in Italian neo-realism, which presented a crisis in the 
cinema of action, shooting the any-spaces-whatever (Deleuze 1989) of bombed-out Europe, and 
showing to audiences the changed psyche of the human being.18 Neorealism made way for a new 
cinema, one that was not bound by action or movement but instead broke with the dictates of 
narrative to explore pure optical and aural situations, and direct images of time. In Rossellini's 
Stromboli (1949), new narrative situations appear at the point where reality is represented as an 
empty space or a missing part (the tuna fish sequence, for example, which, in its graphic horror, tears 
the character and our engagement away from stable ground). Movement is repeated and repeated and 
then brought to a standstill in Maya Deren's Ritual in Transfigured Time (1945-6) and Alain Resnais' 
Last Year at Marienbad (1961). In Welles we find crystalline temporalities {The Trial; Citizen Kane), 
where the story eternally divides and divides again, into the past and the future, now a Nietzschean 
discourse, where the edit as a hook for consciousness is no longer cogent. Time is delivered as a- 
centred and crystalline in Andrei Tarkovsky's Mirror (1974) and Nicholas Roeg's Don't Look Now 
(1973), or as a singularity, where motion and history are merely mental relations, in Chris Marker's
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often quoted La jetee (1962). Aberration within the world-like and thought-like apparatus of these 
film texts creates disruption in the mind regulating that text; the dialectical relationship is lost, 
although not entirely, as is the case in structural-materialist and abstract film. In the itinerant form of 
Rossellini, Antonioni, Akerman or the crystalline and repetitive rendering of events in Resnais, 
Welles, and Duras, Deleuze finds nonsensical gaps and wayward camera orientation, where sheets of 
present, past and future co-mingle and the film itself seems to wander from any ruse of centrality, 
now almost a consciousness itself, but one with amnesia.
If Bergson, Nietzsche and Spinoza are among Deleuze's philosophical forebears, Pasolini, 
Deren and Tarkovsky are the practitioners of his thoughts, generating cinema as poetry, rendering 
reality with reality, deploying a free and indirect discourse of cinematic speech-acts where it is no 
longer possible to discern between the subjective experience of the character and the director's 
expression, and where sequences frequently cut between fictional and actual elements. The 
action/reaction schema of the movement-image here begins to break down, the Newtonian Universe 
is cast out, and orderly time is fragmented like so many facets of a shattered crystal. The time-image 
disconnects from the activity of correcting aberration within movement, and in doing so creates a 
shift or rupture in the sensory-motor schema, which, as Deleuze puts it, tears a real image from 
cliche. In the time-image, the Whole is open and it belongs to time. 'If our sensory-motor schema jam 
or break, then a different type of image can appear: a pure optical-sound image, the whole image 
without metaphor, brings out the thing in itself, literally, in its excess of horror or beauty, in its 
radical or unjustifiable character’ (Deleuze 1987: 21). This cinema has an errant composition, one 
that denies the viewer purchase through narrative and reveals instead the originating subject and the 
goal of art, which is thought - not the representation of thought, nor the taming of thought, but an 
opening onto 'what does not let itself be seen in vision' (Deleuze 1987: 168), or that which cannot, or 
has not yet been, thought.
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1 See W. Uricchio, Film’s Fate: a storage medium in a culture o f simultaneity {Impact 1997 Catalogue (1997): 6-8). 
Uricchio proposes that cinema may not be solely indebted to the photographic, but also to the telegraphic - that cinema 
could have been much more to do with extensivity rather than with storing and holding an image. Without the 
apparatus to realize this idea of the live moving image, the cinema, writes Uricchio 'abandons the project of the now 
and moves over to the fictional,' to become more about representation than television ever would (Uricchio, from a 
lecture given at Harvard University, May 2005). Uricchio gives several examples of how cinema attempted 
simultaneity before defaulting to the dramatic form, including a novel live' mobile cinema, installed in a double-decker 
bus.
2 This first cinema, the cinema of attractions (according to Gunning) is a sideshow-like popular and participatory 
cinema. This type of cinema is eroded by die dream industry of Hollywood, whose narrative form destroyed the 
carnival aspect of the cinematic event, by isolating an audience and prescribing their experience.
3 The term 'diegesis' comes from Greek word for 'narration' and was applied to cinema by Etienne Souriau. As Metz 
writes, it means 'the sum of the film's denotation' (Metz 1974:97-98).
4 In Vita Futuriatica (1916), Marinetti and director Amaldo Ginna used mirrors, superimposition, split screens and 
hand painted dots to distort their images.
5 Deleuze deduces four styles of montage from the movement-image: the organic montage of Hollywood, the 
dialectical montage of the Soviets, the extensive or quantitative montage of the French impressionists, and the intensive 
montage of the German expressionists.
6 Surrealist films such as L'Age D'Or (Luis Bufiuel and Salvador Dali 1930) offered hallucinogenic arrays of pictorial 
assemblage.
7 Jean Louis Schefer (1980) cited in Deleuze 1989: 37.
8 Deleuze discovers in Bergson, via Kant, that the SM-S has become the most orthodox method for responding to sense 
data. Kant has argued that space and time are the a  priori forms of human perception, meaning that the spatial and 
temporal properties of the objects we perceive do not derive from sensory data, but from our mind's own way of 
interpreting sensory data. Umberto Eco has his own term for this process, the 's-code': the system-code that 'makes a 
situation comprehensible and comparable to other situations, therefore preparing the way for a possible coding 
correlation' (Umberto Eco, A Theory o f Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1979: 40, 43-44). A film 
becomes in time and simultaneously becomes as language and meaning. Without cinematic S-codes, there could be no 
secondary codes, such as narrative.
9 Rodowick writes that 'Our subjective prehension of things, then, takes place as a "contraction of the real", through the 
agency of memory in its two forms: one where layers of recollection surround a kernel of immediate perception; the 
other which condensed disparate historical moments into a single point' (Rodowick 1987: 88).
10 Compression is the term I use to describe both the way in the brain uses the SM-S to reduce sense data and the way 
in which classical narrative uses short cuts and nodes of information to give the sense of a richer and deeper world of 
characters and occurrence without having to present them.
11 As Hollis Frampton writes in Circles o f Confusion'. 'A waterfall is not a "thing", nor is a flame of burning gas. Both 
are, rather, stable patterns of energy determining the boundaries of a characteristic sensible "shape" in space and time 
[...] You and I are semistable patterns of energy, maintaining in the very teeth of entropy a characteristic shape in space 
and time,' (1983: 11)
12 Deleuze celebrates modernist cinema’s manifestations of time-images, extending Bergson’s philosophy of 
intellect/intuition, matter (perception) and mind (memory). Bergson did not live to see the non-linear, discontinuous 
and multifarious narratives of the 1990s and new millennium.
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13 Again, we can refer to Buster Keaton, whose face appears deadpan in close-up, as though defying our need to be 
affected.
14 Only now filmmakers compulsively reveal diem, in DVD extras. In fact, we dislike or fear losing cinema's trick of 
sensibleness when watching a film but then delight in errors of sense and order after the fact.
15 Artaud became enthusiastic with the cinema and its possibilities as an art form whilst working with Carl Dreyer (he 
was the lead actor in two of Dreyer's films), but this enthusiasm dissipated by 1933, when he abandoned the cinema in 
favour of the theatre of cruelty.
16 Rodowick describes this as 'machinic thought' linked to our own machine of thought. Rodowick goes on to clarify 
that, The spiritual automaton is in no way equivalent to a psychological consciousness, nor can it be construed in the 
forms of identity' (Rodowick 1997:175).
17 Here, Deleuze is particularly Heideggerian.
18 This nooshock is coupled with changes in our scientific understanding of brain functioning, and with advances in the 
crystalline attributes of quantum physics.
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I am sitting watching. In a Chinese cinema in Milwaukee I am sitting 
watching. I am in a large deserted auditorium watching a matinee 
screening of T he L a d y k i l l e r s , the 2004 Coen Brother's remake of the 
classic Ealing comedy. It is a very poorly articulated film, but my 
engagement is further compromised by the fact that the projectionist 
has failed to correct a registration problem. Every few seconds 
throughout the entire feature duration the film jumps and slides in 
the projector gate. I am having overwhelming difficulty in access, 
like Keaton's projectionist, not able to enter a building, to gain 
entry to the room that is a called The L a d y k i l l e r s  -  because, as it 
opens, the door keeps swinging shut again.
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Act 1, Sc 3. Kamara - films are rooms of topographical uncertainty
The word camera derives from the Greek word 'kamara,'1 which means chamber or 
vault (or bedroom, in the modem usage) but also has root fragments to do with taking and 
with transporting. A classical film is a series of 'takes' which are durational renderings of 
spaces (interior, exterior, virtual), customarily populated by protagonists busily conducting 
themselves in accordance to a plot they are conveyed by. These takes are sutured, stitched 
together to constitute the impression of a temporal and diegetic Whole that extends out as a 
logic and a world, beyond the arrangements we are being shown. The camera creates the 
impression of a three-dimensional moving space on a two-dimensional surface - a room in the 
lens and on the screen. This is a spatial system that developed from nineteenth-century stage 
space, where the room was the natural centre of dramatic action. It was Andre Bazin who 
stated that the cinema reverses the spatial operation of the theatre, going from outside to 
inside as it establishes a scene (Bazin 1967: 100-72), and, as Edward Branigan writes, 'It is 
clear that film could in certain ways more actively develop the reproduction of room, of 
mobility from room to room' (Branigan 1992: 2323). The cinema room consists of a 
continually collapsed unseen rebuilt into a seen, where the diegetic space and the fourth wall 
of the camera are perpetually reinstated in the reverse shot, what Stephen Heath describes as 
'The summing of a space that always joins apart, elsewhere' (Heath 1981: 152).
Cinema is founded on this mode of presence in absence, in that the camera that was 
present erases itself in the reverse shot and is further eradicated by way of the edit. As 
viewers, we have developed the complex ability to complete this space by overlooking the 
suturing of space and time conducted by camera and edit. We know that only eyes or the 
camera have the means to see what we are being shown, but we have let go of the logic that 
what we have seen needed eyes or camera to see. We accept this even if the room on-screen is 
an empty room, where there are no character eyes to see and show us what they see. In other 
words, we do not notice the lack on which all of classical cinema is constructed. We have
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allowed a synthesis between our minds and the suturing process, and if this process collapses, 
for example, when the camera 'crosses the line' during a shot/reverse-shot sequence and a 
performer consequently switches orientation in frame when reversed, occupying the same 
side as their counterpart, that synthesis is de-stabilized. It can be lost entirely.
O f Camera (Eastwood 2003) explores the abortive attempts of two people, a woman 
and a man, to be together in the same space. Their situation is a disagreement fuelled by 
technical difference: the woman exists on analogue video and the man on celluloid film. The 
two protagonists are at the point of failure in a relationship. Gradually the woman realizes that 
not only she and her counterpart are emotionally irreconcilable, but also that they are literally 
incompatible: they are merely on-screen characters who are being recorded, edited, played 
back and watched by a director and crew, an editor, and an audience. The film takes place in 
one interior, which comprises of four rooms, a corridor and a stairway landing. We never see 
the characters outside of this environment, and it is not entirely clear where each of the rooms 
is situated. Topographically, the woman is boxed into a film system and we are looking in 
from the outside of that system, eavesdropping on a character that is becoming aware of 
others who are present and investing, to varying degrees, in either her plight as a fictional 
character (can she or can't she reconcile her differences with the other character?) or her 
plight as a mediated subject (can she or can't she find stable ground within the mediation 
system she is experiencing, as she encounters and slips into the intervals in her videotaped 
materiality?).
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O f Camera has the outward appearance of a short drama, with the aesthetic and tonal 
qualities of film noir. The lighting and the colour of the film stock reference mid-career 
Alfred Hitchcock (Vertigo 1958) and Michaelangelo Antonioni (II Deserto Rosso 1964), 
amongst others. The film opens with a hook: a woman is at home one night by herself and 
begins to suspect that there are intruders in her house. She makes an anxious telephone call 
and requests that the person at the other end of the line comes to the house to investigate. This 
develops into a plot twist: the people in her house are the people making the film, and there 
are a number of subtexts including the hanging question of whether the couple will reconcile 
their differences and come together to face the traumatic situation of their mutual 
disenfranchisement from the cinematic system they have been drafted in to. Dialogue, 
musical score, key lighting, costume, and mise-en-scene suggest that the film will develop 
and resolve the issues it announces, but the film does not find a resolution. There is the 
residue, then, of a Hollywood form of telling, but the recognizable cues (the aforementioned 
score, decor, wardrobe, romantic encounter) are misappropriated; they register as dissonance, 
as extra-linguistic; their boundaries are fluid. Key lighting and sound properties are 
unsuccessfully deployed, as though they have come in at the wrong moment, or belong to 
another film altogether. Exterior sounds are married, as room tone, to interior spaces (we hear 
traffic in the hallway); non-diegetic foley sounds, including VCR player eject mechanisms, 
and rain on a window that becomes applause, are con-joined to practical elements on screen.
Topographical certainty, which is most commonly arrived at through a correct 
sequence of establishing shots - wide shot, mid shot, and close-up (all monitored in terms of 
their continuity) - is undermined. The positional blocking of the characters in relation to one 
another is inaccurate, and the 180° rule is frequently contravened. The pre-filmic space is 
continually implied from the space of the pro-filmic, a seen which is never entirely foreclosed 
and delimited by suture, so much so that shot/reverse-shot series often involve the appearance 
and disappearance of props (notably a red chair) and the uncomfortable shifting of
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composition in frame. The result is a crooked house whose changing walls, shifting details 
and narrative false starts threaten the loss of topographic balance in the minds of the audience. 
The device of the match-cut, where an edit is based on compositional similarity (a technique 
favoured by auteurs such as Hitchcock and Stanley Kubrick and used to startling effect in 
Luis Bufiuel & Salvador Dali's Un Chien Andalou 1929), is challenged by extending 
compositional likeness to compositional sameness: the Woman retains identical position in 
frame (see film stills below), and is oriented to the same chair, but across the interval of the 
edit she is relocated to a completely different room. She appears directly to experience the 
shock of this absurd movement. Unlike Sherlock Jnr, there is no progression for the character; 
there is instead the shock of the return of the same as difference.
Preceding shot. Following shot.
O f Camera (2003)
O f Camera deals with the waning of indexicality and the different ontologies of 
analogue video and film images. The film presents not only the existential crisis of two 
characters but the impending demise of analogue video (the woman has the property of worn 
vhs videotape), and of celluloid film (the disappearing man exists on a 16mm projected film 
print) and the new temporality and binary notation of computer algorithm (both characters are 
isolated by rota-scoping and treated digitally by the manipulative power of computer software 
and filters). This is an unwieldy and purposefully inconsistent metaphor: if the Woman is on 
video and the Man is on film, what medium is their background, and what media construct the
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objects they might hold in their hands? At one point the woman kisses the man and her video 
attributes momentarily transfer to his body.
This transference of matter between beings is a Deleuzian situation in itself: the point 
of becoming imperceptible, which is the immanence of becoming in time as a being that is not 
as distinct from its exterior as it believes.4 The properties and systems of classical cinema 
here extend outwards, revealing themselves to die audience before eventually folding in, so 
that the story and the characters are swallowed-up by the absent centre which constitutes all 
classical cinematic telling. When the Man stops still and burns in the 
projector gate, the film has stopped, stopped itself, from the point 
of this absent centre. For a moment the character is erased and a gap 
opens up in the film's telling. O f Camera is not a piece of architecture but a 
Trojan horse, one that unpacks as it unfolds on the screen. With its deceptive structure, the 
film is wheeled into a screening context only to collapse itself from within, disassembling, 
from dynamic, action-oriented and outwardly mobile system to introspective failing system; 
from narrative to dysnarrative.5 The film fittingly ends by incompleting itself, taking the main 
protagonist in fast-forward beyond the credits and in reverse, back through previous sections, 
until she insists that this activity cease, and her image fades into video noise, and then black. 
O f Camera twists its own narrative trajectory like a Mdbius strip, so that it encounters the 
other side of its story, which is the film’s construction. It does this not merely reflexively but 
as the completion of its set, of its geometric existence. This is the balance of the equation: 
cinema as imbalance. The vernacular of the movement-image is effectively inverted, so that it 
is the phantasmagorical value of cinema in itself that forms the basis of the film.
O f Camera declares how a breakdown in a personal relationship can alter the way in 
which we situate ourselves in the other's space: 'Can you move, can you stand over there,' or, 
'I think we should swap places.' The 180° rule is broken, but so too is the rale which separates 
the intradiegetic from the extradiegetic (i.e., what separates the complex arrangements of
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looks and positions within the internal story world on the screen and the looks and positions 
outside of that world, on the set of the shoot6); in other words, the place the 
performer/character cannot look at or go towards (the camera), is manifest in the social 
situation. One form of seeing, what Heath calls the 'quasi-obscenity' of seeing (Heath 1981: 
154), which is the camera seeing with ultimate efficiency without having presence, is thus 
transformed into another seen. In short, the internal consciousness-like spatiality of the film 
becomes awry and we are left with the knowledge that the film is a thing that is doing the 
seeing. The audience can no longer rely on the mechanics of impossible continuity to transfer 
them from one cine-situation to another, because in the organization presented in O f Camera 
the engineering of the movement-image is grinding against itself and twisting on its own axis, 
destroying itself from the inside out, daring to transgress its own limit. The function of 
impossible continuity has broken-down, revealing false continuities, or the non-localizable 
relations of shots. By making a problem of the intra-diegetic in cinema, O f Camera makes 
naked the waltz of repositioning performed by actors and technicians in the cinematic 
operation, dancing solely in order to convey the simple command that A is looking at B.
Artaud is astute when he notices that 'the cinema presents us with an incomplete 
world, shown only on one side' (Artaud 1972: 77). In classical cinema, the lack of two-shots 
or contextualizing wide angles in a scene (for example, in At Five in the Afternoon, Samira 
Makhmalbaf, 2003) reads as topographically unstable against our understanding of the proper 
function of a dramatised cinematic sequence. We therefore read from the film an interior 
uncertainty, even though our own social transactions never involve over-the-shoulder shots 
(we are inside the SM-S, not stood before its screen). James Chandler suggests that the over- 
the-shoulder shot is a technological method in line with eighteenth-century ideas about how 
we form a sentimental sense of an other, by imagining their situation and conforming to social 
contracts of proximity between speaking but non-intimate persons (Chandler 20057). In The 
Address o f the Eye, Vivian Sobchack writes, 'Indeed, as if to avoid any possible confusion and 
conflict between its material body and the character's, the film's body generally situates itself
close to but behind the character's body in what is commonly called an "over the shoulder" 
shot' (Sobchack 1992: 226). The over-the-shoulder shot is close, but not too close; in other 
words it is close enough for the viewer to feel involved without being crowded. Thomas 
Bedding made the point during the review of a film in 1909 that the shift to closer camera 
positions made it necessary that film actors never recognize the presence of the camera, as 
this compromised the viewing pleasure of the spectators in their belief that the characters 
were 'inside' the film world, participating in a real event.8
In Chris Crossing (Eastwood 2003), the observance of a correctness of social space is 
presented as a dispute within the interaction of the characters, in that one tries to explain to 
the other the crossing-the-line rule of cinema. It is also a dispute within compositional 
alignment, in that the characters cross the 180° line as they argue. The character Chris 
remarks that, ' Scenes in  normal f i c t io n  film s a re  s tru c tu re d  around sho t 
and re v e rs e -s h o t .  The o v e r-th e -sh o u ld e r sho t he lps lo c a te  th e  two 
people in  th e  scene . I f  you ju s t  g e t one p e rso n 's  p o in t-o f-v ie w , and 
then  th e  o th e r  p e rso n 's  p o in t-o f-v iew , i t  can be a b i t  
d is o r ie n ta t in g ,  l ik e  th e y ’re  no t r e a l ly  t h e r e . '  In the films of Ozu, Oshima 
and Antonioni we frequently see empty and amorphous spaces that have lost their Euclidean 
co-ordinates.9 In Tokyo Story (Ozu 1953), it is no longer clear who is speaking to whom, who 
is in front of or behind whom. The shot, the frame, eye-line matches, and 'intra-diegetic looks' 
(Heath 1981) all stray towards a limit, which is the interval. The classical cinema can never in 
fact deliver a convincing point of view arrangement, because our lived-body perceptions are 
crystalline in event: sheets of present perception, distraction, daydream, recollection, bodily 
compromise (there is something in my eye as I look at you), blinks, adjustments to brightness, 
the movement of the eye in the turning of the head, and so on. Yes, film resembles the 
behaviour of thought unlike any other art form, and often, in classical cinema, is constructed 
as though it is consciousness recorded (flashbacks, POV shots, the interpenetration of image 
and sound). But the cinema cannot adequately present to us the constant flow of the thoughts
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of the on-screen inhabitants of the cinema world, only their words and actions. Any attempts 
to concretely situate the viewer in the apparent consciousness of a protagonist fail 
categorically, as Sobchack outlines in her analysis of Robert Montgomery's The Lady in the 
Lake (1946), which is an entirely first person noir feature.10 We are too passive to achieve full 
physical empathy and would need to be more fully embodied when we watch a sustained 
point-of-view shot in order for it to succeed as an equivalent to our perception.
Through irrational organization however, a new relation and arrangement of looks 
that can be thought of as sexualized shows its face. This is what Heath finds in Ai No Corrida 
(Oshima 1976), where intra-diegetic space is problematized by the breaking of the 180° rule, 
and, during the lover's intercourse, particularly when the servant looks on (and is caught 
looking) the geography of the bedchamber is made confused.11 Rather than trying to 
perpetually drag the pre filmic into the frame to create unity, Oshima's film presents the 
splitting of the seen, or the endless 'nothing seen' (Heath 1981: 152). This creates a look 
which sends back and loosens the relay circuit of what Heath explains as the camera-viewer- 
character triad; '...the apparatus is pulled out of its true, its guarantee of vision; the look 
divides and the spectator loses the view of the film... the viewer then knows what it is to be 
seeing the film' (Heath 1981: 153). In Blow-Up (Antonioni 1966) the fashion photographer 
crouches down in the park and then looks up. The image cuts to his view of the wind in the 
trees, and holds on that shot, until the photographer stands up and enters its frame: the seer 
has been displaced from the seen. In Stalker (1979), Tarkovsky neatly sidesteps the entire 
difficulty of the seer-seen relation, introducing a character who will see by first of all having 
the Stalker look towards the camera, his back to the view, before turning his head around and 
seeing what we have already seen behind him, thus removing the need for a point-of-view 
shot. A new room altogether is assembled from the shot/reverse-shot spaces of a previous 
feature film in Natalie Frigo’s D imer with the Stranger (2006). Marguerite Dinas’ India 
Song (1975) shows to us the complex relationship between the pro filmic and pre filmic 
space. Expression is outside of the frame (we hear the shamed Consul's cries), and Duras is
making use of the longing we have for what is not in view. The mirror in the ballroom offers 
to us the reverse shot in the shot. A locked-off, palatial, architectural camera points into the 
pro filmic room, but there is another kind of camera, a haptic camera, which moves across 
bodies and the space.
Howard Hawks said of The Big Sleep (1946) that so long as each scene fizzed and 
moved along nicely, nobody would really notice or care that the wider film made no sense in 
terms of plot. The film functions on a scene-to-scene basis, but when reflected upon, it does 
not constitute a Whole; there is no unified story to recount. This is what makes The Big Sleep 
one of the most radical Hollywood films ever produced, because it points directly to the 
cinema as an appearance. There is a 'storytelling function' that Deleuze derives from Bergson 
(Deleuze 1990), a utility within intelligence that makes an order of that which occurs between 
intelligence and society, or the lived world. A story is an orderly configuration, a schema 
through which an infinite number of occurrences may pass, not least our selves, as thinking 
subjects. Deleuze makes the case that this capacity for building narratives from chaos forms 
precisely that which enables any society to remain stable, and this is an argument that has 
been made an innumerable amount of times for a religious rather than a secular society. The 
narratives we have fashioned for our highly complex social interactions can be seen as 
extensions of the compressed units of sense rendered by the sensory-motor schema. Edward 
Branigan's account of what constitutes a narrative is close to Bergson's description of the SM-
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S: 'Narrative is a perceptual activity that organizes data into a special pattern which represents 
and explains experience [...] a way of organizing spatial and temporal data into a cause-effect 
chain of events with a beginning, middle, and end that embodies a judgment about the nature 
of the event' (Branigan 1992: 312). In fact, the comparison between sensory-motor scanning 
and the organising principles of media can be extended to the current method for authoring 
moving images to DVD. This process of data compression looks for similarity within 
sequential film frames or inter-laced video fields, in order to duplicate existing picture detail 
rather than continually re-render it. For example, a landscape sequence may in fact feature 
very little movement, and therefore can be more or less copied as data from frame to frame. If 
a more profoundly moving object such as a bird enters frame, the compressor has to work 
harder to render its detail. It is for this reason that rapidly cut or densely superimposed 
structural films and scratch videos are extremely difficult to author as DVDs.
Classical cinema is founded on the organizing principle of the inventory, from script 
to shot-list to storyboard, to schedule to edit decision. A drama shoot is a closed set.13 
Industry feature production is like joining the dots of the shooting script, under time and 
economic pressure. On a drama shoot there are a number of cells needed to concoct a defined 
whole. Shoot days are broken up into the logistical realization of these cells, which are 
numbered and, when shot, re-assembled in order in the edit suite (they would commonly have 
been filmed non-sequentially). In the edit suite something peculiar happens. In the pursuit of a 
closed and hermetically sealed narrative Whole, an infinite series of possibilities opens up. Of 
course, within the film industry this is rarely the case, as the editor is given a template to work 
to. And this is what Deleuze calls the logic of enchainment, narrative as schema, that which 
constitutes a kind of geometry of cinema, within which the hero 'only acts because he is the 
first to see' (Deleuze 1986: 70). We begin with 'violence' (Heath 1975), a contrary to the norm 
that must be worked through towards unity (Greimas 196814). There has been a violation and 
the course of the narrative will follow either the reinstatement of the old homogeneity, or the 
founding of a new one, for 'every narrative re-enacts cultural beliefs about success.' (Branigan
1992: 25). The schema of story is so identifiable that all the viewer or reader need do in order 
to arrive at meaning is look for assigned probabilities to events, and recognize pattern through 
repetition and rhyme, what Barthes calls the logic of the, ’already read' (Barthes 198815). In 
Cinema and Philosophy, Alain Badiou gives a concise account of normative cinema, or 
'neoclassical cinema' as he puts it (Badiou 2003: 111), and its predilection for pornography, 
the unit of families and romantic couplings, the depiction of excessive violence, and 
hackneyed plots (what Godard, and then Deleuze, called T)ad films').
O f Camera opens with the classic violence that Heath speaks of, a disruption in 
homogeneity producing lack for a protagonist, the kind of lack that classical cinema is fuelled 
by and relentlessly mines. As we have discussed, the brain uses story as a structure for 
memory and as a means of orientation, because this structure enables us to remember more 
and in greater detail. Heath writes that 'without narrative, the memory of a film fails' (Heath. 
1981: 170). The viewer retains the initial disruption to homogeneity as a remembered 
platform on which to locate events as they unfold. The cinematic proper thus acts as a 
secondary sensory-motor device. When previous inferences are indirectly discontinued (for 
example, the frequent lapses of spatial and narrative continuity in O f Camera), an individual's 
attention does not spread equally along the narrative but works forwards and backwards more 
avidly through the text, attempting to generate hierarchical structures ('this means this' 
because 'that occurred then'). Branigan explains that 'In this manner a perceiver uses a schema 
to automatically fill in any data that is deemed to be "missing'' in the text' (Branigan 1992: 
15). However, unclear character goals require increased processing time, and as we have 
established, the brain always looks to find a shortcut, to hitch a ride on a habit. Unexpected 
information can cause a re-ordering in the schema, and comprehension slows when explicit 
propositions constructed earlier must be re-activated, as is the case in O f Camera, where the 
viewer must ask, and re-ask: Who is the Woman? How do I make sense of her environment 
and predicament? Why are her reactions not consistent? With its incomplete sentences and 
missing clauses, O f Camera draws attention to the language-like regulations of the classical
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cinema it resembles but disavows. The bottom-up, material existence of the filmic process - 
its corporeality - enters into a conflict with the top-down, narrative operation that seeks to 
negate it.16
Classical cinema, as Heath puts it, is in essence the balance of repetitions, and 
narrative is the operation of this balance, 'the order of bearable repetition' (Heath 1981:154- 
157). For example, in the second scene of Hitchcock's Vertigo (1958), Scottie has visited his 
ex-girlfriend Midge. We have already seen the distressing moment where during the rooftop 
chase Scottie became paralyzed with fear, and injured. In the following scene, Scottie holds 
onto his cane, complains to Midge about his corset, comments on the spare time in his new 
daily life (now that he has taken early retirement from the police force), and finally fails in the 
test of ascending the mini-stepladder by the high-rise window without fear. Each element is 
the repetition of the same sign: incapacitation, emasculation and fear. Christian Metz speaks 
of pleasurable films, or 'good objects,' referring to Freud's theory of childhood play, where a 
child repeats an activity until it has mastery over it, thereby constituting the activity as good 
(Metz 198217). Young children begin telling stories in heap and rhyme form, and this finds its 
correlate in the rote system of industrialized normative film narrative. As Joan Copjec writes 
'The effect of repetition is clearly identification' (Copjec 1988: 233). The sensory-motor 
schema has a tendency towards constancy and so, when in the cinema, the adult acts in the 
same way as the child, having actions repeated for it and looking for pleasurable elements.18 
In fact, the very demand of commercial cinematic storytelling is constituted on an audience's 
desire to move from ignorance to knowledge. Copjec uses Duras' India Song as a way in 
which to examine what she terms this 'compulsion to repeat' (Copjec, ibid). The film passes 
us through all kinds of associative spaces, until we let go of frustration, give up on accessing 
narrative meaning by way of complicated and conflicting motifs, and let the film's formal 
repetitions act on us from a place of difference. The waltz that forms the spine of the film (a 
spine in a paralyzed and misshapen body) is itself the choreography of repeated movement. 
We re-enact things and revisit things in our minds in order to gain mastery over them, but, as
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Copjec argues, Duras' film offers no possibility for mastery. The narratorial element is 
omnipresent, but it has lost its authority. Burning incense has more vivid movement than the 
human bodies, who are stopped and started again, in an automatic time.
Film repetition in structural-materialist film most often takes the form of content-less 
loops, flash frames of arbitrary sameness, exemplified by Tony Conrad’s The Flicker (1966). 
Structural film rejects balance as a necessary audience disposition, although it uses 
operational systems of its own to hold a viewer in a state of non-identification. Its strategy is 
to evict any dramatic or content-based scene, in order to grasp instead film in the process of 
its material effects. So much structural-materialist cinema appears socially disengaged and 
perceptually preoccupied with fixated looks, away from others, looks that are regressive and 
obsessive - a retrograde seeing - what Lacan might have regarded as infantile, pre-linguistic 
babbling. Almost all structural-materialist films remove die agency of the viewer and close 
down their bodies much in the same way as Hollywood narratives. Flicker films or formal 
inquiries into exploded fields of vision render experience captive in a manner opposite but 
equal in measure to the effect of generic classical narrative. The viewer's experience for 
transformation is chastened - we find ourselves a part of a peculiar cult that stares without 
focus into space, probing every pixel or grain of celluloid as though stargazing. The 
constancy of the repetitive image can at times offer passage to other mental states, by way of 
its very minimalism, but for the most part structural film leaves the viewer with only 
introspective or reflective thought. In an uncertain film, the viewer strains forwards towards 
the film, willing it to find order, hoping again and again for the false starts to become the 
actual race, which can and must be run to completion.
One ideology, the Hollywood film, suspends and stabilizes the viewer as subject; the 
other, structural-materialism, activates the viewer as subject in the process of viewing. In 
Questions o f Cinema? Heath asks, what are the apparatuses of these establishments? Both 
structural film and Hollywood cinema production (and their interpreters) have tended to focus
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their analysis on the 'unity’ of a film, i.e., either the meaning structures and conveyance of 
fiction narrative or the unity of process and textual/textural articulation in structural- 
materialist film. Classical cinema uses frames of reference in a sequential arrangement of 
impossible continuities of space and time that are not determined solely by local conditions. 
Bottom-up receptivity is largely subordinate to top-down configurations of psychological 
persuasion - the activity and result of its meaning, not how it means, an obsessive regime of 
pro-filmic unity in which everything seen has semiotic value. What Branigan terms the levels 
o f narration (Branigan 1992) which form this arrangement begin with the very identifying 
logo of the film studio and progress through film titles, the crediting of performers and key 
technical personnel, text captions (for example, 'London. 1940'), establishing shots (for 
example, the city), symphonic melodies, the voice of a narrator, closer shots/interiors, the 
voices of performers, and so on, ensure that nothing remains surplus by the time of the 
closure of the film text. Unnecessary components, such as hairs in the camera gate are 
eradicated from the ensemble. All image and sound errors are corrected. The on-screen, or in­
screen, diegesis is constructed and maintained by these narrative agencies, giving the viewer a 
sense of organization in the film image, and also a pleasurable identification, which is in part 
borrowed from Lacan's mirror phase, where the child, upon seeing its reflection, finds itself in 
a liminal phase in which she or he recognizes themselves as both the world and an other, who 
is perceived by an other. The cinema is, according to Metz and to Heath, a 'secondary' mirror 
phase (Heath 1981), in that the viewer is already aware of his or her own presence, and is able 
to be receptive to a 'reflection' that gives everything back except the self. The image is not, 
after all, a life. Not yet, at least.
In I  Make Things Happen (Eastwood 2001) and The End (Eastwood 2002), both 
protagonists are scaling the ladder of the levels of narration. The End features a performer 
who has undertaken an urban pilgrimage through the film in search of the end credits, which 
she eventually encounters and for a time co-exists with. Where customarily the textual 
element (supplied by the narratorial system) sits in commentary on, but separate to, the
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diegetic space, here these textual layers fold into one another. The text becomes a character 
and the character is revealed as a text. The moving image always sits in a peculiar plane 
between, on the one hand the added visual elements of text and graphics and, on the other 
hand, the non-visual elements such as diegetic and non-diegetic sound. As Raymond Bellour 
writes, The image is indeed located, with respect to the echo it might receive from language, 
half-way between the semi-transparency of written titles and dialogue and the more or less 
complete opacity of music and noise' (Bellour 2000: 25). Indeed, The End provides a peculiar 
concertina effect of sound in relation to image, in that the audio is local to the performer, via a 
radio microphone, whereas the camera is far from the subject, and often cropped through the 
zoom lens. The members of the public the performer Ava Hervier encounters differ in 
response according to their relative knowledge of the camera. Each person approached is 
forced to quickly supply a meaningful reply to the question, 'Excuse me, can you tell me how 
to get to the end?" even though any apparent meaning or explanation is absent. They must 
each hypothesize a context: 'a club,' 'a mobile phone,' an end to the road, 'the end of time,' and 
so on. Here is Gilbert Ryle's ‘wink’ in context (Ryle 197119). The final meeting of narrated 
levels is an awkward one, where protagonist and invisible narrator, performer and graphic 
element, sit side by side in a moment of anticlimax. The audience senses an ending before it 
comes and must deliberate whether or not to leave the cinema space.20
The Searchers (John Ford 1956) The End (Steven Eastwood 2002)
Ethan Edwards (John Wayne) walks away from camera towards the caption 'The End' at the close o f the The 
Searchers. In The End Ava Hervier reaches the end o f her quest and finds the end o f the film.
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The trajectory of cinema as a history, and of the film theory that followed suit, 
involves the application of analysis, language systems, and, indeed, language to the medium. 
As we have ascertained, the course of normative films within that history is that of a plan of 
action applied to a schema: treatments, scripts, shot lists, storyboards, itineraries, inventories, 
plans, what De Certeau characterizes as a 'flattening out1 of space and time (de Certeau 1984: 
35). This flattened diegetic space, and its relation to extra-diegetic elements (such as musical 
score and on-screen text), has been the predominant arena of film theory for a number of 
decades. Metz went so far as to propose a grand syntagmatique of cinema, which was in part 
developed from Saussure's structuralism and aimed to isolate discrete units in the classical 
cinema transaction. In the grand syntagmatique, Metz outlines eight methods for how 
classical cinema uses editing to articulate and order narrative and makes use of specific 
semiotic elements within the shot and in support of the edit, including: key lighting, camera 
angles, mise-en-scene and musical score. He maintained that in fact all films utilize these 
principal syntagmatic 'types,' and claimed that documentary cinema and non-conventional 
narrative (Deleuze's second modem, or time-image cinema) were nothing more than the 
irregular use of this grammar.
Certainly, the film shot has the luxury of both a word-like and sentence-like 
appearance, but this linguistic appearance is complicated by with the inherently non-linguistic 
flow of the lived world the shot records. There is a fascinating reversibility at play here. In 
Metz, we find that there is no general in the image: writing the word 'dog' connotes a general 
category where the reader can mentally supply any dog, but a filmed shot of a dog will always 
exhibit the singular type of dog in view; it cannot fail to be specific. However, the written 
description of an event must use linguistic structures, whereas the filming of an event is 
never, in and of itself, linguistic, although it may have a linguistic interpretation. Our spoken 
and written natural language has never suddenly advanced; in fact it is very slow to change, 
and yet film 'language' can transform in months (for example, following the invention of the 
Steadicam, and more recent advancements in computer graphic imaging).21 In the film The
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Hours (Stephen Daldry 2002), itself a literary adaptation, there is a sequence in the opening 
montage which is bound by matched movements. Each of the three female protagonists, 
although separated by countries and by decades, is linked by a common behaviour: they touch 
their shoulders with their hands. A thought: try to think of this visual device as a literary one, 
where it is written that Mrs Dalloway touches her shoulder as Virginia Woolf touches her 
shoulder. No such compositional match-cut exists on the page.
Metz argues that the shot has the capacity to evolve into an identifiable morpheme of 
film speech, in other words a word-like, whole, and meaningful unit, with equivalence to a 
spoken or a written sentence, although he says that this has not yet taken place and that the 
cinema has no phonemes and therefore no actual words: 'There is a syntax of the cinema, but 
it remains to be made and could be done only on a syntactical, and not a morphological, basis' 
(Metz 1974: 6722). Metz makes a distinction, then, between cinema as a language and a 
language system, and in the grand syntagmatique attempts to systematize the cinema's word­
like elements. Deleuze counters Metz by stating that a shot can never be a morpheme, 
precisely because it has no phonemes within it (no constituent noises, that, when combined, 
make up a shot-word or shot-sentence). Both agree that the shot is only in itself an utterance, 
and cannot doubly articulate in die way spoken language can (i.e., be both utterance and 
uttered), because its smallest unit is itself - precisely the shot, and only the shot - a duration 
that is already actively signifying, without a linguistic structure, by virtue of the fact that it 
resembles the world we perceive.23
But Deleuze regards Metz's structural position as denying the open-set nature of the 
shot, which he sees as pure potential. The shot's material essence of space (space in time) is, 
for Deleuze, part of a pre-linguistic perceptual gap that language has always existed in 
relation to. The cinema is a free-worlding and denaturing device, one that at its heart will 
always remain beyond the reach of systematization. The shot offers the viewer a bundle of
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loose and indistinct information (this is dissimilar to the word) and therefore has a propensity 
for openness. In this sense, the shot is not at all like the word or the sentence, but might be 
more comparable with a rant or mumbling, a rambling statement that is complicated in form. 
Moreover, the shot is a physical thing, not a virtual thing - its existence in the projector gate, 
or as a video image on a screen, is not like the word printed on the page (although we do to 
some extent 'read' its form). Metz does concede that comparisons between the cinema and 
spoken/written language are problematic, and that there are significant differences between 
the shot/sequence and the word/sentence, the principal one being Deleuze's point of the lack 
of double articulation in the shot.24 In Film Language (Metz 1972: 11525) Metz states that the 
shot is always the creation of the filmmaker, rather than plucked from a cinematic dictionary 
of phrases, and therefore is infinite in number, unlike any word, which, if it is to be 
understood, must derive from a glossary that is finite in principle, non-syntactical 
experimentation, or automatic writing notwithstanding.
The fundamental disagreement in thinking between Deleuze and Metz resides in their 
understanding of the pre-linguistic. Metz seems to regard the pre-linguistic as awaiting 
significance and therefore always appraised on how not-yet-like it is, whereas Deleuze offers 
that, 'There is no "like" here, we are not saying "like an electron," "like an interaction" etc. 
The plane of consistency is the abolition of all metaphor; all that consists is Real' (Deleuze 
1986: 69). This plane of consistency is Bergsonian immanence, the realm of matter-sense, 
that which is sensible only to itself - it can never be sensible in language. Roger Dawkins 
describes this as an anterior plane that provides the foundation for Deleuze's philosophy of 
cinema and language: 'Codes are not an evident given in matter, and therefore matter can be 
considered independently of the linguistic function. In other words matter is "perfectly 
formed from other points of view'" (Dawkins 2002). In Deleuze's film philosophy, the pre- 
linguistic is not formless, and neither does it signal anything. In order for the film image to be 
sensibly uttered, or become utter-able, it must be constituted as 'narrative utterance,' and this
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is where Deleuze and Metz share a point of view - that this narrative form is external to the 
structure of the image itself.26
In I  Make Things Happen, the performer Jo Burlington (formerly Cripps) declares in 
the narration that if she can make the plastic bag move without touching it, The film will be 
good.' She is reflexively encountering the media limit situation of the film she is appearing in, 
speaking about the present tense of the image from the point of the edit, which is in the 
present of the film's future, but in the past of the event of the film's viewing. She, the narrator, 
can predict that a white car will come over the bridge and appear to her, the on-screen 
protagonist, because the filmmaker has already seen the car, even though the viewer has not. 
There is no syntactic structure in the shots, these are meanings placed onto the moving image 
- the shot and its sequence possess only wild meaning, language comes from the outside, in 
the form of competencies for extracting meaning from the image-flow, what Dawkins calls a 
system of 'rules of use' (Dawkins 200227). Meaning is both enabled and constrained by 
various external institutions of ideas and contexts, for example, the association when entering 
an art-house cinema, when seeing an MGM logo at the head of a film, or when first 
witnessing a film. Meanings external to the film text are also constructed internally, within 
our consciousness, based on competencies of recognition, recall, and so on.28 There is an 
anecdote by Emeric Pressburger (one half of the celebrated Archers partnership) where, 
having fled the Nazis, the writer returns to his home village in rural Hungary some years later 
and sets-up a film projector in a village hall. After running a film, Pressburger asks various 
villagers what they had made of the images. Many of them had not in fact seen the moving 
pictures on the screen at all.29
The filmic image is not a language or a code. The pro-filmic space, whether the 
architecturally robust room or the crooked house, is more than a story, and we must look, 
therefore, for the emergence of ruptures and gaps, where the chambers within, and the overall 
structure of the house of classical cinema are found to be highly combustible. Classical
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cinema conforms to the sequence: camera - room - self - house, where the self of the film’s 
identity, its mode of telling and its characters, is consistent with the house of the film, in other 
words its architectural order. But we are after impossible houses, and the errant spaces within 
places. A radical cinema follows the flight line: camera - room - becoming - togographical 
uncertainty. In place of the self, residing in a house (the theory of identity in Freud and in 
Jung) there is 'something else,' a liminal film - the becoming of the film as it bums up and 
collapses as a house. During a screening of the DVD version of O f Camera, the disc faltered 
whilst playing the distressed closing credits, stopping and starting without regularity and 
forming an unsettling and fitting extension of the pre-recorded events. Here, the body of the 
film text produces behaviour in the body of its vessel for playback, introducing further 
collapse, to the walls of the edit, and unexpected gaps in what had been a fixed temporality.
O f Camera (2003)
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Z,/fe v4 House On Fire (2006) - the shooting script as schema and list.
1 The Greek kamara and the Latin camera are generally thought to derive from the Greek word kampto. Kamara 
can mean the roof o f a vault, a covered wagon, and a boat with an arched cover.
2 See also Deleuze. 1989: 161.
3 The vanishing space o f the room on screen, and matte painted scenery, also relates to Renaissance perspective.
4 Tamsin Lorraine qualifies becoming-imperceptible as '...leaving behind not only the perceptible boundaries o f the 
body but also one's conventional understandings o f oneself, o f others, and o f one's world, in order to respond 
informing impact o f imperceptible encounters' (Lorraine 1999. 188-189)
5 The Trojan horse is a useful analogy both in terms o f its spatial connotations and the idea o f the gift as covert 
weapon. When O f Camera previewed at the Curzon Soho, London in May 2003 the cinema projectionist insisted, 
angrily, that the master Beta videotape I had provided was faulty or had been recorded over. The film begins with 
the image o f video in fast-forward, which has the immediate appearance o f error, o f a faulty tape recorded over.
6 In Questions o f Cinema (1981), Stephen Heath proposes three looks in cinema: the camera, the viewer, and the 
intra-diegetic.
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7 James Chandler, The Affection-lmage and the Movement-Image: the sentimental journey - the history o f the 
sentimental. Time@20 conference, Harvard University, 2005.
8 In the on-line article, Stars and Audiences in Early American Cinema, Lee Grieveson writes that Thomas 
Bedding, editor of The moving picture world, noticed when reviewing a film in 1909 that when the cameraman 
'puts his camera near the subjects ... you see what is passing in the minds of the actors and actresses' (Thomas 
Bedding, The moving picture world, 3 July 1909, quoted in Bowser, The transformation o f cinema: 94). Grievson 
continues, 'Alongside the shift to closer views, it was strongly argued from 1909 that actors should never 
acknowledge the presence of the camera so as not to destroy the voyeuristic pleasure of spectators and the belief 
that they were "inside" the film world, participating in a real event. The intensification of emotional attachments to 
characters, and to the actions within the film was the basis for audiences becoming attached to the actors who 
played those characters.'
Lee Grieveson http://www.latrobe.edu.aU/screeningthepast/classics/cl0902/lgcll4c.htm#fii36 
Uploaded 20 September 2002
9 See, Deleuze 1989: 129.
10 See Sobchack 1992: 230.
11 Heath writes that 'Oshima's film finds the apparatus (of'looks') and its terms of vision as problem, as a specific 
construction (not a natural reproduction)' (Heath 1981: 150)
12 Branigan proceeds to subdivide narrative into four paradigms, or texts: narrative fiction (the novel); narrative 
nonfiction (history); nonnarrative fiction (many kinds of poetry); nonnarrative nonfiction (the essay). For schemas 
of story structure he refers to Tzvetan Todorov's five-stage model (Tzvetan Todorov, The two principals o f 
narrative diacritics, Vol. 1 No. 1 Fall 1971: 39) although we could equally look to Vladimir Propp, AJ Greimas, 
Joseph Campbell or any number of their Hollywood derivatives (Rob Mckee, Dov Simmons). Tom Gunning's term 
the 'narrator system' accounts for how this system (from around 1908-1909) was determined by the need to deliver 
the psychological individuation of characters whose interior motivations helped propel the story forward, 
producing and in turn produced by, causal chains of events. As has been much theorized, this character 
individuation is almost exclusively male, intended for the edification of a male gaze (see, Laura Mulvey [1975] 
and Tania Modleski [1988]). Mulvey makes the point that any audience member, regardless of their sex, is 
gendered as male in terms of their identification with the 'look' of the film text, a process that echoes what Luce 
Irigaray calls the predominance of vision in our culture,' and leads to objectification and disembodied sexual 
relations. Heath writes that cinema and psychoanalysis are contemporaneous. Both are a specific construction of 
male desire structured on the riddle of the nature of femininity, with the female as the unknowable other, as the 
object of a desire. (Heath 1981:169). Therefore not showing, telling or representing challenges what Deleuze
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would call the Masters, or the male gaze. Irigaray writes that the nothing seen, i.e., the not masterable by the look, 
is threatening to male theories and practices of representation (always inevitably leading to objectification).
13 When documentary filmmaker Nick Broomfield made a fiction film he detested the rigidity of the shooting 
script and schedule, complaining there was nothing open or unexpected about it.
14 As Branigan writes, Greimas refines this, to say that narrative is 'a special working through of contraries, 
subcontraries, converses, and contradictories,' (Branigan 1992: 9, referring to Greimas & Rastier, The interaction 
ofSemiotic Constraints, Yale French Studies 41 [1968]).
13 Barthes writes that 'the logic to which the narrative refers is nothing other than a logic of the already-read' 
CMichelet 1988).
16 Top-down and Bottom-up are terms film theory has borrowed from cognitive psychology, which differentiates 
social attitudes attached to identity (top-down) from material attitudes attached to activities not rooted in identity, 
principally of the body, which are not symbolic or meaningful (bottom-up). In the cinematic context, the order of 
the narrative is of a top-down form, and the material existence of the film in the gate of the projector is bottom-up 
in form.
17 Metz (1982) describes how the cinema screen is a Lacanian mirror, a double of the double, a surrogate for our 
own doubled, reflected image. The film text can be divided into 'pleasurable' or 'un-pleasurable' according to 
whether it is a good or a bad object. This concept derives from Melanie Klein's theories of child development, and 
the young child having what it desires presented to it, or withheld from it.
18 In 1970s apparatus theory, Jean-Louis Baudry argued that mainstream films encourage a regression to primitive 
stages of human development, the desire being to enter (in the auditorium) into a copy of early child wholeness 
and homogeneity.
19 The wink in question is the distinction the perceiver makes between voluntary signal and involuntary twitch, 
appraised on the basis of a minute movement and most importantly, the context of the movement, something Ryle 
argues the cinematographic 'shot' lacks.
20 The original concept for the videotape was to have the words THE END and the performer sit together for such 
a degree of time (perhaps 30-40 minutes) that the viewer would be forced to make their own ending, by exiting.
21 In New Vocabularies in Film Semiotics, Stam, Burgoyne and Flitterman-Lewis write that 'To speak a language 
is simply to use it, while “to speak” cinematic language is always to a certain extent to invent it' (Stam, Burgoyne 
and Flitterman-Lewis 1992: 36).
22 Metz's film semiotics made a key distinction between the Cinematic Fact and the Filmic Fact, the former being 
an economic and socio-cultural system of film event (and pre/post film event), the latter being a signifying text. 
Having made this separation, Metz localized his inquiry to the Filmic Fact, proposing five modes of film 
expression: phonetic sound; written titles; musical sound; noises; the moving photographic image. The only code
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constituted by Metz has been a syntagmatics of the image track.
23 A double articulation in natural spoken language involves a first articulation, or a morpheme, which is the 
smallest formal unit of significance, for example, the word “cow”. The morpheme "cow" is made up of phonemes, 
and phonemes are second articulations; they are noises or sound elements that do not in themselves have symbolic 
value. For example, the “c” sound, or the “ow” sound, in the utterance of the word "cow." Morphemes and 
phonemes shift in tandem with one another. Different pronunciations of the “ow” in “cow” will still be understood 
as “cow”.
24 The shot arrives in perception as a 'complete segment of reality1 (Metz 1972: 115), a Whole, whereas a word is 
always the double articulation of its constituent phonetic sounds and the cultural recognition of these sounds in 
combination.
25 In The Imaginary Signifier (1982) Metz makes the distinction between enonce, which is a statement, and 
enonciation, which is a speech act, or as Joan Copjec (1988) intuits, a 'speech event.' Copjec goes on to point out 
that explicit attention to a cinema statement makes of it an object, a pro filmic event which seems to come from 
nowhere, as though not said or announced by anyone, or indeed anything. Attention to a cinema speech act has the 
opposite effect, in that it uncovers a cinematic point of view at the expense of its historical specificity. Metz writes 
that, 'Shots are the creations of the film-maker, unlike words (which pre-exist in lexicons), but similar to 
statements (which are in principle die invention of the speaker)' (Metz 1972: 115). In fact, Metz's evaluation 
appears to discover more differences than similarities between spoken language and filmed or edited sequences; 
and yet he sticks to a linguistic method as his aid in categorizing the cinema. Although (unlike words) shots are 
potentially infinite in number and always unique to the invention of the filmmaker(s), and to the context of 
realization, their word-like nature is enough for Metz to believe that in time a lexicon will emerge, distilling the 
noisy and multitudinous shot into a dictionary of utterances. The semiotics of cinema has yet to achieve this, and 
Metz has subsequently been criticized for his catalogue and its narrow band of selected subjects (the Hollywood 
film).
26 Deleuze offers two clear cinema signs, what David Rodowick calls Deleuze's 'pure semiotics' (Rodowick 1997): 
the movement-image and the time-image, neither of which is compromised by being required to articulate 
meaning. Deleuze writes, When we recall that linguistics is only a part of semiotics, we no longer mean, as for 
semiology, that there are languages without a language system, but that die language system only exists in its 
reaction to a non-language-material that it transforms. This is why utterances and narrations are not a given of 
visible images, but a consequence which flows from this reaction. Narration is grounded in the image itself, but it 
is not a given' (Deleuze 1989:29-30).
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27 As Roger Dawkins elaborates, 'What we are left with then are two notions of the pre-linguistic. The first is the 
pre-linguistic as an amorphous and syntaxic matter, according to which a conception of language is based on the 
formation of this matter into substance. The second is a more positive notion of the pre-linguistic as the matter- 
sense from which signs are a product. In this respect the pre-linguistic is not a reflection of some ratified form, and 
thus there is more scope for creative expression. For this to be the case the pre-linguistic involves two principles: it 
is non-amorphous, but at the same time it is a-syntaxic and a-signifying. The pre-linguistic in this second sense is 
the matter-sense of language, a matter-sense which proceeds not towards some pre-established expression, but 
towards the troth of an expression which is established at the same time' (Dawkins, 
http://reconstruction.eserver.org/022/deleuze.htm not dated).
28 This is essentially a cognitive, pragmatic attitude to film semiotics that continues to seek an understanding of 
how film is understood, but declares this meaning cannot be found in the film text itself. Cognitive film semiotics 
(for example, the work of Roger Odin) can be seen to represent the next stage of semiotic film theory. It aims to 
model the actual mental activities/intuitive knowledge/competence involved in the making and understanding of 
filmic texts. This approach positions itself somewhere between the linguistic determinism of Metz and the rational 
autonomy that cognitivists confer upon film spectators.
29 There are many such similar stories recounted by ethnographic documentaiy-makers, where a cine-literacy had 
to be demonstrated and explained to the audience. It is of note that not all cultures that are new to the motion 
picture initially fail to see or recognize an image. Some fledgling viewers concentrate their gaze in a selective or a 
"haptic" manner, choosing to scrutinize certain areas of the picture plane rather than investing in following 
character actions. For a fuller definition of the haptic gaze please see Act One, Scene 6: Bleed - some unknown 
bodies without organs.
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Perhaps it is necessary to make what is before and after the film pass inside it in order 
to get out of the chain of presents... it is necessary to move towards a limit, to make 
the limit of before the film and after it pass into the film and to grasp in the character 
the limit that he himself steps over in order to enter the film and leave it, to enter into 
the fiction as into a present which is inseparable from its before and after.
(Deleuze 1989: 38)
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Act 1, Sc 4. Fissures and Fires - the collapse of the house of cinema
The cinema of which we have been talking has the semblance of a language in its 
narrative structure and the formation of architecture in terms of its screen spaces; both are 
designed to elicit an orderly response in the thinking viewer. But these orders are contingent - 
their geometries also produce void spaces, they babble and are prone to slippage. When slips 
occur, whether intentionally or not, they can be fruitful. In the place of order, an unstable or 
collapsed architecture, and a more fluid kind of cine language can introduce gaps and voids to 
the mind and the peculiar sense of extension to the body. Just as the schemas in classical 
cinema provide monologue to our mental templates for data processing, the gaps that can 
occur in cinema have the potential to enter into dialogue with lapses in our own attentive 
recognition.
In Matter and Memory (Bergson 1911), Bergson describes an interval or a temporal 
delay in recognition between stimulus (perception) and response (action). He states that this 
delay is the very gap from where consciousness operates, a gap that is regulated by the 
sensory-motor schema, which is always looking to extend and mould movements from the 
lived world into habitual form. In Bergson, consciousness (the intellect) is that which 
manages the ceaseless flow of cause and its translation into effect. But this process originates 
within a cluster of centres of indetermination, from where perception comes into 
consciousness and action comes out from it. Deleuze develops Bergson's thought, stating that 
such an attentive recognition offers its greatest insight when interrupted, when it falls back 
into a perceptual gap or when it fails altogether.1
What of our intentions before we can think of them as that, and before they are 
exhausted as outcomes? In order for this undetermined nature of thinking to find space to 
emerge, a spiritual automaton is needed, to widen the gap, and it can be found in the new 
modem of cinema, where irregularities, errors, deviations and temporal eruptions are 
constructed by false continuities rather than impossible ones, and where we see blank
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expanses off directly unfolding time delivering the film text as the becoming of its own 
duration, without articulation or sense. This cinema spiritual automaton slackens off the 
sensory-mo*or schema by disordering it, creating what Artaud in his own incendiary theory of 
cinema caliss a body without organs (or BwO2), a consciousness brought about by disjunction 
and detached from the signifiable lived world. Deleuze writes, ’It is indeed a matter, as Artaud 
puts it, "of* bringing cinema together with the innermost reality of the brain," but this 
innermost neality is not the Whole, but on the contrary, a fissure, a crack' (Deleuze 1989: 
167).
A momentary glitch occurs in the temporal certainty of the film O f Camera: the 
female protagonist's smile spreads into a horizontal white line of video noise, at the moment 
before she is accelerated into fast-forward and re-wind. Several gaps are opened up and 
traversed: the story has been interrupted (this sequence is not what happens next, so much as 
how, in film or video physiology, what happens next happens); the physical image has been 
distressed, which produces image-lapses or deviations on screen; and the central character has 
found herself suddenly attentive to the space between media and character. The distress we 
are witnessing is two-fold: it is the distress of the character and the distress of the very video 
image she exists within. We see her reach out, touch, pull against the media attributes of 
video static and the roll bars of fast-forward; we hear her gasp, stunned and breathless, when 
her correct speed and position is re-instated. This intermediate space of distress is between 
one and another, between top-down and bottom-up operations, where medium and narrative 
coexist3. It cannot be envisaged, grasped or fixed.
O f Camera is not a love story, although it resembles one. Inter-character relations are 
unclear, there is the complexity of furtive looks, and the suggestion of coherent identities that 
may have histories and motivations, but the gender and dramatized emotional lives of the 
protagonists is not of as great a consequence as their deviant motion. What is of consequence 
is the indecipherability and fluidity of the characters. The gap they occupy puts the film body
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of cinematic telling into contact with its outside, so much so that the inside and the outside 
become confused with one another. Applause is also the sound of rain; chemical marks on the 
film print are also character tears; the apartment floor is street pavement; the half redecorated 
wall of the living room is also a blue screen backdrop. The process of cinema production 
arrives as unwanted guest in the dinner party of telling as that which can never be fully shut 
out of the house of diegesis.4 The regulation and containment of the moving image's wild 
properties is an activity that makes an enclosed place of its inherently excessive space. 
Classical cinema creates a corset for its own body, strapping in its frame. It makes a corset for 
the bodies on the screen, who, as performers cannot move too far to the left or too far right 
(they might step from their light), and who, as characters, have no time or scope for the mess 
of contingency which is a life (they never shit, and rarely choke on their words unless it has 
an explicit motivation). And, finally, classical cinema makes a corset which is the singular 
body psychology of the audience, who are now marked as unmarked, their identity implicitly 
constructed as male, heterosexual and white, their desires unified. This corset constitutes a 
synecdoche where the film body, corseted too as unmarked, has come to stand for the whole 
of the possible within the cinematic operation, thus refusing the activity of its intentionality 
and becoming.5
Thus, not only is the 'inhuman secret of the bodily mechanism' generally hidden from 
the film in its own perception, but it is also generally hidden from the spectator. That 
'secret' emerges as a secret only on those occasions when the exact material nature of 
the film's body is either interrogated or disguised in some fashion that finds explicit 
expression in the film's perception [...] A peculiar and sensory disparity arises when 
the film attempts to reflect on its own material embodiment, or when it pretends for 
the sake of the filmmaker's histoire or the narrative to represent its own bodily 
discours as human in substance and conduct. (Sobchack 1992: 220)
81
The moving image is by nature a corporeal space, a porous space. It secretes, and is 
always threatening to leak through on to the tenets of classical cinema, making bodily stains 
on the film as a site of telling. Such stains - scratches, irregular mechanical ticks, corruptions, 
camera knocks, continuity errors, and so on - can enable the viewer to feel the exterior of the 
film, its diegetic excess, and to enter a cinematic body that is always between place, touching 
upon new ground, moving towards the very limits of the cinema itself. The gestural signatures 
of the film as it is made - its indexical marks, its corruptions, a digital code error, a fading of 
celluloid emulsion, video dropout - are the unthought intentions of die film, before they are 
removed, corrected, or worn out as outcomes. The Woman in O f Camera has touched the 
edge of her narrative rendering, slipped into the situation of time and space as improper - the 
category of excess. We might describe this as an extra-cinelinguistic experience for the 
viewer, what Luce Irigaray describes as the mucous (of the body, of language), that which 
cannot be isolated as either interior or exterior, as subject or object, a fluid that exists between 
- the gap or third term between male and female in the sexual act, or, in this instance, what 
exists between film and viewer, and, moreover, what is between the film's material and its 
announcements. Lorraine describes mucous as a 'murky intermediary realm' where 'difference 
is acknowledged' (Lorraine 1999: 386). This mucous is close to what Deleuze and Guattari 
term virtual feminism , and what Deleuze means by the interval - a plateau for the body 
doubled as both corporeal certainty and emergent borderless desire. A virtual feminism 
transgresses the limits of critique and the mental redundancy of binary opposition. It 
generates momentum towards new and novel ways of becoming a feminist, or, in other words, 
one who is always encountering and embodying difference. Its space is the how of how a 
subject desires, not what she or he desires - the doing of the desire within its very touch. For a 
moment then, let us explore the space (the state) of a gap in cinema in terms of the feminine. 
This gap is not psychosis or death or transcendence, but rather immanence. It suggests a shift 
in the cultural imaginary towards contingent and destratified films, and this is the objective of 
a cinema into the real, to bring out the feminine of the time-image. Around such a shift the
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self is spilled into the real, it becomes with it, as a life, as that which is in excess of 
signification - a body that thinks, a sticky film that bleeds and makes touches.7
Perhaps we are passing through an era when time must redeploy space? [...] A 
remaking of immanence and transcendence, notably through this threshold that has 
never been examined as such: the female sex. The threshold that gives access to the 
mucous . . .  a threshold that is always half-open. The threshold of the lips, which are 
strangers to dichotomy and oppositions. Gathered one against the other but without 
any possible suture, at least of a real kind.
(Irigaray 1993: 18)
What Irigaray describes is the stranger within - a mobile, dancing imperceptibility by 
which we may brush up against our own limits.8 What emerges from the situation of the 
feminine gap in cinema is a fluidity of language, of terms, of descriptions, of relations, and a 
desire for a becoming in space and time. This is the possibility of an other psychology in the 
cinema transaction, where the narrative binding that perpetuates coherent vision is tom up, 
and a mental image of disassociated duration and fluid identity becomes visible. This identity 
is excessive, because it remains open to the contingent forces that would otherwise be 
foreclosed. Some thirty years before Irigaray proposed a theory for corporeal language, or 
Deleuze delivered his philosophy for the organ-less body of (not yet) thought produced by a 
cinema spiritual automaton, Maya Deren called this 'vertical film,' or what she describes as 
the non-enchantment of the film body's desire for non-fixity. Deren's Meshes o f the Afternoon 
(1943) and Ritual in Transfigured Time (1946) make of the moving image the dance of its 
own temporal properties. The labyrinths of Meshes are not only the product of a dream, or, if 
they are, it is not the dream of Deren's on-screen character but the dream of cinema, a dream 
that jousts with the woken world. Meshes and Ritual pirouette in a cyclical time and a circuit 
of expression that cannot be contained by the old system that would seek to move towards 
clarification before closure. In Ritual, the character steps into the social space of the party and 
with each movement of her body or the panning of the other dancing bodies she encounters 
the limitless possibility of her own position, in time. The film moves towards an endless loop, 
and is saved only by the termination of its cine-self, as an object with a fixed duration. 
Nonetheless, there has been the gesture of another space and time - a new and unknown
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trajectory for the human, which is a film. Here, in film practice, is motion, momentum, 
alterity, a fracturing, a bursting; a whirling until matter is shattered. These are Luce Irigaray's 
words, siren calls for the radical transformation of language in all of its forms.9 Arthur 
Kroker, writing of die deep affinity between the rhizome of Deleuze and Guattari and 
feminism, makes this point: The feminist subject, then, [is] an event-scene, living at the edge 
of the material body and virtual reality* (Arthur Kroker 199210). It is precisely this - poetry - 
the wild and unformed vibrations of words and clusters of matter that are not required to 
convey meaning, that Deleuze looks for, and almost finds, in the time-image cinema. But 
Deleuze lacks adequate examples, and this is perhaps because he does not look to the practice 
of filmmaking. There is much still to be done to release images from fixity.
This film situation, between top-down and bottom-up oppositions, reveals how any 
discursive utterance, and particularly the discourse of classical cinema, is legible only through 
its attempts to disguise the form by which it is delivered. Janet Cardiff and George Bures 
Miller's cinematic installation The Berlin Files (2003) is a looped film that purposefully never 
gains legibility. In one sequence a Steadicam shot glides through an empty apartment, peering 
into a room to catch sight of a pianist. This hyperbolic camera movement seems to run ahead 
of the sequence, to be too big for it. As though aware of the camera’s stealth, a dramatic 
orchestrated score suddenly rises, but its refrain is the same as the pianist’s melody, and he 
continues to play, only now in accompaniment to his own thriller scene. The shot sweeps 
away to find a more covert means of approaching the player, and, as it does so we see an 
intruder reflected in the piano's surface (like the momentary glimpse of a figure in the 
bathroom mirror in O f Camera). Something of great significance must be happening, but we 
have not been granted a proper view of events, and the score bursts from the screen as the 
image fades to black. Cardiff and Bures Miller are playing with an association of the 
cinematic, embodying the retrograde process of narrative comprehension. This is most 
apparent in the photographic slide show sequence, which re-presents key images from the 
installation loop as 'evidence,' but also shows us what we are already doing as viewers: trying
to make coherence from fragments. The Berlin Files hitchhikes on the back of cinema. In the 
repetitions of figures moving to and from camera - the figure in the snow, the woman in the 
subway, the waitress on the photographic slide, the karaoke singer - it shows to us the 
inherent repetition and symmetry of the cinematic form. When the shadow of an apparent 
audience member briefly brushes across the screen image, the viscosity of the cinematic 
membrane is touched. The audience turns their collective head to the back of the enclosed 
installation space, to find that the shadow was an image manipulation, and there is no physical 
body obstructing the projector lens. A part of the audience has become virtual and stepped, 
like a more enterprising Sherlock Jnr, into the sequence. We are discovering filmmaking is an 
operation that overwrites the lived world as it attempts to elucidate it. It disassembles as it 
creates.
The Berlin Files 
(Janet Cardiff & George Bures Miller 2003)
During the filming of David Lean's Lawrence o f Arabia (1962) the crew on location 
in the desert was faced with the near impossible task of removing their footprints from the 
sand, their aim being, as Sobchack writes, 'to cover the film's perceptual tracks, to disguise 
the "extra-diegetic" situation of the narrator of the narrative, and so to transform an 
intentional and discursive activity (the viewing view) into the intended and produced object 
that is histoire (the viewed view)' (Sobchack 1992: 227). A film narrative is never without 
bleed; it cannot contain the entire rogue elements it seeks to order or repress. The footprints in 
the sand, the camera reflected in a mirror, or a car window - these are instances of the image 
as it exceeds and transcends material visibility and makes a feedback loop. Such images are
the film's nature naturing (Spinoza's natura naturans), the infinite substantive of the film, 
where there is confusion between verb and noun. Classical cinema has manufactured and 
maintained supremacy, and yet its intentional singularity - the 'Whole' of the film text - cannot 
be separated from the infinite intensity of the open set that it attempts to close or delimit. 
From the chemical noise on the surface of the celluloid, to the inaccuracies inherent in film 
telling (approximate continuities, approximate emotions, conceits of time, gestures and 
arrangements of space), from the variable performance of the film print and the environment 
of the auditorium, to the always shifting relationship between symbolism and realism, from 
the indelible fact of the film's making - indexed in the narrative through details such details as 
haircuts and ddcor - to the dummy shots of arrival and departure in the documentary, examine 
any film closely and you will find approximation, compression, artifice and noise. There is no 
singular unitary Whole. There is, rather, the agglomeration o f good enough, of effective.
In O f Camera, we are on a slide descending down a chute towards the other world, 
the film's body. We can think of the situation within O f Camera as die double-becoming of 
the film, in that two ontologies are emerging in tandem: the narrative is being negated by the 
appearance of distressed pictures which cause interruption, and yet the narrative also extends 
itself to occupy this distress, so that the not-story elements (the film image burning in the 
gate, videotape drop-out, colour saturation), become the story.11 The two heterogenous realms 
(the discursive and the non-discursive) come into contact with one another, but instead of 
becoming synthesized or re-establishing dominant/subordinate relations, each realm 
encounters an indeterminate outside. New configurations of the articulable and the perceptible 
emerge. O f Camera describes a crisis - that of experiencing a tear in thought where characters 
do not jump across impossible continuities, but instead become swallowed-up in them. What 
the Woman sees and encounters is the interval between mobile sections (shots) in the moving 
image itself, where each edit is a distressing of the movement-image, of coherent, action- 
oriented film narrative space. She is one of Deleuze's pure seers, who exist in the interval of 
movement, where time is out of joint. It is not possible to hold on to her screen image as a
historically determined character, only as a life in the predicament of the state of change 
encountered as anxiety, approaching what Deleuze calls 'a whole new sense of subjectivity' 
(Deleuze 1989: 4712), the subjectivity of the gap.
O f Camera is a fiction that conveys an affect of temporal absence. The screen persona 
of the Woman isn't actually experiencing anything, because she is simply a construction, a 
piece in an artifice chain, the forcing of a narrative identity from a conceit that is an 
impossibility: a thought a filmmaker had of a film in which a character only exists on 
videotape. The performer can only offer the appearance of a crisis in thought and a slippage 
into the between of self as mediation; her sensorimotor collapse is still at a safe distance from 
any somatic, sentient person: a film character cannot think or feel the media they are 
imbedded within. What Deleuze calls 'intercessors' (Deleuze 1989: 222) leap into existence in 
the gap between the actuality of the shoot, the properties of the media, and the narrative as it 
is being told. It is these intercessors that suggest new and novel paths for the narrative form, 
because they are not fully contained by it. Their behaviour is not polite. O f Camera utilizes 
discontinuity in order to make alien the character (the player) within the events, to make her 
both the rendering of some present/absent other (the mediator, the author) and the 
transgressor of this other. Hers is a willful, dissolved identity that refuses to fall on one side or 
the other of the binary distinction of protagonist/performer, story/format. She falls into the 
gaps ordinarily bridged by impossible continuities, but she also experiments with them, lives 
them, enters them with curiosity. Her hand transgresses the frame, making bodily contact with 
the 'something else', or the 'other1 of the film itself, its surplus.13 The edge of the frame and the 
edit become diegetically felt forces acted upon the body of the film and the body of the 
protagonist, rather than agents of cohesion. The Woman is match-cut from one room to the 
next; her hand reaches across the interval; the Man is somehow transported between rooms, 
and finally is ''cut'' from the film altogether. The edit is as much a character as the Man or the 
Woman. At times it is still a unifying and calming presence, at others it brings about 
disjunctive and division. When the cut is a division, 'either/or1 dialectics are replaced by the
limitless and excessive possibilities of 'and, and, and,' when what comes next finds its basis in 
the divorce from what came before.
O f Camera. Following shot. Preceding shot.
It is not a matter of following a chain of images, even across voids, but of getting out 
of the chain or the association. Film ceases to be 'images in a chain... an 
uninterrupted chain of images each one the slave of the next,' and whose slave we 
are... It is the method of BETWEEN, between two images,' which does away with 
all cinema of the One. It is the method of AND, 'this and then that,' which does away 
with all the cinema of Being=is.
(Deleuze 1989: 180)
What emerges when the edit consists of and followed by and, rather than either/or 
dichotomies? In the Mobil petrol station section of Two or Three Things I  Know About Her 
(Jean-Luc Godard 1966), Juliette visits her husband’s garage in her red mini. We are 
presented with a number of versions of this occurrence, just as we have previously been 
presented with a number of versions of the character of Juliette. The red car toot toots its 
arrival, is turned and cleaned in a rapid succession of minor variants. Why show the garage 
and the characters, and not the trees in the background, Godard ponders, making choice a 
formal element in his film's construction, putting thoughts concerning the film into the film, 
as a creative problem.14 There are two or three things I know about Godard's ideas of 
montage: that film inevitably uses interstices of framing and editing, and therefore must 
ponder these methods whilst simultaneously using them; that the lexicon of cinema therefore 
can and must only appear as the text-like apparatus of its own form, in its own texts; that, in
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Godard, the continuity of the past no longer gives meaning to the present. 'Given one image,' 
Deleuze writes, 'another image has to be chosen which will induce an interstice between the 
two. This is not an operation of association, but of differentiation' (Deleuze 1989: 179-18015). 
A sequence edited on the basis of and-and-and, rather than either/or, unleashes a distribution 
of intensities and the possibility for the new; the irrational edit is neither purposeful nor 
arbitrary, it gives privilege to the in-between rather than to discrete sections that form links in 
a chain.
Thus modem cinema develops new relations with thought from three points of view: 
the obliteration of a whole or of a totalization of images, in favour of an outside 
which is inserted between them; the erasure of the internal monologue as whole of the 
film in favour of a free indirect discourse and vision; the erasure of die unity of man 
and the world, in favour of a break which now leaves us with only a belief in this 
world. (Deleuze 1989: 187-188)
Not before or after then, not subject or object, but intensities, middle terms, irrational 
junctures: ands, ands, ands. This form of cinema is precisely interstitial: the Whole becomes 
the and, the very gap; it is not the absolute, out there, but rather the passage from one 
antinomy to another antinomy. There is no more out-of-field, because the irrational interval 
has brought about a dispersal of the outside. The inside and the outside have revealed 
themselves as not separate from one another; the outside of the image has been replaced by 
the interstice between the two frames. Deleuze writes, 'The cut or interstice is no longer a part 
of the preceding or following image (the two series), it is an element in itself (Deleuze. 1989: 
215), in rebellion against what Arthur Kroker calls 'its own reterritorializing codes of space- 
binding' (Kroker 199216).
Peter Tscherkassky's Outer Space (1999) and Instructions fo r a Light and Sound 
Machine (2005) emerge for the viewer as though the film is being projected as the celluloid is 
simultaneously dipped into and processed in a deep chemical bath. The film is the subject, 
staring into the dazzling white light of its own completion to a visible image on the screen, 
the death throes and birth cries of film as an art medium, its life realized at the moment of its
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death. In Instructions, Tscherkassky fires The Good, the Bad and The Ugly (Sergio Leone 
1966) from a canon, and, like the bridge in the famous western, it explodes, between the 
viewer and the screen, as we are contemplating scrambling across it. These iconic celluloid 
sequences, now found footage, give in to an exhaustive physical manipulation (the result of 
months of effort in a dark room, optically re-printing and isolating areas of the frame with a 
laser pointer). These are physical wounds. Eli Wallach is made to face the firing squad again 
and again, to hang from the cinema's noose. Structural film is made over as a raft riding 
highly controlled but nonetheless exhilarating rapids, the distress effect, its precious 
appearance: die old-guard avant-garde, walking on a velvet red carpet, sensation and narrative 
reclaimed. We might ask, does this make Tscherkassky's polished, next-generation 
structuralism constitute an aberrant-image or an action-image? There is no traditional 
narrative, although screening notes for Instructions refer to a purgatorial journey down into an 
inferno through the nine hellish levels, or lives, of the cinematic operation.17 The movements 
presented (mechanical grinding, chemical spill, action oblivion) are nonetheless character 
driven, the expressions of the very matter of the cinema.
In Outer Space, there is the doubling of abuse, where one abuse negates and destroys 
the other. Barbara Hershey's character in The Entity (Ron Silver 1981) is repeatedly raped by 
a poltergeist that has no visual appearance, leaving space for the deplorable misogyny of the 
director’s eye to scrutinize die unobstructed violated body. In Outer Space it is the film The 
Entity that is raped and taken through ordeal after ordeal, by the invisible presence and force 
of Tscherkassky. The gaze has had its eyes ripped out; rigidity is given a fluid state. The 
affection-images of Hershey and Wallach's faces oscillate between fight and flight in their 
own palpable universe, the edit. They wrestle like antimatter with their counterparts, the 
famous ones, who are the screen faces of another realm. The narrative component of each 
feature film has been entirely removed. All that is left are the movements in time of the 
cinema world, movements that are nonetheless dynamic, dangerous and action-packed.
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Outer Space (Peter Tscherkassky 1999)
And so, rather than extending movement by creating its likeness, the time-image 
foregrounds cinema as artifice, providing pure optical and sound images which are self- 
evidently descriptions of the thing rather than mere indexes or registers of it.18 This kind of 
cinema can only signify itself, its virtual sensibility and its physical impossibility. In spite of 
its appearances, it is not the lived world, but it is also not a syntactical text. The irrational edit 
of the time-image constitutes a vibration between intention and contingency, making an 
image Markov chain that is not random but rather a semi-accidental phenomenon, a mixture 
of uncertainty and dependency, for the image is still partially dependent on the form of 
classical cinema as the place from which to jump. In an irrational cut there is no stable 
association through metaphor or metonymy. There is, rather, a re-linkage of independent 
images. Not one image after the other but one image plus another, which is Godard's 
interstitial method, a method that gives proliferation to the creative problem of what Deleuze 
and Guattari term choosing to choose,19 which, in the cinematic sense, means to choose an 
image, one image, any image, to follow another. Godard shows Deleuze a montage which 
interlaces an arbitrary before and after into a becoming. Of course, the organization of shot to 
shot cannot vary in the completed arrangement of the finished film because of the film object 
(the tape or print20), but the object can perform differently, and so too can our attitude to it, 
given the space of vibration made possible by irrational intervals. Difference is precisely the 
viewer's renewable entrance into the gaps and durations of the not-rational film sequence. To 
choose to choose is to choose to have thoughts differently, to fluidly invite into being, or
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cause into being, the not-yet-thought in the place of the habitual. Choice is deeper than any 
link in the world. To choose to choose. To choose to film.21
I am s t i l l  e d i t in g  a f ilm  as I w r i te .  Like a House on Fire {2006) is 
one in a series of invented cinematic Tarot cards, a deck that deals out a cluster of utterances, 
each indirectly pointing to the next and to the arbitrariness of what has come before and what 
will follow. Characters in the film read the cards but the cards cannot offer any reading of the 
film. The cards are like Borges' apocryphal Chinese Encyclopedia,22 storyboards for the film 
we are watching that mock any attempt at film to be a language or functional sign system, 
and, moreover, mock the ubiquity of signs and the expectation of meaning within society and 
culture in general. Each card points nowhere in particular; each is a signifier without fixed 
signification. There is a filmmaker trying to write a film, but the house in which he writes is 
cohabited by the film’s crew, cast and the characters they are playing. Everyone is banging 
around, trying to get into various rooms, or waiting for the film and its story to happen. This 
is not a story however, but rather a fumbling with the language of cinematic telling, a 
sequential turning of cards akin to a game of Cluedo23 in which the envelope is finally opened 
to reveal that the revolver has murdered the ballroom using a Colonel Mustard. In Like a 
House on Fire, the normative, top-down vernacular of classic cinema and the bottom-up, 
localized film speech act form a combined utterance, where commonly they would be 
segregated. The situation of the film's making and the situation of the film made cause
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difficulties for one another, and yet, like shuffled cards, maintain a unity in disunity, through 
irrational compilation. The filmmaker, his subject, the bodies of the cast and crew, and the 
space of the location, become confused, so that the film's centre is shattered from the inside: a 
film house, a straight house, a crooked house, a character becoming house ('In this card he is 
the house'), a house on fire, a house collapsed. Where the house was, he is the film.
One of the performers, JEFFREY, comments (His back to camera), 'Don't 
you think it's strange that films get written by writers? They get 
written on laptops, in coffee shops, in studios, in bars. They get 
written in rooms. And films are rooms. But a film can go anywhere it 
wants to. . . '  Where are the rooms in relation to one another, and who are the characters in 
relation to one another? They are one and the same, determined by equal edit motivations. 
The film has lost its inside and outside, the one devours the other in a continual re-ordering of 
diegetic and spatial order, so much so that often point-of-view shots are wrongly located, pre- 
filmic sounds complicate non-correspondent pro-filmic spaces, conversations bridge 
locations, and sequences resist the cut as a determined parameter of events.24 Like a House on 
Fire offers no 'prior1 by which the viewer might determine the characters, and no reliable 
sense of 'what will happen next' that the viewer can rest their association on. The extra- 
diegetic act of the edit, and the pro-theatrical occurrence of the edit, are ontological devices, 
much in the way that they had been in O f Camera, only now interstices proliferate 
everywhere.25 Camera jerks collide with characters falling over or looking away, and, in turn, 
seem to butt into attributes rendered in post-production, so that the structure of the Whole 
collapses, like a house of cards. We hear bumping, crashing and surplus sounds and these 
attitudes have the effect of placing the film in the present tense of its own event as conveyer 
of sensations. But the only thing being signified is the film , and by this I mean not merely its 
properties (which is the ideology of structural-materialism) but signification of the category 
of the cinema as a signifying agency. Because the film cannot be made sense of, the sense for 
the viewer becomes that of 'I cannot make this into sense'. She or he remains held at the
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threshold of 'ontological error' (Scott26) what can be thought of as the human subject's 
predilection for signification at the expense of the intensities and insightful properties of pure 
process. In Like a House on Fire, a narrative does develop (the filmmaker's predicament), but 
this stability in turn is ruptured. The audience leans in, willing the film to find its form, to 
stand on its feet, but is in fact only given the feet that the film stands on.
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Deleuze observes that 'It is characteristic of cinema to reflect itself (Deleuze 1989: 
186). The reflexivity at work in Like a House on Fire makes the differences between the film 
space and the lived world apparent. The film assaults the building blocks of classical cinema, 
continually re-arranging itself and beginning again. The acting is uncharismatic and each 
scene falls flat. The director who is also the writer and the editor is in the film. The characters 
appear as though waiting for the narrative to pick up momentum and give them actions that 
will convey them through the film's duration. These protagonists are not heroes or villains, 
and neither are they 'like us.' Instead they are intermediaries, potentialities - conduits without 
proper current to conduct. The situation of the writer becomes the situation of the written, as 
the filmmaker, preparing a text which will serve as the template for the film he will make, is 
disturbed, first by the appearance of a film crew and cast, and secondly by the appearance of 
the characters the cast are playing. Here we have an initial disruption, recognizable to all as 
the writer confronted by the written, but one that does not create action, for there is no 
ensuing logic o f transformations (Branigan 1992). The predicament of trying to write a film 
(something which is inherently un-cinematic) is supplanted by the predicament of being co­
opted into the film concurrently being written.
Artaud believed that what the cinema needed was 'indecipherable signs and 
unfinished puzzles.' He remarked of the The Shell and the Clergyman (Dulac 1928) that it 
'[...] does not tell a story but develops a series of states of mind which are derived from one 
another just as one thought is derived from another without this thought reproducing the 
reasonable sequence of events' (Artaud Collected Works Vol 3). Although the narrator 
element is omnipresent in Like a House on Fire, it has lost authority and been effectively 
replaced by what Deleuze, quoting Artaud, describes as, 'multiple voices, internal dialogues, 
always a voice in another voice' (Deleuze 1989: 16727). A character, Chris, is delivered to the 
audience as an historically determined subject, collected from his house and brought to the 
domain of the dramatic by two mumbling members of the crew, in what appears to be a 
factually unfolding event. Chris bears a likeness to a tarot card depicting a man who has fallen
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and clutches hold of a door, and frequently during the film Chris does fall to the floor and 
grasp at whatever is around him. Chris the factual person becomes Chris cast as persona into a 
faltering drama, who in turn becomes a body (what Bresson called a ’model'28) performing 
like-behaviour to the filmmaker. 'Can you turn the lights on,' is the repeated refrain of this 
character, caught in an optical drama, only in the dark (the origin of this remark is a panic 
attack I encountered during the night29). He does not seem to know why he is there, and, for 
that matter, where 'there' is. The viewer cannot fully conceive of the film's spatiality, territory, 
or intent. Even the author stumbles, clueless, upon scenes of what must have been his own 
making. The audience passes through an array of associative spaces, the waste products, 
perhaps, of another film, a legible film, where three characters have good reason to be 
together looking at cards, in a living room, in a bar. These images might be leftovers, a 
'bubble-and-squeak' film made of scraps from a previous and more sumptuous meal.30 The 
audience is thus encouraged to give up on accessing narrative meaning by way of the film's 
conflicting motifs, and instead allow the film's formal repetitions to act upon them and for 
their own difference to act upon the film.
This is the means by which Alain Robbe-Grillet suggested viewers engage with the 
crystalline structure of Last Year at Marienbad. Robbe-Grillet states that 'Two attitudes are 
then possible: either the spectator will try to constitute some “Cartesian” schema -  the most 
linear, the most rational he can devise [...] or else die spectator will let himself be carried 
along by the extraordinary images in front of him [...] and to this spectator the film will seem 
the “easiest” he has ever seen: a film addressed exclusively to his sensibility, to his faculties 
of sight, hearing, feeling' (Alain Robbe-Grillet 196231). Such incompossibility made possible 
by the interval is often recuperated by the viewer and made into a sensible form, for example, 
the form of analogy. Many people who watch O f Camera and Like a House on Fire 
rationalize the various sequences as being representative of psychological states: the man's 
scratched appearance must symbolize his weariness in the relationship; the woman's jittery 
form must represent her anxiety, and only that32
Deleuze is quite emphatic that instances of time-images in films are not analogous to 
anything (other than themselves) but rather have signifying value from a place of what 
Charles Peirce called firstness,33 Borrowing this sign system from Peirce, Deleuze proposes 
that Peircean thirdness is the standard sign used by the cinema: the realm of symbolization 
that involves meaning and interpretation. Deleuze renames this sign the legisign (also known 
as the relation-image).34 Deleuze terms secondness the sinsign, that which possesses an index 
or attribute of its source. Secondness is where, according to Peirce, the actual emerges from 
the virtual, the perceiver or thinking subject undergoes 'opposition and struggle for the sign' 
(Marks 200235) and begins to make differentiations in terms of action-reaction, deciding upon 
the this and not that of the image based upon the qualitative attributes of an object or event. 
Secondness is a perception that leads to action. 'Red' may be a colour field, but 'steam,' or 
'bum,' is an attribute of something that is red hot, an actual event. Thirdness mediates firstness 
and secondness.
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Like a House on Fire is a deliberate perversion of sign systems, from first to third 
order (for example, the opening blue colour plane is abstract but becomes identifiable as 
possibly a blue screen, and later as actually the backing to the tarot cards). Red signifies 
danger but also red herring. A steaming Red Tea Kettle, such as the supporting player in Like 
a House on Fire (above) has the sinsign or secondness indexical value of danger (scalding) 
but also the legisign of a cultural event, conveying that water is ready to make tea. However, 
when viewed repetitively, and in a number of contexts where it does not complete itself as 
sinsign or legisign, the red kettle manifests as merely an image, one that has no symbolic 
value (literally a red herring, then). When secondness does not provoke a movement in 
response to movement, it remains suspended within thought as affect (firstness); and when 
secondness reconstitutes the whole of movement with respect to all aspects of die interval of 
thought it becomes relational (thirdness). In Deleuze, these sign-types correspond to the 
affection-image, the action-image, and the relation-image. The cinema has tried to replicate 
and reinforce the dominant convention of thirdness by approximating syntax in its mode of 
address and patterns of form, downplaying its propensity for abstraction and the very 
corporeality of its function. The fluid and irrational cinema to which we are giving our 
attention concentrates on perpetual firstness, on the very utterable of the moving image, its 
chiasmic expulsion, rather than on what is being uttered. In Irigaray's terms, this would be the 
'not-that' of the image.
Within every classical film there is another film. Sometimes this film within a film is 
implicit; at other times it is explicit. Wherever and whatever I film, I first encounter myself as 
a person who is filming. This excess of the image (what is behind the image, after the image) 
constitutes its own text, what Deleuze calls dysnarrative, that which creates a rift between 
narration and practical reality.36 Such a form of what the Russian Formalists called 
'literariness' inheres in the form of the text, through its characteristic way of using style and 
convention, often reflexively.37 In fact, any instance of reflexivity acts as a critique of film 
production, for through citation a film makes parody, thereby emptying the cinema narrative
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of its diegetic power. Deleuze writes that 'the film within the film does not signal an end of 
history, and is no more self-sufficient than is the flashback or the dream: it is just a method of 
working, which must be justified from elsewhere. In fact, it is a mode of the crystal-image' 
(Deleuze 1989: 76-7738). The film about the film lets loose the nature of the film naturing. As 
we have established, classic cinema narrative exists and functions precisely because of such 
hidden processes and is an explicit attempt to master them (Branigan 1992: 10), but this 
regulation can itself run into loss (especially given the edit process).
Robbe-Grillet's theory offers the viewer respite from the impulse to see film images 
as legisigns or sinsigns and therefore to have to read them. But the viewer's impulse to read 
and recuperate is nonetheless extremely useful, as a property that can be implicated in the 
ensemble of the film's operation. This reaching for sense operates as an additional attribute to 
any film text, like an extra transition, or a peculiar interval of its own. Like a House on Fire is 
comparable to an overheard conversation where only parts of sentences are audible. It has the 
appearance of a film drama that might add up, if only all of its components were available. 
But in its current formation its meaning remains obscured, incomplete. Signs present 
themselves and represent themselves, but there is limited information and time for these signs 
to become structured, to be co-opted into a sensible system, before they are updated and 
changed. The images are only like symbols and therefore cannot be deciphered. Like a House 
on Fire makes an announcement: the moving image as anxiety, as malady, as gap.
So too does Gary Hill's Incidence o f Catastrophe (1987-88), where the act of reading 
the written word is a sickness, a madness between the ‘read’ and the ‘lived.’ Hill uses the 
physicality of the (video) interval and image superimposition to embody Maurice Blanchot's 
Thomas the Obscure (1941). Characters around a dining table utter words that cause, or are 
timed with, cut-aways and in-frame occurrence; the turning of a page becomes commensurate 
with the 'fold' of the video edit. The pages are wiped into and over images of fluidity: a tidal 
pulling, collapsing mud banks, the mass of a liquid, the flow of written words, the page as a
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waveform. The edit crashes against the shore, opening and closing the conception of book and 
of legibility, making the book, and the videotape, as much object as text. Videotape folds into 
itself; interpretation and representation are afflictions. Through experiencing the word as 
nausea inducing, we encounter the video artist as reader, as Hill attempts to ’try out' reading 
and ’try out’ video making. It is as though we have momentarily penetrated Hill's own 
thinking body.
The viewer and character can also, and at once, be reader, watcher and co-author, and 
to a great extent the author, when in the inter-text between intention and contingency, is also 
the reader of what exceeds his or her invention.39 This is why the moving image is foremost a 
lectosign. It must be read as well as seen, although it can never in and of itself, as an 
independent image, be meaningful; we do read the moving image, although it is not actually 
readable without the imposition of our own pie-determined texts. The activity of both reading 
and watching a moving image involve oneiric figurations and the balance of various mental 
images (for example, during film watching there is the balance of light cast upon a screen, 
diegetic story space, memory images, which might be recollections of what we have seen of 
the film, or memories in general, plus speculative images of a future-present, which might be 
the future present of the film, or one unrelated to the film). Cinema deploys the oneiric 
figuration of film interlaced with mind, and within its own text, balances the invented with the 
actual; the dreamt with the sentient; the top-down with bottom-up. In classical cinema, these 
Saussurean binary oppositions privilege the first term over the second, so that the viewer is 
largely non-participatoiy. Films that are fluid and uncertain in their arrangement do not 
operate within these binary oppositions but rather involve their co-existence. They do not 
produce consumption or engender meaning. The discontinuous time and the forms of 
reflexivity excreted in Like a House on Fire and Incidence o f Catastrophe constitutes a 
textual immanence, where inter-textual articulations (book-videotape; script-scene) mean that 
story is erased as it is being written, sous rature, as Derrida has it, and the maker is revealed 
wherever the text tries to conceal them, in a mutual reversibility of body and language in a
lived world which, without language, is strange. As Paul Ricoeur writes, 'our movement up 
the entropic slope of language encounters the movement by which we come back this side of 
the distinctions between actuality, action, production, motion' (Ricoeur 1977: 30940).
Like a House on Fire delivers the cinematic without what such a semaphore 
articulates and holds up: the narrative. Here is the moving image as a tool, albeit still crude, 
for experiential and cognitive ecriture. And then there is the cinematic without the cinema 
altogether, the film ic without the film , which I will come to. Uncertain films such as this elicit 
a tension, a crisis of confidence in the audience, one that is different to the distracted 
inattention within the structural-materialist film’s reception, because the images are not 
abstract and appear to be like dramatic ones. Like a House on Fire is dependent on the 
narrative search engines in our minds for its completion (or incompletion). What I mean by 
this is that I am principally interested in the
Mental state 
(or even the emotional state) 
where a person is oscillating between the sensible and the 
irrational. Without narrative-like elements, it is less 
possible to explore this state. I like to give the impression 
of narrative coherence being just around the corner, although 
every corner turned offers another corner.
Gilberto Perez 
(Film in Review: The Edges of Realism 1997: 175-176)
The point is not merely to tell us the story but to make us 
aware of our path to the story.
During this thwarting of expectation for story (within this repetition of nearly-story), 
the audience either becomes irritated, or switches to a different access point to the flow of 
images in sequence. In this sense, narrative is a uniquely experimental form. And besides, to 
craft stories well is to be inert, and I have never taught myself to do this. However, the 
building blocks I use are extremely similar to that of the classical film drama. To repeat, I use 
actors, scripts, suggestive scores, motifs, in fact almost all of the tropes and vernacular of 
classical cinema, but aberrantly. What I most want to do with cinema is doubly impossible. 
Firstly, because I want to make films that provoke my own thoughts to become distended and
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new, but of course, as the author, I know every detail of my own finished films too well for 
that to be possible. Secondly, I desire for the cinema as gap to have such potency that it 
changes the physical limitations of the medium, so that frames collapse and the film spills out 
into the world, where it becomes a life. This is only possible in thought. I can think this kind 
of a film, but in the physical world I can only make assertions towards it.
Narrative, we know, is a many thousands of years old system for managing sense data 
and the virtual images of memory and imagination. It makes catalogues and arranges events 
into teleology. This is all fine, and any audience member is supremely skilled in extracting 
meaning from disparate events and signs. The key thing is giving the audience the confidence 
(in the author, in the film) to remain in the state of extracting, of mining, rather than hurry to 
the dead conclusion of whether the film does or does not make sense, and whether it does or 
does not entertain. I have found that people appreciate my films much more when they view 
them a second time. Then they bring to the assemblage the repetition of viewings and their 
own difference, and they encounter the pictures inventively with that difference in repetition.
Difference makes each cut emerge as simultaneously planned and arbitrary. 
When people view Like a House on Fire and O f Camera a second time, they adjust to the 
films' irregular nature, but they also retain from the first viewing the sense-making thoughts 
they had. This interlacing of thoughts and associations acts as an additional text applied to the 
on-screen sequences. There is repetition of form applied in the same way as a classical drama, 
in that we see a red tea kettle as instrument, as weapon, we see blue-screen blue as mise-en- 
scene decor and as psychology ('I was daydreaming'); Chris continually falls over, in different 
environments, but none of these repetitions constitutes a meaning that the audience can carry 
with them. Each revisiting of a sign provokes the fact of difference within repetition, the 
return to the same as difference. Chris arrives again, once more, in the bar (the beginning 
again of Like a House on Fire two thirds of the way through the film's length) establishing 
the film's entry into another series. A sequence of shots follows, linked on the basis of
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movements in frame. This series berserks movement-image rationality. The sequence is 
further interrupted by free indirect passages of movement without the motivation of direction 
further interrupt: Chris looking, Jeffrey looking, Megan’s head turning suddenly to one side, 
Megan’s hands on the pages of a book. These are unintended moments when the director of 
photography ran the camera without looking through die viewfinder or informing any of the 
cast. The film trips over its own virtual body (as an edited temporality), presenting the lived 
world as a series of fallings over, like Jacques Tati’s Playtime (1967), its cinematic 
movements as ’busk’, as a dance becoming, no longer narrative but a symmetry of inter­
flowing incident phases, palimpsests of coincidence, decaying in detail as the next overlaps 
and replaces the last, what Deleuze describes as 'a rolling ball of the present, from where we 
cannot speculate or retrospect’ (Deleuze 1989:67).
Like a House on Fire is a film dropped down a flight of stairs. The tarot cards parody 
the categories of chance and inteipretation. The edit decisions are not aleatory; they are the 
result of percept thoughts in the situation of the edit, the 'trying out' of one shot to another. 
This tumbling is unavoidably over determined, simply by the highly controlled act of 
technically performing edits, but nonetheless, a register of the edit, as a thought, remains. One 
would have to either be a total novice or a supremely skilled editor to have complete mastery 
over the edit itself, because an edit is an outcome determined by its own format and by the 
model of its cultural iteration. This model seeks equilibrium and defaults to providing 
pleasurable and safe passage for the viewer, even when dealing with shocking content. 
Perhaps it is the case that there is no such filing as an irrational edit in the mind of the editor, 
although the apparent irrationality of combinatory shots can make a mental site for new 
thought in the viewer. Whose mind does the film or video editor imagine perceiving the 
edited film? Is it an every-mind, and does the editor make decisions based on what that every- 
mind can possibly know and will emotionally react to? When I edit, I essentially assemble the 
film my own mind wants to perceive. My point here is that an irrational idea that suggests a 
non-rational edit is not the same as the idea in the mind of the viewer that watches that edit. I
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think this is why I can only say with certainty that I make films for myself. I could not 
possibly think the thoughts that a person other than me might have in reaction to the actions I 
perform in response to my own thoughts. I try to retain my process and thinking as implicit 
rather than implicit within the exhibited films, and although this thinking is not explicit in the 
final film, it is never fully overwritten by explanatory material.
I  Make Things Happen, The End, Chris Crossing, O f Camera, and Like a House on 
Fire create interferences. Their reflexivity offers a trick surrogacy, where the film about a 
film becomes a subject that can never adequately resolve, because it cannot be completed 
satisfactorily. For, at some point, the film within the film must run up against the film it is in. 
But reflexivity turns bodies inside out: film bodies, filmed bodies, thinking viewing bodies. It 
disassembles the arrangement of looks, altering the presence and look of the spectator, so that 
there is no stable subject on camera or in the viewing place of the theatre. As Sobchack 
describes, such reflexivity expresses how a person can in one instance be performer and 
performed; that a film can be telling and told, story world and material. And from this 
reflexivity the lived world is reproduced as an unsolvable conundrum and the cinema a liquid 
kind of architecture.
Relativity (M.C. Escher 1953)
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If the normative value of cinema is the self as house, its posturing of unequivocal 
language is an agoraphobia. The cinema house is a spy place, a vantage point - the masculine. 
Avant-garde film and structural-materialist film have eschewed the structure of a house 
entirely, in favour of noise. Fluid film uses the house in order to explore the edges of its 
possibility: the shifting walls and Mobius strip architecture (like the impossible structures in 
the work of M.C. Escher), the utterance and the exploration of elastic space and unregulated 
time. I am uncomfortable fully ascribing this sensibility to the feminine. We lack the terms. 
But the cinema, in all of its operations: writing, rehearsal, production, levels of narration, 
edited spaces, and audience reception, is a difficulty. In O f Camera and Like a House on Fire 
the condition of the character is the film itself; we witness characters that cannot be 
characters. They push against the limit of cinema in a cine situation that eats its own tale. 
Their activities are not commensurable with the lived world precisely because they were not 
invented for it. With this idea we are drawing closer to a cinema that can manage an inventive 
form of absence. The 'like' in Like A House On Fire is the arrangement of rooms - a house - 
set fire to, a film's life-likeness burned. The image of a house does not signify 'house,' but 
'Here is a house,' the index of actualization, as it occurs, in a film. The objective is to find new 
forms of identity rather than negate identity altogether. In terms of the cinema, it is to 
discover new forms of narrative, rather than abandon narrative with the attitude that no story 
can be emergent. In Deleuze's philosophy the se lf is replaced by a life. If we develop this 
thought, the film object (as subject) is increasingly intermixed with its life as a process 
(filmmaking). The film house is replaced by movements through and around it, or by the 
activity of disassembling and reconstructing it.
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1 Deleuze writes that '[...] Bergson constantly circles around the following conclusion, which will also haunt 
cinema: attentive recognition informs us to a much greater degree when it fails than when it succeeds' (Deleuze. 
1989:54-55)
2 Artaud 1976: 570-571.
3 In O f Camera, my original plan was to heavily rehearse the male actor who played the male character and have 
the actress literally brought into the location to react, without the benefit of briefing, to the activities around her 
during the shoot. The only vestige of that process is die end credit sequence, in which we can hear her exclaim and 
groan. These are the exasperated noises Sharon Smith made following the word, 'Cut!' I returned to this sudden 
shift in behaviour around the foreclosure of a take in The Film and The Film We Didn't Make.
4 Stephen Heath writes on this matter, that, I f  the fiction film works to produce a homogeneity, works to flatten 
out contradiction, that homogeneity is only ever the product of the film; in no way can it exhaust the textual system 
-  the filmic process, the relational movement -  which is precisely the term of its production' (Heath 1981:133).
5 A 'synecdoche' is closely related to metonymy and to metaphor. The use of synecdoche is a common way to 
emphasize an important aspect of a fictional character; for example, a character might be consistently described by 
a single body part which comes to represent the character, for example, 'mouths to feed' for hungry people. 
(Source, Wikipedia). I have applied this idea of synecdoche to classical cinema, whose evolution runs concurrently 
to the development of Saussure and also of Merleau Ponty and Sartre's theories. As Sobchack writes, 'Existential 
and semiotic phenomenology suggests that "coding" and containing the body's excessive, mobile, and "wild” 
signification is a cultural and historical activity that stakes out upon the body's broader meaning-producing field a 
limited and mutable circumscription of existence' (Sobchack 1992:144).
6 In fact, the very power of mucous is to spill thought into the body and the body into thought, and both body and 
thought into the world. Mucous is Irigaray's term for the unthought moving toward representation, for those 
strangely uncanny aspects of experience that defy already established self/other and body/mind divisions (see 
Whitford 1991a, 163). Tam sin Lorraine writes that The desire of a "masculine" economy of language fails to 
reflect adequately the porous nature of the body... it ignores the murky intermediary realm in which desires are not 
clearly laid out or articulated' (Lorraine 1999: 37).
7 Introducing fluidity into language and identity relations sparks warnings of post structural freefall from a number 
of theorists. Riley Olstead suggests that (un)meaning (i.e., the freeplay of signs in postmodemity), can be regarded 
as the ultimate effect of alienation, and in fact an attitude manufactured by the dominant order and cultivated as a 
positivity where it is in fact a dangerous rather than transformative absence. Olstead sees perpetual self-negation, 
the project, if you will, of Deleuze and Guattari and of post-structuralism in general, as the paralysis o f the modem 
thinking subject. As Lorraine writes, Irigaray, too 'criticizes philosophers who take an interest in the 
"deconstruction of ontology" without concerning themselves with "the constitution of a new, rationally founded
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identity' (Lorraine 1999: 218, quoting Irigaray in, Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution 1994b: 32). 
Lorraine continues: Tor Irigaray, subjectivity must be premised on a felt encounter with our own corporeal limits 
and an acknowledgment of the difference of the other who allows us to experience our limits' (Lorraine 1999: 
220).
8 Tamsin Lorraine notes that The excessive, unrepresentable feminine cannot be contained within current systems 
of representation. If Irigaray evokes such a feminine, she can do so strategically only by articulating the blind spot 
that is required for the phallogocentric economy to function in a specific context. This means that this notion of the 
feminine (if indeed we can call it a notion) is always in movement' (Lorraine 1999:41.)
9 See Tamsin Lorraine 1999: 64-65 on Irigaray's use of fluid language.
10 Arthur Kroker, Two meditations, CTheory. originally published in Arthur Kroker, The Possessed Individual. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
11 Becoming is a term used by Deleuze (and Guattari) for the emergent movement of a life along the plane of 
immanence, as it opens onto the new. This concept is central to Deleuze's process philosophy, which reverses the 
trend of a timeless metaphysical reality in philosophy sustained since Plato. 'Becoming' is favoured over 'Being' 
and 'Non-being.' Becoming does not characterize change as illusory but as the cornerstone of metaphysical reality.
12 'Subjectivity, then, takes on a new sense, which is no longer motor or material, but temporal and spiritual: that 
which 'is added' to matter, not what distends it; recollection-image, not movement-image' (Deleuze 1989: 47). See 
also Bergson (1911) Matter and Memory: 69-77.
13 Heath writes that The something else, the other film of which this film says everywhere the slips and slides: the 
narrative of the film and the history of that narrative, the economy of its narrative production, its logic. To 
approach, to experience the textual system can only be to pull the film onto this double scene, this process of its 
order and of the material that order contains, of the narrative produced and of the terms of its production. Analysis 
must come to deal with this work of the film, in which it is, exactly, the death - itself the disturbance - of any given 
cinema' (Heath 1981:143)
14 Godard here offers up to the audience something of a cognitive shift, in which the thought processes of the artist 
become a part of the dramatization. The film then is the analysis of its own structure.
15 Deleuze writes that 'Given one image, another image has to be chosen which will induce an interstice between 
the two. This is not an operation of association, but of differentiation, as mathematicians say, or of disappearance, 
as physicists say: given one potential, another has to be chosen, not any whatever, but in such a way that a 
difference of potential is established between die two, which will be productive of a third or of something new1 
(Deleuze 1989: 179-180). He continues: The Whole undergoes a mutation, because it has ceased to be the one- 
Being, in order to become the constitutive 'and' of things [...] The cuts or breaks in cinema have always formed the 
power of the continuous' (Deleuze 1989: 180-181).
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1if
16 See on-line journal, CTheory, Arthur Kroker, originally published in Arthur Kroker, The Possessed Individual. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
17 See, www.sixpackfilm.com.
18 Deleuze writes that 'In the first case, we had, we perceived, a sensory-motor image from the thing. In the other 
case, we constitute a pure optical (and sound) image of the thing, we make a description' (Deleuze 1989: 44). This 
is why Robbe-Grillet, who wrote the screenplay for Marienbad, stated that the chronosign (Deleuze: 1989) of the 
pure optical image seems poorer, because it is not the thing but a description of it, a substitute for the thing, which 
in replacing the real, makes the referent disappear and in its place creates antinomy. The film antinomy is celluloid 
and sign.
19 See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Schizophrenia and Capitalism 1987.
20 There have been manifold attempts at database narrative engines, choose-your-own-adventure styled "random" 
narratives, none of which, at root, have managed to produce arbitrary or entirely self-generating story forms, in 
fact, quite the opposite, have relied heavily on existing codes, particularly in the role playing computer games 
typified by Tomb Raider.
21 This is the basis of Deleuze and Guattari's Difference and Repetition, and what Deleuze means by regaining 
belief in this world, or, as Ronald Bogue phrases it, to 'Disenchain the chains and dissolve habitual temporal 
regularities' (Bogue, speaking at the Time@20 conference, Harvard University 2005). In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze announces that we should 'make of repetition itself something new1 (Deleuze. 1994). Deleuze 
arrives at the concept of difference in repetition by reading Kierkegard through Nietzsche - the leap of faith, into 
immanence. The religious force in Kierkegaard (God) is dropped by Deleuze, but this force is translated into 
repetition, and the cosmos emerges as the infinite series of repeated dice throws. A Life is akin to a Markov chain, 
and has the potential for multiple outcomes.
22 Borges attributes in his essay The Analytical Language o f John Wilkins (from Other Inquisitions: 1937-1952*) 
the following taxonomy to an ancient Chinese encyclopedia, the Celestial Emporium o f Benevolent Knowledge: 
'On those remote pages it is written that animals are divided into: 1.those that belong to the Emperor, 2.embalmed 
ones, 3.those that are trained, 4.suckling pigs, 5.mermaids, 6.fabulous ones, 7.stray dogs, 8.those included in the 
present classification, 9.those that tremble as if they were mad, 10.innumerable ones, 11.those drawn with a very 
fine camelhair brush, 12. others, 13. those that have just broken a flower vase, 14.those that from a long way off 
look like flies.' Scholars have questioned whether the attribution of the list to Franz Kuhn is genuine. While Kuhn 
did indeed translate Chinese literature, Borges' works often feature many pseudo-learned references resulting in a 
mix of facts and fiction. To date, no evidence for the existence of such a list has been found.
23 In North America this game is called Clue.
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24 In Atom Egoyan's Speaking Parts (1989) the assemblage of the edit is the product of both videotape and 
celluloid an electrical device. In the final sequence, video noise, celluloid memories, surveillance pictures, 
broadcast television and analogue playback coalesce; fragments of earlier explode into later. This sequence is an 
erupting fountain of cascading liquid images: characters thinking, seeing, remembering, mediated, flipping 
between present moments and caught in versions: the TV studio, the chapel of rest, the hotel room, the hospital 
video feed, all fused together by the interference threshold of their own temporal and diegetic edges.
25 Deleuze 1989: 181.
26 'Our ontological error - which becomes moral, scientific, aesthetic, political, clinical error - is to signify - to 
become slaves to things as meaningful - including self, world, and god - rather than participating in process - 
expressionism in philosophy: simulacra as creative manifestation of intensity in an eternal return, refrain, or 
miming of the intensity itself (Scott. Analytica.com, posted April 01 2005)
27 See also The Old Age o f the Cinema (Artaud 1933), which marks Artaud's break with cinema.
28 See Robert Bresson (1975) Notes on the Cinematographer.
29 See Act 1, Scene 4, Disequilibrium.
30 An old fashioned, working class British meal comprising of the mashed and fried vegetable leftovers from the 
previous day's roast dinner. I put that one in for my Mother.
31 From the paperback Last Year at Marienbad (Alain Robbe Grillet 1962). As Rodowick says of Marienbad, 
version collides with version. 'No! The door was closed!' protests one of die characters about the topography of 
events. Marienbad stages the possibility of incompossible worlds, harnessing the very physicality of the edit - its 
being - to make these worlds seem reasonable. In Marienbad, the eyes of the characters are widened to the bliss 
and horror of disorderly time. In the silent crosscutting sequence, the edit becomes a violence done to the 
characters, (as too is the case in O f Camera).
32 This is why Antonioni's colours are so arresting, because they appear to be symbolic but in fact are not. They are 
only colour, pure colour.
33 Peirce writes that The being of a symbol consists in the real fact that something surely will be experienced if 
certain conditions be satisfied. Namely, it will influence the thought and conduct of its interpreter [...] Just as a 
photograph is an index having an icon incorporated into it, that is, excited in the mind by its force, so a symbol 
may have an icon or an index incorporated into it, that is, the active law that it is may require its interpretation to 
involve the calling up of an image, or a composite photograph of many images of past experiences, as ordinary 
common nouns and vetbs do; or it may require its inteipretation to refer to die actual surrounding circumstances of 
the occasion of its embodiment, like such words as that, this, I, you, which, here, now, yonder, etc. Or it may be 
pure symbol, neither iconic nor indicative, like the words and, or, of, etc' (Peirce 1932:4.447)
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34 This is the territory most commonly associated with semiotics through Roland Barthes, where signs produce 
thoughts that make comprehensive statements about qualities and events. As Laura U. Marks writes, The legisign's 
relation to its object is only ever symbolic, in that the sign stands for an object via an interpretant that represents 
the sign, as argument' (Laura U. Marks 2002:197).
35 Ibid.
36 Deleuze writes observes that The cinema is always narrative, and more and more, but it is dysnarrative in so far 
as narration is affected by repetitions, permutations and transformations which are explicable in detail by the new 
structure' (Deleuze. 1989: 137).
37 For Shklovsky, it is not the 'images' that are crucial in poetry but rather the 'devices' deployed, a poetic speech 
involving a special use of language that achieves distinctiveness by deviating from and distorting, or 
defamiliarizing, the 'practical' language of eveiyday life, short-circuiting automated responses and exploding the 
encrustations of customary perception. This is Brecht's politic of distanciation; in Benjamin (The Author as 
Producer) it is the act of reflecting, the response to the demand that an artist make his or her process evident in the 
art object.
38 Deleuze continues: I t  was inevitable that the cinema, in the crises of the action-image, went through 
melancholic Hegelian reflections on its own death: having no more stories to tell, it would take itself as object and 
would be able to tell only its own story (Wenders). But, in fact, the work in the mirror and the woik in the seed 
have always accompanied art without ever exhausting it, because art found in them a means of creation for certain 
special images' (Deleuze 1989: 76-77)
39 Mikhail Bakhtin writes that The word (or in general any sign) is inter-individual... The author (speaker) has his 
own inalienable right to the word, but the listener also has his rights, and those whose voices are heard in the word 
before the author comes upon it also have their rights' (Bakhtin 1986: 121-122). Bakhtin and the Russian 
Formalists argue that a literary structure does not reflect reality, but rather the reflections and refractions of other 
ideological spheres. The reader, or in this case, the viewer, as a difference to the text, challenges the dominant 
attitude of film theory towards spectator inertia. It is important however to acknowledge that not all film spectator 
theory posits the viewer as passive. Vivian Sobchack refutes the idea that ideation is ever suspended in any 
significant way during the film viewing transaction, and David Bordwell's cognitivism regards the cinema viewer 
as highly active. See, Bordwell, Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation o f Cinema. Harvard 
Film Studies. 1989.
40 Paul Ricoeur (1977) The Rule o f Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary studies o f the creation o f meaning in Language.
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“ book is made of words in lines and those 
words have a system that we understand as 
meaning, and we don't really pay any 
attention to the gaps (between the words), 
but if there were no gaps then we would 
have no words. There have to be gaps in 
order to define the words. It's like the 
way film moves through a projector gate. 
You have to have black between each frame, 
otherwise the frames blur into each other 
and you have no image. The way we process 
experience works in the same way. We aren't 
supposed to be aware of the gaps. The brain 
does the same thing. It orders in a certain 
way and we are accustomed to that order. We 
are accustomed to that calibration in our 
minds, even though our minds have to skip 
the blanks. Our minds are told not to tell 
ourselves about the
These are marks I produced on an aeroplane at the onset o f a panic attack,
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Act 1, Sc 5. Disequilibrium - film can help us think panic
How, then, might I enter panic, the new to my habitual thought, without panicking? One entry 
is film, a better mode for occupying absence. Film can help us think panic; it can give panic a 
situation.
(Eastwood 2007: 128)
Panic is creation.
(Deleuze & Guattari 19872)
If we recall, the early cinema produced an anxiety of displacement due to its inherent 
disequilibrium, which, in classical cinema, is tempered by the trick of hyper-schemas. These 
schemas erase the trace of the film's body and generate instead the illusion of a Whole, 
through storyboards, shot-lists, contingency plans, rehearsals, impossible continuities, levels 
of narration, the star system and so on. There were parallels drawn between this cinematic 
proper and the arrangements of the sensory-motor schema, that which, as Gregory Flaxman 
writes, 'Having migrated into the brain [...] colonised thought to the degree that disturbances 
can be ignored, shunted aside, "declared unreal'" (Flaxman 2000: 103). Deleuze suggests that 
Bergson's immanence, which is the becoming of all matter in time, is in and around us, but 
partitioned off by the screen of the sensory-motor schema and its perception images. He notes 
that When a sensory-motor whole is no longer apprehensible, either in the cinema or in the 
world, paralysis grips the “ordinary man”, as if confronted with something intolerable in the 
world or unthinkable in thought' (Deleuze 1989: 1693). What is outside of the sensory-motor 
schema? Is it possible for the cinema to extend its hodological space and make a path into this 
intolerable and unthinkable in our experience? 4
Panic is the excess of the sensory-motor schema. It is the thought without the thinker, 
the idea cut adrift, a cause in itself, a spiritual automaton let loose without the guardian 
sensory-motor schema. Panic forecloses the thinker as it unleashes a dimensionless world of
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cascading matter. There are certain persons, such as myself, who have what is called anxiety 
disorder, or panic attacks.5 When experiencing an attack, an individual is taken to the 
threshold of sensory-motor stability and from that vista senses a gap that is the impending 
erasure of all of the physical and ideational frames of reference that constitute their identity. 
In Bergson, this gap is the interval between perception and mental reception (manifested as 
action), an interval that reveals to us the pure becoming of all matter in time, what he calls 
immanence. We have looked at what the cinema is, in its many guises, but what is panic?
A panic attack is described by the medical profession in a DSM publication as the 
spontaneous emission of a certain form of adrenaline, norepinephrine, from the adrenal 
glands located at top area of each kidney in the lower back (DSM 20006). This emission 
produces a sudden feeling of intense fear or discomfort, provoking an instantaneous fight or 
flight response. Commonly, this response is not rational in its origin, although at times it is 
prompted by real-world events.7 A s h o c k  t o  t h o u g h t . I cannot climb back into my
thinker. I can sm ell my sw eat, t a s t e  th e  s tro n g  sweet a c id  o f th e  app le  
I am e a t in g , b u t th e  s e n s a tio n s  a re  away, they  a re  e x te r io r ,  n o t 
where I am. Then p a n ic , th e  v io le n t  escape o f th e  o th e r  th in k e r  in  my 
th o u g h t, or when ex trem ely  t i r e d ,  b u t  for the most part panic strikes soon after 
falling asleep. It attacks in sleep and threatens to remove, again, again. Night panic attacks are 
more violent, because I do not have die conscious critical faculties to quell the sudden rush of 
adrenaline. Without apparent cause, or warning, I erupt from deep sleep into extreme 
movement, throwing myself across the room, thrashing. I have instantaneously found myself 
in a life without a self, at the very point where that life is entering the state of total dispersal 
into a world. There is often a crying out, but I am not at its origin. Not only am I not Steven 
Eastwood, I am not a person who is not Steven Eastwood. I am not a thinker. I am not a 
thought. I am not a body, merely the author of space,8 only  immanence and. you f e e l  
i t  ru sh in g  up th e  r e a l i z a t io n ,  and there it is. that He i s  now ab sen ted . I 
becomes he becomes no t in  th e  in s ta n t  o f t h i s ,  th e  r e a l i z a t io n ,  th a t
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this is how time is, a nothing a covering device a habit,\ a pre­
fabricated location, folding in.-gone. There it is! that gap the
real, and there is no experience .as it departs a book that vanishes, 
disinvented, it shuts closed 
many others
who have severe pan ic  attacks describe the panic as the sensation of dying. I would say 
that a panic attack is worse than the fear of death, or what I can imagine the experience of 
death might be like. What I am encountering during an attack is that no thing is, no thing 
exists or has ever existed: that there is no place or time to be bom into, and no place or time 
from which to die. Here is another testimony, not my own but another's, but one that starts to 
suggest the confederacy between this traumatic interval and the displacement the cinema 
presents to us:
I look at this body and can't understand why I am within it. I 
hear myself having conversations and wonder where the voice is 
coming from. I imagine myself seeing life as if it were played 
like a film in a cinema. But in that case, where am I? Who is 
watching the film? What is the cinema? The worst part is that 
this seems as i-f it's the truth, and the periods of my life in 
which I did not feel like this were the delusions. (Anon9)
Now, what does this testimony do, and what is this written text doing to explicate 
panic and its relation with film? The impossibility of documenting any of these experiences as 
we undergo them, or even of thinking them, inevitably results in difficulty when attempting to 
say anything substantial about the structure of such lapses. So, can we assign panic a 
language, or a body?10 Panic is the ineffable in the language of the visionary, the unutterable 
in my language and I have always retained something sacred in the unspeakable nature of it 
and in d i r e c t ly  th e  p u n c tu a tio n  and th e  semblance f r e e ly ,  o f vo ices  
th a t  a re  n o t e s ta b l i s h e d . To speak of or about panic is to reduce the unspeakable 
into speech, and this is to be in the place where panic is not. Panic is the loss of the word and 
the loss of the thinker, the Kantian sublime, an opening of the mind onto immanence. But
116
speak of it I do, in moving image and in this text, if only to observe how it evades the moving 
image and the text.11
In the 1640s Henry Moore called this the sensorium, the state before meaning is 
reduced in response to external data (his description is very close to Deleuzian affect, which I 
will come to, in time). This state of the thought without the thinker is almost always equated 
with horror and therefore elicits panic. Artaud wailed that it was to stare nature in the face and 
hear, as a distant scream, the sound of one's own thinking. Walter Benjamin called it the 
rausch or sprung, a moment of discontinuity or a profane illumination, 'the sudden spark that 
ignites the mind with its solution' (Benjamin 1999B12). Panic is a chasm, intimate then with 
the chiasmus in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, the (much romanticised) space between 
language and not-language. This gap is redolent of Lacan's absent cause (again, confederate 
with Deleuzian affect). In the novel Nausea (1938) Jean-Paul Sartre refers to the filth, a state 
altogether abhorrent in its terrifying being. That everything is. In Borges' short story The 
Aleph (1949, revised 1974) we find panic as a point in space that contains all other points, not 
a reliable and determinable terrain, but literally an 'everywhere' and an 'everything' which is 
hideous in its immanence. Similarly, William Burroughs declared panic as 'the sudden 
intolerable knowing that everything is alive.'
We have named it: panic is the gap, and this gap is prior to anya nd all strcutrures. 
Blanchot writes, 'What is first is not the plenitude of being, it is the crack and the fissure, the 
erosion and the tear; intermittence and the gnawing privation' (Blanchot 1959: 49-50). Alain 
Badiou, like Deleuze, accounts for this void in our thinking as a rupture or cut. This void is 
not entirely a lack or absence, and neither is the panic attack which pulls towards this void, or 
is pulled towards it. Hollis Frampton, in Circles o f Confusion (Frampton 198313) describes 
such peculiar absences as an entry into 'ecstatic time' - the upsurge when the plates of memory 
and imagination press together in mental anxiety and create a burst of cognitive energy. If we
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think of panic as the apparent transgression of the containment of identity within the body and 
within sensible thought, then there are shades of panic in Irigaray's mucous and there is most 
certainly distress in Deleuze and Guattari's interval, both of which theorize exceeding thought 
and exceeding the body, in order to enter a pure affirmation, the chartless channel where we 
may happen upon little archipelagos of our becoming as imperceptible beings. After all, the 
channels may be smooth but they are recognized by our sensory-motors as turbulent. Most, if 
not all of us, do not desire to be imperceptible. We thrash and we cry out. The outside has 
achieved totality as an open whole with zero interiority. There is no more perceiver; 
immanence is liberated from containment within dialectic and duality. The thinking subject 
has lost any distinction between exteriority and interiority, between before and after. Deleuze 
gives a name to this state: pure affect.1* The inside of us becomes dispersed into the outside, 
onto the plane of immanence, where it is unreasoned. We cannot see or be seen there, and 
neither is it possible for us to return from there with artifacts. The above text is likewise a 
fleeting barrage to the thinking sensorium, a wall of references that fire as provocation before 
quickly dissolving into nothing. These are the outlines of limit situations, pointers to gaps, 
gaps that are presently absent. A panic attack, a picnoleptic episode, an epileptic seizure, a 
drug trip: none of these absences are visible to others. They can only be perceived in their 
exterior affection-images, in the face of the absentee, the expression of the draining away of 
sensible thought evidenced on the features of the departed during their momentary abdication 
of mental and sensory functions.
Panic is the plane of immanence. The plane of immanence is the infinite possible (the 
indivisible) of all possible thought, ’...not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the 
image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of 
thought, to find one’s bearings in thought' (Deleuze & Guattari 1996: 37). The supreme act of 
philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari go on to say, is not to think the plane of immanence but to 
show that it is there, unthought. Like the footprints of the crew in the sand on the set of
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Lawrence o f Arabia, the trick of the sensory-motor schema has been to erase the tracks of its 
own machine, so that, outside of trauma or drug intake, it is difficult to find (to think) a path 
back to immanence. However, as Gregory Flaxman observes, 'if the route back to the 
unbridled images of the plane of immanence has been closed off, the hopes of cinema and 
philosophy are, as we find in The Time-image, cast with a new project: to trigger the 
deregulations of the sensory-matrix itself, to disrupt the certainty of the image-relay, and 
finally to assemble the intensities of the plane of immanence on the body itself (Flaxman 
2000: 103). In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari write of the unthinkable at the edge 
of thought. Panic is a life as it thinks towards the limit situation of thinking itself, where there 
is no thinker. The very problem is to try to think what is not thinkable as an aspect of thought, 
to think what is possible in cinema as it encounters its own limit and peers out into the not 
possible of its own media. How temporal and spatial can our creative experiments into pure 
immanence be, given the formats of a life, in the lived world and an image on a tape or a 
print? Precisely what kind of a cinematic shock to thought brings about these temporary 
crevices? How can I use film to make folds in the fold I already make in the plane of 
immanence?
Well, we now have a good idea of the similarities (in the form of habit and cliche) 
between the sensory-motor matrix and the normative filmic text. We know that the plane of 
immanence that Deleuze so animatedly takes from Bergson is outside of narrative and 
narrativisation, and that narrative in fact eclipses instances of immanence. However, both 
classical cinema and time-image cinema introduce aspects of sheer panic and of an encounter 
with immanence through the frame of narrative. In the movement-image, the absence that 
panic elicits is framed by the explicit psychology of a character, as is the case in traumatic 
dream sequences.15 In the time-image, absence is presented to us as the more complex inter­
thinking of filmmaker, character and film itself.16 The examples Deleuze gives of time-images 
ordinarily utilise dominant character conditions such as mental instability as the basis for a
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temporal departure, eliciting a wandering about through which the filmmaker is able to 
encounter abstraction. Antonioni's The Passenger (1975) offers several disorienting 
departures from a stable and sensible world. Like the mind instructing the eyes to partially de- 
register from present perception and look left when remembering, or look right when 
imagining, the camera appears to look away from its subject, in order to purely think. In the 
desert, the shot tracks past and away from David Locke (Jack Nicholson) into a wide vista 
that has no symbolic or narrative content, but is instead a purely optical and sound situation 
that fills the space where something is, for example, 'too powerful, or too unjust, but 
sometimes also too beautiful, and which henceforth outstrips our sensory-motor capacities' 
(Deleuze 1989: 18). Later, in the remote hotel room, the sequence rotates through reels of 
time. As the audio recording of the conversation between Locke and Robertson is played 
back, the camera moves out from the building into a remembered space, and then back into 
the hotel, slipping into the past-present moment of the recording of the tape. And isn't 
Antonioni's passenger a body of thoughts without thinker, let loose on a world of any spaces 
whatever? As Locke remarks 'I used to be somebody else... but I traded myself in.'
David Lynch's Mulholland Drive (2001) is a panic-in-general that seems to wrap its 
cloak around all characters and events. The narrative is nothing but a series of tremors in the 
black Los Angeles night, where the protagonist Betty is cast and re-cast into bodies and social 
worlds that cannot contain her or that she cannot maintain. She is in a state of panic, her 
identity long since left behind, and the film panics with her, dropping in and out of its own 
system, generating preposterous clues to its unsolvable puzzle, muddying the order of events, 
events that may never even have transpired.17 In Michael Haneke's Cache (2005) each 
dramatic scene arrives and unfolds as a vulnerable duration, because at any moment the 
diegetic space is threatened by a sickening tug into mediation. We cannot separate the 
character's psychology from our own, owing to the very fact that every situation carries with 
it the latent pressure of being revealed to us as merely video playback, just another tape
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through the door, where videotape is the double for the lived world. This is the menace of 
mediation; the fear of being pulled into another plane, another thought, an unsafe thought 
(and this too is the case in O f Camera). Here is the panic of finding that the comfortable 
world is not the world, or not the only world. In the sparse home of the adult Algerian, the 
locked-off camera clinically observes the emigre’s violent suicide, only to cut to another 
angle. All of a sudden the staple screen arrangement of shots becomes horrifyingly disturbed 
by a force that resists binding to the intention or pursuit of any on-screen character and more 
greatly resembles the very intentionality of the film (the other thinker).18 In these film 
examples we can see traumatised characters prone in time, encountering uncommon sensory 
experiences that are out of kilter with the patterns and perceptions of the normal social world 
around them. But beneath these characters is the character of the film itself, also prone in 
time. Its images are not tethered; they constitute an on-screen sensibility that seeks out 
slippery temporal states, and holds strong, somehow, inside of them, outside of them. This is 
what Vivian Sobchack means when she says that the cinema transposes the intrasubjective 
privacy of direct experience (Sobchack 1992: 11). If there is surrogacy at work in the classical 
film operation, in terms of the character or the argument as stand in for our selves, then in the 
spastic arrangement of uncertain films, the surrogate provided is absence itself. What do we 
think of these absences and where might we go with them?
Paul Virilio has made much of the capability the cinema possesses to engender 
departures. In The Aesthetics o f Disappearance (1991) Virilio uses the term picnolepsy for the 
kinds of lapses in consciousness we are opening our thoughts to. He writes,
The return being just as sudden as the departure, the arrested word and action are 
picked up again where they have been interrupted. Conscious time comes together 
again automatically, forming a continuous time without apparent breaks... However, 
for the picnoleptic, nothing really has happened, the missing time never existed. At 
each crisis, without realizing it, a little of his or her life simply escaped.
(Virilio 1991: 9)
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Once the picnoleptic episode is over, normal consciousness and a linear experience of 
time is resumed. Virilio remarks that these absences are described by, amongst others, 
epileptics. Dostoyevsky witnessed what he described as the ’shipwreck of the senses' that 
emerged rapidly at the moment prior to every epileptic seizure, 'At that moment I understood 
the meaning of the singular expression: there will no longer be time' {Notes From 
Underground19). Thus, the picnoleptic bows out for a time, and experiences pure duration, a 
primitive, pre-linguistic, non-intellectual flow of time, a denatured time, whose ontology is 
prior to the sensory-motor re-training of the stream of temporality. What the sensory-motor 
schema compresses through memory, and eclipses through narrative, the picnoleptic mind 
expands, so that our subjective prehension of all things - the contraction of the real - is 
suddenly reversed and opened, as the perception of nothing other than the becoming of time 
itself. Virilio quotes Bergson when he says 'It's our duration that thinks' (Virilio 1991: 2220), 
and adds that picnolepsy may well become an experiential method for human development, 
so that 'Anyone would now live a duration which would be his own and no one else's, by way 
of what you would call the uncertain conformation of his intermediate times, and the 
picnoleptic onset would be something that could make us think of human liberty, in the sense 
that it would be a latitude given to each man to invent his own relations to time' (Virilio 1991: 
22). Like the picnoleptic absence, 'becoming' is to momentarily relinquish one's boundaries as 
an identity and in its place enter into a state of being as open set; it is to be only matter in 
time. This is why Deleuze (and Guattari) advocated a practice of schizoanalysis (literally to 
be like the schizophrenic, as Walter Benjamin, and also Theodor W. Adomo had advocated 
before them21), because such a practice affords a momentary absence into immanence without 
the risk of all encompassing mental illness. The moving image is an automaton we can use to 
practise schizoanalysis and to generate picnoleptic absence. Virilio finds in the moving image 
the hypnogogic state through which to gain 'entry into another logic' (Virilio 1991: 62).
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In A Wrinkle in Time, Alan Wright notes that ’The picnoleptic cut exposes the "depth 
of time" that eludes conscious, or even unconscious, perception. Another level of time, 
extendible and elastic, absorbs the picnoleptic subject, yet he or she remains immersed in the 
measured flow of chronological time' (Wright 1996: 5922). Wright finds such a non-linear and 
fragmentary temporal sensibility in Tarkovsky's Mirror. The potentiality of cinema as an 
other time is given in Mirror, when the adolescent boy Ignat, left alone in his Mother's 
apartment, is confronted by what a camera frame and an edit can do, which is to collapse 
spatial temporalities: the apartment is folded into its duplicate, from another time. We see the 
indexical ring of hot condensation left on the glass coffee table after a cup (must) have been 
lifted, and this marks the join between one time and another. Here is a world not sensible to 
our own topographies of space and time, and Tarkovsky locates this ability to slide around in 
and out of time within the mind of the young child. This is not only the assigned perception of 
actual child characters (although there are several) but also a disequilibrium spiraling out 
from the psychology of the film as a thought-like composition. The way that sequences 
extend, fold, unfold and skip in time is more akin to the pre-linguistic world as the child 
experiences it, where temporality is giddy but not yet frightening in the way that adult panic 
is. It is clear that both the cinema and the child in intuitive play have a propensity for 
disequilibrium. States of exhilaration and perceptual absence are particularly associated with 
how children delight in a sense of imbalance, frequently engineering turning and spinning in 
play, whereas the configurations of the mature brain and inner ear make the majority of adults 
resistant to imbalance. Not only the inner ear but also the child brain operates differently. 
Indeed, Virilio develops his concept of picnolepsy by making a connection between the 
underlying durational skews of the cinema and the woofs and warps (Peirce's semiotic terms) 
in the sheets of the polymorphous point of view of a child's perception.23 William James uses 
the phrase 'blooming, buzzing confusion' to describe the young child's unprocessed 
experience of seeing the world as one 'bigness', which is as yet unregulated by language
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(James 1950: 48824). Mirror presents the world remembered by an adult who tries to place his 
thoughts into the spinning top mind of his once very young self.
This is what Deleuze terms the pre-hodological space, '[the] ...space before action, 
always haunted by a child, or by a clown, or by both at once. It is a pre-hodological space... 
The obstacle does not, as in the action-image, allow itself to be determined in relation to goals 
and means which would unify the set, but is dispersed in 'a plurality of ways of being present 
in the world,' of belonging to sets, all incompatible and yet co-existent' (Deleuze 1989: 20325). 
The exodus from historic time into chiasmic time encountered by the picnoleptic, the young 
child, or the person panicking, has no ticking handles registering its regularity, for, the present 
of this time may loop, bend around and fold in on the person who is experiencing it. During 
its rude opening, this kind of a present moment finds its becoming as the between of past and 
future relations, and it emerges in this way rapidly, without the interlacing of those past and 
future events as safety handles. This constitutes a crisis for the sensory-motor schema, an 
interruption in time as it is relayed to us. The mind either swiftly regulates this interruption as 
a commonplace blip, or, conversely, reacts to it as distressing, even life threatening, 
irrespective of the lack of a real-world referent. A cinema that severs ties with comparable 
teleological imperatives moves towards an open-Whole that is akin to the pre-linguistic 
experience of the child, the shocked person and the trauma victim. However, if this cinema 
tries to give equivalence to the experience of the child, or equivalence to the person who is 
dreaming, or panicking, it falls back into description, and into motivated and orderly units in a 
sequence. In Mirror, what is couched as the dream or the non-linear memory of a child cannot 
maintain such a flimsy and cliched frame, indeed it has no desire to, and so the arrangement 
spills over, so that one image after another arrives, not as our time, not even as a child's time, 
but as the pressure of cinema time. Mirror does not offer symbolic images, but rather the 
imaginary which is the cinema itself: its superimpositions and transitions, its slowing of time, 
its irrational cuts and match-cuts whose only signification is the real which is cinema, what
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Tarkovsky memorably referred to as the 'second reality' (Tarkovsky 1989). The film generates 
ripples within its own liquid composition, arcs that merge with, intensify or cancel out other 
arcs, and repetitions that are never quite the same as before. These are the movements of the 
cinema - its motions, its own thoughts, its spaces and its transfigured time. The Russian 
director said of Mirror that even the author might not be able to extract meaning or sense 
from its images in inverse series.
In the instances of such time-images a panic cinema fleetingly shows its face: the not 
seeable in vision, the not possible in movement, the not-yet in thought. This is a fluid cinema 
that no longer speaks for or produces a people and a world, but instead delights in the moving 
image as a verb without an identifiable syntax or subject. Deleuze and Guattari speak of an 
'imperceptibility' that lies just outside of a normative perceptual range. The cinema can give 
us this extra perception, by speeding up, slowing down or skewing time, and through the 
general causality of a new and other nature: the nature of the film (and video) image. In O f 
Camera there is the turning inside out of the film, as it becomes, along a flight line away from 
its own narrative habits, on the page, on the set, in the edit, in the gate, on the screen. The 
character touches the edge of the frame, her hands are a noise of video surface; she calls out 
to halt her own rapid advancement along the tape. The 'of in O f Camera is a celluloid film 
print, and it is videotape, each the conveyor of image sensations. Of is a body, its conduct, its 
passage. In O f Camera the woman is made of magnetic particles on videotape and the Man is 
made of celluloid, but this is still symbolic, linguistic, and only the general manner of the 
idea. In our own consciousness, 'of is thought as the conductor of experience, it is the form by 
which we locate ourselves as thinking bodies and from which we become absent. Our 
intentions as thinking and productive subjects are premised on the management of the 'and/or' 
relation, on past knowledge and future speculation. Should I do this, or should I do that? A 
panic attack is the 'and,' and only the and, a content-less relation. O f Camera makes the 
cinema the very cause of the characters' panic, as they are opened on to the inescapable
125
immanence of their own film, a rickety continuity that is never entirely sealed and can only 
ever bleed. The actuality of on-set, in edit, and on-screen constructions threatens to emerge, 
and does in fact emerge, not only in this film, but also in every moment of any film.
A panic cinema occurs when diegesis and film spatiality reveals its centre as absence, 
when deliberate or poor direction creates tectonic shifts in shot/reverse-shot orientations, 
when the body-mind of the film text slides around without ground, or when it leaps from first 
person to third person at will and without intention.26 Such leaps are notable in Italian neo­
realist use of free-indirect discourse, where subjective and objective points of view are 
interchangeable and indeterminate. Outside of the intentions of an author, cinema limit 
situations find emergence through bad filmmaking and through error - the momentary 
absences when the film print jams in the projector gate or the reel is changed, or when a 
dramatic scene is panned and scanned for broadcast ratio, leaving the viewer concentrating on 
an out-of-focus speaking character who resides in the tele-proportioned area of the intended 
cinematic frame. When the image bums under the glare of the projector bulb, top-down and 
bottom-up operations conflate and topographic confusion occurs. Whether accidental, bad, or 
purposeful, without this pulling away from a familiar plane - the face of Lana Turner, now 
scratched; the surveyed room disclosed as videotape in playback - the time-image has no 
power to emerge and would only be perceivable as formal abstraction. Time-images push 
away from movement-images in the way that an astronaut attached by a lifeline pushes away 
from a satellite, dependent on the object for propulsion, but in a flight line out and away from 
the structure and into the void. The time-image draws out the incommensurable and the 
incomprehensible from the actions of the movement-image. Perhaps this is why Zizek, 
amongst others, maintains that Deleuze is Hegelian, because his concept of the time-image is 
always in the equation of the movement-image, as that which it is not.
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A fundamental aspect of the cinema-as-gap is to encounter its own limit as a physical 
medium and as a narrative producing system, for the cinema to panic itself, to disassemble, to 
shatter itself from its inside so that what is within is wrapped around what is without. Panic is 
a nowhere that must paradoxically be somewhere, that is, so long as we return from it. This 
state is to become the world in general and to relinquish the illusion of centre. This is what 
Christian Marazzi describes when he explains that, 'When one is at the mercy of panic one 
escapes towards nowhere, towards anywhere: one seeks refuge in the world in its totality' 
(Christian Marazzi 200427). In Like a House on Fire, a character wakes up to find that he is 
the room, he is the house; he is the film. I made a 'w oofing ' sound l a s t  n ig h t ,  
when I came p a r t i a l l y  awake in to  my no t th in k in g  body; a c ry  in to  
space, a c ry  o u t and a ls o  a c ry  as u tte ra n c e  to  s i t u a t e  a mind 
absented  from s p a t i a l  r e g u la t io n :  woof b u t no t y e t word. The world 
tig h te n in g  around, i t  i s  ab su rd , now. There, you go th e n , t h a t  s tag e  
th a t  r i s e s  from under th e  f lo o r :  p a n ic , a c u r ta in  opening. I become 
awake, b u t in to  a b reak , b o l t in g  u p r ig h t in to  a gap. The in s id e  and 
o u ts id e  a re  u n c le a r . I have no d i s t in c t io n  between mind, body and 
house. I th in k  I aim th e  house and I cannot lo c a te  th e  p lace  o f my 
sen tien c e  t h a t  i s  n o t th e  house. I am house w ithou t body. P an ick ing , 
I throw m yself around th e  room. I c a l l  o u t fo r  a l ig h t  to  be sw itched  
on, so t h a t  o p t ic a l ly  I can r e - s i t u a t e  m yself as J and no t as 
e v e ry th in g  i s .
In psychoanalytic terms, notably Lacan, the real is the 'everything else' that cannot be 
contained by the frames we use to manage experience, such as language. Zizek writes, 
'Properly understood, the Real is thus not another centre, a "deeper", "true" focal point or 
"black hole" around which the symbolic formations fluctuate; it is rather the obstacle on 
account of which every centre is always displaced, missed' (Zizek 2003 29). Zizek gives an 
image to the Real and it is the image of an obstruction, what he calls, 'that bone in the throat' 
(Zizek 200330). This Real is the and which is situated between representations of it. This and
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is antagonism, a pushing and pulling between unstable models and approximate likenesses, 
and Zizek finds it elected in both Lacan and Badiou as a tool for prizing open an access into 
the Kantian sublime. This and, Zizek says, is a radical rupture, an event encounter with the 
Real, 'Or, again, the Real is simultaneously the Thing to which direct access is not possible 
and the obstacle which prevents this direct access; the Thing which eludes our grasp and the 
distorting screen which makes us miss the Thing' (Zizek, in Hallward 2004: 168-17231). In 
Lacan this "everything else" is the phenomenological space of the imaginary, before the 
symbolic: the traumatic core of the real, which cannot be integrated into the symbolic order. 
This real real, Zizek elaborates, is neither a meaningless formula nor an image too strong, but 
a tiny gap between phenomena. The symbolic order and the sensory-motor schema (perhaps 
they are one and the same) act as screens through which reality is presentable. Otherwise the 
image would be abhorrent in its vividness, its scale, and its sheer existence (this again is the 
Kantian sublime). This is what trauma is in psychoanalysis, an unmanageable and abhorrent 
real that curves the ostensibly straight space of the thinking subject, although as Zizek 
observes, Freud (in line with Einstein), turned this around and suggested that space is first 
symbolically curved, then the thinking subject invents or resuscitates trauma (using narrative 
tropes), in order to account for his or her own imbalances.32 Whether the trauma itself is a 
glimpse at an underlying curved space or a tear within an otherwise continual straight space 
cannot be determined, certainly not from the space of the passage of this text, but we know 
that for the recipient a trauma is a shattering experience, an external cause that throws the 
subject into total disparity, so much so that the victim of a trauma often holds tightly to the 
event, redefining themselves in terms of the before and after of what affected them. Trauma 
creates pure affect, a response without established cause, the movement of life when it is most 
threatened, where shock fundamentally changes orientation to intellect, to body and to self.
For a moment I would like to explore this space of affect, before elaborating on its 
relation to the moving image. Peirce postulated that time is, 'the continuum par excellence,
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through the spectacles of which we envisage every other continuum' (Peirce, quoted in Doane 
2002: 8-9). Doane adds to this by silting that 'the rationalisation of time ruptures the 
continuum par excellence and generates; epistemological and philosophical anxieties' (Doane 
2002: 9). Peirce asked, where does perception end and thinking begin? He gives the example 
of a blow to the head that comes without warning and from behind. Something has 
unexpectedly and violently come into i experience, but the receiver of the blow does not 
immediately know what this something is. The shock creates an interruption that produces an 
alteration in the course plotting of the victim's space and time. The mind tries to think itself 
back up to sensible space and, finding that it cannot, it creates panic and fights with the space. 
As Brian Massumi elucidates, the sfreef below and around the subject who has been struck 
loses geometry and becomes a vector space, what Massumi calls 'the edge of the virtual' 
(Massumi 2002: 215). This space is not emptiness, however, but rather a question not yet 
answered; it is the activation of pure affect, which begins to move and then finds thought 
again. Affect is the state of being moved, the state of being between implications; it is a 
bodily event from where thought earn start over again. Enfolded in the shock event are 
unfoldings, some of which offer the capacity for going towards a limit. In this space, Zizek 
writes 'all qualitative differences inibrent to the social edifice are suspended. This 
supernumerary stands for the 'pure' difference, the non-social within the field of the social' 
(Zizek, in Hallward 2004: 16633). We doi not commonly take creative occupation of this panic 
state, but instead quickly leap into the security of closed communities. In the shock of this 
distended vectoring of all matter the subject looks for solutions in several directions, either 
towards the collective, which is safety, or towards the pre-individual, which might constitute 
a loss of identity altogether.34
But this affect state is something worth remaining in, like a cloth or an invisible cloak 
that is wrapped around filings. Affect is an infra-individual level, what Massumi describes as 
the feeling of the transition that is not reducible to a description of what is happening. This
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feeling - the feeling o f a feeling - is exactly the state that Deleuze says causes an idea. Panic 
and affect are the same then, a pure stream, impersonal, pre-reflexive, a flux. Affect and panic 
are not experiences. They are not the life, or myself who is in life, or has life, but merely 'a 
life' (Deleuze 200135), a life that is a plane of immanence. A panic attack is the sentience of 
one's situatedness as changing matter in time, where sensations are away, exterior, not where 
I am (and where I am is not where I was). This is perhaps what a phenomenologist means by 
the expression 'the experience of experience,' for experiential reflexivity is to regard the being 
of one's self as though from the outside, which is also the same as panic. This is a momentary 
bottom-up perception within die human lived-body. Inter-textual perception occurs dining a 
panic attack, by the simple virtue that no panic attack completes itself. Every panic attack is a 
rhizome, in that the experience does not resolve but rather dissipates, the pulse of its chemical 
flood spreading and then declining. Therefore, a panic attack is the between text, oscillating 
between sensory habit and void absence. A panic attack never fully becomes in time but it is 
always the threat of its own becoming, a middle without completion. To complete a panic 
attack would be to be removed from the world, to be fully de-situated - not to die but to be 
removed and then to have never been. It is this very threat that constitutes an attack, and the 
completion of this threat would constitute the non-existence of this author, this text and the 
world around this author and this text.
We should be clear then that an experience outside of the thinker is not a blissful non- 
Hegelian atopos. Maurice Blanchot posits such a becoming as an interminable moment, a hell 
all around identity that makes of language a utopia (Blanchot 194936). Blanchot warns that to 
determine to encounter this absence may entail something infinitely less tolerable than the 
delimitations of language. Can we even attempt to voluntarily exempt ourselves from 
dialectical containment, and should we tiy? Irigaray continually announces a possible sense- 
experience beyond the customary, and this, as Tamsin Lorraine suggests, brings her thinking 
into close sensibility with Deleuze's sensory-motor interruption, which is to become an open
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set, to become-imperceptible. But Irigaray is hesitant, suggesting that language and identity 
must be warmed and re-moulded, as more liquid, as poetic, not collapsed into noise and 
dispersed into abstraction. Deleuze offers schizoanalysis as the means to stray from dialectical 
relations, and the lifeline to return along, but he and Guattari are also hesitant, warning 
against wild destratification in What is Philosophy? (1987), and proposing that we make 
absences by extending matter in art, in text and in thought, where the material alterations to 
objects and the virtual enhancements to thoughts are the safe substitute for a mental encounter 
with an abyss in thought.37 Certainly, the blow of panic cannot be dressed up as an epiphany, 
and it cannot be harnessed or transformed, as useful, as productive, but it may generate an 
idea, and it is thoughts that we are after. Zizek writes: 'This tragic encounter of the impossible 
Real is the limit experience of a human being; one can only sustain it, one cannot force a 
passage through it' (Zizek, in Hallward 2004: 17138). He argues that we can adopt one of two 
attitudes to any encounter with the void: either maintain what he calls a 'proper distance [...] 
marked by simultaneous attraction and repulsion,' towards what is perceived as the 
'impossible-Real Limit of the human experience' or instead try to orient the void as that, 
'through which we should (and, in a way, even always-already have) pass(ed)' (Zizek, ibid). 
The medium of the cinema offers a manageable displacement for an attempt at the former, 
and even at the latter. To add to their taxonomy, one method for what Deleuze and Guattari 
call becoming imperceptible is to engage in the practices of film as panic proposition.
This is why Artaud says that the most characteristic and striking quality of the cinema 
was always the effect of hazard.39 And this is why Deleuze celebrates the moving image as a 
nooshock to thought. When it was new, and in so far as it still can produce utterances that are 
unregulated, the moving image presents itself to the viewer as a destratified affect space, 
populated by uncommon time. In the cinema we have already invented another way to live 
time, our collective license to enter into and manipulate durations, to distend temporality and 
mock History as teleological order. The moving image gives a becoming to a pre and post­
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individual world, it shows to us the interval in our own thinking, and it does so without 
significant distress. How, then, might I enter panic, the new to my habitual thought, without 
panicking? One entry is film, a better mode for occupying absence. Film can help us think 
panic; it can give panic a situation. We can use cinema to think time, to encounter aberrations 
in thought, aberrations that without the aid of cinema would be received as distressing. 
Cinema can be a panic navigator, the moving image a medium for forming articulations that 
are not panic, but rather the gap produced and encountered in trying to articulate panic. The 
cinema always fails when it tries to be like our perception, even when that attempted likeness 
is perception interrupted, or perception distended. The Cinema cannot represent panic, and 
serves very badly as its illustration, but it may function as panic's tom and mis-folded map. 
Film is my friend in this otherness of thought, it is the increase of my thought, its 
acceleration, but also its slowing and slewing, into an unknown body. The cinema as spiritual 
automaton is this cartography, my tool for absence; my new map in de-territorialization. The 
cinema is a panic hodos, a path, a hodological space for pre-hodological intensities; a virtual 
situated in an actual. The cinema is the set of panic-like thoughts, a d is p e r s io n , th e  
body' s l i f e  s t r iv in g  in  i t s  a p p e t i te  fo r  more l i f e  th rough th e  
ex ten s io n  o f p e rc e p tio n  and th e  d is te n t io n  o f th o u g h t, s t r iv in g  to  be 
more th an  l i f e ,  to  expand i t s  p o te n t ia l ,  ex tend  i t s  sen se , deepen i t s  
f e e l in g ,  e n te r  th e  e x te r io r  to  i t s  own ex p erien ce . This i s  a ta k in g  
f l i g h t  cinema th a t  tu rn s  movement around a v o id , a though t gap. 
Think! -  cinema as th e  method fo r  p u tt in g  a jo y fu l pan ic  in to  th e  
w orld. A p an ic  cinema is precisely to exploit the cinema's ontology as the space for a 
mind to encounter gaps in thought without panic. When it is let loose outside of its normative 
conventions this gap is cinema. I make films not to express panic but to give extensivity to it, 
to occupy panic as affect, and fashion it as a further movement to my being. This outside is 
the sense of the world as extra-linguistic. Like consciousness, it recedes from us as soon as 
we perceive it or even conceive of it. To be aware of it is to render it inside, into corporeal
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and conceptual logics. There is an indeterminate that we can attempt to utter in moving 
images and this is why it is necessary to keep cinema outside and pre-hodological.
I have written so much, stared at the screen for so long, that I am close to panic, now. 
The not this. The not is. Let's try to write it. Panic is my other thinker in thought, 
but I lack the apparatus, the evolved spiritual automaton, to make cartographies of it with 
which to chart passage (not a map of but a map through). The moving image offers the 
possibility of touching upon an indeterminate outside of thought, ordinarily experienced as 
panic by the brain. The films I have made set about a form of becoming by operating non- 
isomorphically between fluid and solid states.40 Every film is a topographical foray into 
absence (even if this absence appears to be contained); it is never a map in itself. Panic is 
an unexpected absence. The cinema is an absence without seizure, a prosthetic 
technical device for facilitating access to an intermediated understanding of time and of space 
whilst not robbing our minds o f agency. It is precisely because we know that the 
cinematograph is the cause of our momentary absence in the cinema that we as viewers do not 
react to it with a depth of absence that would, outside of the cinema, be processed as panic.41 
Cinema is not the representation of panic - it is the enactment of panic. It is a method for 
reform to our experience.
Make the indiscernible, that is the frontier, visible.
(Deleuze 1989:180)
It is not my desire to make a theory or a representation of this void but rather to 
creatively encounter its difference. I desire to flood as a panic without racing to rid myself of 
its horrific between. I do not wish to romanticize panic, but I would like to think it, to rob it of 
its barbs by diverting it, and the vessel I am proposing to use on this journey into panic is the 
moving image. In the moving image there is a world other than this world but very much like 
it. There is something akin to our lived space, but with different spatial properties and values.
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I see in it spaces in time, but they are not my habit, they are more than my thought and other 
than my perception. This, then, is where it is possible to draw parallels between an aberrant 
cinema and the temporal absences that make up a panic attack: time-images can suggest to the 
imagination departures from the habitual schemas of our thought, because beneath the 
classical form of cinema, film is anxiety.42 This anxiety can open up and maintain the kinds of 
gaps that the sensory-motor schema rushes to close down during a panic attack. Cinema's 
wild spiritual automaton (its unknown body) has the capacity to facilitate the agreeable 
passage into the gap; it becomes this gap, without provoking typical fight or flight resistance. 
In this unknown body the cinema as interval and panic as interval coalesce. The cinema is the 
construction of an abstract machine that manufactures affect and makes intimacies with panic. 
Its house is a mobile home with mobile sections - a place to arrange to meet panic in. Such a 
disjointed cinema 'panics' the viewer through an array of rooms, vistas, affects, time zones, 
transitions and disorders, without narrative as ground. If the classical cinema is the lived 
world structured in the form of our own consciousness, then aberrant time-images have the 
potential to reverse this operation, so that the cinema is a consciousness (other than that of our 
own in the lived world) that makes panic accessible to us. And more, because there is the 
possibility of an encounter with the exterior lived world by way of a consciousness structured 
in cinema, what I will call the not-yet-moving image, a possibility, a veil, a peculiar thought 
we are now able to have, what Deleuze calls '...the cartesian diver in us, unknown body which 
we have only at the back of our heads whose age is neither ours nor that of our childhood, but 
a little time in the pure state' (Deleuze 1989: 169).
The moving image is a navigable absence, and we can go as far as to say that panic is 
the same as the cinematic, in the occultist and pre-linguistic sense of cinema, in the aberrant 
sense, because both cinema and panic tear through the veils of an imaginary and symbolic 
real. The crisis of thought in panic is the crisis of cinema. Fault-lines in the moving image and 
traumatic ruptures within thought form sheets that interlace. We become absent with the
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cinema as it slides, its provisional language choking on the bone in the throat that is the film's 
actual and virtual body. This is why a cinema that has the conviction of remaining precarious, 
ill-formed and on the verge of dispersal can have sympathy with our own imperceptibility, as 
it becomes. I am aware of the fragility of my own boundaries and limits. I do not desire robust 
films. Both this cinema and myself vibrate as molecular, abstract and in the flow of alterity.43 
Why then would I be more likely to have a panic attack in the cinema than on the street? It 
may well be that during this cinema time I am the film and the film is myself, because the 
cinema is the space of the world and myself combined, as an unknown body.
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1 (Steven Eastwood, transcribed from Dictaphone, 1997). This is an extract from a spoken account of a disturbing 
episode under the influence of psilocybe mushrooms, which are hallucinogens, something a person with panic 
disorder should not take very often, or indeed at all. The text is included in the appendices of this document.
2 The maximal point of creativity is a chaos, where infinite change, infinite randomness, infinite speed and infinite 
determination coalesce to constitute a life, which is only an immanence, a changing.
3 The interruption of the sensory-motor schema is often experienced around a traumatic limit situation, such as an 
accident or a shock, and is something the schema deliberately inhibits or limits.
4 De Gaetano (1993) points out that Deleuze regards the movement-image as unfolding in a Euclidean and 
tiodological space' while Bresson and neorealism unfold in a Riemannian space, Robbe-Grillet in a quantum 
space, Resnais in probabilistic and topological spaces, and Herzog and Tarkovsky in crystallized spaces.
51 have been experiencing panic attacks for the past eighteen years, half of my life in fact (although there are also 
a couple of isolated experiences from my childhood). In the first five years or so of experiencing these attacks I 
was more prone to an episode during the day, and, with the help of a number of psychologists, I developed 
strategies for deflating these episodes at the moment they arose.
6 In order for the encounter to be classified as a panic attack, the individual must experience at least four symptoms 
of anxiety from a DSM established list (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders, 4th Edition 
(DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Clinicians characterize any episode with fewer than four of 
these symptoms as a 'limited symptom attack,' usually attributable to normal "fight or flight" reactions to fear or 
danger. Panic attacks are almost always short in duration (typically 5-10 minutes), and this is understood to relate 
to the potency of the norepinephrine burst released into the blood. Around seventy percent of the population will 
have a panic attack at least once in their life. The word panic derives from the God Pan who, according to die 
Jungian principle of synchronism, connects the nature 'within' to the nature 'without'- the manifestation of the 
world in general, no longer in particular.
7 For example, a person may have a panic attack based on the dread of crashing in an aeroplane, but a panic attack 
is also just as likely to happen abstractly, as is the case in agoraphobia, which is the fear of wide-open spaces. 
Most commonly a panic attack occurs as a result of the fear of having an attack.
8 Comparable to Rimbaud's 'Je est un autre.'
9 Quoted in on-line article Strangers to Ourselves, copyright © 2004 - Jeffrey Abugel and Depersonalization.info.
10 Julia Kristeva's study of Proust, Time and Sense (1997) describes how situations like these, what she terms 
affects and emotions, must be framed discursively in order to be recognizable and communicable to others. But she 
explains that when we express affects discursively, we tend to express them qualitatively, as judgments, and in 
doing so we disguise their specificity by making them into a sort of reasoning - reasoning in search of itself. Panic 
is not reasonable however and cannot be reasoned. This attempt to articulate or make figural what is excessive and
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without physical or temporal certainty means that we as thinking subjects are continually looking for modes of 
expression for an unspeakable realm of being. Kristeva makes the point, in line with my own, that the failure to 
articulate these realms - the fact that they elude us - is what produces ideas and art, and what makes us all too 
human.
11 The most insightful pieces of writing I have produced about these experiences are berserk and short-lived - 
bulletins from the brink of an episode, which have etched within them the urgency of a person using the act of 
mark-making, and writing, as an anchor to the lived world. A mark must have had a mark-maker in order to come 
into existence on the page. Mark making signifies a proof of origin, and it also acts as a task: the task of 
manufacturing distraction. In her paper States o f Emergency: Panic Disorder and the War on Terror, Riley 
Olstead writes, 'At the moment when panic displays itself as the loss of the use of the word, as disarticulation of 
language - as physical incapacity to denominate or remember objects (aphasia or dysphasia) - it is the capacity of 
language, language as possibility of existence that we fear to lose' (Olstead).
12 Theodor W. Adomo (1967) highlights Benjamin's concept that brings together the play of childhood with 
'mental derangement,' writing that, The rebus is the model of (Benjamin's) philosophy.' The playful disorientation 
of the rebus and the delight in the sudden spark that ignites the mind with its solution are keys to Benjamin's 
concept of'profane illumination.'
13 Frampton (1983) writes that we experience ecstatic time, which is distinctly different to the historical clock time 
of industrial capitalism, during sleep, erotic rapture, and moments of intense emotion. This is not the orderly linear 
time of teleological trajectory - a monumental time - but rather a cyclical time, one of repetition, what Tamsin 
Lorraine calls 'a time that does not adhere to a pre-established grid, but that follows the rhythm of a sensible that 
goes beyond the self-contained forms of particulars or individual objects' (Tamsin Lorraine 1999: 36. See 
Elisabeth Grosz 1995 chapter 7 for more on Irigaray and time). Such a facet of lived time does not emerge and 
behave in the way that historic time does, and has consequently been theorised as feminine and named as a cosmic 
time, as an ecstatic time. In A Pentagram fo r Conjuring the Narrative, Frampton describes a paradigm for 
comprehending the world in which everything -- not only the universe, but also the greater structure of mind that 
apprehends it -- remains at eveiy moment in a sort of flickering, pulsating, unstructured flux. However, within this 
flux there are inevitable tendencies which Frampton calls 'stable patterns of energy.'
14 See Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? 1996: 173.
15 For example, in Hitchcock's Vertigo, there are the wild visions of the retired police officer Scottie after he 
believes Madeleine has died, and in Powell & Pressburger's A Matter o f Life and Death (aka Stairway to Heaven, 
1946) Peter the RAF pilot endures repeated fantastical visions of time stopping, and of other worlds which, we are 
to understand, are the product of brain damage following an abortive parachute jump. In Roman Polanski's 
Rosemary's Baby (1968) and in Jon Schlessinger's Midnight Cowboy (1969) there is the drugged dream. In Nicolas
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Roeg's Don't Look Now (1973) there is the prophetic vision of an unwitting clairvoyant. It is Robin Williams’ 
character that is out of focus, not the camera lens, in Woody Allen’s Deconstructing Harry (1997). More recently, 
there is the unsettling denouement in Sheitan (Kim Chapiron. 2006). The film begins with audience participation, 
and the final sequence is a giddy, shape shifting, time skewing come down from a bad acid trip.
16 In Antonioni's The Red Desert (1964), there is the story that Guilliana reads to her son, which lets loose another 
film within the film, a free indirect discourse which leaves the viewer asking, are these Guilliana's thoughts, her 
son's, or Antonioni's? “There’s something terrible in reality and I don’t know what it is," Guilliana remarks, her 
perception, the perception of the filmmaker, and the internal seeing of the film rendered as indiscernible during her 
episodes of distress. Pasolini (1972) writes that in the Red Desert 'Antonioni... looks at the world by immersing 
himself in his neurotic protagonist, reanimating the facts through her eyes...to allow himself the greatest poetic 
freedom, a freedom which approaches - and for this it is intoxicating - the arbitrary.' As the anxiety of Giulliana 
becomes heightened, the colour tones in the room around her alter. It is as though the film hesitates between the 
images serving a narrative function and detaching itself from narrative altogether, what Deleuze describes as 'a 
kind of shimmering effect between significance and its loss' (Deleuze 1989: 157). At one point not only the 
characters but also the fiction itself becomes lost in the fog, and the image, bereft of all detail and therefore of 
function, is returned to the real word as if arriving for the first time, a brain on the screen which is mindless, 
thoughtless. Antonioni writes, We know that beneath the represented image there is another image more true to 
reality, and that beneath that one, still one more, and again a further image beneath that one, until you get to the 
true image of reality, absolute, mysterious, that no one shall ever see. Or perhaps, one will arrive at the 
decomposition at any image whatsoever, of any reality whatsoever. The abstract cinema would then have its 
rational for existing' (Antonioni, quoted in Tinazzi. 1974:4, re-quoted in Rohdie. 1990:127).
17 In Mulholland Drive the cinema is a counterfeit which threatens to envelope the character Betty, whose identity 
has shattered completely in order that she become the other she believes her lover will desire - the actress - who 
sits in the nightclub Silencio and sees the singer faint even though the recorded performance of the singing voice 
(another’s voice) continues playing. Earlier, there had been the panic of the daik spectre (Lynch calls him 'the 
bum') in die dream of the man in the diner, a panic that fulfills itself as the dreamer had described, and yet finds no 
fulfillment as a motivated narrative element.
18 The videotapes posted through the host's door are the dread of an eternal return of the surveyor as surveyed, the 
repressed memory of the Parisian TV talk show host, who, as a child, lied and brought about the condemning of 
the Algerian child refugee. There is the gap between what he knows but has not allowed himself to think (a 
colonial guilt) and what he is no longer able to deny in his thoughts.
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I am in a cinema watching Robert Bresson's A Man Escaped (1956). It
is the tortuous sequence in which the captive French resistance
fighter makes his way along the roof of the prison barracks in his 
minutely plotted get-away. Second by pained second he steps steadily,
slowly, in thick socks, carrying his shoes so as not to be heard. I
adjust my sitting position in the auditorium, and am alarmed to feel 
my toes meeting the resistance of shoes. Wasn't I shoeless?
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Act 1, Sc 6. Bleed — some unknown bodies without organs
But, if cinema does not give us the presence of the body and cannot give us it, this is 
perhaps also because it sets itself a different objective; it spreads an ‘experimental 
night* or a white space over us; it works with ‘dancing seeds’ and ‘luminous dust’; it 
affects the visible with a fundamental disturbance [...] and the world with a 
suspension, which contradicts all natural perception. What it produces in this way is 
the genesis of an ‘unknown body’ which we have in the back of our heads, like the 
unthought in thought, the birth of the visible which is still hidden from view.
(Deleuze 1989: 201)
In die coupling of Bresson's film and my own physicality, the actual borders of my 
body and the virtual borders of the elements on the screen had conflated to form the unknown 
body of which Deleuze speaks, a spiritual automaton in the brain made possible by the 
cinema. The moving image, which so resembles thought and yet is not thought, is akin to the 
lived world and yet is not the lived world, produces this unknown body with the viewer, in the 
space between screen, world and thought. It makes the viewer react to the moving image as 
simultaneously a virtual world and an actual world. This unknown body is not the human 
body that has an interiority of thought, or the material body of the screen, which is outside, 
but a body between them, a body that is both thinking and screen. It forces thought to think its 
self, by perceiving, outside on the screen, thought-like events other than those of the brain.
Just as the novel is restricted to the white page in the bound volume, the mediations 
of the moving image are bound by formatting, by the film reel, the videotape, the digital 
timeline. Within the confines of the rectilinear screen, a film may experiment with structure 
and visual texture, but it must conform to the playback standardization of projection screen or 
monitor window if it is to be seen.1 The frame is the regulatory geometry of the camera, 
projector and the screen, and is in fact what holds firm against the immanent possibility of 
erratic movement and slippage.2 But we have noted that slippage into affect produces new 
frames with liquid edges. These fleshly boundaries are not projection zones for a self but 
rogue states for a life, for the unknown body does not know who it is, it only desires to
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extend. When and how does the cinema bleed from the frame that seeks to contain it and 
extend to become embodied in the lived world? And how might our actual experience stretch 
its own boundaries into the realm of the cinematic?
A film or video can override sensorimotor signals from the body and from the
immediate environment around that body. In The Address o f the Eye V ivian Sobchack
describes how our reaction to a film text is to continually assimilate its existence as the same
as our own, and then to distance it as the unreachable experience of an other, what she calls
the 'Here, Where (eye) I am' assimilated into, and then detached from the 'There, Where I am
not' (Sobchack 1992: 10). The viewer veers from engrossment to estrangement and back
again in a number of complex ways, at times reacting to the film text as though they are
within a social transaction, holding eye contact and reacting with empathy and intuitive
physical counter-action, and at other times perceiving the film as a dead object, one that can
at best stimulate, and at worst fades into the background amongst other sensoiy noise. We see
the puppet and the puppet's strings, the top-down and bottom-up equation, but for the most
part we choose not to concentrate on the strings. Even when the movements of cinema are
fantastic, we still opt to react to them 'as if real' (Richard Dyer 1994: 7-103), what Sobchack
describes as the cinema's 'eidetic given-ness' to experience.4 During any cinema situation this
bodily and cognitive confusion spasms and swirls in the back of our heads, excitedly and with
distress. Our body is halved as it is doubled, put to sleep and yet augmented, as we 'feel the
movement as well as see the moved' (Sobchack 1992: 105). The cinema gives us perception
by using perception; it shows us life by living a life. In fact, without some (albeit sublimated)
awareness of the film performing its fllmliness, no film object could make any sense at all.
This defies the entire argument of structural materialist film by stating that any moving image
is intuitively received as that, concurrent to its reception as a meaning system. Sobchack
makes this point in a footnote,
What is suggested here is that even at its most abstract and materially reflexive, the 
cinema is not understood as merely its brute material unless it is secondarily coded as 
such. Thus, in 'structural-materialist' films, the materiality of the film is, and must be,
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signified in order to be understood on a material basis. In sum, the young infant (not 
yet communicatively competent because only preconscious of its own production of 
vision as both a viewing view/moving image) sees the play of light and shadow and 
colour of any film as only its brute materiality, whereas the communicatively 
competent, self-conscious viewer sees no film in that manner, unless it is secondarily 
coded as materially significant. That is, to the baby the film is not yet a film, but to 
the mature viewing subject, the film is always more than its material presence and 
play before it can be seen as anything less.
(Sobchack 1992: 6, footnote 66)
An image: of tall seats in front, and an iridescent plane, seemingly stretching further 
up and across than my vision can encompass, with overwhelming sound, and distorted shapes; 
perhaps these are animals. This is my first memory of the cinema - a Disney animation - 1 
think it may have been The Jungle Book (Wolfgang Reitherman 1967). As non-infants, we 
know that the cinema's wild meaning (Merleau-Ponty's term for undifferentiated significance 
in lived experience, prior to reflection) is there, we simply allow it to remain under resourced. 
Perhaps, as Sobchack argues, it is not so much that we ever really lose our selves at the 
movies than that we find another body, one, I would suggest, that each viewer always 
acknowledges, without yet necessarily feeling confident to enter into greater intimacy with. 
Sobchack adds that 'we discover the film's body as "inhuman" much as we discover our own: 
when it troubles us or when we look at its parts on a dissecting table' (Sobchack 1992: 220). 
Like the dual controls of a learner car, the cinema takes a hold of our bodies in momentum, as 
though braking, from nowhere, but then our own bodies assert force and agency back against 
the vehicle around us.
In Circles o f Confusion, Hollis Frampton gives the example of a scratch on a 
projected celluloid film print appearing in front of Lana Turner's face (Frampton 1983: 196). 
In this instant, Frampton argues, the film momentarily becomes more to do with the scratch 
than the character or the actress. Moreover, this event can be about the scratch and the 
character, an event that reveals protagonist, performer, image, image method and image 
recipient, each vying for dominance. But rather than attempting to separate each component 
out and make it discrete in order to establish a hierarchy where one is above or below the
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other, there is the possibility for compositing a new creature, one which, although not 
commonly recognized, has always been there. When a boom microphone drops into shot, at 
least three realms are operating concurrently: the story world, the world of the cast and crew, 
and the world of the audience watching. Such an embodied aspect of the cinematic transaction 
generates pleasurable and un-pleasurable lapses (recall the juddering print of the Coen 
Brothers' The Ladykillers recounted in Scene 37) but also produces new fingers, new eyes and 
new touches - touches that tentatively make forays into different worlds. Unknown bodies 
gather together around such errors. This is where the cinema begins to contravene its own 
system and enter the real, and where the mind experiments with the threshold of the physical 
possibility of the human body.
Since the industrial revolution there has been a paradigm shift in the extension of our
sense perception and physical capability. The telephone, the phonogram, the cinematograph,
the automobile, train, aeroplane and rocket, the television and analogue video, real time live
broadcast, satellite images, cellular phones and instant messaging, the computer, hypertext
and the internet, virtual reality, digital video, DVDs and podcasts, each of these inventions
has prompted behavioural changes, enhancements to our possibility that we cannot yet
quantify, nor give adequate analysis to. Like any other machines, the camera, the edit suite
and the projector (whether analogue or digital), work as extensions of our own physical
possibility. Sobchack writes that all machines are necessarily human-like in order to function
as prostheses (Sobchack 1992: 184-186). Dziga Vertov went so far as to imagine the voice of
the machine spokesperson for such a human extensivity:
I, a machine, am showing you a world, the likes of which only I can see. I free myself 
today and forever from human immobility, I am in constant movement, I approach 
and draw away from objects, I crawl under them, I move alongside the mouth of a 
running horse, I cut into a crowd at full speed, I run in front of running soldiers, I turn 
on my back, I rise with an airplane, I fall and soar together with falling and soaring 
bodies [...] My road is towards the creation of a fresh perception of the world. Thus I 
decipher in a new way the world unknown to you.
(Vertov, quoted in Sobchack 1992: 184)
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This confusion and conflation of bodies, then, between the mediated moving image 
and the lived world, has many manifestations, and it might be useful now to attempt another 
taxonomy of the situations or spaces where this conflation can occur. In the first century of 
the cinema, filmmakers, irrespective of their aesthetic or political sensibility, explored the 
physical limits of the medium, and used the medium to elicit physical responses in the 
audience. The action-image provides exhilaration, the zenith of which is the spectacle of 
cinemascope and the IMAX. We have already noted the oneiric confusion the moving image 
on the screen elicits, where it is possible to wear shoes and yet at the same time be shoeless, 
where the sequence of eating can make one hungry, the sequence of pornography can make 
one aroused (indeed, some of the earliest moving images were designed to titillate), the first- 
person sequence of a car chase on screen can make the viewer's body sway from side to side, 
and yet the image of a gun raised and pointed cannot produce the sensation of danger, only a 
pale empathetic response. Roman Polanski constructed a shot in Rosemary’s Baby (1968) 
where John Cassavetes' character makes a secretive telephone call, half-obscured by the 
bedroom doorframe. As his body moves further left behind the frame and out of view (of 
Rosemary), the audience leans collectively to their right to try to see around the obstruction. 
But the obstruction is two dimensional, not three-dimensional. An on-screen interaction can 
prompt contextually appropriate emotional and physical responses, as the audience acts-in to 
the context of the teleplay and its environs, crying, feeling hunger, desire, fear, boredom and 
repulsion. In Misery (Rob Reiner 1990), watching the dramatization of limbs being broken 
creates sensations in the same parts of our own bodies; the giddy swirling camera around the 
tip of the Empire State building in King Kong (Peter Jackson 2005) produces an arresting and 
vertiginous feeling. It is almost as though we feel about to fall. What keeps us from falling is 
not only the knowledge of the screen and the auditorium; it is also the fact that when watching 
a film we can see the seeing and hear the hearing (Sobchack 19928). And yet the distraction 
of an actual baby crying in the auditorium can rob the film text of all its persuasions.
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Rejecting the sensations and manipulations of narrative, the avant-garde produced 
tactile relations through direct contact with the material of film and of videotape. Stan 
Brakhage hand painted on individual frames, making rapid flickering sequences such as 
Mothlight (1963). Fluxus video artists created feedback loops, some designed to produce 
trance states, others to use minimalism, formalism and reflexivity to generate abstract 
thought. A recent silent film by Peter Miller, Projector Obscura (2005), makes a reverse 
engineering of the cinema, moving it backwards, up-turned, on its head and hands. He 
modifies the film projector to act as a camera, and runs unexposed celluloid through it. The 
light from the auditorium falls onto the film and we become privy to the cinematographic 
infant, staring into the mirror. Curtains part and close again; a succession of white screen 
rectangles shimmers, without image. Perhaps this subtle yet illuminating film would be best 
screened in a camera.
There is the sculptural opening out of the moving image into the space around it, 
advanced in the multiple projections of the proponents of expanded cinema. Underground 
filmmakers and expanded cineastes more directly engage with their audiences, their films 
often transgressing the screen, coming close to live performances. Beyond the control of the 
artist or the film director is the vibrant physicality of the screening space common to an 
underground film screening, where the film must vie for attention and stand shoulder to 
shoulder with other films. There, errors result from DIY sensibilities and constraints - the 
sound or image may be bad, the film often starts and is started again, there is no raked seating, 
the audience interrupts and asserts the presence of their own bodies. Because the rarefied 
space of the cinema auditorium and of the gallery is not observed, the film text performs 
differently, taking on new attributes. Alcohol and the moving image co-mingle, tiredness and 
discomfort inform the image and the residual spirit of the carnival makes the nature of the 
gaze differently attentive. Aggressive and explicit films, rapid-fire films, comedies, scratch 
videos, filmed rants, succeed there, where narratives would fail. In fact, greater privilege is 
often afforded to the viewer and the space than the film text.
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Installation artists create moving image environments for sensory immersion, offering 
temporal flux, the monitor is upturned, immersed in water, the image is thrown onto bodies 
and objects, the film print loops and presents its own degeneration. In Gaiy Hill's Tall Ships 
(1992), projected figures walk up to meet the viewer in the corridor of a gallery, growing in 
size, until they are level, and then turning to walk away, doubling as image and social 
encounter with a stranger. They do not speak or present themselves as characters; they merely 
pace the ebb and flow of our engagement with the phantasmagorical properties of the 
medium. The camera is moved around a semi-circular frame and the image made giddy in 
Tony Hill's Downside Up (1985), strapped to a plank of wood in order to be thrown and spun 
in Hill's Holding the Viewer (1993). I'm Not The Girl Who Misses Much (1986) by Pippilotti 
Rist thrusts the artist into fast forward much in the same way as the character in O f Camera. 
In the gallery we are increasingly seeing cinematic appropriation where before that vernacular 
was treated as adversarial - using scale, modified projection, directional sound and lighting, 
and many other cues appropriated from the cinema, but foregoing narrative, targeting the 
thinking body of the visitor to the space, who, significantly, is mobile and free to enter and 
leave. Douglas Gordon slows Hitchcock to the duration of a day in 24-hour Psycho (1993); 
Tacita Dean's installation Foley Artist (1996) peers behind the curtain of the moving 
image/sound relationship by making visible those who live record micro sounds which are not 
contiguous to the film shoot, but act to enhance the image.9 The sheer scale of the image in 
the installation - immense and minute - supplants the cinematic movements of pans and 
zooms and offers the fleshly dialogue of which Sobchack speaks. Virtual reality game 
designers extend the physicality of our eyes, hands and legs into a multi-dimensional graphic 
realm where we meet with other avatars, although thus far its narratives only crudely imitate 
the order of commercial cinema.
The unknown body surfaces and stretches its limbs in all of these outcomes, resisting 
containment by sign systems, or being caged in by plot and made sensible by our own 
comprehension. Although produced for what the philosopher and post-phenomenologist Don
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Ihde describes as 'the terminus that is the lived world o f the human’ (Ihde, quoted in Sobchack 
1992: 18710) the cinematic prosthesis never fully takes to the human body. This is because 
both the cinema and the human being are at origin contingent centres, whose perceptions and 
actions are not instantaneous but rather divided by the continual series of (predominantly) 
imperceptible intervals. Every mind perceptually divides and distends time, just as every 
camera mechanically does so. A celluloid film depends on marrying that which is least 
contingent in its physicality to that which is least contingent in our own, uniting human 
mental perceptual gaps and persistence of vision to the shutter blade in the film projector or 
the interlaced over scan in the video image. A film's body is therefore partly human and partly 
inhuman, just as the viewer's body is partly synthesized with the mechanical and partly with a 
virtual that is on the outside. In the classical operation the cinema's body is always 
intentional, centered, and self-displacing. Classical cinema seeks only to bear out our 
customary thoughts, our commonsensical spatial organization, the movement-image looking 
to the methods of the body and the mind of the viewer for guides and points of contact, and 
then grafting onto them its own body and mind.11
In fact, the classical narrative involves a cluster of bodies that when combined 
produce an animate and apparently sentient creature, which we regard as the film. We can 
give such a cinema the taxonomy of seven bodies, although not one of them is distinct or 
discrete. These bodies are: the body of the film shoot (the pre-filmic); the bodies of the 
performers and the filmed spaces (the pro-filmic); the body of the film's diegetic telling (its 
narrative sense and the levels of its narration, the mise-en-scene, the score, the shot and 
reverse shot, and so on); the body of the film's assemblage (its suturing, the dissolves, 
superimpositions); the body of die film in the gate (the final film or video object and how it 
performs during the event of its exhibition); the body of the theatrical space (the site for our 
sight); and the body of the viewer (regardless of whether she or he is engaged or disengaged). 
When these bodies are maintained by the established system of proper relations they appear 
as regulated and sensible, each of their corporeal existences sufficiently combined and
contained. In fact, the majority of cinema seeks to take away our bodies and de-limit our 
minds, supplanting them with a surrogate organism.12 The transaction of this cinema comes 
complete with its own persuasive intelligibility; lucidity is assumed by viewer and by 
filmmaker - the pact o f our cinematic communicative competence.
But there is a pre-linguistic sense to this apparatus. The radical and aberrant cinema 
of which we are speaking is an indeterminate rather than determinate system. It directs itself 
towards a berserk body that cannot live outside of the possibility of thought, and further, 
towards the a-ccntred non-Euclidean brain we are increasingly becoming acquainted with, a 
brain that continually encounters and leaps across momentary cerebral deaths. Stripped of the 
imposition of a precarious language, the existent terms of the cinematic proper are revealed as 
limbs without pro-prioception, a term the neuro-psychiatrist Oliver Sacks uses for the way a 
body operates in relation to itself. In A Leg to Stand On (1998), Sacks describes how trauma 
can temporarily or permanently destabilize pro-prioceptive body geography, so that, for 
example, the victim can no longer orient one part of his or her body in relation to another 
without the visual aid of a mirror. Imagine now such a cinema. Every film is this. The moving 
image is at origin uttered wildly before it articulates with specificity, just as the 'introceptive' 
image we maintain of our own bodies is more than that which we see reflected in a mirror 
(Sobchack 1992: 12). The body of the screen and the camera are the most articulate elements 
of the cinematic process, their limbs more present and robust than those of the performers, the 
film stock, or die camera operator; they articulate 'fleshly boundaries' (Sobchack 1992: 210). 
But before suture and other methods saved cinema from itself, plugging all of the wounds that 
might have bled and exposed the bodies of the cast and crew and so on; before fragmentation 
and dissection by theoretical analysis, the moving image gave another sense to us, through the 
features of its uncommon physical and virtual being.13 Beneath legitimization through a 
cinematic proper, the moving image is and has always been a rogue body. Give cinema a 
body then, but do not think that the moving image is nature. The cinema is not nature; it is 
nature's excess, a graft that extends our movements of thought but also produces an allergic
reaction. And the fact that the moving image as prosthesis does not take to our own bodies 
but instead produces an unknown body is of benefit to experience.
Auditorium (Eastwood 1999/2002)
Long-haul Avid video editors experience a phenomenon known as interfacing, where 
the temporality of the non-linear time-line presents itself to the mind of the edit suite operator 
as a concurrent system. Exhausted editors become so immersed in the reality of cutting and 
pasting portions of mediated time that their own reality begins to take on similar attributes. 
They find themselves attempting to slow and reverse traffic on their journey home, or copy 
and paste lost sections of conversation, in an oneiric configuration produced by a mind that 
wants to join actuality with video or film. In playback, we make our own modifications - Dvd 
extras offer alternate endings; fast forward, pause and reverse produces new temporal 
engagement.14 A feature film may be watched at double speed or in installments over the 
duration of days or months. The Longest Most Meaningless Movie in the World (Vincent 
Patouillard 1970) runs to 48 hours, a plot-less stream of found footage, only ever "screened" 
once. At the premiere of Battleship Potemkin (1925) Serge Eisenstein was still editing the 
second reel as the first reel was being projected. Students of Vertov were quite commonly 
instructed to shoot practice films without stock in the camera: the cinema as a frame, an 
opening. Abbas Kiarostami treats his car as his office, the place where he conceives of most 
of his films, staring out through the rectilinear frame of the windscreen and finding: the 
cinema. A gap between two buildings presents itself as cinemascope; a streetlight becomes 
equal to the pending arrival of a character. During a visit to the camera obscura in Edinburgh 
I watched as the demonstrator dropped a piece of white paper on the circular table and then
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lifted up a red double-decker bus as its refracted image passed across the paper surface. On 
the video recording of the duration of the 1999 total eclipse of the sun, I captured one of my 
friends saying 'It's like the lights going down in the cinema.' I named the tape Auditorium. 
These lived situations are scenes from the three-year long film, which unfortunately became 
lost in the post(production) and was never delivered. The three-year long film may have been 
a linguistic slip, but like the event of cinema's inception itself, it opened up a new possibility 
within the mind. First the nooshock of die moving image, then a secondary nooshock: the 
aberrant moving image as an uncommon way of thinking. Thirdly, the nooshock of a film that 
is the world we live in.
Janet Cardiff and George Bures Miller's In Real Time (199915) has participants 
navigating a route through a building with the aid of a small video camera. The camera's flip- 
out screen plays back a previously recorded video image of the same environment, creating a 
live and embodied 'mix' of actual events and video occurrence, in which the digital moving 
image sometimes resembles and at other times clashes with what the eye is concurrently 
seeing around its frame. Details within the recording and within the actual environment slip 
into accord, so that the real appears to offer synchronous services to the mediated, and vice- 
versa. Cardiff comments that 'the aspect of having to follow the video image and the real 
world image is very disorienting and makes die brain start to flip reality for fiction and the 
video for reality.'16 Cardiff and Bures Miller's work is essentially spectacular in its objective 
and not as removed as it might seem from the stimulation of the action-image. In the 1950s, 
commercial cinemas in America conducted similar experiments, mildly electrifying seats, 
causing smells to emanate at key moments in the film drama, and placing actors in the 
auditorium who would grab at the shoulders of viewers during horror films. And we know 
that the early cinema lifted greatly from the trick lighting and mirror work of magic lanterns 
shows, fake stances, and so on. But Cardiff and Bures Miller take dramatic narratives off the 
screen into the auditorium, and out, onto the streets, where they exist in a new frame and 
more forcefully occupy our own physical space. The Paradise Institute (2001) creates what
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Cardiff refers to as a 'cinema simulator' replicating the whole experience of the cinema. A 
heavily worked soundtrack accompanying a projected image features modifications to the 
sync sound. Viewers hear talking from the aisle behind them, a woman commenting on the 
film and answering her mobile phone, background noise in the balcony.
The Paradise Institute (2001) 
Janet Cardiff & George Bures Miller
Cardiff s The Missing Voice (Case Study B) (1999) is an audio walk through the 
warehouse district and the financial area of east London that uses binaural sound to create an 
acoustic frame for the participant wearing the headphones, so that every image and scenario 
on the walk presents itself as cinematic. The recorded story melds with the narratives of the 
actual as the participant, guided by Cardiff s complicit directions, embarks on a pre-ordained 
derive. 'With the audio walks I want people to be inside the filmic experience and have the 
real physical world as the constantly changing visuals of the screen' (ibid17). Each of these 
expanded video projects provide a disembodied thrill for the participant much in the same 
way that a 3D movie or a virtual reality game does. Clearly this is part of the intention of the 
work, to use the tropes of the cinema (the sound of distant gun shots, helicopters landing, 
dramatic violins, the whispered tones of the noir narrator), and certainly the social space is 
radically transformed by the intervention, making of human perambulation a continual 
Steadicam following shot, and causing minor occurrences within the locale to flare up, 
become more than themselves, and enter into a frisson with the Active.18 During the oneiric 
experience of tape and world in The Missing Voice and In Real Time, the swirling confusion
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between the intra-subjective and inter-subjective creates an affection image, where the film 
and the viewer enter into a molecular becoming, each now reversible, reverse engineered. 
Temporarily, the cloak of the cinema is everywhere and covering everything, like Borges' 
map; not a physical body, as we know, but a way of re-embodying space. It is a new body in 
thought.
As Artaud writes, the cinema 'does not separate itself from life but returns to the 
primitive order of things' (Artaud 1972: 21). Artaud's BwO is the wild meaning of cinema, 
haptically cradled as an embodied vision that veers between attention and inattention, and 
between attraction and repulsion. This BwO cannot come to life because it is inorganic, a life 
and a living which exceeds the inadequate possibilities of human existence. He writes, 'Man is 
sick because he is badly constructed' (Artaud 1982: 7919). The body without organs thrusts the 
actual lived body beyond its physical possibility, towards its impossibility. Such a BwO finds 
a becoming in the irrational arrangements of shots in series. These series provoke the neuro­
physical vibrations Artaud so hoped the cinema would generate. The automaton produced by 
these fissures 'does not form a whole, but rather a limit, a membrane which puts an outside 
and an inside in contact, makes them present to each other, confronts them or makes them 
clash' (Deleuze 1989: 206). Constructed by cinematic images, this body breaks from cliche 
and roams in the lived world, where its participation is disorderly and absurd, a remake of the 
body now severed from representations, and therefore return to the body's real flesh, itself but 
a gap through which intensities can flow and be felt. Artaud thinks that the cinema has 
nothing to do with the lived world, and this is why, he believes, it brings to life an unknown 
body within us. It frees our virtual body to stretch and be ludicrous. 'Give me a body then,' 
writes Deleuze, 'this is the formula of philosophical reversal. The body is no longer the 
obstacle that separates thought from itself, that which it has overcome to reach thinking. It is 
on the contrary that which thought plunges into or must plunge into, in order to reach the 
unthought, that is life. Not that the body thinks, but, obstinate and stubborn, it forces us to 
think, and forces us to think what is concealed from thought, life' (Deleuze 1989: 189).
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Cinema, for both Artaud and Deleuze, will produce images that dismember representation and 
break with the physical and conceptual boundaries of our bodies and our world. The body 
without organs is a figure of dissemination and disorganization, in willful suspense from the 
schemas of behaviour it receives from its own biological (over)-determination. It is a 
possibility, a will, a life we will be, rather than the life we have and live. Deleuze develops 
Artaud's ideas into what he terms another thinker in thought, where the brain, like Artaud's 
conception of the body, is the gap. This cinema gives to the brain images that cannot be 
thoughts.
Just as Artaud's Theatre o f Cruelty had no desire to speak for the human, a cinema 
which moves to exceed itself has no desire to represent or reproduce the body, mind or 
experience of a woman or of a man, but rather seeks to construct a new body, one which 
defies the arrangement of the cinema organism in its combinatory meaning (bodies arranged 
like legs holding up a table) and the fixity of its execution. This absurd cinema emerges in the 
gap between body, language and thought. It moves between a virtual cinema only possible in 
thought and a cinema where the film's body tries to give itself to exteriority, 'to give itself in a 
space-time without end' (Irigaray 1993: 64, quoted in Lorraine 1999: 36). This is how Irigaray 
counters a masculine motivation towards transcendence. We may interpret in this a film 
which achieves an outside in order to make touch between this exterior and its own interior, 
and now, in the present tense of its emergence as a film. This BwO is a virtual film, where the 
cinema is an imaginary that can be projected onto or misrecognised in the lived world. So, a 
physically challenging moving image then, which begins to find embodiment beyond the 
confines of its frame - a behavioural cinema, of action (filmmaking), and a cinema of 
pataphysics20 suggested to us as a virtual, as a thought without a body or a world. The cinema 
that we are now imagining is precisely that, an imaginary, a thought that draws energy from, 
explores and exploits the gap between the fabrication and unreality of the film, and the lived 
world. A Cinema into the Real performs two questions: what is the lived situation of a film, 
and what is the mediated situation of the lived world? Like Artaud's plan for remaking the
156
body (by returning to the body), this practice, of a cinema into the real, reconstitutes a
cinematic body that was taken away from us. This involves the classical cinema's torso losing
its physical limbs in order to acquire its virtual ones and exercise its anarchic body without
organs. And on this Deleuze writes,
A flickering brain, which re-links or creates loops - this is cinema... Everything can 
be used as a screen, the body of a protagonist or even the bodies of the spectators; 
everything can replace the film stock, in a virtual film which now only goes on in the 
head, behind the pupils, with sound sources taken as required from the auditorium. A 
disturbed brain-death or a new brain which would be at once the screen, the film 
stock and the camera, each time membrane of the outside and the inside?
(Deleuze 1989: 215)
Cinema into the Real, Test 1 (2001)
A conversation at a caf6 table is covertly recorded and the words and actions o f the speakers are transcribed into a 
film script. The participants watch the videotape, learn their lines, and re-perform their exchange at the same cafe 
location, first unannounced, and then later within a film set, a performed series o f live takes in a shoot without 
cameras. Micro conversations at adjacent tables around the set become implicated as potential cinematic material.
There are similarities between being immersed in the theatre of the classical narrative 
film space and absorbed in a lived social experience, but there are also profound differences. 
In a classical film, nothing is extraneous, and in the lived world, everything is extraneous. 
One is, customarily, a captive space, a place framed, where portions of time are broken up as 
takes and edits; the other is supposedly frameless. In Cinema into the Real, Test 1 a table in a 
busy cafe has a camera and radio microphones trained upon it. A sign placed on the table 
reads, 'If you sit here, you will be recorded.' Over a period of days public conversations at that 
table were videotaped and a nine-minute section of one particular exchange was selected and 
transcribed into a film script, word-for-word and action-for-action. Nick and Kelly, the two
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people involved, had not seen each other for a year, and their discussion was therefore polite 
but restrained. The banality and awkwardness of this made its way into the script. For a 
number of weeks, the two protagonists (neither of whom were trained in performing) 
rehearsed their way back to the original exchange, to the point of the doing of the 
conversation. Reading die transcription or watching the videotape document, it is clear that 
both are occupying roles and engaging in fixed patterns of social etiquette. Their bodies and 
their words give and they take. During rehearsal however, the more familiar the two became 
with the text and with each other, the further they deviated from the stilted nature of their 
original conversation, replacing it (improving it) with the stylised performativity we are 
conditioned to think is real from watching films. Both were seeking to be flattering on 
camera, fearing that the outcome would be boring if they were not, and in fact the majority of 
the direction I gave them was to be flatter. It is this very element - the banal, and its relation 
to the assumed cinematic - that formed the locus of their encounter, and the focus of the piece, 
for what is strikingly evident is how the presence of an other (in this case two others, the 
person on the other side of the table, and the other of the hidden camera) introduces new 
frames which can either prohibit or enhance the character, disposition and unfolding narrative 
of the subject. To have objectives, expectations, desires, is to frame a life not yet lived, and 
we characterise ourselves in order to make actual those stories of ourselves. This cinema 
intervention gave to Nick and to Kelly a sense of themselves and each other as elements of a 
scene, on videotape, to come.
At the end of the rehearsal period, the two returned to the cafe and the same table and, 
in an unannounced and one-off intervention, re-performed a duplicate of the nine-minute 
conversation. The conversation was then re-presented at a public event, now taking the form 
of a series of takes under film lights and a boom microphone in a film shoot without cameras. 
Whenever the performance deviated significantly from the script, the filmmaker entered the 
set and announced a cut with a clapperboard. Take-for-take, the conversation was worked 
through. Finally, it was performed in one long take, with a live score. The audience and cafe-
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goers were able to refer to the video recording of the original conversation on a monitor in the 
comer of the space. Everyday activities around the set became implicated in the work, so 
much so that several audience members approached me afterwards and explained how the 
performance had made them aware that the conversations at their own table were also 
potential film(ed) material.
Cinema into the Real, Test 3: Scoring Belfast (200221)
A film is a stage with received conventions, both in terms of its production and its 
exhibition. There is a normative form of conduct for the film set, and there are normative 
expectations that members of the public encountering the set, and participants within the set, 
have of the film that is being made. This expectation is related to the imaginary event of 
seeing the film later, and also to the received hierarchies of creative, economic and 
organizational power that determine the conduct of those on or around the set. Fiction film 
production involves the marking out of scripted social space and acted behaviour so that it 
corresponds to camera and lighting set ups. Taped marks secure the positions of performers, 
objects, lights and camera, so that composition is formed and maintained, and continuity 
observed. The camera and sound teams, along with the performers, fence themselves into 
comers around cabling and lighting positions, extra-diegetic bodies, a surplus that need not be 
regarded as waste. In the shoot there is the complex mapping of space through taped 
positions, and endlessly revised geometries of continuity, of "not crossing the line." These 
intricate maps or choreographies, ordinarily floor or street based, provide a template for 
behaviour and action; both actors and crew members develop considerable skill in either
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hitting or moving around these marks. The appearance of film production apparatus gives 
significance to everyday contexts; it changes them. In Cinema into the Real, Test 3, lights for 
a film shoot were erected at a bus stop at the end of a Saturday afternoon in die busy Belfast 
city centre. Every few minutes a passing car pulled up in front of the bus stop, its stereo 
playing evocative cinema score phrases, the sound of which triggered film lights positioned 
either side of the stop. Violins sound. A light creates a glow on the face of a bystander then 
fades. By placing a cinematic frame such as this, over an everyday context, ordinary public 
occurrences become implicated in a classical cinema narrative mode. Over a period of two 
hours a wide range of the Belfast community became active in the intervention. Each time the 
car drove away and the sound faded over distance, the lights faded also.
The transient public became inquisitive or self-conscious before what they assumed 
to be an unseen camera. Engagement or reaction varied. Some bystanders tried to speak to the 
car driver, who adopted the tactic of looking the other way (an action that served to add to the 
film noir quality of the intervention). Others kept out of the scene, preferring to watch, 
waiting for what they expected to be the imminent arrival of actors. Many adopted new 
behaviour for the accompanying music, now their own personal theme. One elderly woman 
spiritedly requested wardrobe and make-up. Between each pass of the car, or each take, I 
would enter the set, as the filmmaker, and mark with tape the foot positions and shopping 
bags of the people waiting. When asked what film was being made I replied, “A film without 
a camera”. I added that I was marking their positions so that I knew where they would be. By 
the end of the two-hour duration there remained an expanse of fifty or more position marks, 
the topography of where each person had been, the mapping of an everyday choreography. I 
placed these marks within a social context to make pointers towards an immanent film that 
appeared to be coming, and to pose questions about that other choreography, the social script, 
and whether this is a methodology for thinking about our conduct as social beings that we 
find instructive. The marks signify disorder as much as order, the failed attempts to direct 
lives, only a motif, their function having nothing to do with authored choreography and
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everything to do with the chaotic and contingent modes of social behaviour, and with the lay 
expectations we have of the mediums we call the cinema or television. Where exactly was the 
film team who would surround and make us of these marked positions? Nowhere but in my 
own mind and the minds of those waiting, on the set.
Sobchack writes that the viewer 'shares cinematic space with the film but must also 
negotiate it, contribute to and perform the constitution of its experiential significance' 
(Sobchack 1992: 10). The competence and literacy of the film watching public was co-opted, 
and directed, in order to form a novel cine text: the inventive and imaginative space of the 
image of oneself, in the world, as a film. In Test 4, lights for a film shoot are erected at a tram 
stop in central Zagreb. Members of the public become caught up in film scenes, actors drafted 
into a virtual film, as the lights illuminate the area and a musical phrase from a cinema score, 
seemingly without source, becomes amplified. One young couple purposefully traveled to the 
site to perform a kissing scene. When asked what film was being made, this time I answered, 
“A film which is always and everywhere.” Some members of the public commented that they 
were waiting expectantly for the arrival of film or television stars. These passers-by made 
sense of what they were seeing as cinema, as the composite of all they understand cinema to 
be. Most notably, there were the travelers, people performing their selves, as nomadic. A 
station is a place of arriving and departing and this is a particularly rich narrative; it is the 
very essence of narrative, if we follow the concept of the mythological hero’s journey from 
Vladimir Propp and the Structuralists. When in transit we are selves in transition, outside of 
the precepts of familiarity. We are differently social. Cinema has used the Candide, the 
innocent abroad, as a staple story structure since its inception: the western, the road movie, 
the meeting of strangers at stations and airports. These places are where drama is permissible, 
as public, where there is room, in the liminal space - the any-space-whatever - to explore 
uncommon facets of our characters. In this film, which is the lived world, people are 
variously good and bad at playing themselves. What is a film if it is not the world?
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So, not only the film itself, but the film shoot, the film edit, the film as an idea - the 
cinema is an aspect of experience, an aspect of language. The film shoot forecloses its vicinity 
as implicated in another order, the environment which-will-be-represented. In pulling cinema 
into a real and ostensibly unmediated context, such a cinema as this attempts to locate the 
lived world as an elaborate, covert theatre of multiple and continually revised fictions. This 
film is always and everywhere. This film is unfinished, because to finish a film is to let the 
swell of its thought become sediment. The finished film object is what Zizek calls the 'post- 
evental forcing of the real' (Zizek, in Hallward 200422) which in this case is the forcing of the 
unnamable contingency which is thinking film into the as i f  filmed film object. Badiou insists 
that the unnamable real be respected by not making 'as if assertions about it. This is why 
there is a largely untapped potential in revisiting films, and why each of the films I produce is 
the progenitor of the next.23 Films speak across each other; they change in their performance 
in relation to one another, and each audience changes them. Films are more powerful as ideas, 
or as incidents and events, than as discrete distributable objects. The idea can do anything; it 
is the organism and the object that are crude constraints, whose most promising attributes are 
their very fleshliness.
The cinema transforms our organism because it is without a centre, and therefore 
connects to the dispersed centre latent within the human being - the meeting of nowhere with 
anywhere. Deleuze observes that 'there is an absolute contact between (the) non-totalizable, 
asymmetrical outside and inside [...] in which the skin of the film and the brain (of the 
audience members) are in absolute contact, physically, emotionally and psychologically' 
(Deleuze 1989: 278). But in essence this philosophy is anti-phenomenology, a rejection of the 
romantic return to the child as a centre who has not yet been divided into a subject (a subject 
who is the object of an other), in favour of the gap between. Sobchack's phenomenological 
argument is that the cinema articulates lived experience by using and modifying lived 
experience, which is not the case in painting or photography, or even in the theatre: a film has 
sense at the same time that it produces sense. According to Deleuze's reading, existential
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phenomenology privileges a 'natural perception' at odds with cinematic signification. He sees 
the cinema as a problem for phenomenology because it can 'with impunity, bring us close to 
things or take us away from them and revolve around them, and it suppresses both the 
anchoring of the subject and the horizon of the world. Hence it substitutes an implicit 
knowledge and a second intentionality for the conditions of natural perception' (Deleuze 
1986: 57). Sobchack claims that Deleuze misses the dialectical and dialogic character of 
Merleau-Ponty's later semiotic phenomenology while he moves on to assert 
(phenomenologically) the direct and preverbal significance of cinematic movement and 
images.24 Deleuze, however, neglects the embodied situation of the spectator and of the film. 
What is missing from Deleuze's theory of cinema is die very rhizome of its practice: shooting, 
re-shooting, editing.
My brain seizes-up, i t  c o n t r a c ts ,  i t  f e e ls  t i g h t .  I s tru g g le  to  
jump from th e  b ra in  in to  a th o u g h t, a r e c o l le c t io n  th o u g h t, o f id eas  
fo r  cinema beyond p h y s ic a l i ty ,  n o t tra n sc e n d e n t, b u t a lre ad y  h e re . 
The though t s u f fo c a te s  in  a vacuum -  what id e as  can I have fo r  a 
cinema beyond p h y s ic a l i ty ?  I am d is t r a c te d  by s o c ia l  exchanges around 
me, by my awkward s e a t in g  p o s i t io n ,  and I cannot f in d  an opening in  
my id e a t io n . I th in k  o f an empty page as a gap, a c in em a-less  cinem a. 
I become rem inded o f th e  l i n e  o f f l i g h t  t h a t  a cinema in to  th e  r e a l  
t r a v e ls  a long : to  th in k  and conduct o n e 's  s e l f  tow ards a cinema th a t  
i s  not (y e t)  p o s s ib le ;  to  make a f ilm  th a t  e n te r s  and becomes 
in d is c e rn ib le  from th e  l iv e d  w orld i t  was p re v io u s ly  r e g is te r e d  as 
o th e r  th a n . T his i s  a f i lm  to  c o m e . If we follow this line of thought we find our 
selves caught up in the waveform of a film forever being made and remade, and this is not 
sensible. This is a porous film, continually uprising and disappearing; at times 
indistinguishable from the world it intervenes in. Its body bleeds. This film invites 
participation, causes distress and falls down, in front of us. It is immanence, a life lived 
towards a fluid film situation, the will to falsehood.
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These are powers of thought for an emergent cinematic body, always attempting to 
break the physical law of its own media and be solely idea, an unknown body which is the 
actual and the cinematic, an emergent poetics, a force from the outside. This film is the 
antagonism and reversibility between various terms: top-down/bottom-up perception, actual 
and virtual, perception and expression, film that is being made and film that is being watched 
(the two present tenses). We have traveled from the schema of the movement-image and of 
the sensory-motor schema, through the rupture of these schemas in the time-image, and the 
expansion of the cinema's body along a flight line of desire to make physical contact with its 
own exterior. We have discussed the normative and aberrant ways in which the cinema 
viewer lose their selves in the image, in the dark, and the new thoughts which can emerge 
when the voids produced by the cinema are not rescued by narrative. Now it is time to give 
our thoughts to die cinema as a means to go out into the world. Film wants to return to the 
lived world, like the shards of metal from the sword still embedded in the body of the gashed 
ship's dog, out to sea thousands of miles from the weapon, in Umberto Eco's The Island o f the 
Day Before (Eco 1995). Film bleeds and retains the register of the originating wound, which, 
in classical cinema must be stitched closed, constricted into (the illusion of) a Whole. But the 
film wants to go home to the lived world that is not virtual. The intention of any film is 
always towards a result that is in excess of its own virtual state, and in excess of the actual - 
an act of filmmaking that makes of itself a film that was made and is being made. This, then, 
is to overlook the cinema in order to filmmake. The film becomes a void. Do not finish the 
film. This is the rhizome of filmmaking - an interval experience in itself. This practice, of 
thinking within the task (the task being to open onto the actual through filmmaking), puts the 
cinema back into the lived world, as a thought. It returns the rogue body of cinema to the real, 
where it can roam free, meaningless and untamed, here and now, right away, made as it is 
thought.
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1 Michelle Smith works so physically with found celluloid - cutting and sticking multiple items in the same 
composition - that die final objects cannot be projected, and must be digitally scanned frame by frame, in order to 
be seen. See, www.wovenfilms.com. Peter Tscherkassky similarly has an extremely tactile relationship to film as 
material.
2 Sobchack has noted that 'Three metaphors have dominated film theory: the picture frame, the window, and the 
mirror. The first two, the frame and the window, represent the opposing poles of classical film theory, while the 
third, the mirror, represents the synaesthetic conflation of perception and expression that characterizes most 
contemporary film theory. What is interesting to note is that all three metaphors relate directly to the screen 
rectangle and to the film as a static viewed object, and only indirectly to the dynamic activity of viewing that is 
engaged in by both the film and the spectator, each as viewing subjects' (Sobchack 1992: 14-15).
3 See Richard Dyer, Action! in Sight and Sound, no.10 Oct 1994: 7-10.
4 See Sobchack 2000: 58. Sobchack argues, however, that this given-ness is in the same instance destabilised by 
the acknowledgement of likeness to the lived world (something I will come to in the second part of the thesis).
5 On the subject of our physical relation to the image, Sobchack also observes that 'What we look at projected on 
the screen... addresses us as the expressed perception of an anonymous, yet present, "other." And, as we watch this 
expressive projection of an "other's: experience, we, too, express our perceptive experience. Through the address 
of our own vision, we speak back to the cinematic expression before us, using a visual language that is also tactile 
[...],' (Sobchack 1992: 9). Sobchack uses Charles Peirce's evocative terms 'woof and warp' to describe how 
perception and expression pulse back and forth in order to constitute what we understand as a film.
6 Any film, Sobchack argues, even structural-materialist film, presupposes that it will be understood as 
signification, as conveying meaning beyond the brute material presence of light and shadow on a plane surface, the 
cinema assumes its own intelligibility. To the infant the film is not yet a film, but to the mature viewing subject, 
the film is always more than its materialist presence. Intelligibility is assumed by filmmaker and spectator - the 
film experience rests on mutual presupposition of the inter-subjective nature of cinema.
7 See Scene 3: 51.
8 As Sobchack writes 'A film is an act of seeing that makes itself seen, an act of hearing that makes itself heard, an 
act of physical and reflective movement that makes itself reflexively felt and understood' (Sobchack 1992: 3-4).
9 Increasingly, artists who use moving image are turning to the classical cinema as a source material to appropriate 
and critique. See for example the recent exhibition Final Cut - Media Art and Cinema at the Kunsthalle 
Dominikanerkirche Osnabruck, Germany, as a part of the EMAF film & video festival, April 25th to May 20th, 
2007
10 Don Ihde writes that checking on the final terminus of the perception of the world is an immediate, or direct, 
impossibility for the human eye. The camera is 'the hermeneut who enters the cavern to hear the saying of the
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oracle and we are left to his interpretation' (Don Ihde The Experience o f Technology 2002: 275, quoted in 
Sobchack 1992:187).
11 Classical cinema generally presents itself to us as thinking organically; in other words its images represent the 
human organism and its relations to the world as centred and consistent. Such a cinema, however, simply confirms 
our conscious and subjective thoughts, our habitual bodily organization and its relations to an exterior world. The 
sensory-motor schema and the movement-image conspire in their natures of thought and their systems of seeing 
and hearing.
12 Sobchack elaborates that 'the perceived geometry of the projected image was seen as setting the film's non­
geometric perceptive boundaries, providing a circumscription of the premises of the camera's perception analogous 
to the way on which the lived-body provides the bounded premises for human perception. The frame is to the 
camera what the screen is to the projector [...] The screen is the material substance that enables the frame its 
function' (Sobchack 1992: 211).
13 As Sobchack emphatically outlines, prior to the reified shorthand vocabulaiy of film theory, which gives to us 
films that are formalist, realist, epic, spectacular, semiotic, psychoanalytic, structuralist, neoMarxist, and offers us 
terms such as montage, diegesis, suture, identification, and other syntagmatic categories, prior to this 
categorization, a film, 'makes sense by virtue of its very ontology' (Sobchack 1992: 12).
14 The DVD menu function is a cinematic open set. The DVD extras and Director's cut culture is a new and 
potentially exiting way in which to explore the structural volatility of any and all film.
15 Janet Cardiff, In Real Time, 1999, site specific audio and video walk, located in the Carnegie Library of 
Pittsburgh, approximately 15 minutes.
16 Janet Cardiff, interviewed by Atom Egoyan. http://www.bombsite.com/cardiff/cardiff.html.
17 ibid.
18 The Steadicam is a significant technological development in terms of how it brings together several of the film 
bodies outlined. The mobile and agile camera encourages lyrical movements from the camera operator and 
produces specific positions and repositions for the performers. The new art of the 'following-shot' has resulted. The 
Steadicam also makes for a different kind of embodiment in the viewer, who suddenly feels weightless, as though 
super-perceiving.
19 For Artaud, the human body is a limited organization, not capable of encountering the tears and collisions of life 
without being crushed by them. This human body conducts thoughts and receives sensations from what he dubs a 
"pathetic inside" and converts these experiences into diluted representations, what Artaud, in his inflammatory 
prose, calls, 'stinking farts of gas.'
20 Pataphysics, the science postulated by Alfred Jany of solutions that are not possible in the physical world.
21 Scoring Belfast (part of Fix02, Catalyst Arts performance art festival, Belfast).
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22 Ziiek borrows the term from Alain Badiou, and extends it. Slavoj Zizek, From Purification to Subtraction: 
Badiou and the Real'. 173, in Think Again, Alain Badiou and the future o f Philosophy, Ed. Peter Hallward 2004.
23 Kenneth Anger, during a screening and discussion in Toronto (November 2006) commented that he is 
continually reworking his films, to the constant chagrin of film historians who are determined to fix their 
completion dates.
24 On this point, Sobchack argues that, 'In this focus on embodiment and situation, existential, semiotic 
phenomenology is not out of step with the contemporary quest for an account of signification that grounds 
meaning as value-laden, committed, and socially active. Its aim is to locate the structure and meanings of 
phenomena in the contingency and openness of human existence' (Sobchack 1992: 31-32).
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Reality is, in the final analysis, nothing more than cinema in nature.
(Pasolini 1972: 198)
The camera must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link.
(Deleuze 1989:172)
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Act 2 , Sc 7. Cinema and similarity - the resemblance complex
Reality may be a human creation, but it is no toy; on the contrary it is the second of 
human creations. The first peculiarly human invention is representation. Once there is 
a practice of representing, a second order concept of reality follows in train. This is 
the concept of reality, a concept which has content only when there are first order 
representations.
(Ian Hacking 1983: 1361)
To put cinema into the lived world inevitably involves encountering the various 
attitudes filmmakers have adopted towards realism and the factual image. As guiding 
principles, emergence, irrationality, subjectivity and abstraction are not commensurable with 
the documentary's adherence to resemblance and to what Bill Nichols in Representing Reality 
terms 'the discourses of sobriety' (Nichols 1991: 3) i.e., science, history and politics. The 
activity of thought and the sensations of the body as aspects of actual experience remain 
largely un-resourced in the documentary, although the aura of subjectivity exists as a pressure 
and a possibility. How might we envision a cinematic tool concerned with a more multi­
faceted and complex encounter with the lived social world but not premised on representation 
and objectivity? Before addressing this question, let us first consider the methods in which the 
documentary film achieves likeness and organizes meanings.
The indexical property of the cinematograph, the very life-likeness of the moving 
image (compared with the a-temporality of the still photograph, the painting or the written 
word3), has been the reason for the documentary film's obsession with similitude. This is what 
Andre Bazin terms the 'resemblance complex,14 the human compulsion to form life-like 
representations Hacking refers to, and also the automatic human response that appraises a 
rendered marie (if it is not a functional modification) on the level of whether it is a likeness or 
not. The advent of photography in the nineteenth century provided a new and more technical 
form of realism, and with it persuasive truth claims based on the second order semiotic value 
(Peircean secondness) of the images that were being produced. Photography, for Bazin, 
surpassed art because of its ability to lay bare what he called 'the realities.'7 The indexicality
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of the photograph produces a physical likeness of the image caused by, and bound to, the
object represented and therefore what Bazin dubbed an absolute realism, a true similarity.8
This photographic index, as Bazin described it, was freed from the intervention of human
hands by way of an automated point-of-view. It substituted the shifting perspectives of a
living subject with a technology for temporal seizure and exactitude, and provided the
transference of reality from the thing to its reproduction.9
The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of 
time and space that govern it. No matter how frizzy, distorted, or discoloured, no 
matter how lacking in the documentary value the image may be, it shares, by virtue of 
the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the 
reproduction of; it is the model.
(Bazin 1967:14)
Bazin's phenomenology revels with quasi-religious fervour in the corporeal process 
of the photograph and cinematograph. The moving image is touched and literally (chemically) 
made evident by light. More than a likeness, the movement of the photograph in rapid 
succession is the physical imprint of the world in time. Bazin is convinced of the cinema’s 
cold mechanical objectivity and its unassailable status as the producer of truth. He sees the 
film camera as the mummifier of time, its form of mechanical reproduction providing 
transcendence from the limitations of western painting and all of the tensions between 
symbolism and realism attached to previous representational art forms.12 Cinema verite in 
particular was, to Bazin, a project to end art and supply the real itself.
The camera does not know what it sees but nonetheless it does record, and is capable 
of capturing certain attributes of the lived world (light, movement) with the minimal 
intervention of human opinion. A camera can, for example, be mistakenly left recording and 
capture duration without intention. If the camera is left recording in a bag, it may have 
registered an image without form, a firstness image which cannot yet connote and must 
remain as abstraction until the context of the recording is revealed. Ordinarily, the image 
material the camera regards is received as secondness, in that the moving images look like the 
world regarded. Secondness is where the documentary would logically be most at home,
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particularly direct cinema; it is the eventfulness the documentary claims to accurately record. 
Most film or videotape 'rushes' constitute an image-flow of a set of events that provoke 
movements by the editor in terms of an assemblage (edits are performed), where meaning is 
ascribed to the sequence in terms of edit revisions and by die addition of narration, score, 
titles, and so on. The resemblance complex of which Bazin speaks is of this third order 
semiotics, what Peirce termed thirdness - the category of language and language-like 
operations. Thirdness constitutes the dominant currency of our enunciation and recognition, 
none more so than in the moving image.13
In the first incarnations of the documentary film we can observe the transformation of 
unfettered images of the lived world into meaningful forms, built on the foundations of a 
realism that had clearly established narratives for the representation of a predominantly 
working class, or for a racially exotic other. Applying Hacking's rationale, it is not difficult to 
see the relationship between apparent life-likeness and the capability of the documentary to 
effect social change. In the earliest of factual films we find the translation of a classic social 
realist sensibility into the moving image: images of everyday industrial, low-income life in 
the Lumiere Brothers' actualites (for example, Workers leaving the Lumiere Factory 1895); 
the use of narrative editing to heighten the sense of realism in Robert Flaherty's Nanook o f the 
North (1922). Flaherty’s infamous construction of a semi-circular igloo for the purposes of 
filming and lighting provides a fitting example of what Nichols calls decoupage, the carefully 
constructed artificial space and time within the documentary where a director stops and starts 
activities within the actual situation in order to re-set the cinematographic apparatus in 
accordance to a pre-conceived outcome. John Grierson proclaimed that the very puipose of 
the documentary was to make 'creative use of actuality,' in order to achieve social impact His 
Night Mail (1936) featured postal workers 'playing themselves' in studio reconstructions of 
train carriage sorting rooms.14 In Soviet realist films of the 1920s and 30s this form of active 
social construction carried over to the structuring of the viewer’s historical-materialist 
consciousness. Dziga Vertov's Kino-Eye newsreels were shot, edited and screened around the
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country on board a fleet of agitprop trains and steamers, assembled according to Marxist 
historical dialectic and the principles of constructivism.15 In these examples we can find the 
beginnings of closed-hypothesis realism in the documentary form. Both pre and post-war 
classical cinema, whether politically of the left or right, East or West, fiction or documentary, 
has as its agenda the representation of a people who are, as Rodowick describes, 'already 
there, "real before being actual, ideal before being abstract"' (Rodowick 1992: 153, quoting 
Deleuze. 1986: 16).16 The people are seen as 'representable.'
The dominant order tends to regard the marginal as actively in need of representations 
from outside of their community or culture. The ethnographic film, for example, makes a case 
study by picturing the other as voice - as an utterable subject - and then communicating the 
others' communication for them. This inevitably creates a division between common speech 
and artistic aestheticization, or parole (an act or utterance) and langue (a language system).17 
The parole of local dialect - the everyday speech of the working class, or speech that is 
classified as ethnic - is re-framed by and through the langue, or the received normative 
language of the ethnographer who is looking in. The various peoples we see on our screens in 
ethnographic films are brought into being by this process. As Deleuze & Guattari argue, 'the 
race summoned forth by art or philosophy is not the one that claims to be pure but rather an 
oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, and irremediably minor race' (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1994: 109). Similarly, in Hollywood cinema we find an individual protagonist often 
standing for an organic collective or a mass ideology. In Soviet Realist cinema, the group 
replaces the individual hero, but the filmmakers retain the use of image manipulation 
(dialectical montage, in the case of Eisenstein) to represent a class experience. Eisenstein and 
Vertov had as their agenda the proposition for an image of a collective people - a challenge to 
the supremacy of acted fictions - that used social non-actors, but this objective became caught 
in the trappings of representation and image spectacle. In the pre-war period both Soviet 
realism and American cinema presented a people as bound to unfolding history, as 
teleologically determined historical subjects.18 According to Deleuze, the modernist
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aspiration of Soviet Realism collapsed into state controlled mediation and America 'lost the 
ability to envision itself as a people "to come'" (Deleuze 1989). We will return to the idea of a 
group called 'the people,' who are largely, if not entirely, absent from the documentary form 
of representation, but for the time being I would like to explore in more detail the complexity 
of methods used by the factual filmmaker to achieve a realism which is perceived as on behalf 
of and reflecting this people.
Realism in the documentary film involves the deployment of technique and rhetoric. 
It is not only in the propagandist statements of Soviet Realism that we find rhetoric at play; 
rhetoric exists in any and all textual utterances. Classical documentary uses a range of styles 
to compel the audience towards a particular argument or point of view. This is commonly a 
moral or ethical position on an issue or situation in the current or the historical world, with 
rhetoric the chief device used by the filmmaker to convey this outlook to an audience.19 
Nichols provides a number of ways in which rhetoric can convince the viewer of a particular 
argument. These include the use of evidence (such as that of the eye witness), artistic proof 
(i.e., the quality of the film’s production and articulation), ethical unassailability (for example 
the unquestionable moral character or 'good name' of the presenter and/or filmmaker), 
emotional disposition and on-screen demonstration. Emotional proofs depend on pre-existing 
associations from the viewer, and most commonly involve the deployment of suggestive 
musical scoring or emotive image juxtaposition, making continued use of Eisenstein’s 
dialectical montage. The above terms may be combined, for instance, when a 'trustworthy' 
commentator makes an emotional appeal during a crime reconstruction. Demonstrative 
rhetorical proof concentrates on making the evidence persuasive rather than necessarily 
accurate. Nichols gives a succinct example of this in the abundant half-truths of advertising, 
where the use of rhetoric has to do with influence rather than with precision or fact, the 
broadcaster relying heavily on cliches of core values and the conventions of a culture, 
particularly in the USA. As Nichols explains, 'rhetoric courts the viewer as style reveals the 
author1 (Nichols 1991: 136). In this sense, factual cinema and television operate an elaborate
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system of style and manipulation where rhetorical influence is as often implicit as it is 
explicit. For example, the declaration of non-bias can be, and often is, utilized as a form of 
rhetoric. The documentary has rejected elements of the fictional or the make-believe in order 
to secure confederacy with the institutions of the world that exert real power and have the 
ability to affect change. That is to say the documentary is almost always in essence 
propagandist, the image placed in the service of the dominant ideology as spectacle and 
distraction. But the documentary, as a cultural product, required a network of distribution and 
so kept close company with the fiction film (the publicly agreed foremost style for the 
representational image) in order to make use of its systems of reception as entertainment.
This kinship with the mechanism of Hollywood and its storytelling has made for an 
uncomfortable association with the discourses of sobriety, for neither science nor economics 
seeks to entertain. Nichols proposes four modes for the documentary: expository (a narrated 
stoiy of events), observational/ethnographic (a more direct seeing of events), interactive (a 
conscious engagement with events) and reflexive (a self-conscious inflection of events). Erik 
Bamouw also delineates four categories, but for the attitude of the documentary filmmaker, as 
either prophet, explorer, reporter, or painter.20 Bordwell and Thompson similarly produce a 
quartet of approaches, but these are thematic: categorical, rhetorical, abstract, and 
associational (2003). In Theorizing Documentary Michael Renov outlines that the 
documentary sets out to either: record/reveal/preserve; to persuade/promote; to
analyze/interrogate or to express (Michael Renov 1993).21 Clearly, the factual moving image 
is a hybrid of objective representations of what we understand to be the historical world. 
Nichols observes that the documentary strikes a complex and contradictory position in the 
history of the moving image (Nichols 1991: 166). Methodologically, the documentary 
believes itself allied to discourses of sobriety, structurally it allies itself with the codes and 
conventions of classical cinema narrative, and yet, culturally, it distances itself from diary 
films, from the films of the amateur cineastes and socialist workers collectives, and from the 
early actualities from which the documentary initially derived. Whichever of the modes
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proposed, the documentary inexorably incorporates models of realism, and involves rhetorical 
overtones, whether cleverly intended or not.
Cin&na verite seeks to unearth truths through tenacity and by way of prolonged and 
supposedly unobtrusive exposure to a subject. The idealistic objective of Direct Cinema, the 
American variant of the documentary cinema verite tradition, was to deploy cameras that 
recorded without yet making sense of, or understanding, what was seen. This attempt at a 
frictionless cine-anthropology imagines a film that films by itself, to show without telling, an 
ideal that direct cineastes such as Pennebaker, the Maysles Brothers, Leacock and Wiseman 
adhered to. As Amos Poe remarked, “Filming the truth, you get one take, you can’t re-do it” 
(Amos Poe 200322). However, Direct Cinema lifted the Hollywood story telling device of 
crisis and dramatic teleological content, charting unstable sets of affairs that developed in 
complexity before achieving resolution. Direct cinema makers stressed die need for the 
representation of an everyday uncluttered by the presence of filmmaker and crew. Frederick 
Wiseman, for instance, advocated the near invisibility of those behind the screen, and went to 
great lengths to minimize the effect of his own presence, seeking to convey the impression 
that people were, 'being themselves.1 This required what Nichols terms a sophisticated form of 
non-intervention.23 In order to create a situation where the subjects were 'being themselves' 
the crew had to not be their selves, i.e., to tightly control their behaviour and pretend to not be 
present. This is the paradox of cinema verite: 'The discipline and control of mise-en-scene 
that would have been directed toward what occurs in front of the camera gets turned on those 
behind it. They must move and position themselves to record actions without altering or 
distorting those actions at the same time' (Nichols 1991: 14).
Many documentary filmmakers pre-script the factual film they plan to shoot, mapping 
out plot arcs and points of dramatic or emotional tension, with false and true resolutions. 
Abbas Kiarostami has commented about his own work, and the cinema in general that, 'Every 
film is ultimately a reenactment of reality, not that reality itself (Kiarostami24). Cinema
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verisimilitude has as a style found implementation in socially rooted fictional films 
commonly referred to as docudramas.25 Ken Loach’s Cathy Come Home (1966) and The Big 
Flame (1969) feature the single viewpoint of a long lens camera, which denies the viewer the 
complex arrangements of shots customary to classical narrative, and thereby creates the effect 
of factual legitimacy. Raymond Williams writes of Loach that, 'a certain dramatic, but also 
political, hypothesis is established... a hypothesis which is played out in realistic terms but 
within a politically imagined possibility' (Raymond Williams 1989: 234). In the docudrama 
realism is a self-effacing style designed to disguise the trace of the filmmaker, and premised 
upon the image viewed as an extension of the eye and the ear. Having made a number of 
factual films, including X-Ray (1974), Kzysztof Kieslowski came to the realization that there 
were things he could not show in a documentary (either physically, or morally) and he instead 
opted to take his documentary style into fictional forms of telling, for example Camera Buff 
(1979), which is itself a reflexive story about the life-altering capacity of filmmaking.
The documentary remains commonly understood as literalism, as the way the world 
actually is, and yet it privileges the seeable over the perceived, over the remembered and the 
imagined. In other words, what can be objectively seen has gained almost entire dominance 
over what is subjectively perceived. The seeing of thought and the sensations of the body do 
not figure in the expositional, ethnographic and interventional films outlined by Nichols. The 
raw unfettered indexicality of the photographic image, the 'sticky stuff, which Bazin claimed 
to be the reality of the image (and which helped form a cultural idea of authenticity that 
sparked all kinds of dread in the digital age), speaks only for realism in terms of the visible 
event evidenced by the chemical, analogue photograph, and does not account for interiority as 
a form of realism. In fact, indexicality is precisely the reason for the eclipsing of the 
subjective, for the secondness image presents the model without interiority. Subjectivity 
eludes the grasp of the photographic; what is thought or felt cannot fall within the 
photographic register. This is not only the case for analogue images. Digital video, whose 
indexical status remains much debated, replicates the rectilinear aspect ratio of academy 4:3
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or 16:9, now 'capturing' frames (i.e., converting light into binary code) rather than 'exposing' 
them. Whether a documentary is produced using analogue or digital technologies, abstract 
thinking is at all times subordinate to the registered image. This allegiance to the optical 'fact' 
in the documentary has, as Nichols notes, been at the cost of the exploration of more 
anomalous forms of rendering an experience of, or mediated encounter with, the lived world. 
In its fixation with fact, history and the observational, the documentary has occluded other 
dimensions of human experience, ones that are largely interior and not subject to scientific 
models of verification. Because we cannot record thoughts and ideas, nor fix memories and 
temporal lapses, they have not been given a place in the documentary. The fore-grounded 
subjectivity of evoking human recollection, or of making camera shots which appear to give 
equivalence to the point-of-view of human vision, have to date found no real place in factual 
filmmaking, certainly not in the classical documentary.
This is a supremacy that can be challenged, given the fact that we also do not zoom, 
track, cut or even directly perceive using rectangular frames in our own sensorium. A film or 
video camera may record with steely detachment, but it is the human subject, whose 
subjectivity and ideology exists at either a conscious or an unconscious level, who commonly 
operates the camera and equally is the object of the camera's vision. Across the board in the 
factual film we can observe a consistent disregard to emergent mental relations and the denial 
of formal possibilities. And yet what we see is not all that is real. On an implicit level, 
however, any documentary is tightly enmeshed in subjective rhetorical devices. For example, 
in die classical expositional form of the narrated wildlife film it is not uncommon to be 
presented with the point-of-view of an animal (Nichols gives the example of a documentary 
about a toad). We may be watching stock-footage cutaways, following a story involving 
animals personified in character-based and identifiably human struggles, and hearing studio 
recorded Foley sound that has micro amplification but no indexical link to the image origin. 
These enhanced or fabricated perceptual moments join subjectivity to the objective image; the 
narrative content of the sequence provides a distraction from the inherent falsity of the
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arrangement. In many ways we can find in such an example the template for more 
extraordinary approaches to the human factual subject, particularly in terms of a more haptic 
use of sound.26 Certainly, the idiosyncrasy and timbre of the human voice, so lacking in the 
'cleaned-up' speech of the conventionally recorded and edited interviewee, is one avenue for 
exploring subjectivity. The crystalline aspect of time and memory in time-image fiction is 
another, and this has been the fertile ground for Chris Marker's experimental documentary 
career, which we will come to.
The aura of subjectivity within a documentary also occurs around dramatic 
reenactments of actual events, which move a film’s categorization very close to fiction. It is 
not unusual to see interview testimony supported by a cut-away to reenactments of the events 
described. These images, often rendered in different film stock or media, or treated differently 
in terms of colour grade, are not flashbacks in the strictest sense, because they are not fully 
attributed to a thinker. Instead they exist, not as the point-of-view or perception of a person 
but rather as the 'speculated' or the 'imagined' of the documentary itself. This is an example of 
the fictional mode entering the documentary mode. In Brian Hill’s Drinking fo r England 
(1998) the subjects of the film break into song to articulate their varying addictions to alcohol. 
In each instance the lyrics are pre-written, in collaboration with a songwriter and a musician, 
but the spoken testimony that precedes and follows each subjective interruption to the text is 
factual, historically rooted and seemingly un-prompted.28 The classical documentary cannot 
by its very nature venture to represent drunkenness, and the occurrence of each song serves to 
highlight the limitations of this kind of factual form, but the unusual delivery of the text 
points to the levels of social difference alcohol can induce, and brings spiritedness to the 
production. As Roscoe and Paget write of Drinking fo r England, 'The "event of the song" in 
documusical produces a kind of obverse effect to Reality TV's flickers of authenticity, 
abruptly breaking away as it does from the conventions of documentary and accelerating into, 
rather than out o f something altogether more theatrical. There is definitely a "flicker" here, 
but one signaling a new kind of life — that of performance' (Roscoe & Paget 200129). This
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tactic, of song as testimony, does not necessarily undermine the authority of the film text, or 
make the viewer react to the characters on the screen as fictitious; it merely offers the 
additional element of personal experience delivered through music rather than through the 
conventional - but arguably equally theatrical - set-up of the interview.30 Theirs is a speech act 
that reveals otherwise obscured aspects to their character.
Does the moving image add to a displacement from the real already exacerbated by 
language and signs, or take us closer to the real by increasing our understanding of such 
mediating forces? Photography may have been the dominant resemblance for the (mid-late) 
nineteenth century, yet the achievements of photography did not give us the real, only its 
duplication or transparency. The cinematograph and the video camera constituted the 
dominant resemblance apparatus for the twentieth century and although, increasingly, 
complex digital events are placing the validity of moving images in question, video, and to a 
lesser extent film, remain the dominant forms for representation in the twenty-first century. In 
the moving image, perceptual realism is above all else a style. Hollywood tries to make high 
definition video look like 35mm; there is the concerted efforts of banks of programmers to 
produce a computer generated imaging of grass by producing algorithms of grass in general 
which appear to the viewer as consisting of grass in particular. This grass in general is, 
however, sharper than the noise of our vision. Reality TV, also, strives for a realism that has 
the appearance of being of the moment of the event, through conscious use of hand-held 
blurry images, jump cuts, and dead moments. Indexicality has the cultural value of the 
impression o f authenticity,31 something we currently perceive in die pixilated video streams 
from embedded war journalists, (although there is much debate over whether a digital image 
is an index of real events32).
The impression of indexicality has substantial psychological influence, and, in the 
current cultural context of digital imagery, is linked to an image's real-time status: if an image 
is coming to us in real-time, then it has the semiotic value of being less likely to have passed
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through modification.33 In The Evil Demon o f Images (198734) Jean Baudrillard writes 'The 
secret of the image... must not be sought in its differentiation from reality, and hence in its 
representative value (aesthetic, critical or dialectical), but on the contrary in its “telescoping” 
into reality, its short-circuit with reality, and finally, in the implosion of image and reality' 
(Baudrillard, quoted in Nichols 1991: 6). Baudrillard says that images are fundamentally 
immoral, and that therein lays the power an image possesses, what Deleuze might call the 
power of its falsity. For Baudrillard, there is no longer an objective 'out there,' only the image 
of its simulation. Nichols rejects this, stating that there remains a difference between an image 
and the real, and although he suggests possibilities for embracing less scientific attitudes in 
the documentary, he also warns that by refuting truth claims the documentary (particularly the 
reflexive documentary) is in danger of avoiding the expression of actual events. The debate 
about the elusive nature of the real, where reality is seen as beyond depiction or 
comprehension, is to the modernist an ideological myth, and a dangerous one at that.35 The 
issue here is the political implications of the postmodern blurring of fact and fiction and the 
post-structural distrust of meta-narratives and the totalitarian regime of language. Does this 
blurring offer innovative creative possibility or merely a disengaged and apolitical free-play 
of perceived surfaces? On this point Nichols writes that 'Documentary may talk about 
anything in the historical world except itself (until we consider reflexive documentaries). It is 
hard to be reflexive if you have something pressing to say about an issue' (Nichols 1991: 17). 
The truth-seeking documentary-maker asks that filmmakers and broadcasters discount 
reflexivity, poetry and formalism in order to directly address the thing in itself - the lived 
social world - with all of its complexity and trauma, arguing that, in spite of post-structural 
protestations, we need the nerve to say that there are some things that are incontrovertibly, 
and singularly, real.
Our access to historical reality may only be by means of representations, and these 
representations may sometimes seem more eager to chase their own tails than able to 
guarantee the authenticity of what they refer to. Neither of these conditions, however, 
precludes the persistence of history as a reality with which we must contend.
(Nichols 1991: 7)
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According to Nichols, historical reality is under siege, and yet he also makes the point 
that history is precisely what the documentary-maker cannot ever control. Whether the 
filmmaker is cognizant of it or not, his or her meta-subject is always that which is always 
outside of any attempt to capture it: history.36 Nichols also concedes that there is an element 
of truth to Baudrillard’s conceptual nihilism, in that the image has made reality subordinate to 
it (and this is Hacking's thesis), but he states that it is precisely the cold and hard reality of 
death in warfare that enables clear distinctions to be made between a lived world and a 
mediated one. The first Gulf War might not have happened (as Baudrillard procatively 
claimed) in terms of our distance to it as peculiar and passive audience members, but it also 
did happen - people died, and there are images of these deaths (although these are the types of 
images that Governments and television channels deem unsuitable for broadcast, because, we 
are told, they would be too traumatic and cause additional stress to families of the 
deceased37).
Crisis and trauma are what bring the real profoundly home to the individual, but 
crisis, like any other lived situation, becomes quickly compressed into narrative, into a unit of 
entertainment, and increasingly must fit within the ideologies and unique sales strategies of 
broadcasters and their sponsors. One clear example of this would be private Jessica Lynch, 
the American Soldier 'rescued' by US forces in Iraq. The US military, working with 
embedded journalists, stormed the hospital where Lynch was held captive, but did so more 
than a day after they knew her captors had fled the building, firing only blanks from their 
guns.38 In this example we see that trauma is translated into spectacle: none of the news 
reports concentrated on Lynch’s actual ordeal, only on the sensational display of her rescue 
and the later scandal of its veritive fictions. 'Reality is ours for the making' writes Nichols 
(1991: 11), but clearly he did not mean this. It is difficult to envision how a documentary- 
maker can now proceed in an unfettered rendering of a real event, which is supposedly out 
there, awaiting or evading capture. Would she observe journalistic codes of conduct arrived at 
through market forces or as a result of increasing political pressure from administrations, or
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would she make codes of her own and, if so, would we prefer that she did? How limited are 
the facts she has to hand and how pervasive are the fashions, idioms and economic forces for 
presenting those facts? How can she speak for another whose experience she has not known? 
Representation invents a singular concept of reality, a motivated version. Rather than as an 
indexical device for pointing at the real and recording it, how might we think of the moving 
image as an apparatus that complicates our understanding of what kind of a real it is we are 
perceptually and cognitively maintaining? After all, it is very often our encounter with an 
irreducible lived world, and our inability to express it, which forms the textures of our 
expressions.
If there were a modem political cinema, it would be on this basis: the people no 
longer exist, or not yet... the people are missing...Ait, and especially cinematographic 
art, must take part in this task: not that of addressing a people, which is presupposed 
already there, but of contributing to the invention of a people.
(Deleuze 1989: 216-17)
The ‘people’ of film documentary are not the people actually participating, and the 
‘people’ of film narrative are not the same as the people who are watching the film; they are, 
rather, their constructions. The people are missing. A philosophy of a minor cinema says that 
the people (that is, our selves) must organize their, our, own representation; any attempts by 
others to do so on the people's behalf leads back to an absence of the people. It is in the post­
war period, for the most part in Europe, that Deleuze first recognizes a counter cinema, one 
that begins to relinquish the objective of representing a people. In the co-mingling of dialect 
and the Italian language in neo realism Deleuze discovers a minor cinema whose utterances 
are spoken within the context of a dominant language, which is the classical cinema and 
documentary. The dialect of this minor cinema, and its usage and alteration of existent 
normative tropes, gives Deleuze hope. Deleuze does not mean that there is a pre-existent but 
as yet unrealized unity that a missing people can assume or possess. He means that concepts 
are needed which enable both virtual sites (creative thought) and real sites (creative conduct) 
in which a people can find invention. One concept for this invention is to privilege the act of 
utterance over what is being uttered, to favour the immediacy of a filmmaking parole over a 
cinematic langue. Such film utterances are speech acts determined by the locality and
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contingency of their making. They are not planned or completed in accordance to fixed 
schemas.
Deleuze's concentrated attention on neo realist cinema is based on Pasolini's concept 
of a cinema o f poetry. The cinema of poetry uses free indirect discourse to introduce real 
objects into fictional frames, and vice-versa.39 A free indirect camera blurs the distinction 
between objectivity (the lens) and subjectivity (the character; the cinematographer and/or 
director), and, in blurring that divide, announces that the greatest element of the cinema as an 
art form is the indiscemability between subjectivity and objectivity. Pasolini thought of 
modem cinema as essentially a sliding of representational ground between fiction and reality, 
that which broke 'the uniformity of the internal monologue (the erased author) to replace it by 
the diversity, the deformity, the otherness of a free indirect discourse' (Pasolini, quoted in 
Deleuze 1992: 183-184). Pasolini suggests that the cinema is an arrangement of signs whose 
semiology brings us into contact, not with the linguistic structures and articulations of written 
or spoken language, but rather to a possible sign system of reality itself, the writing of the 
non-linguistic with the non-linguistic, what he described as, 'writing the real with the real.'41 
The moving image is unlike other art forms because, rather than making a figuration of the 
lived world, it takes quotations directly from it. And so Theorem (Pasolini 1968) begins with 
archive newsreel footage of a workers' strike, before progressing to a fictional drama. The 
Passion According to St. Matthew (Pasolini 1964) features actuality footage o f rural Italy, 
which in the edit, is constituted as the point-of-view of a fictional character. And Rossellini 
frequently cast in his films locals who lived and worked in the film location.42
It was the Russian Formalist and cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin who first 
suggested this form of free indirect discourse in Rabelais and His World (Bakhtin 198443), 
although there is no evidence to say that Pasolini was aware of Bakhtin's work. In the writings 
of Rabelais and the carnival of the seventeenth century, Bakhtin gives analysis to the 
relationship between official language and dialect. Here, free indirect discourse is an
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enunciation forming part of an utterance that depends on a different subject of enunciation, 
and this produces intra-subjectivity. The deployment of free indirect discourse reveals in any 
text the inter-play of subjective and objective voices, or points of view: the actual and the 
imaginary, the factual and the fictional are rendered as indistinct, each exceeding the other, 
creating speech act utterances that simultaneously use language and perform operations upon 
language.44 The free indirect camera of neo realism is a form of disengaged vision that 
enables the artist to lift the veil from the lived world, producing images that provide a meeting 
point between perception and reality. As Deleuze comments, 'The real was no longer 
represented or reproduced but 'aimed at'. Instead of representing an already deciphered real, 
neo-realism aimed at an always ambiguous, to be deciphered, real; this is why the sequence 
shot tended to replace the montage of representations... neo-realism produced a formal or 
material ''additional reality'" (Deleuze 1992: 1).
Often in the documentary, free indirect relations crop up around non-contiguous cut­
away shots, for example, during war films, when actual footage from combat is cut into studio 
recorded dramatic scenes as the 'seen' o f the actor in the cockpit. Without the anchoring of the 
action-image, these cut-away film utterances leave the viewer feeling as though two-headed. 
As Deleuze articulates, 'The speech-act must create itself as a foreign language in a dominant 
language' (Deleuze 1992: 223). Free indirect point of view shots are stylistic rather than 
linguistic; with these instances o f looking and seeing, there is no direct discourse, i.e., no 
voice over, or dissolve announcing that the image sequence is a 'dream;' there are no clear 
markers of subjectivity, as is usually coded in narrative cinema, and therefore there is no clear 
borderline between the objective and the subjective. We might say that neo realism had as its 
objective the reversal of the semiotic sequencing of the sensory-motor schema, which looks to 
rapidly move images from firstness, through secondness, to thirdness. During certain 
moments in neo realist cinema, images with narrative belonging become loose of mooring, 
straying from cause and effect until settling as image without intention or thought. It is 
impossible to say, during these stray occurrences, whether the image before us is functioning
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as factual or fictional. It is both. Deleuze claims that neo realist images turn exterior spaces 
into mental relations. In fact, the time-image is the very emergence of firstness from 
secondness and thirdness, where characters (and viewers) become pure seers, receptive to 
spatial properties and unfolding durations outside of the sensible means to understand them.
Film theory and production has tended to concentrate on how the cinema produces a 
subject, turning away from considering how it attempts to reproduce reality. The cinematic 
project of attempting to reproduce reality is of course an impossible one. What the cinema 
does best is articulate the difference between the lived world and our renderings of similarity 
towards it; it is at its most incisive when it produces the meaning of its inability to reproduce 
reality. We are moving towards the difficult territory of regarding the moving image as, above 
all else, poetic in its forms and capabilities. This kind of cinema articulates volatile 
differences rather than similarities; it draws vitality from the very difference, in its utterance, 
from that which it is making articulations towards. The transience of our grasp of the real is 
what constitutes the poetic utterance, and in science, often what we cannot know of the real 
helps us position relative truths about it. As Andras Balint Kovaks observes, Deleuze 
emphasizes the work of art's difference to the lived world, rather than its similarity.
When one focuses on similarity rather than difference, one concentrates on structure 
(rather than on poetry, which is free and anarchic). A work of art is not a copy or a 
representation of a real thing; it is as real as the real. Art is the highest level of 
repetition and is on the same level as the so-called real thing. The difference between 
simulacra and reality is of the same nature as certain differences within reality.
(Kovacs 200546)
To make a representation is to force the unnamable into the nameable, to reduce a 
contingent and emergent actuality into signs that speak for it and prize from the event discrete 
and reproducible elements or entities. This is what 2i2ek calls totalitarianism - to brutally 
impose onto reality an authored realism.47 Deleuze's philosophy regards an articulation or 
expression as art only if it surpasses the realm of representation.48 Art is a figure moving 
towards the state of not-figure, towards the pinnacle of artistic expression, which is the
expression of an idea. This art creates affects and percepts, chaining and unchaining along a 
plane of immanence, which is a possible that has not yet become. Whereas philosophy is the 
practice of the virtual of thought, such an art is the practice of sensations, what Peter 
Hallward calls 'a zone of experimentation with the matter of the real' (Hallward 200650). 
Between formalism and realism, between linguistic utterance and non-linguistic expression, 
between fabulation and historical fact, is the process of emergence, the taking place of 
something new which comes to be through its relation to what is.
However, the thing that creating creates is always already old and prone to habitual 
patterns, and for Deleuze the dynamism of the creating process matters more than the creator 
or what is created: the work itself has no intrinsic spiritual dynamism, only the creating, the 
doing. The writing matters more than what is written, and as a practice of philosophy Deleuze 
tries to extract the process from the result, looking for the very ontology of a fresh idea and 
the experimentations that organisms (especially people) and machines are capable of doing. 
This is esprit, what Deleuze names affect, which in art is the marking of marks irrespective of 
their signification. Affect replaces categorization. Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism 
releases realism from representation: art is not the creation of likenesses, but the invention of 
new patterns, of differences. This is an approach to form as invention, rather than form 
working from pre-existing, a-priori structures. Deleuze, as radical realist then, returns the 
subject to the object it had observed and tried to gain mastery over by duplicating it as art. As 
Rodowick summarizes, there is no longer the Cartesian split, because both the subject and the 
object are equally a part o f time.54
Art puts forward a proposal for how to perceive what we are living, and yet its 
greatest capacity is for putting forward proposals for how to perceive what we are not-yet- 
living. For Deleuze, art is inorganic and not a representation of reality.55 Systems do not need 
unity, and this would include the system of the narrative fiction and of the documentary. In 
order to produce difference we require seriality and repetition - the rhizome - the dynamics of
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proliferation of a system, which is in fact opposed to regularity. In Chris Marker's Sans Soleil 
(1982) the seriality o f seemingly unrelated images makes of the narration what Deleuze 
describes as a 'fabrication capable of bringing forth such historical events as the creation of a 
people' (Deleuze 1989: 141). Rodowick explains that such a series requires an act of historical 
imagination that produces the new and releases identity from teleology (the politics of identity 
as the self-same) into the series, where identity and history are creatively falsified. In essence, 
the emphasis for thought is given to that which is open to time as series, as the expression of 
'not yet' which can give rise to the 'not yet' existence of a people. This can take place provided 
that the people are no longer constituted by what is previous. According to Branigan, Sans 
Soleil 'explores some of the general forms of intelligibility available in our society' (Branigan 
1992: 116) including the attitude the moving image takes towards the past and to memory, 
what Adrian Miles describes as, 'the technologies of memory, o f record, of the processes and 
activities combining memory with the quotidian'.56 Official histories and collective images of 
a people shape and restrict the episteme of a culture's self-image; the quotidian becomes the 
general rather than the particular. This is one of the processes by which the individual 
becomes lost within the general, i.e., the category of a people. This has been the particular 
effect of broadcast television, but also of the cinema, what Deleuze calls 'public images,' that, 
'comprise a sort of official history, which the unpreserved present that passes is more like 
unofficial history or private memory1 (Deleuze 1989). Rodowick writes that a revolutionary 
form of cinema must allow a collective political goal without necessitating a collective 
subject (Rodowick 1997: 15357). This includes the transformation of the past as the 
constituent of a present identity, and Deleuze offers the tool of the powers o f the false  to bring 
about this creative evolution, through difference and through change. Powers of the false are 
the thought flight lines of an imagination not bound by history, identity or spatial/temporal 
order. The fabulation of the historical imagination is the central concept for a modem political 
cinema produced by and for a missing people. Sans Soleil presents a false memory syndrome. 
The memories and diary images of the actual cinematographer (who is in fact a fictional 
device) cannot be separated from the images of television and found footage. The film is in
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fact the assemblage, after the fact, of many hours of travelogue material filmed and gathered 
by Marker, creating new lines of past-present by fictionalizing the past. This is why Marker's 
film calls for a kind of pillow book cinema, a future populated by poets who each create their 
own, 'lists of things that quicken the heart' (The Cinematographer, Sans Soleil).58
A pillow book cinema has resonance with philosopher Gilbert Ryle's concept of thick 
description, which is the attempt to recognize (and render) the very detail of the everyday 
rather than the broad stroke or the general view.59 A thick description of human behaviour, in 
anthropology and other fields, is one that accounts not only for actions but also for the 
situation of their taking place, such that the context gives vital meaning to anyone outside of 
the situation who is looking in and trying to ascertain significance. Ryle, in Collected Papers 
(1973), gives the example of a wink, which, out of context, has no evident meaning. As the 
context emerges, the connotation of the wink changes. The documentary has proved 
suiprisingly lacking in such detail or thick description, compressing information into crude 
approximations, with the complexity of lived experience inevitably exceeding its frame. This 
loss of complexity is the standard complaint aimed at broadcast news and factual 
programming. The anthropologist and ethnographer Clifford Geertz borrowed the term thick 
description from Ryle to propose a process of inscription replacing one of evidence, an 
attitude of research that may prove innovative to documentary filmmakers. Inscription has the 
potential for allowing the image to remain as affect, where it vibrates in firstness. It might be 
more useful to stop trying to treat cinema as a 'language' and investigate other methods 
(psychological or neurological, perhaps) in order to try to envision an affect-based 
documentary image, one that is fired with alterity. This is not a new endeavour. Dunng the 
same post war period in which neo realist cinema emerged, Maya Deren called for a 
'verticality' in film, distinguishable from the 'horizontal' film structure associated with drama, 
what Deren describes as 'one circumstance -  one action -  leading to another1 (Deren, quoted 
in P. Adams Sitney 2002: 173-4). A vertical film structure, or a poetic structure, 'probes the 
ramifications of the moment, and is concerned with its qualities and its depth, so that you
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have poetry concerned, in a sense, not with what is occurring but with what it feels like or 
with what it means’ (ibid60).
What exceeds the reach of the factual image is also, and in some cases most 
profoundly, its subject. The most pointed example of such excess would be the termination of 
life, death as excess. Stan Brakhage’s The Act o f Seeing One's Own Eyes (1971), is a mute 
film shot in a morgue and dispassionately following a series of autopsies - a relentless gaze at 
a historical reality that no structure, code, system, lens, or thing, can contain. Wemer Herzog's 
Land o f Silence and Darkness (1971) is a documentary that, in presenting individuals who 
were bom deaf and blind, points directly to the limitations of the medium, profoundly 
demonstrating how encounters with the very limits of the medium are where its greatest 
insights present themselves to us, as active viewers. Both films direct the camera to the 
camera's very limit, and train the viewer's attention on the threshold of what is perceivable 
and knowable. By presenting the reality that there are things we cannot represent, such a 
cinema begins to advance propositions towards what Adomo describes as a radical 
naturalism:
...if the film were to give itself up to the blind representation of everyday life, 
following the precepts of, say, Zola, as would indeed be practicable with moving 
photography and sound recording, the result would be a construction alien to the 
visual habits of the audience, diffuse, unarticulated outwards. Radical naturalism, to 
which the technology of film lends itself, would dissolve all surface coherence of 
meaning and finish up as the antithesis of familiar realism.
(Theodor W. Adomo, quoted in Philip Rosen 2001:4762)
This radical naturalism that Adomo imagined denatures the factual mode, by 
incorporating counter-intuitive and pre-linguistic or poetic possibilities within it, creating a 
fact-fictional film continuum and a level of perception which is not afraid to exploit its 
differences to our own. Such an other-nature cinema is the transvergence of reality, a state of 
plurality, of crisscrossing lines of flight and planes of immanence, where the real is revealed 
as the antagonism between conflicting assertions towards it. This denatured cinema is as 
natural as the nature we know of, although it is more than human nature. This new event of
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cinema must therefore be as much scatological and sociological as it is concerned with or 
bound to the history of cinema as we have come to know it.
If we introduce free indirect elements to our factual cinema, and embrace accident 
and contingency; if we adopt thick rather than thin description and give privilege to the body 
as well as to teleological information and entertainment arcs; if we regain license to 
incorporate distressed elements to the assemblage, to incorporate irrationality and verticality, 
even, and experiment with other attributes of the fiction film; if we purposefully problematize 
the proclamation of irrefutable evidence and the construction of incontrovertible historical 
subjects, and if we steer away from an obsession with likeness and the social imperative to 
represent and instead point out the limits of representation (the excessive as always present, as 
absence), we might (rediscover another kind of film. Such a cinema would adopt a 
responsively dialectical method informed by no particular teleology. Imagine bodily news 
reports from a zone of conflict, crystalline recollections in history programmes, unfettered 
durations standing in for narrated sequences, irreverent shards of moving images, reproducing 
affect. Currently on YouTube we can watch the low-end digital video single take of the New 
York Twin Towers attack, recorded by an observer through a camcorder from an overlooking 
apartment, complete with off camera asides of distress intermixed with mundanity.64 In 
contemporary television sports coverage, we find the near instantaneous recollection of the 
match, with winner and loser outcomes rapidly cut together by teams of editors, right up to 
the final whistle blow. Remove the narrative imperative, and the manner of arrangement is an 
explosion of movement in time. Douglas Gordon Phillipe Pareno's Zidane (2006) is a balletic 
rendering of a single football match, shot from twenty-four camera viewpoints, each lens 
concentrating on the body of the footballer at the expense of the wider spectacle of the match. 
The event of a goal, of winning or losing even, is peripheral to the thick description of the 
movements and expressions of one of the twenty-two players.
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Striving for the indexical similarity of secondness and the realism of thirdness in the 
factual film tends to preclude the enablement of genuinely novel thoughts and thought 
arrangements. We may in some instances feel informed by documentaries, and accurate 
factual information remains paramount to our cooperation and well being as social beings, but 
the manner in which we are informed is, for the most part, an exaggerated and exhausted 
version of established schemas, which, as Alain Badiou writes, 'are cited and submitted to a 
hystencization of their sources' (Badiou 2004: 11166). Badiou calls for a new cinematic 
configuration, but having listed the likes of Kiarostami, the Straubs and Godard, he says that 
no new film event is currently perceptible.67 Certainly the cinema has yet to find its absolute 
nature, a possible but not yet fully actual. In the documentary, where is the very difference 
that animates us as distinct beings? Where is our uncertainty and our undecideability, where 
are our thoughts and our feelings, and where is affect and that which exceeds our ability to 
signify? Let us try to think of a crystalline film, one that deals with aberration and itinerancy, 
with interiority and excess.
1 1n his book, Reals and Representations (1983), Ian Hacking characterizes Homo sapiens, (whom he terms Homo 
depictor) as a species defined by its need to depict. To be human, Hacking argues, is to represent the human: to 
make symbols and images that stand for lived experience. Hacking traces a teleology of representation back to the 
first cave paintings, and in doing so makes the compelling point that reality is subordinate to depiction, it is a 
secondary concept which came into being following the primary event of representation. The histoiy of reality as a 
concept is therefore, in Hacking's view, a history of sign making, o f semiotics, where the image forms the centre of 
our construction as subjects, not merely within our perception, but as gest and as mark. Representations are 
likenesses, and these likenesses are by definition publicly shared subjectivities prone to shifting attitudes based on 
cultural assumptions about what is realistic. And so realism is merely a category, a shifting mode subject to the 
fashions and points-of-view of the day, and representation is a wider mode, which informs realism and compels the 
human subject to produce increasingly more complex marks. See Hacking. 1983: 132-136.
3After all, a written account of an event does not have to look like the event, and a pencil drawing of a subject is 
still a record of the encounter between draftsperson and subject, and may even appear to render a likeness to what 
we see, even though there are no "lines" on or around the actual subject.
4 Bazin, What is Cinema? Vol 1:13.
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FThis pluralism of realities is o f note, given Einstein's Special and General Theory o f Relativity, Heidegger's Sein 
und Zeit, and Picasso's experiments with multiple perspectives and collage within the picture plane. Around the 
same time that Picasso was breaking new ground in two-dimensional art. At the beginning of the twentieth century 
Picasso made claims to a perceptual realism released from the confines of perspective and mechanization. Bazin 
sees Picasso at the apex of a shift that began in the mid-nineteenth century, one that gradually moved away from 
this resemblance complex. Bazin writes of the fundamental principle of the (Egyptian) statuary: 'the preservation 
of life by a representation of life,' (Bazin, What is Cinema? Vol 1:10) and of the history of the plastic arts as the 
story of resemblance, o f realism.
Charles Peirce writes on the indexicality o f the photographic medium that 'Photographs, especially instantaneous 
photographs, are very instructive, because we know that in certain respects they are exactly like the objects they 
represent. But this resemblance is due to the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that 
they were physically forced to correspond point by point to nature. In that respect then, they belong to the second 
class of signs, those by physical connection' (Charles Peirce, quoted in Nichols. 1991: 149).
Bazin observes that 'All the arts are based on the presence of man, only photography derives an advantage from 
his absence. Photography affects us like a phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snowflake whose vegetable or 
earthly origins are an inseparable part o f their beauty [...] This production by automatic means has radically 
affected our psychology of the image [...] Photography enjoys a certain advantage in virtue of this transference of 
reality from the thing to its reproduction' (Bazin, What is Cinema? Vol 1: 13-14).
12 See, Change Mummified: Cinema, Historicity, Theory, Philip Rosen. Univ of Minnesota Pr. 2001.
13 Peirce suggests that the connection between an image and the real is not one of representation but one of 
implication, in that the sign points towards the observable and implies the real, rather than ever accurately 
depicting it. Deleuze favours Peirce's theories because they steer away from the principle of mediation’ and 
language as agents of separation, where signs intercede between thought and reality and thereby create a 
disjuncture in experience.13 Signs are instead multiple and flexible, and language is only the most conventional 
category. There are abstract signs, emergent signs (physiological response to events) and conventional signs 
(language), each a different mode in which the real appears, what Peirce terms firstness, secondness, and thirdness.
14 Grierson filmed the shots of the interior o f the carriage where the mail is sorted in a studio. An impression of 
movement was given by gently swinging the string that was hanging down from the top of the sorting boxes before 
each shot was filmed and telling the postal workers to walk with a rolling gait.
15 Films such as the 23-part Kino Pravda (iCinema Truth, 1922-25) metaphorically inter-cut candid-camera footage 
with extracts from pre-revolutionary features. Soviet Marxist ideology attempted to effectively reverse the 
definition of realism, saying realism showed dynamic reality and essential historical movements beneath surface 
appearance, whilst still depicting the working class subject as champion of the real. Vertov later used prismatic
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rlenses, dissolves, micro-cinematography, split screen, multiple impositions, tints, animation, and staccato editing,
thus disregarding reality and entering the realm of cine-poetry.
16 Deleuze writes that This is the first big difference between classical and modem cinema. For in classical 
cinema, the people are there, even though they are oppressed, tricked, subject, even though blind or unconscious. 
Soviet cinema is an example: the people are already there in Eisenstein, who shows diem performing a qualitative 
leap in The General Line (Old and New) [...] and in Vertov and Dovzhenko, in two different ways, there is a 
unanimity which calls the different peoples into the same melting-pot from which the future emerges' (Deleuze. 
1989:216).
17 These are Saussure's terms. Saussure concentrates his analysis on the structures of langue, which are more 
systematic. Bakhtin reverses this, by giving privilege to parole utterances, and resisting the structural project to 
isolate all language as catalogued. During the 1970’s linguistic theorists began to examine data that was naturally 
occurring. Post-structural linguistics developed from Bakhtin's writings on parole, in resistance to how structural 
linguistics concentrates on the scientific paradigm of language as determinable and systematic. On this subject, 
Michel de Certeau writes that, 'Gilbert Ryle, borrowing Saussure's distinction between langue (a system) and 
parole (an act), compared the former to a fund of capitol and the latter to the operations it makes possible: on the 
one hand, a stock o f material, on the other, transactions and uses' (De Certeau. 1984: 32-3).
18 Rodowick writes that 'Classical cinema participated in its own way in representing the teleological becoming of 
the people as identical with the ineluctable unfolding o f history' (D.N. Rodowick 1992: 152).
19 As might be evidenced by the polemic of Michael Moore's recent films Bowling fo r Columbine (2002) and 
Fahrenheit 911 (2004), both of which deploy emotive strategies of direct engagement (for instance, Moore 
arriving unannounced at various institutions) and discriminatory editing in the pursuit of a highly pre-conceived 
argument, albeit under the guise of an apparently open-hypothesis, journalistic mode. Moore may present his film 
as interactive in that they ostensibly involve a series of unforeseen events, but his work is primarily expository, 
rhetorically organized to support his thesis and to ensure that there is no ambiguity in terms of audience 
interpretation. Moore lifts from the anti-expository rhetoric of the 1960s Direct Cinema movement merely in terms 
of an authentic image for his argument (i.e., as open hypothesis, rather than polemic), and yet we continually see 
images that serve as illustration to Moore's commentary, using what Nichols calls 'rhetorical continuity' in editing, 
utilizing material from headlines and footage from local news much in the same way as a scratch video maker 
might19. In fact, Moore introduces home movie material and cable news items in his films to signify the superior 
'truth' of the personal and the local.
20 See Bamouw, Erik (1993) Documentary: A History o f the Non-Fiction Film (2nd revised edition), Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
195
i '
See also Stella Bruzzi's derisive critique of Nichols' taxonomy in New Documentary, A critical introduction. 
Routledge, 2000.
22 Amos Poe speaking at Living Documents, Real Lives in Documentary, Oct 28 2003, NFT London.
Nichols sites Eileen McGany’s analysis o f Fred Wiseman’s films, such as High School (1968) in which the 
filmmaker, following a self-imposed code of objectivity, often treats his institutionalized subjects with the same 
cold and detached manner as the institutions they work within. See, Nichols 1991: 13.
24 Kiarostami, interviewed by Philip Lopate, Film Comment, July-August 1999: 39
25 Metz said that verisimilitude is the mark o f film as a medium, in that it so palpably resembles the lived world 
without ever being mistakable for that real world.
26 In the documentary, it is only dramatic accompanying musically scored phrases and the clarity of voice of the 
speaking subject that have anything like an assertive stance as sonic elements, although at times poor sound is 
deployed as a device, particularly in the docudrama, as a hallmark of legitimacy. In the collection Conventions o f 
Sound in Documentary (Ed. Rick Altman 1992) Jeffrey K. Ruoff draws attention to Tuzzy sound' that has come to 
be read as authentic -  seeming to be as 'pro-sonic' - in the documentary film image. (Ruoff 1992: 224-5).
28 Drinking fo r  England, lyrics: Simon Armitage; music: Michael Conn.
29 In the context o f her writing on Reality TV, Jane Roscoe has drawn attention to moments she calls, 'flickers of 
authenticity,' in which the mask of performance falls away from the Reality TV contestant/ participant. Her phrase 
deliberately recalls Barthes’ notion of the 'punctum' and Brecht’s 'alienation effect,' (Jane Roscoe, Real 
Entertainment: New Factual Hybrid Television, Media International Australia 100 (2001): 9-20. Roscoe and Paget 
go on to describe the Drinking fo r  England participants as 'self-fashioners,' who 'reveal a more complex identity 
through their idiolect -  the Voice' (Paget & Roscoe, Giving voice, Performance and authenticity in the 
documentary musical). http://www.ejumpcut.org/currentissue/MusicalDocy/index.html).
30 Errol Morris’s film The Thin Blue Line (1988) uses the concept of a highly stylized interview aesthetic in which 
all interviewees are shot with the same camera and lens, and in the same focal relational distance to their 
background. This is a decision based on creating equality of presence and the standardization of voice.
31 Nichols. 1991: 150.
32 See D.N. Rodowick, Reading the Figural, or, Philosophy after the New Media (Duke University Press, 2001).
33 One example of the myth of real-time as index of fact is the NY Times Square broadcast on the eve of the new 
Millennium. Rival television channels, broadcasting what they claimed were live images, filtered live feeds 
through real-time processing software that digitally matted-in advertisements for their channels, wiping over rival 
advertisements on display on actual video billboards in the square. Video realism, or reality TV, is the current 
vanguard of truthfulness. We are given to understand that amateur video is more truthful than highly produced and
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¥constructed television, and the same, ubiquitously, applies to surveillance camera imagery. But the diary film and 
the web camera eye are just as culpable constructions of authenticity as the fiction film shot on 35mm, both 
applying variations o f self-censorship, framing, editing, and contexts for reading.
34 The Evil Demon o f Images, Baudrillard's lecture on film given in the Inaugural Mari Kuttna Memorial Lecture at 
the University of Sydney, Australia in 1987. ISBN 0 909952 08 5. Now out of print.
35 In many ways the current phenomena of Reality TV passes the problem back to the viewer, supposedly 
democratizing what is depicted by having viewers vote for who is most real, or most 'like us.' As Clare Fox has 
observed, 'Reality TV shares a particular idea of what reality is. The real in TV terms involves removal from 
society' (Clare Fox o f The Institute o f Ideas, speaking at The Eternal Frame conference, FACT 2003).
36 In The Political Unconscious (1981) Frederick Jameson writes that history is, "Not a text, not a narrative, master 
or otherwise, but that, as an absent cause, it is inaccessible to us accept in textual form, in that our approach to it 
and to the real itself necessarily passes through its prior textualization, its narrativization in the political 
unconscious. See also, Michel Foucault, Film and Popular Memory, in Johnston, 1977 (especially on the workers 
documentary film).
37 There is the example of the mother of the American soldier who asked George W. Bush to broadcast the image 
of her son's coffin arriving back on US soil. This request was declined.
38 The operatives had taken direct influence from Jerry Bruckheimer’s Black Hawk Down, with Bruckheimer 
himself acting as an advisor to the Pentagon primetime Reality TV series Profiles from  the front line.
39 In Pasolini's use o f free-indirect discourse, the utterances of the film are particular to the context and performed 
behaviour in the present tense of the film as it was made. Actors and non-actors cross between various diegetic and 
non-diegetic film environs, both realism and narrative affect are eschewed. See Pasolini. 1988: 175.
41 See Nichols 1985. Vol. I: 542-548.
42 In Teffet de reel (The Reality Effect, anthologized in The Rustle o f Language, Roland Barthes [1989]) Roland 
Barthes speaks of the way that superfluous detail and unrelated dialog can enhance the diegetic sense of realism in 
a narrative. Pasolini and Rossellini's use o f dialect in this way did serve to enhance the film's verisimilitude, 
confirming, as Jonathan Culler writes, the 'mimetic contract' and assuring the reader that he can interpret the text 
as about a real world,' (Saussure's Theory o f Language, in Jonathan Culler, Saussure Fontana, 1976).
43 Interestingly, Bakhtin is a 'cultural sleeper,' whose academic research surfaced many years after he was writing.
44 See, De Certeau 1984: 33.
46 AndrAs B&lint Kov&cs, paraphrased, speaking at Time@20, Deleuze conference, Harvard 2005.
47 2iiek, From Purification to Subtraction: Badiou and the Real, in Think Again, Alain Badiou and the future o f 
Philosophy, Ed. Peter Hallward. (2004)
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In Francis Bacon: the Logic o f Sensation (Deleuze 1981), Deleuze lists three modes of modem art in terms of 
their relation to, or rejection of, the representational. The first deals with pure geometric abstraction, where 
creativity is reduced to sterility, and the viewer is left without movement to think. The second mode of modem art 
practice is abstract expressionism, what Deleuze regards as a disorganized mess. The third (and here Deleuze finds 
Francis Bacon as the exemplar), is where the figural is ripped apart; where art is "the grin without a cat," (From 
Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland (year). The grin without a cat, is also the English translation of Chris 
Marker's Lefond de Vair est rouge, 1977), an encounter with the limit o f possibility.
50 Peter Hallward paper, On Deleuze and the philosophy o f Creation (Institut Francais, Petite Salle, May 25 2006)
53 Many of these concepts Deleuze develops from Bergson's Creative Evolution. The mind first and foremost 
wants to manipulate all matter in terms of the limit o f its possibility. Impossible images come from the possible, 
however. An intellect orders and makes intelligible the chaos of the lived world, manipulating form in terms of 
productivity and function. An instinct reacts to the lived world in terms of the essential: avoiding danger, for 
example. For Bergson, all things in the world are images, but artists actualize these images, using intuition - the 
thing that becomes available to human consciousness when it does not require the totality of intellect and instinct 
in tandem. Intuition is the propensity for the human mind to reorganize duration without desired outcome and to 
manipulate form, either physically or mentally, merely because it can. Intuition resides in the gap between the 
familiar and the unfamiliar, the interior and exterior o f our experience. In Deleuze's view, the artist actualizes this 
gap as an image. The filmmaker, for example, works with affects, because what he or she records is not entirely 
gestured by their own hand; something of the image (if it is not computer generated) is uttered independently of 
die author, in the flow of time before the lens. This is Pasolini's argument when he says that the filmmaker writes 
the real with the real.
54 D.N. Rodowick, from a lecture given at the Photographers Gallery London, 2003.
55 The finite and the infinite are the same in Deleuze's philosophy, which is therefore not a platonic idea of art as 
the imperfect copy. A work of art is not a copy o f the real, it is as real as the thing, and so, for Deleuze, the cinema 
does not represent the real, it is as real as the real. The work of art represents difference (differences within reality 
and between 'realities') not similarity. There is no original thing. The only original thing is the small difference in 
repetition. The work o f art is identical with chaos.
56 Adrian Miles, Technologies o f Memory, quoted by B.C. Holmes in, The Deleuzian Memory o f Sans Soleil. 
http://www.bcholmes.org/film/sansoliel.html. Updated May 2000.
57 Rodowick writes that 'This is a historical image that invents a future by creatively transforming occluded 
elements of the past' (Rodowick 1997: 153).
58 Chris Marker is himself missing in the sense that photographs of the filmmaker are extremely rare. Marker is 
renowned for his secrecy and for inventing mythologies about his history, identity and practice.
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59 This is in fact the aim of phenomenology, to address the irreducible 'thickness' of human experience.
60 This idea of a vertical cinema also related to the Saussure's distinction between a structural linguistics that was 
diachronic and one that was synchronic. Saussure believed that the etymology of a word does not affect its current 
meaning, and argued for a linguistics that was synchronic, or "with time," describing language in terms of how it 
worked in everyday life. However, Saussure stated that the object of this linguistics must be language as an 
underlying symbolic system (langue) and not speech (parole), which was merely surface utterance.
62 Adorno, Minimia Moralia: Reflections from  Damaged Life, quoted in Change Mummified: Cinema, Historicity, 
Theory, Philip Rosen 2001: 147.
64 Visit, www.youtube.com.
66 Alain Badiou writes that, 'Artistic activity can only be discerned in a film as a process of purification o f its own 
immanent non-artistic character [...] the cinema is a place of intrinsic indiscemibility between art and non-art. No 
film, strictly speaking, is controlled by artistic thinking from beginning to end - it always bears absolutely impure 
elements within it, drawn from ambient imagery, from the detritus of other arts, and from conventions with a 
limited shelf life' (Badiou 2004. 111).
67 Bazin once famously claimed that the cinema had not yet been invented. Peter Greenaway has recently reiterated 
this, and the recent book Future Cinema, The Cinematic Imaginary After Film  (Ed. Jeffrey Shaw and Peter Weibel 
2003) offers speculation about a future cinema which incorporates new electronic media. This hybrid cinema 
melds montage, traditional cinema, experimental literature, television, video, and the net. Such a new cinematic 
form suggests that traditional cinema no longer has the capacity to represent events that are themselves complex 
configurations of experience, interpretation, and interaction.
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As for The Film, yes, I absolutely wanted to take some of the reflexive and self- 
referential ideas from O f Camera and apply them to an actuality. I said to Roy and Arran 
that I wanted to drape film over the town like a veil. Together we lived that film and 
everything we did was about that film. Of course, our stomachs rumbled when hungry 
and the trees still swayed in the wind, just as they would if that veil wasn't there, but I 
think as far as our perception and ideation goes, we were at times seeing that swaying and 
feeling that rumbling within the frame which we called The Film. I'm trying to use film 
as a way of pointing to the lived, without describing it. I want to see what it is like to live 
filmmaking. This is perhaps an abstract concept, but I discussed with Roy how 
filmmaking might be comparable to his walking - another way of confronting the real 
without showing it or telling it.
(Steven Eastwood, from an email sent to filmmaker Alan Rhodes)
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Act 2, Sc 8. A film tactic for the emergence of a missing people
How can we speak of inventing a people, or enabling the creative becoming of a people 
not-yet-here, without running into the same problems of defining a teleologically rooted 
collective subject? In his two Cinema books, Deleuze resists any temptation to propose a cine 
practice by which a people might group themselves, his objective being, rather, to speak to the 
cinematographic apparatus as a virtual capable of engendering new thought. For Deleuze, it is the 
possibility for new and creative thought that will lead to the formation of a 'people.' But it is 
perhaps an oversight on Deleuze's part that he concentrates on what has been written, what has 
been painted, what has been filmed, rather than on the present situation of writing, of painting, of 
filmmaking. His concept for the emergence of a missing people finds illustration in the less 
intense entity of the completed film, precisely that which Deleuze, when speaking of the art 
object, says is left when the rhizome has reduced in momentum.
In fact, very little film theory or philosophy of any kind gives analysis to the situation of 
filmmaking, and yet this would seem to be a fertile space for the becoming of a people, precisely 
because the representation (if that is the intention of the film) is still half-formed. The potency of 
a concept as event (its expression as action) is strangest during its midpoint, between idea and 
conclusion: not what we desire for our film then, but how we desire in our filmmaking. The shoot 
and the edit are the rhizome in every live-action film production, where the originating idea and 
the final screened outcome are deemphasized. What kind of a tactic for filmmaking could 
produce a rhizome cine practice, one that committed my thoughts and my body to the not-yet of a 
film in process and allowed for parole utterances? Clearly, a tactic which was temporary in 
application, one which, to use Michel De Certeau's term, rented space in the place o f the other, 
(De Certeau 1984) which in this sense is the dominant order of the documentary or the fiction 
film; a minor cinema therefore, speaking in the voice of the other that has attempted to represent 
a people. This tactic would be accidental, adrift, contingent.
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And so I sought out a residency in an unfamiliar place, spending May 2004 in the town of 
Bridport on the south coast o f England. It was there and during this period that The Film (2004) 
was recorded. With hindsight, The Film is in many ways a response to, or more accurately a 
reaction to O f Camera. O f Camera depicted, through fiction, the situation of becoming the film 
itself: a woman discovers her own mediation on videotape, and encounters her estranged partner's 
degrading celluloid. The Film presents a factual experience of mediation. It is only this 
experience - of filmmaking - that is in any way represented. It follows the emergent process of 
embodying the event of filmmaking as a drift, in which a small group of people who were 
recently strangers called a film into their minds as they wandered and recorded. We walked our 
way to the film that was in front of us, through disused cinemas, across hilltops and along 
beaches, via allotments, into a camera shop and out of the town. The moving image was an 
imagined veil directed towards the actual in order to inventively encounter and make alterations 
to its emergent and contingent properties.
As a means to head nowhere with this potential film I adopted the Situationist tactic of 
the derive, which is the direct action of wandering without purpose or goal.1 De Certeau says that 
those who drift in this manner, 'trace indeterminate trajectories that are apparently meaningless, 
since they do not cohere with the constructed, written, and pre-fabricated space through which 
they move' (de Certeau 1984: 34). The derive provides a method for reclaiming place as space, 
and reclaiming time as not delineated in terms of the duality of work or leisure. It is typically a 
means to differently encounter an urban space, but this drift would be a wandering off from both 
a township (Bridport) and an established way of filmmaking. To walk purposelessly is to lack a 
place, to be absent. Most walks are in search of a proper, commonly either a destination, or the 
proper that is the consumption of leisure time as perambulation.2
Drawing upon the tactic of the derive in this text, I am going to approach the 'telling' of 
this film and its successor, The Film We Didn't Make (2006), in a discontinuous form, rather than
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observing a teleology of events or an historical unfolding. This is how the films were made, by 
creating tears in the fabric of documentary and fissures in the ordering of cinematic exposition. 
So, in the place of describing the content of the films I will try to make a space where we might 
regard the various procedural, spatial and temporal attributes of each.
This nowhere gives a tactic mobility, to be sine, but a mobility that must accept the 
chance offerings of the moment, and seize on the wing the possibilities that offer 
themselves at any given moment.
 ______   (De Certeau 1984: 37)
My intention in Bridport was not to make a film about a person or a place and I had no 
desire to find a subject matter, or even to complete a film. Instead I sought to collaborate with 
somebody who would enter into what I would later term a “lived film,” a film realized in a 
manner entirely alien to me, and as far from the rigid production schema of O f Camera as 
possible. The first step was to be unlike or other than myself. Arriving as a stranger, I spent the 
month drifting, wandering the environs of the town without plan or direction, looking for 
strangers, hoping to find collaborators through unofficial and non-institutional means and to make 
a film with them. The drift tactic would ensure that schematic production could not take place, in 
that, when wandering, the very absence of delimitation creates the conditions necessary for 
emergence.3 1 frequented cafes, pubs and the town square; marking gaffer taped T  positions for 
people to potentially hit, leaving a film clapperboard face up on the pavement with the word 
“Real” written on it. This was what I termed cinema busking, an inversion of street casting, in 
that I was purposefully casting out, with no opinion about whom I would find. I considered 
introducing inactive film apparatus into these social situations - lights, cables, tripods - in the way 
that I had done in the Cinema into the Real tests,4 but opted to replace this with a more passive 
form of intervention and coercion.5 Rather than directing people to hit a mark and stand beneath 
a bright film light as a tram or bus arrived, I was now making a mark and waiting to see if my 
collaborator would simply arrive on it.
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This attempt to occupy an emergent film process, one that involves others, brings about a 
direct encounter with the assumptions any person makes about the nature and outcome of the 
filmmaking process, and, although I had no plan, I wanted to discover what assumptions the 
presence of a filmmaker in the town would produce. Just what kind of an interpretive community 
was Bridport? Some people, depending upon their motivations and their prior knowledge, are 
willing to have their image enter the idiom of media (television, cinema, or art). Others are 
suspicious of how the agency of the filmmaker may manipulate their social everyday into a 
cultural product that misrepresents them. These assumptions are not without bias, the default 
assumption being that any film, whether a fiction or documentary, will have as its objective 
narrative representation, and may therefore result in misrepresentation. Reactions varied 
considerably; over time reluctant parties revealed their vested interest in being represented, whilst 
others became perturbed.6 A documentary maker has special privileges when first reporting a 
story or investigating within a locality. Documentary maker Nick Broomfield has over a number 
of years carefully developed a seemingly clueless but doggedly persistent persona, Nick 
Broomfield, which he uses to gain entry to all manner of private situations. The novelty of a 
mediating presence such as this temporarily opens doors, but there is a limited duration to this 
key to the town. When a person becomes known and therefore familiar, a different set of attitudes 
can emerge; prejudices and privacies often replace openness.7 Certainly, the relationship between 
a filmmaker and their subject is an extremely complex and often conflicting one. When co- 
mingling fictional and actual elements, and using social non-actors who are effectively 'playing 
themselves,' this relationship, under the name of solidarity, can throw up as many problems as 
more schematic representational approaches. I often thought of my process in Bridport as like a 
dating game: would like to meet people who will make a film  with me.8 1 followed-up on every 
name, place or organization mentioned to me in passing. Spending evenings by myself in public 
houses I became aware of the complex and organic nature of social groups. To be by oneself is a 
destabilizing force, in that members of various social groups take note of a solitary person and 
feel either affronted by them or responsible for them. I tried to take a seat at group tables or on 
the periphery of a group. I used my notebook as a legitimizing object - writing as an activity gave
me reason to be by myself; it constituted 'company'.9 However, making entries in my notebook 
led certain people to believe that I was reporting on their behaviour. “What are you writing 
about?” one woman asked probingly, the tone of her question emblematic of how many would 
perceive my intentions.
a film is coming
when the film comes we will not be in the span of this
space, of the film's becoming
drama is about responding to the script
documentary is about responding to the lived world
i am responding to the life that is the film
the film becomes a life, but not this life
I brought to Bridport an association of a proper practice that is the culture of the cinema 
and factual television, with its microbe-like operations (De Certeau10). By creating anticipation
for a film that may or may not at some point in the future be produced, The Film rented space in 
the place of the documentary. I appropriated the documentary-in-production as an attitude and as 
an idea in the minds o f  those in and around the production, writing over the documentary by 
regarding filmmaking as ecriture (Derrida11). The rental of space within the place of the other 
outlines a resistant mode for the innovative use of everyday life, but this rental is necessarily 
temporary. From this limited duration the practitioner can occupy novel forms of conduct, so long 
as they do not try to ensure any permanence or longevity. In the introduction to his book, De 
Certeau describes those who occupy space in this way as the 'non-producers' of culture. The
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actions of these non-producers are unsigned, unreadable, and un-symbolized, because they occur 
outside the legitimization of a place. In order to be a practitioner of the space of filmmaking I 
resisted any compulsion towards a resolved outcome in terms of a cultural product.
De Certeau proposes that we shift emphasis from the cult of personality, of personal 
development and productivity, onto the directness of our engagement with the lived world. He 
calls for action rather than introspection, activity rather than psychoanalytical self-transformation. 
In order to generate the not previously thought, in order to emerge as a people, it is necessary to 
get outside of the symbolic and to bend flight-lines around such institutional hegemonic forces as 
the expositional documentary, with its over determined templates and its endless recapitulations 
before and after every commercial break. De Certeau differentiates a tactic from the strategies of 
institutions, making the point that a strategy is always in relation to a proper entity or power base. 
Strategy occurs in space, but tactics take place in time (de Certeau 1984: xix). Political, economic 
and scientific rationality has been constructed on this model, what de Certeau qualifies as the 
'proper,' or the mastery of time through the foundation of a spatial and institutional localization, 
for example: a building, or a television broadcast.12
Classical cinema is essentially a strategy that operates from the place and economic order 
of the studio system, and from a language system of sense making. The very strategy of its telling 
is Cartesian, where will and power operates from the base of a place which is the 'industry' and 
the dissemination of its habitual articulations, the movement-image.13 Of course, resistance is 
inextricably coupled to power. If classical cinema is the 'proper,' then raising a hatchet to this 
obstruction runs the risk of reinforcing the geometry of its forms. A revolution that begins and 
then ends is a closed set; it has been recuperated from its line of flight back into the power 
structures and hierarchies it resists. Power transforms relations of insurgent forces into territories, 
while resistance enables their non-fixity. And so a revolution must remain open, and to remain 
open, actions that are resistant must be rethought as temporary, as minor occurrences that are 
constant in effort. In Rodowick's reading of Deleuze, the spirit of resistance is the stirring of
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intensity more willful and affirmative than that which we ordinarily live, and it is molecular, not 
molar in its formation.14 A revolutionary undertaking is therefore to denature everyday life as it 
has been prescribed, by 'experimentally altering the forms of its practice,' (Ben Highmore 2001: 
237). This is why Irigaray suggests articulating an improper language (in place of the masculine 
language), one whose ontology consists of multiplicities and which expresses fluidity rather than 
solidity.15 This improper language is not alternative or oppositional. It sidesteps recuperation by 
remaining open to the outside through the transformation of an external space flooded by 
subjectivity.
In the standard procedure of film production, a film's utterances are designated as not of 
worth, and therefore invisible. A radical eruption in the language of film practice finds 
illumination and productive agitation in the fluid activity of making do, for making do has no 
such codes for its conduct. The tactic of the film drift deploys the very vernacular of cinema 
against itself and into the lived world, where it is now improper, and it is here, in this non-place, 
that a missing people can congregate. This is a film situation that does not attempt to show or to 
tell, but rather to emerge with a people.16 The tactic makes of film an encounter with the actual, in 
which the nature of the encounter and the transformation of the subject determines on-screen 
content; it acts as a rudder that steers in the direction of a strange archipelago, where it is possible 
to become alien to one's origins, as filmmaker, and to a cultural history of cinema, and new to an 
other who is filming with you. This is what architectural theorist Markos Novak, in his paper 
'Speciation, Transvergence, Allogenesis: Notes on the production of the Alien' (Novak 2002), 
terms the state of being alloo, a distinctly Deleuzian and Nietzschean attitude that is, in essence, 
an annihilation of the past (Deleuze has written of the philosopher's task to become dead in order 
to make propositions about the lived17). But as a filmmaker, can one be without family, without 
history, and not determined by the past? Each filmmaker recapitulates, and as Deleuze observes, 
every film builds upon the legacy of cinema, every film sits within the manifold discourses and 
associations of the larger term, 'Cinema.' Each individual film operation is therefore bound up in 
intentions towards or away from the cinematic proper. Because of this patrimony, the filmmaker,
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just like the person or people she or he seeks represent, rarely owns their own words, and this is 
why it is vital that they continually form new utterances. Even a hermit, as Bakhtin offers, does 
not own his own words; the word always comes repeatedly, 'from the mouth of another, "always 
half someone else. It becomes one's own only when the speaker populates it with his own 
intention, his own accent, when he appropriates die word, adapting it to his own semantic and 
expressive intention' (Bakhtin, quoted in Robert Stam 1989: 189). This is the credo of the 
amateur cinema movement, to use existing cinematic tropes to make films about their everyday 
lives, without desiring to enter their filmed articulations into the canon of culture or into the 
market place. And this too is the philosophical principle of itinerant filmmaking - to treat the 
cinema as a means to drift and to see, rather than to arrive and declare, because within a film drift 
there are film accents. Not words, accents. And a drift is the space for the possibility of affect. 
Something surprising emerges which was not on the map. The task, then, is to temporarily open a 
space from where these accents and moments of affect can emerge, whilst not entirely denying 
the vernacular of the cinematic. What I mean by this is to find a plane for identity as a fluid 
filmmaker, so as to transform language and its operations (in this sense, the shared patrimony and 
vernacular of cinema) instead of abandoning language altogether: to treat the cinema as a 
blockage that enables film  to exist and to make this film  the temporary space in and through 
which a people can emerge. On a film drift, it is possible to become as though an other, and here 
some new characters and possibilities for identity emerge.
When watching The Film, the viewer is following a meander in which those who are 
ostensibly the subjects of the film give themselves over to the situation of filmmaking and 
become themselves filmmaker. This situation and the resultant emergence of difference (the 
filmmaker, the subject, a people emerging) becomes the film. Jean Rouch, commonly thought of 
as an ethnographic filmmaker, often actively sought out situations that were unpredictable in 
order for there to be a more palpable relationship between filmmaker and filmed, and so that he 
might, through improvisation, or even through failure, become other than whom he was and is 
when not filming. It was Rouch's goal that the film production brought about change in the lived
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world and the social situation of the protagonists. In some way, the film helps. As Erik Bamouw 
observes, 'the direct cinema documentarist took his camera to a situation of tension and waited 
hopefully for a crisis; the Rouch version of cinema verite tried to precipitate one. The direct 
cinema artist aspired to invisibility; the Rouch [sic] artist was often an avowed participant. The 
direct cinema artist played the role of uninvolved bystander; the [sic] artist espoused that of 
provocateur1 (Bamouw. 1974: 254-255). In Jaguar (Rouch 1954), the filmmaker acts as a social 
agent, the camera is a 'Living Camera'18 and the film itself is a theatre for a people. The fiction is 
derived from real elements, and thereby, as Gauthier comments, 'myth is introduced into reality' 
(Gauthier 1972: 198-9919). Grob writes that, 'In the image of his ''Maitres-fous", Rouch is a 
possessed filmmaker who gives birth to a veritable magic dance whose effect is to capture the 
moment of the real' (Grob 1962: 320). The carnival mode, however, inevitably becomes bound 
with representation. Ross McElwee maneuvers around this dilemma by making himself the 
subject of his film. Sherman’s March (McElwee 1986) sees the filmmaker divert from his own 
original historical documentary brief and concentrate instead on his life unfolding around the 
abortive project. In fact, the film documents most accurately the way in which McElwee's 
filmmaking evolves, notably in the way his camera becomes inseparable from his body, so much 
so that it creates both an entry point and a palpable barrier to a host of potential romantic partners. 
“I’m filming my life in order to have a life to film [...] My real life has fallen into the crack 
between myself and my film” (Ross McElwee, Sherman's March). McElwee's schema of desired 
outcome and meaning (a film about General Sherman) becomes destabilized and then lost, and 
his life emerges in its place as a film being made.
In this situation both filmmaker and subject enter into an altered relationship with the 
actual of the film being made. Abbas Kiarostami often deploys the tactic of being lost or 
searching, what Godfrey Cheshire calls 'the sense of a mythic quest theme shrewdly conjoined to 
a rugged social realism' (Cheshire 1996: 41). Kiarostami's so-called Koker Trilology (Where is 
the Friend's House? [1986], Life and Nothing More, a.k.a And Life Goes On [1992], Through the 
Olive Trees [1994]) begins with the simple story of a young boy searching for his friend's house
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in order to return a lost notebook. In the follow-up film, Kiarostami fictionalizes his own 
experience of returning to the village where he shot the first film, searching for his young cast 
having learned of an earthquake that has devastated the community. The third film is an account 
of the same director, still based on Kiarostami, directing the second film {And Life Goes O n\ now 
fictionally encountering a community in the aftermath of an earthquake's destruction (Through 
the Olive Trees). David Oubina writes of Kiarostami's Koker trilogy that 'Each film documents 
the one before, and in turn becomes the fictional motif for the next. In this extraordinary series of 
palimpsests, where each film overwrites its predecessor, Kiarostami moves constantly between 
the two poles of fiction and documentary: there is no clear distinction between the two registers, 
but rather a complex system of permutations' (Oubina 2001: 21). In these films, time and 
occurrence move freely between the actual and the cinematic; the event of the film being made 
(whether documentary or fiction), and the reenactment of actual situations the director facilitates, 
re-invents the everyday. Not only do non-actors play themselves, they also, by the event of the 
third film, play themselves playing themselves. Here, fact and tabulation interweave, and a 
people - the Koker villagers - participate in and in part author a new village and a new sense of 
themselves as villagers, by way of the loose framework of the film in production.
Agnes Varda's The Gleaners and I  (2000) sees the filmmaker rediscover the potency of 
the moving image, digitally and in the palm of her hand, conjuring as she records. She does not so 
much speak for an under-culture of gleaners who forage the land for the wealth of its detritus, as 
glean herself, in videotape and in time, spiritedly picking a path through urban and rural France 
using the camcorder flip-out screen. The gleaners are present, but they are not made sense of. It is 
their practice in their everyday lives that Varda acquires. Andrew KOtting’s film Gallivant (1996) 
is a free-play with the documentary form, a drift diary in which the filmmaker embarks on a road 
trip with Eden his daughter and Gladys his grandmother (who had not previously met). Eden, 
Gladys and Andrew are subjects encountering subjects, inquiring by way of the camera. Kdtting 
clearly feels some responsibility for their lack of relationship, and sets up an elaborate four-month 
journey along the coastline of England, Wales and Scotland in order that they spend concentrated
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time together. Their nomadic route is a shifting site for performing filmmaking, for a free-play of 
self as filmmaker and for the documentary travelogue reinvented as an imaginary plane. As a 
filmmaker, Kdtting’s film is his way of giving something to both Eden and Gladys, something 
that as a document will endure beyond both of their deaths (Gladys is ninety, and Eden has a rare 
condition called Joubert’s Syndrome, which is likely to reduce her life expectancy). Gallivant is 
also Kdtting’s opportunity to explore an aspect of the UK that fascinates him, that of the 
neglected small communities on the periphery of the island, where folklore spanning a dozen 
centuries is still observed, although slowly disappearing. The fact that the film has two stories and 
two subjects, firstly, that of a family of four generations traveling together in a camper van, and
t
secondly, an ethnographic examination of a strange and disappearing, semi-pagan England, helps 
propel the film narrative along but also enables the filmmaker and his crew to elicit particular 
responses from the subjects they meet, and from themselves as subjects. In short, each appears 
novel, accessible and not intrusive to the other. As mobile filmmakers, they create temporary 
license to encounter the other with difference, and to be other than themselves, and this in a way 
constitutes a people: those on the periphery of an island and the periphery of a cultural practice. 
Gladys and Eden are simultaneously users and makers. They are users in that their way of 
operating is nomadic, producing a nowhere of and from the margin or edge of the land.21
What we require, then, are certain temporary openings through which a people might 
imagine their own becoming. Drifts with more proliferating flight lines are needed. New, non- 
Euclidian maps are needed, what Hakim Bey, in The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological 
Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism (TAZ), calls 'psychotopographical 1:1 maps' which do not take 
possession of territory because they are virtually identical to the territory they depict (Bey 1985: 
101). These virtual maps are ideas that make of place a space. We can think of the classical 
cinema and documentary as maps that act as guided tours of a subject, tours consisting entirely of 
highlights and noteworthy destinations or monuments. They are organized routes that make of us 
sightseers. What cartographies and trajectories might we find in the gap between the say-able and
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the perceivable, i.e., between an image presented within a montage as factually informative and 
an image that is merely durational?
Bey's psycho-topographic map is the bodily drawing in time of the wandering nomadic
subject; it cannot function as a template for a trajectory. It is a map drawn as it is used then
discarded as useless once the drift has come to an end. This psychotopology is 'die art of dowsing
for potential temporary autonomous zones, where revolution remains closed but the possibility
for insurgency is open, and where the map too is open' (Bey 1985, ibid). Bey's proposal for
perpetual temporary uprisings is a way of countering the inevitable hegemonic recuperation of
revolution, where opposition is re-established or re-enforced as the same. This is akin to an anti-
oedipal permanent revolution in Deleuze and Guattari, who suggest a break from the confines of
oedipalization in order to release pre-personal possibilities. Cartographic filmmaking performs 
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the operation of the map as thick description of a land not navigable, but thinkable, where the 
map is a fold in thought. Such a tactic, what Deleuze and Guattari call nomadology, is the 
practice of writing over maps, so as to discover new and proliferating cartographies, rather than to 
continue with an orientation through Cartesian grids. Like the handkerchief looped through a bolt 
and tossed into the lush fields of the Zone in Tarkovsky's Stalker (1979), the nomad takes off on a 
line of flight, the means by which a molecular being might de-territorialize. This line is not the 
most direct line, which would in its productivity replicate the geometries of the boundary lines of 
a territory. Deleuze in fact often uses the image of a diagonal line that cuts through polarized 
regions and ignores the binary attitude of opposites.
Nomadology has as its inspiration Nietzsche, who regarded the nomad as an inhabitant of 
the desert, a place where there is no history, where there are no trails and no developments, where 
the borders between nature and culture and between reality and fantasy are lost; where there is no 
centre and therefore the possibility for continuous movement. Lorraine observes that Deleuze's 
nomadic subject, she or he who becomes-imperceptible 'can set a world of becoming into motion 
without succumbing to the fantasy of becoming everybody/everything, if she is careful to
214
acknowledge the blockages that enable her to exist' (Lorraine 1999: 190). Similarly, Novak's 
alien islands, or archipelagos, are not yet navigable, and in any case, it is not desirable to settle on 
a landmass, whether, in this case, it is the fiction film, the documentary, the cinematic essay, or 
the artist's moving image.22 It is preferable to move in between these continents, island hopping 
from actual to virtual and back again, becoming lost, forgetting how to make films in order to 
give birth to an alien filmmaker inside. This cinema uses artifice to invent spaces, it contravenes 
established lines, weaving and leaping, leading and misleading.
The physical space of the film before it has arrived, in other words the pre and pro-filmic 
space of its production, which includes the bodies of the cast and crew as filming is taking place, 
or is about to take place, and the geographic situation around this event. Werner Herzog 
advocates the sheer physical effort of film production, forcing his cast and crew through 
impenetrable jungle and on arduous journeys into desert wastes, on purposefully foolhardy 
projects whose objects are nearly always unattainable.23 The impossible task of the endeavour to 
film creates sweat, exhaustion and trauma, and this forms the dominant attributes of the finished 
film. In Francis Ford Coppola's Apocalypse Now (1979) actor Martin Sheen has a breakdown on 
camera (and a subsequent heart attack) but the director continues rolling, and propels the entire 
production to near collapse. Breakdowns, broken limbs, sickness, exhaustion, near death and 
death, connote a particularly masculine approach, where filmmaking must be a feat. Whether 
testosterone fuelled Herculean attitude or fluid exploration of shooting film, this space is the 
complex and determined body where a film is being made, or from where, at least, we may 
imagine a film will be made.
We are heading towards a definition for this film tactic, although it is important to resist 
its fixity. Let us call it film, which is neither the maintenance of an order and unity as exemplified 
by Hollywood, nor the “eviction” of narrative as argued over by the structural-materialist 
filmmakers in and around the two film co-ops (London [LFC] and New York of the 1960s and 
1970s.y?/m is the mental and behavioural negotiation of the lived world and the not-lived world
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of the film we imagine to come. But more than this, it is the encounter of a blurring between these 
distinctions, the oneiric and crystalline mental negotiation of past-text, present-text and possible- 
text. film  is one means by which the lived world can be (re)-envisioned outside of habitual 
regimes of meaning - the application of a moving image poetry as a becoming. This tactic is a 
'calculated action determined by the absence of a proper focus' (De Certeau 1985: 36-37); it 
cannot count on a proper or schema, 'nor thus on a borderline distinguishing the other as a visible 
totality' (de Certeau, ibid). To film  in this way is to be with friends and with strangers, and to use 
the world-like representational apparatus of the camera in the lived world, the boundaries of 
which are temporarily dissolved by the filmmaking act. The film tactic makes of the people 
filmmakers, who go out into the lived world with the exuberant task of denaturing its properties, 
choosing to choose to make films from the itinerant place of the film's very difference to the 
world, and to the way we live and think in it. These are nomadic filmmakers, who occupy 
thoughts given by the body of an emergent filmmaking process. This tactic is an art of becoming 
lost in a film operation between production and exhibition, between intention and chaos, between 
a film thought and an act of filmmaking. The film itself, even if it is finished, remains, 
paradoxically, an open-set, because the most accurate definition of the tactic is that the film is 
perpetually in front of whomever is filming. In and around Bridport, film  is the frame we placed 
over the real and we called it The Film, a frame that has no pre-filmic space because the film is 
always and everywhere; we simply set its duration. The Film is an attempt to film in the everyday 
space of a missing people rather than from the place of those representing a people.
The Film (2004)
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11n Situationist theory (e.g., Guy Debord 1961), the everyday as a category has traditionally been the marginal zone of 
the working class, and a context regarded as culturally empty by the educated classes. As is noted in de Certeau (1984) 
and the writings and propositions of the (SI), it is notoriously difficult to speak of or theorize these everyday tactics 
without their entering the ranks of the other that this practice critiques. It is even problematic to document the events 
emerging from such a tactic, without drawing attention to them (and therefore rendering them as spectacle) and forcing 
them to take on the value of art object or commodity. Moreover, it is difficult to practice these tactics with intention or 
with desired outcome. Debord regarded the moving image as having to be reclaimed by users of the everyday, in 
counter to the cinema as spectacle. This spectacle -  Hollywood, and its derivatives - created a mode of double 
production: the produced film text and the production of a mode of consumption within the viewer.
2 De Certeau's argument is that the proper belongs to the city, where every point is a destination, which is precisely 
why the Situationist derive is essentially an urban practice, where its impropemess has greatest potency.
31 make a connection between this tactic of derive and Deleuze's philosophy in that drifting, in the new wave ballad or 
voyage form, is regarded as prompting a loosening of the sensory-motor link, giving rise to pure optical and sound 
situations that are not anchored by the momentum of characters caught up in the advancing story. Deleuze (1989: 9) 
equates the French New wave with flaneury, with their strolls and unconcerned events. German cinema of the 1970s 
presented existential drifts, in Wenders’ Kings o f the Road (1976), and cinema as a physical thrust in the direction of 
the impossible, in Herzog’s Aguirre, The Wrath o f God (1973). However, these perambulations are more schematic 
than the tactic I am proposing.
4 See Cinema into the R eal' Act One Sc 6, Bleed - some unknown bodies without organs.
5 Simon Poulter of PVA commented 'You have an acute intervention into process, a kind of'new slackness!'
6 Several willing participants withdrew from filming having come to a conclusion that their image and identity were 
going to be mocked in some way, or moreover, fearing that the film might bring unwanted attention to private areas of 
their lives and the lives of their friends. A consistent problem I encountered was negotiating how much to explain of 
my process and intentions. Should I say that I wanted this film to head nowhere and be without content? Does 
explaining constitute framing, or positioning and create a hierarchy between the people I meet and myself?
7 In the period of drifting which led up to the shoot I had met several people willing to work as crew on the production. 
Carlos Guarita, a political and ethnographic stills photographer, originally from Portugal but now a resident in Bridport, 
took an interest in the project and agreed to operate camera. He had a particular fascination with the disappearing 
folklore of the region, and I identified that this approach to filmmaking would provide a challenging counter to my 
own. Carlos had never shot 16mm before, and this was also of use to me. He would ask where the camera should be 
positioned and I would answer that it did not matter. It was a point of concept to arrive at committing to recording an
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image by accident. Werner Herzog once asked a friend and fellow climber, who had never worked in cinema, to shoot a 
feature film for him: Woyzeck (Herzog 1979).
8 This could have been an elaborate performance, based around the cult of personality of a filmmaker, mid-endeavour, 
who is nothing more than a cipher, a player of people and of moments, who befriends, seeks confidants and uses the 
charm and leverage of the outsider. I did meet a large number of people: Linda and Mutter, Cressida, Nikki, Hunky and 
Jim, Martin and Jules, Humphrey, Trisha, Jake, Carlos, Jess, The Town Cleric, Ian, Peter, Margery, Andy Head, Joan in 
the Square, Bernard Gale, Rachel and John, Roy and Arrun, Doug, Carlos and Jess.
9 In fact, the company I kept was the idea of the film I would make, and often a filmmaker can treat the camera as 
company, as legitimizing object. She or he is not glaringly alone because they have a camera with them. This is the 
case in Agnes Varda's The Gleaners and I  (2000), in Jonathon Caouette's Tarnation (2003), and for Timothy 
Treadwell, the subject of Werner Herzog's Grizzly Man (2005).
10 De Certeau declares that, the goal is to perceive and analyze the microbe-like operations proliferating within 
technocratic structures and deflecting their functioning by means of a multitude o f ‘tactics” articulated in the details of 
everyday life' (De Certeau 1984: xiv).
11 This tactic not only involves drifting, but also detoumement, another methodology of die Situationist International, 
more simply understood as sampling.
12 De Certeau (1984: 117) makes a distinction between space (espace) and place (lieu). A place is an actual geography 
and an indication of stability. Space occurs as the effect produced by the operations that orient it, situate it, temporalize 
it. The reading of space becomes simultaneously the re-writing of space: 'their trajectories form unforeseeable 
sentences, partly unreadable paths across space [...] the trajectories trace out the ruses of other interests and desires that
are neither determined nor captured by the systems in which they develop' (De Certeau 1984: xviii).
13 Classical cinema qualifies the moving image as an operation, because it adds something to pre-existing codes 
(primarily those of narrative, in the sense of the theatre or the novel, neither of which have much in common with the 
temporality of the unedited or edited moving image). De Certeau differentiates operations from actions of immediacy; 
one is productive, the other resists entry into power relations of productivity. A cinema of immediacy does not 
recognize the market place nor does it attempt to gain a position in it.
14 This is where Deleuze is distinctly anti-Hegelian. It is out of the self-oiganizing activities of the molecular politics of 
difference that the possibilities of majoritarian politics for a mass movement can arise. The concept of permanent 
revolution runs through Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, which is counter hegemonic and against monadism.
15 Lorraine writes that, 'If we were to examine the properties of fluids, she argues, we would discover that as a physical 
reality, fluids resists adequate symbolization and serve as a constant reminder of the powerlessness of the logic of 
solids to represent all of natures characteristics' (Tamsin Lorraine, Deleuze and Irigaray Experiments in Visceral 
Philosophy: 63). See also, Irigaray, The Mechanics o f Fluids, in This Sex which is Not One [1977] 1985 :212.
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16Although, when completed, the film tactic often returns to the order of the place of theatrical presentation.
17 Novak wntes that While convergence and divergence are simple linear extrapolations that proceed by strategies of 
alignment, transvergence advances translinearly, by tactics of derailment [...] transvergence recognises true statements 
to be islands in an alien archipelago, sometimes only accessible by leaps, flights, and voyages on vessels of artifice'
(Novak 2002).
18 Jean Rouch, quoted in Eaton (ed.) Anthropology-Reality-Cinema: 51.
19 Gauthier (1972,198-99), quoted in Paul Stoller, The Cinematic Griot. 1992: 138.
20 Grob (1962,3) quoted in Paul Stoller, The Cinematic Griot. 1992: 152.
21 In one scene, we see in close-up the filmmaker’s grandmother Gladys and daughter Eden in a rowing boat, with 
voice just off camera from the filmmaker. The sequence then cuts to a long shot of the same boat some fifty or more 
feet from the shoreline, but with no camera operator on board. The camera has moved to another vantage point, 
stopping and starting the actions of the on-screen social actors in order to realize an aesthetic. The documentary maker 
is just as likely to use these devices as the fiction filmmaker, both of whom make claims to realism from different 
vantage points.
22 Although, given the landmasses of contemporary culture, this would be vocationally sensible. Certainly, the way that 
culture and commerce operate, it is often advisable to gain recognition for one practice rather than shift as a point of 
principle between practices. Work of innovation tends to ignore delimitation by categoiy, although it may not be so 
widely culturally visible.
23 Herzog has proposed a film school where applicants would first have to walk 3,000 miles in order to prove they 
possessed sufficient physical strength and mental determination to be accepted as students.
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Some characters, caught in certain pure optical and sound situations, find themselves 
condemned to wander about or go off on a trip. These are pure seers, who no longer exist 
except in the interval of movement, and do not even have the consolation of the sublime, 
which would connect them to matter or would gain control of the spirit for them. They 
are rather given over to something intolerable which is simply their everydayness itself. It 
is here that the reversal is produced: movement is no longer simply aberrant; aberration is 
now valid in itself and designates time as its direct cause. Time is out of joint': it is off 
the hinges assigned to it by behaviour in the world, but also by movements of the world. 
It is no longer time that depends on movement; it is aberrant movement that depends on 
time....
______________________________ (Deleuze 1989: 41)
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Act 2 , Sc 9. The Film is in front of us - The moving image as enunciation
The film did become our life basically. Tomorrow will be the final day and for those five 
days, to a large extent, the film was my life. It's like, on Wednesday night my life stopped 
- my normal life - and on Thursday morning, and for the period of those five days, my 
life completely changed. And on Tuesday or Monday night it will revert again.
(Amin Denman, The Film)
In The Film we are performing filmmaking as we film-make; we are exceeding the actual 
as we attempt to double it in a mediated representation. In this film everyday we are poets of our 
own affairs, tracing indeterminate trajectories through a place made virtual, a Bridport both 
imagined and actual, desired, searched for, but not attained. Our line of flight was deliberately 
absurd: to chase the pre-filmic with the pro-filmic (a contradiction in terms), directing our camera 
always towards the pre-filmic, the not possible to see - pointing ourselves towards that which was 
not useful and finding there any-spaces-whatever and shots that were gestural rather syntactic. 
This is a film constructed by an unforced gaze, where drifting helped reinstate the speech-act of 
the moving image in the pro-filmic.
Over the course of the month, the only subject matter I could approach with any 
conviction was the actuality of making the film, and so I asked whomever I met, and the crew I 
had assembled from my chance encounters in the town,1 to enter into a micro-operation with me, 
what I described as film ing our way to a film  (a life). A film becomes what Deleuze describes as a 
life (Deleuze 2001) if those who are filmmaking allow the film to be temporarily the process 
through which they live their life, when together we work towards impossibilities and apply 
fabrications, when we make of the context, and our selves, an unattainable text. At the end of a 
day of shooting, precisely because I have been filming all day, near to everything enters my 
perception as a potential shot. When in production we are in a different experience. The 
filmmaker is seeing things through the film and in terms of the film: the becoming of time and 
light, of sequence and duration, of cuts, match-cuts, transitions, expositions, placed over or 
implicated within social interaction and social space. A person standing in a doorway becomes,
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not as I see them, but as the film ’sees'. The film as event becomes concurrent with the un-filmed 
everyday, a difference within it, an aspect of thought as additional prehension; a mode of being 
prior to the meaning of its object. When a film is a life, it is the looking for the film, or the 
heading towards the film (which is in front of us) that becomes the determining content of the 
film itself. If The Film is about anything it is about this space of thought, of thinking of the film 
we are making - the interrelation of virtual and actual images in the mind and in film which take 
place around the event of shooting and editing, the inner speech of the film as it sees and it 
thinks, as a cluster of vagaries, a non-chronological series of variously motivated utterances. In 
the process of the shoot, this translated into a play between the pro-filmic and pre-filmic space, 
and this carried over to the intuitive attitude I would adopt towards the post-production, which in 
essence was to think a drifting pillow book edit.
Although I met dozens of people during my drift, including the Mayor of Bridport,2 few 
were willing or able to engage with the project to a point where we were making the film 
together. A number of people who took an interest in the process withdrew, or failed to answer 
any communication, or were overlooked. The lack of intention I had to depict the people of the 
town or to describe Bridport as a place meant that the project came close to being a series of 
unpopulated durations in an empty town square, like the final sequence in Antonioni's L'Eclisse 
(1962) where the characters we had grown accustomed to seeing are removed from the frame, 
and all that is left are the vacant locations we had previously seen them meet in.
The first person who I found myself spending significant time with was a man named 
Hunky. Hunky and his friend Jim were struck by my vulnerable attempt to find people and make 
a film. They took me for a drive to show me what they thought of as cinematic locations. I began 
to shoot video intermittently, and without aim. Hunky is asthmatic and I filmed infrequently, but 
although shy, Hunky began to share especially personal information with me, somehow 
inexorably drawn out by the camera. I began to envision a film involving Hunky surrounded by 
film lights and not saying very much, and perhaps this was already too clear an expectation.
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Hunky's asthma worsened and I became concerned for his health. I wondered how I could 
manage the trust he had shown me, and how I could develop a project that bypassed the 
information he had given me. Would he expect me to represent him? It was at this point that I 
realized two things: firstly, that I had found a plentiful subject and secondly, that I had no 
intention of making the film of this subject. Hunky and I were gradually becoming friends but I 
was certain that I didn't want the film to be about Hunky. The concern I was feeling for his health 
was directly linked to my shifting attitude to him as a subject. If this form of cinema was a means 
to live differently, then surely my new life involved an emerging friendship with Hunky. None of 
his friends seemed concerned, so I took it upon myself to become involved in his well being. In 
doing so I inadvertently re-cast myself in the role of the persistent reporter, the hounding 
documentary maker chasing his story - the ethnographer seeking to do good.
An article about the project appeared in the local newspaper, and from this point Hunky 
stopped returning my calls. Everybody in Bridport reads this paper, and I found people stopping 
me in the street, asking me how the film was going. This was great publicity for a project that 
may well have been better off without any. The press legitimizes, makes public what might have 
benefited from remaining private. On my last visit to Hunky's house I caught sight of him 
sneaking out through the back stairway. I believe that he and his friends had become suspicious 
of what they saw to be the point-of-view of a salacious news media. Perhaps they feared I wanted 
to make a caricatured reality TV programme about them (Hunky's friend Jim later said something 
to this effect). I was initially afforded the special privileges of a stranger (for a few days I literally 
felt like a local in the Hope & Anchor pub) but then, with the publishing of the news article, I 
became regarded as institutional, a legitimized member of the media. Doors that had opened now 
closed.
After a long chain of associations and chance encounters, I met Roy White and Arran 
Denman, both of whom treat hill and coastal walking as a form of meditation, and who for five 
days willingly allowed their lives to be taken up with very little else but the film.3 It transpired
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that Roy White had something of a reputation in the town as a sage, a flaneur and a former bon 
viveur who preferred to wander the hills and coastline rather than hold down a job or frequent the 
local pubs. Roy had elements of his own he wanted to bring to the film, including his walking 
companion Amin.4 Both recognized in the open-set attitude of the project sensibilities 
comparable to their own form of “becoming,” which is landscape walking. In their desire to 
absent themselves from routine social situations and from habitual or stuck mental activity (what 
Roy describes in The Film as 'role playing' and 'the lumpy gravy'), Roy and Arran walk daily 
through repeated landscape sequences, to enable an altered interiority, a practice akin to what De 
Certeau refers to as 'The long poem of walking' (De Certeau 1985: 98-1015). Roy explained at 
one point that he walks to get away from the enemy, thought.6 Much of the filmmaking was 
conducted on or around a walk, but what walking is like for Roy and Arran is never expressed or 
described. The psychogeographical landscape that we see on the screen resists being a scenic 
tour. It is not a backdrop to human agency and neither is it a romanticized nor an uninhabited 
space. Roy and Arran presented me with two acute presences. Roy could not fail to be 
charismatic on camera whereas Arran had a deflective manner and was noticeably awkward on 
and around the lens, as though partially withdrawn from the situation.71 resisted developing ideas 
based upon Roy's rich character, and also the temptation to draw Arran's character out. There are 
no titles in The Film , none of the subjects are named using the standard of a strap line at the 
bottom of a frame, and the three subjects who were unable to participate (Hunky, Jake Dodds and 
Bernard Gale8) appear only as fragments of another possible film. Roy and Arran are not 
described in the film in such a way that they could be understood as fully rounded historical 
subjects. Rather than exploring characters, we instead set off in search of the unknown body in 
the documentary, which is between an actual thinking body (our bodies), a film body, and the 
lived world. We turned our minds and our backs on the determining and pervasive strategy of the 
institution of documentary representation. In its place, we called the film into our minds as we 
made the film, continually directing ourselves towards film as an enunciation, rather than as an 
announced, towards the 'I sing' underlying every filmed scene, the here and now of the film in the 
making. We placed a film (i.e., the cultural product we have in our minds and hope to see on a
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screen one day) ahead of us. We saw the film on the horizon and headed towards it, mapping 
those thoughts onto the actual site of where those film activities were imagined taking place.
1200 feet of 16mm film was shot, and around fifteen hours of digital videotape. The 
camera was on loan from PVA, the local digital media resource, and much of the film we exposed 
was out of date stock found in a refrigerator in Doug Palmer’s camera shop. The film literally 
emerged from the people, places and apparatus of the town. We walked and filmed our way 
through the disused Palace cinema and the local ballroom school, across hilltops and along 
beaches, via allotments and gardens, into the camera shop and out of the town, the moving image 
our imagined veil directed towards the actual in order that we might inventively alter its emergent 
and contingent properties. Dolly and track was laid without clear function. At times the 16mm 
camera was badly loaded, fogging areas of the film. It was unclear when recording had begun and 
ended. The surplus materials that surfaced and the errors that ensued helped form what might be 
described as a peculiar kind of structural-materialist documentary, or, more accurately, a game of 
film orienteering without clues or goals. There was no rationale for shooting The Film; there were 
no rules governing what we recorded because the film had no defined subject, content, or brief, 
and therefore there was no way of ascertaining what would be useful in terms of compiling a film 
that would be seen at some point in the future.
The term usefulness is of interest here, particularly in terms of the itinerant and 
accidental tactical attitude adopted, and how it fundamentally alters what is perceived as valuable 
and of use by those who are filmmaking. The classical documentary maker, unlike the filmmaker 
who drifts, must be continually mindful in the present of what she or he needs to record and 
always receptive to what is necessary for the construction of the intended whole (which is the 
imagined future of the completed film). The cinema is produced, consumed and measured in 
terms of what is useful, what is discernible, what is necessary and what is marketable, or as De 
Certeau writes, on the basis of, 'what is used, not the ways of making' (De Certeau 1984: 35). 
Although often thousands of feet of film remain unused by the point of the finished film, images
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are rarely recorded without purpose or on the basis of not being useful. Seldom are there idle 
images. As Elisabeth Grosz elaborates,
The useful is always subservient to the requirements of the present: it lacks any element 
of the untimely. The useful, the utilitarian, the adapted is always that which exploits 
external circumstance, the given, but which cannot make the given anew, cannot make 
itself something other. The useful performs only in light of the actual, the real, the 
present, but it has no aspiration to the untapped, die unknown, the new that attracts and 
elevates life [...] In other words, the useful can only be understood in terms of the 
privilege of the present and the known. The useful is what is at hand, available for use 
now. Nietzsche himself, though, is concerned with a different - deranged - sense of 
usefulness, the useful in non-determinable contexts, the useful for a future that cannot be 
predicted, in other words, a useful that is not so much of use but awaiting the invention of 
a use from its current excess.
(Grosz 2004:104-105)
Almost all of what a film production shoots is already mentally predetermined as useful. 
Actuality shots (or, alternatively, non-shots, or B-rolt) are committed to tape or to film in order 
that they exist as a resource. This resource rescues the editor and the viewer from what is 
perceived to be the image tedium of a speaking subject during a conventional interview. As 
viewers, we like to be able to look away. If the subject is talking about walking, then the 
production researcher makes a note of this and ensures that actuality footage of walking is 
recorded. This is used as illustrative cut-away material. But, on a less conscious level, every 
participant in the film production suspends within their minds an image of the film they are 
making - a mental image that they imagine will later be physically seen - and this image endures 
as a virtual template transplanted onto the lived world in front of them as they film. This virtual 
will become a memory, and, moreover, a difference, when thought in relation to the finished film 
object. To work with an emergent form, and to embrace the arbitrariness of time-images, is to 
relinquish the hunt for necessary sequences and to produce instead marks and gestures that are 
given momentum by the mental image of the film (why else are we filmmaking?), but which 
cannot yet be contained within a sequence as sensible articulation.9 The film remains in front of 
us as an image guide track for our behaviour, and we film our way towards it on an errant 
trajectory of mistake and revision, but the film changes, and so do we. This dialogic attitude 
between the utterances of the camera, our gestures as filmmakers and the flow of the lived world
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around our film cannot be compared with speaking, nor necessarily with the dialectic of the 
spoken constituting sense as heard. It is the film-act itself, and not the author or the history of 
actions and authors.
Not useful images? 16mm 'roll-off and the image complicated by elements (rain drops) on the lens.
Filmmaker Margaret Tait has quoted Lorca's phrase of 'stalking the image' to describe 
this way of behaving when filming. The process of filmmaking has often been described as not 
tactile, certainly not when compared with painting, sculpture, even music; the film camera is by 
comparison regarded as unresponsive to touch. In Tait's films however we find the tremendously 
sensual scene, and a camera desiring touch, wanting to brush against the lived world, to catch and 
lose that which it spies through its lens. In Portrait o f  Ga (1955), the camera slips away from its 
subject (Tait's own mother), it draws around her, finds her in her absence, then sees bull rushes. 
The film, the filmmaker, the landscape and Ga have indistinct boundaries, always moving, so 
many bodies trying to give themselves to their exteriority. For Tait (herself trained in a neorealist 
film school) filmmaking was a means to befriend, a way of spending time, and inventing time, 
with another. In Where I Am is Here (1964) Tait's camera seeks only the incidental, the not 
consequential, taking on an unusual and intimate compositional force, losing and finding the 
subject or landscape, never showing or telling but merely glancing past. We see the absent 
waving away of hands, the shrug, the trip, the inattentive gaze, and movement as ambivalence. 
Tait's camera utterances are neither determined nor absolute. They bring to the moving image the 
fluidity Luce Irigaray called for in language: 'Everything, then, should be rethought in terms of
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volute(s), helix(es), diagonal(s), spiral(s), curl(s), tum(s), revolution(s), pirouettes(s)' (Irigaray. 
1980). Here, the one does not move without the other, the filmmaker does not move without the 
film, the filmmaker does not move without the lived world and the subject - each are speaking 
together, pressing their differences together.
Irigaray's polemic emphasizes movement and alterity. In Speculum o f the Other Woman 
she adds to her list, with 'Fracturing, bursting, whirling faster and faster, until 'matter shatters and 
falls into (its) dust' (Irigaray 1974: 64-6510). Tait's film poems possess this lyrical giddiness - a 
fluid and felt nature, disrupting and reversing the flow of time. There is acute and heightened 
sound; the relationship between word and image has a personal insistence, with Tait's own voice, 
interrupting, mumbling, announcing. Her attenuated vision is a commentary on the act of looking, 
the film poems composed of many small and fleeting parts rather than in accordance with a 
renaissance figure-ground operation. This type of vision seems to challenge the homogeneity of 
the look that sees all. Again, this is redolent of what Irigaray identified as the women's non­
investment in the look. Irigaray writes, 'The possibility that a nothing seen, that a not masterable 
by the look, by specula(risa)tion, may have some reality would indeed be intolerable to man, 
since threatening his theory and practice of representation' (Irigaray 1974: 57). Tait's films have a 
powerful and personal tether to community, so much so that often the films produced were 
screened in the houses and halls where they were originated, and this was a part of her attempt to 
develop a language or minor cinema of the people around her. She worked with non-professional 
performers including family members and friends. It is friendship that emerges as the driving 
principle for the work - the fact that making films for and about each other is something that 
friends can do. We can see the same immersion in the ebb and flow of community and friendship 
in the diary films of Jonas Mekas, and this sensibility is extended by Kenneth Anger and Jack 
Smith into the everyday as baroque pageant where friends and acquaintances perform the very 
difference the hand held camera elicits, the intimate spaces of houses and the players dressed into 
an excessive mise-en-scene. It is this practice, of the diary film as a site for friendship and for the 
performance of difference, which emerged over the five-day shoot in Dorset.
Without a subject to represent or a story to tell, and without even a pressing aesthetic 
principle, we are free on our drift to be more tactile with our images in the sense that we are 
brushing against the lived world, and we are free to be indiscriminate with where we look. When 
rain began to fall on the hill beside the Look-out during the long take, the camera was left turning 
over - we see Jess wiping the lens clean, and earlier the faces of the crew obscuring the landscape 
as they peer inwards, checking the gate. There is the crash of the waves on the shore, a defiant 
announcement without anything to announce; and there is the acute sound of the crunch of 
pebbles underfoot, married to a dolly shot which tracks left to right with Roy and Amin along the 
beach, simply because it can. On the side of the hill, as the two men approach the camera, we 
hear the co-mingling of bird song with projector sound, and their images are momentarily spliced 
to and fro in time. When Roy's voice is picked up on a radio microphone saying to Arrun that the 
experience feels counterfeit, and that it is impossible for them to get away from the feeling of 
being in a film, the image looks down, to the forest path, and then cuts, to taped position marks. 
These are some of the thick descriptions.
Roy commented that it might not be my intention to finish the film, that, 'The film might 
enter a cul-de-sac. It might not go' (Roy White, The Film). Owing to the fact that there was no 
rationale for shooting, nowhere that we need look, I decided arbitrarily to hand over the final 400 
foot film magazine as a potlatch, an end of shoot gift to the cast, crew and myself. We were free 
to pour this film away into the lived world. The 10.5 min. duration of the film magazine was a 
space for fluidity, a span we could relax in, fill up and wander from. All on site were aware that 
we were going to roll the camera from the start of the magazine to the end without stopping, and 
that no directions were likely to be given to those in front of the camera or behind it. This would 
be my one attempt at structure, a spine for the film, a duration (one filmed magazine is as good a 
duration as any) upon which to hang the other filmed activity. This effectively meant that the 
long take ‘mattered’, at least technically. If we didn’t get it, I wasn’t sure I would have a means to 
assemble the material in the edit.
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The weather is threatening; dark clouds are looming and the wind
is blowing. I have forgotten the film magazine and am forced to drive
back to Bridport from the Look-out location. On returning Carlos takes 
too long to load the camera and by the time we are ready to shoot the 
rain has set in. A sudden sense of responsibility makes me question
whether Arrun and Roy are content to be here. This is the last day and
I feel that they have come to do the shot out of commitment to the 
project rather than enthusiasm for it. I ask myself, have I made a 
closed set, have I placed a restriction finally, on their lives? The 
dolly track is laid and the camera turns over. Roy and Arrun walk to 
the fence at the near side of the field and synchronously check their 
watches. I have since realized this was their collective reactions to 
tim e the ten minutes, presumably so that they could know when it had 
expired. Roy then defiantly strides away from Arrun and past the 
camera, navigating his own direction through the duration. He takes 
possession of the situation, and purposefully crosses over into the 
pre-filmic space, so that the camera operator is faced with the choice 
of whether to adjust the frame and find him or not. Arrun is left 
stranded. The camera tracks away from him and turns 360 degrees, 
finding Roy as he approaches and enters the Look-out building, and then 
passing on from him to find Arrun again, literally rotating through 
ambient space unfettered by human contact and turning to collect him in 
the frame. Arrun has not moved. His immobility arrives in time (the 
time of the shot) with surprising impact; he appears like one of the 
statuesque figures in Resnais' Last Year a t Marienbad. Arrun has lost 
his guide, Roy, and, not finding any prompt from behind the camera, is 
left instead with an on-screen, in-camera time which temporarily causes 
his paralysis. Once the camera has found Arrun and declared this 
immobility (immobility off camera is different to immobility on 
camera), Arrun makes the decision to join Roy in the Look-out. The 
camera moves with him and we see the dolly track at the bottom of the
frame. Finally, Arrun and Roy emerge from the tiny disused building and 
walk away from the centrality of the camera position. The absenting of 
their bodies is not done by exiting frame into the pre-filmic space, to 
the left or to the right, but rather by departing over duration. The 
two walk into the centre of the shot, disappearing over distance, as 
though in an intuitive agreement between filmed and filming, an 
eloquent reply to the continual gaze of the camera upon them over the 
period of the five days. The question, "Do you see film as a thought 
process?" can be heard from off camera. "Hold on a minute Jess" is my 
reply. Roy and Arrun remain on camera but become absent over space and 
time. The camera consciousness (my gaze, Carlos' gaze) holds on the 
landscape as they vanish, and then tracks sideways down the hill, 
towards anywhere.
What is the speech act of the recording of this pro-filmic space, before it is sanitized by 
montage? As Joan Copjec notes, film theory has excluded analysis of the pro-filmic, which it 
regards as the natural (Copjec 1988: 233), in favour of a specific form of film as the statement of 
this because o f that. The engineering of suture in film production removes the pro-filmic natural 
in its surgical assemblage of realism, and film theory has followed suit by concentrating on 
assemblages rather than durations. The pro-filmic is the raw take prior to having its edges and its 
temporality buffed into timed and articulated sequences. As we have observed, the very 
construction of a pro-filmic space (the camera pointed towards something) instantly creates a rich 
and complex pre-filmic situation, where a different behaviour resides. The Film, during its 
recurring long durational takes, features the camera panning and tracking to 'scoop-up' this pre- 
filmic, as inscription of time. This scooping-up, this disinterested gaze, like the disengaged 
camera eye which wanders from the protagonist towards a non-human content in Antonioni's The 
Passenger (1975), speaks to Irigaray's concept of the 'nothing seen.' Deleuze is interested in this 
disinterested gaze into the pro-filmic space because it conveys the essentially open character of 
sets. The take, when at its greatest intensity (before it has been foreclosed) is an opening onto 
time; it is a direct image that shows to us the continuous emergence of the new and unforeseen
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(Rodowick 1997: l l 11). Werner Herzog’s Fata Morgana (1971) is innovative in this respect, for it 
presents the seeing of an extraordinary landscape (North Africa) without the point-of-view of the 
subject who is seeing. James Benning's series Thirteen Lakes (2004) also delivers this unfettered 
secondness as it verges on slipping into firstness: long take after long take of lake surfaces where 
time does not pass through the schema of the human perceiver in the landscape.12
The dolly movement at the end of the 400ft take marks the recognition of what 
Tarkovsky calls a ’time pressure'13 in the natural, noting an absence and pulling away, both 
responding and leading, unfolding without revealing. When the camera moves in this way, new 
relationships of change are brought into being. There are pivot points, or pointers that may appear 
to be signaletic material, such as the dolly tracking movement itself (the sign of a cinematic 
phrase), but The Film does not signify and any pointers steer the audience to a near content-less 
place. The dolly movement is not linguistic, it is a process of slowing down, an entering into a 
space of nothing happening, where tension is sustained and the viewer is encouraged to withstand 
this tension. The frame, then, drifting always towards that which it cannot yet see, is revealed as 
both container and opening, a way of seeing and not looking caught up in the continual 
antagonism between the pro-filmic and pre-filmic, always carrying with it the pressure of its 
impending foreclosure. For Tarkovsky, the frame acts as an intensive threshold through which the 
force of time, as it exceeds visible representation, allows itself to be felt, and thus the cinematic 
image affirms the existence of a virtual plane beyond conscious perception.
Roy commented to me on one of our film walks that, 'Ideation is mechanistic, like the 
camera, working within certain limits. Thoughts should be vast panoramic views' (Roy White. 
The Film). The manner in which Roy and Arrun occupy the 400 ft plan sequence (the term in 
French cinema used to describe a long take) is a lesson in the choices available to any person 
when asked to improvise. Every moment in our lives involves the activity of thought and of 
action, and yet when asked to, "Do anything; do nothing" it is not uncommon for the subject on 
camera to enter into a mild form of mental and physical paralysis, as though the flow of the
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everyday has stopped but has not yet been picked up by the new flow of the film image as 
purpose. The take is a virtual delineation of space and time, an interstice paired with the lived 
world. The words 'Action!' and 'Cut!' denote an alteration in behavior, as though lived time has 
temporarily ceased and mediated or performed time has replaced it, except that lived time has not 
ceased, it remains, concurrent but no longer fore-grounded. The take is a form of picnoleptic 
absence where the person on-camera is returned to their non-filmic body when the take has 
ended. A take is like a piece of time placed over time, because when a filmmaker says "Action!" 
or "Cut!" there exists (has existed) both time-time and film-time. What was taken? A moment of 
time is not being taken, any more than it is when we are held in a queue or taking an exam, or 
doing anything that involves the bracketing of time and activity. There is no hole left in the wake 
of a take because there is time time beneath or concurrent with film  time. In film, a take is made 
but what film takes it still leaves intact. During a take, the lived world and the mediated slide 
back and forth in relation to one another as dominate/subordinate, depending upon the situation. 
In a take, the subject and the object are therefore not divided in a Cartesian subject/object relation 
but are on the contrary one and the same.14 The take is both subject and object, 'the stowing away 
of the body in time' (Bazin 1967: 9), the committing of lived-time to film-time which also 
involves the behaviour of a film time in the bodies and perceptions of those filmmaking. This is 
what occurs between the announcement and conclusion of the take. A long take is a corporeal 
cinematic experimentation, one that can unfold in such a way as to introduce the novel and the 
unpredictable, and become an example of what Bergson calls 'creative time' at play. It forces the 
mind and the body to find thought and combat sensation, to wait, to be bored, to be a body 
craving purpose. Antonioni has remarked that 'When everything has been said, when the main 
scene seems over, there is what comes afterwards' (Antonioni 195815). Deleuze has said that that 
one of the defining characteristics of Italian neorealist time-image films is waiting, 'Not the 
drama of communication but the immense tiredness of the body... and which suggests to thought 
"something to communicate," the "unthought," life' (Deleuze 1989: 189). This is what George 
Kouvaros (1998: 25116) calls, 'dead time', which is the extra cinematic tension that arises as the 
take outstays its welcome. He writes that 'during those moments when the director holds a shot
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for a few seconds longer than seems necessary [...] we are presented with 'dead time1: an 
expenditure of energy and film stock that in narrative terms contributes little to our understanding 
of the characters, their motivations or problems. It is at this juncture, when, to borrow a phrase 
used by Antonioni, "everything already seems to have been said'" (Kouvaros 1998: 251). In the 
aforementioned Koker trilogy, Kiarostami reclaims the long take and the multiple take as devices, 
but opts to point a camera at the camera filming. The pretense of retakes in Through the Olive 
Trees provides a space for the young couple (non-actors performing roles not dissimilar to their 
selves) to be together in an unusual margin to the restrictive social space of their community. The 
time between takes provides a clandestine opening for difference, a portion of time placed over 
time.
I was constantly hunting for scenes in which there was "nothing happening." That 
nothingness I wanted to include in my film... I needed that "nothing" there... When I use 
a long shot it distances me from my cast and crew, and that affords them an opportunity 
to submerge themselves in the environment... After the first one or two minutes of a shot- 
sequence, that's when the performances get interesting.
(Kiarostami, quoted in Philip Lopate 1996: 38-4017)
Entering the weight of time in the long take, and exploring the aspects of what lies before
and after it, is precisely the aim of Direct Cinema, but Deleuze criticizes the use of the term
'direct,' outlining how verite remained bound to the notion of telling, simply using alternate
means to arrive at what was considered to be the truth. In fact most expositional and direct
documentary have as their objective a pro-filmic truth that resists and denies the one
incontrovertible truth: the presence of the team of people filmmaking. The long take is a trope of
cinema verite. This before and after is the excess of any narrative conceit, and the reason both
Godard and John Cassavetes often continued to shoot having announced the end of the take to the
performers. We can begin to imagine a limitless film take whose duration is an open set.18
It seems to me increasingly that the sole great problem of film, in each movie, is where 
and why to begin a shot and why complete it? Basically, life fills the screen in the way 
that a faucet is filling a bathtub that is letting out exactly the same amount of water at the 
same rate.
(Jean-Luc Godard, on Pierrot le Fou [1965])
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There is, in Godard’s statement, the sense that film longs to transcend the limitations of 
virtuality and become physical; that within all filmmaking there is the endeavour to make time 
into matter and for film to be more physically felt. Any film is inevitably the register of the 
various ways we try to touch time, and of a loss which is the very indiscemability and running 
away of time. So, the take is what makes film time and lived time concurrent, pressing together 
the sheets of time of the present (the filmed) and the future (the film). Not only is the take the 
recording of an intentionality - what we decided to film - it is also, in some way, the register of 
the fact that we had a film in mind during the take, a film which was not yet present, for, as 
Deleuze writes, borrowing from Bergson, ’It is in the present that we make a memory' (Deleuze 
1989: 52). Everything that occurs in perception is stored as it occurs, archived as a past as it 
happens in the present. The crystal image in cinema presents the split where an event is divided in 
the present of the actual moment, and that present as a virtual which can later be retrieved, as a 
past.
This is Bergson’s third schema, formulated in Mind-Energy (Bergson 1920). We are 
constantly mentally archiving, and these recollection images inform our appreciation of future 
presents, including the future present of watching the film we are making. We call into our minds 
the present of a past, where it coincides with our perceptual/cognitive present, maintaining 
integration and interpenetration through a degree of volume or dissolve.19 Deleuze gives the 
semblance of this image mixing in cinema the name crystal image, which is the coexistence of 
past, present and future relations made possible in cinema by the interval and its various 
transitions and superimpositions. The crystalline regime of the time-image no longer requires an 
image defined as false, offset with an image defined as true (the past, which is before this 
present) because truth and falsity, past and present, are now indiscernible and un-decidable.
The Film features recollection images that are crystalline in their execution. Sequences 
are not structured around motivated edits whose intention is the accumulation of meaning, but 
rather on more direct images of unfolding time and the relationship between space and place, and
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between memory and mediation. Both on and off camera conversations with Arrun and Roy were 
almost entirely based on what they remembered of the film shoot to date. I asked what they 
thought forthcoming filming should consist of, and what they imagined the finished film would 
look and sound like. At the time these projections were not prompted in order to elicit specific 
future edit decisions, although in fact this was how they were applied.20 Instead they formed part 
of a general inquiry into the virtual space of film as concurrent to, or mapped onto, lived time (the 
not-film world). They talked of the likelihood of inclement weather, the time a specific walk 
might take, what we should try to film, and what we might film again. The vagaries and the 
fanning out of these thoughts and commentaries guided the film's direction. Their words gave us 
places to head towards and things to do. When the two men sit together in the Palace Cinema, 
addressing their thoughts to the (then blank) projection screen in front of them, they are 
envisioning the film not-yet-finished. I continually asked Roy and Arrun to recollect what had 
transpired, and to imagine what that would look like as a film, on a screen, rather than orally or 
mentally described through their own experience. In The Film, this event plays out as the present- 
present of that day of the shoot (The Palace Cinema), from where a past is retrieved and brought 
into the present (the shooting during the days before) and a future is projected, by calling it into 
the mind presently (what they imagine the film will be like, as they look at the screen without a 
film). This is the re-imagining of the historical (the film filmed) as a virtual capable of difference 
(the film that will be edited).
Roy White and Arrun Denman imagining The Film.
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In the place of exerting a didactic telling of the events, this spoken material prompted 
rational and non-rational assemblages during the edit, these recollections and mental ‘projections’ 
acting as mnemosigns (Deleuze 1989: 52) within the final film, co-existing with images of 
actuality. These conjectures and digressions, the description of die film that will be seen based on 
what was done, provided a template for the film as the lines of flight of various thoughts and 
recordings conducted on or around our walks together. Roy and Amin's on and off-screen voices 
call up another voice, my voice, which is that of the edit, and together these voices, in dialogic 
relation, form what Rodowick describes as the visual and non-linguistic address of the film itself. 
Walking and thinking about what we might do gave us direction during the shoot. The fragments 
of film, videotape and audio recordings of spoken ideas gave me direction during the edit. In the 
edit suite I responded to visual cues and followed thought trajectories, as they arose, and usually 
as I first encountered them, when digitizing each tape. There are several tapes that I have to this 
day not viewed, because I discontinued editing at the point where no lines remained as suggestive 
to me. The Film does not therefore present the specifics of what was seen, imagined or 
recollected during the shoot, nor try to represent thought, but rather points vaguely towards the 
very striking but simple fact that we do imagine and recollect, as we currently perceive. Its 
objective is not to locate perceptions as recollections, but to encounter the limitless complexity of 
their operation.
It is here that The Film seems to offer equivalence to thought, and simultaneously draws 
attention to how problematic shot-to-shot mental relations are in the documentary mode. In The 
Film, Roy and Arrun are framed by a seriality that makes of them a fabrication. What they appear 
to see and to remember is not in fact theirs, but the conceit of the film. When Roy glances away 
from the camera to the earth of his allotment, it is as though his look touches the soil. This 
relationship from seer to seen is not rational within the lived world, owing to both the tracking 
movement and macro-frame of the allotment in close-up given to us by the camera. This is an 
impossible movement that is bound to Roy's distracted gaze through an interval that is itself 
moving, from rationality to irrationality. The very tactile nature of the arrangement suggests a
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form of touch and of thought sensible to the film and not to the subject. Its viewpoint is closer 
than, other than, our natural vision. This glance is haptic in its denouement and free and indirect 
in its arrangement, presenting the detail rather than the wide shot of a vista that we could safely 
attribute to a point-of-view (before then deciding that the point-of-view did not belong here, in 
what appears to be a factual sequence). Here, it is the camera that seems to be doing the looking. 
During another sequence in The Film, we see Roy looking through his monocular, and this shot is 
followed by a free and indirect shot of an elderly woman on a beach with her dog. There is 
enough of a rational relationship between the shot of the 'seer' and the shot of the ’seen’ for the 
viewer to accept the image as the looking of the subject, that is, until registration numbers appear 
on the film strip and the ’seen’ cuts to an entirely arbitrary shot of a different seafront.
Roy White recollecting in The Film.
A subject waiting for activity to take place can demonstrate momentary lapses of 
attentiveness, where thought takes greater command of the disposition of the body. Towards the 
end of The Film, Roy is asked whether he had ever thought of the other people who had 
previously been involved in the film, and if he had any concern for, or interest in these subjects, 
who had for whatever reason fallen by the wayside. In this section, we see the image of Roy 
thinking, and this is the image of a factual moment (he is remembering). Roy looks up and then 
away to the left of the frame, out of shot. The sequence cuts to the (repeated) image of Bernard 
Gale, stepping up to his mark in the ballroom school, and then it returns to Roy, who remarks that
239
certain people had been 'Cast out [...] pushed aside.' When the image of Roy's face appears to us 
to be remembering (or imagining), and this appearance of thought is followed by a repeated 
image from earlier in the film, the sequence takes on the stance of a recollection, contravening 
one of the rules that binds the documentary to sobriety: we are seeing an historical subject's 
memory. We have what appears to be a shot-to-shot relation giving us information about what 
Roy knows of Bernard, and yet during the period of filming Roy and Bernard never met, and did 
not discuss the project. This relation of thought is my relation, prompted by the vagaries of Roy's 
on-screen distraction. Bernard Gale appears only as a fragment of another possible film, a visual 
cue - one whose manifestation is loose, conjectural. Lost or 'discarded' subjects (as Roy phrases 
it), are frequently conjured back into the film by Roy and Arrun’s apparent on-screen recollection 
or imagination. Arrun points downhill to the cafe and recounts the experience that took place 
some minutes previously at that location. Roy points to an area of white sky and this match cuts 
to a projected white film frame, or appears to have a daydream of the Look-Out when he is 
watching the old movie in Doug Palmer's camera shop. In The Film, we are not being shown the 
facsimile of memory (the twenty-eight minute edit does not have the objective of giving 
equivalence to the co-existence of recollection images and attentive recognition in the mind) but 
rather the fact that we do remember images in our lives, and that we also remember cinema 
images.21 The visual field is never bound with any stability to Roy or to Amin's thinking, nor to 
their point of view; it is the beginning point of a projection, a memory that is mobile and without 
a thinker. These thoughts are in departure from Roy and Arrun as thinking subjects, so that 
gradually the film is thinking, by itself.22 It is in this way that the cinema enables a counter- 
linguistic enunciation of thought.
Deleuze is particularly fantastical on this matter. He writes, 'The virtual image (pure 
recollection) is not a psychological state or a consciousness: it exists outside of consciousness, in 
time, and we should have no more difficulty in admitting the virtual existence of pure 
recollections in time than we do for the actual existence of non-perceived objects in space' 
(Deleuze 1989: 80). The past, present, and future are brought together as concurrent in Resnais'
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Hiroshima Mon Amour (1959), the film itself a peculiar time capsule rendering personal history 
as a singularity in thought. Not, Did it ever rain?1 but Does it ever rain?' Which is the case, 
Hiroshima as a subset of the girl who is remembering, or the girl as a subset of Hiroshima as an 
event in time? It is not possible to say. The very taking place of an event depends on a forgetting 
that makes way for a remembering. This is the radical alterity of forgetting and what occludes the 
screaming noise of immanence.
Tarkovsky's images, for example in Mirror (1974), appear to think themselves in this 
way, without the summary or conclusion of an established thinking operation. In Mirror, it is 
neither necessary nor possible to locate the bodies on-screen as consistent historical identities that 
are thinking or remembering. The film instead provides a zone for sensing in the moving image 
the pressure of time and memory as it seems to manifest on that very image. It is not possible to 
re-trace a teleology based on causal events in Mirror. The images are the heaviness of time and 
the flimsiness of space, stream flows, bursts of growth and then lapses of stagnancy. The film is a 
damp mist. Images curl around one another even as they temporally precede and follow in a line, 
like the child's early brain, which does not (yet) remember the day (today) as a sequence. The 
neural connections are not orderly, motivated or prioritized. This is a de-differentiated world, 
where the edit is a response to the time-thrusts or temporal pressures that visibly emerge in the 
take.23 There is the co-mingling of archive footage, dramatic scenes and lush flights of cine 
consciousness. Interiority of thought (memory, point-of-view, and the imagined) transgresses the 
virtuality of its being, so that what is established as document is then re-qualified as invention, 
only to crop up again as actuality. The director is unconcerned with the hierarchies and 
authorities of these differing images, for him they have no difference because each has a rhythm 
that echoes the essential movement of matter. Margarita Terekhova is an intercessor. She is 
actress, grandmother, mother, daughter and wife, across time, both historical and ahistorical. 
Mirror thinks and remembers in the way that the cinema can and the human subject cannot. It 
presents memories in the form of open sets, something our own minds struggle to do. It is not 
possible to locate the filmed present tense, which images of the characters is imagined, which
241
remembered, which existing later, because the convention of the flashback as an image or a 
filmic segment which represents temporal occurrences from before the image previous to the one 
we are now watching does not apply. Neither is it possible to ascribe status to any image as being 
fictional, factual, recollected, dreamt, or envisioned. The present endlessly returns, although we 
cannot hold onto it with any teleological certainty.
Material from the past becomes a new material for the present. We often remember 
where the place of a memory occurred before we remember the specifics of the events of that 
memory, and, more curiously, we frequently remember the place where we previously had a 
recollection. As de Certeau writes 'Memory is played like circumstances, just as a piano is played 
by a musician and music emerges from it when its keys are touched by hands' (De Certeau 1984: 
8724). Location, then, and landscape, provides pause and projection space for new thought and 
recollection. The remembering of remembering reveals the cartographic practice of the mind, 
how it produces within itself virtual spaces as points of origin - the virtual bodies of a life. This is 
why so much has been written about the relationship between the moving image in its assemblage 
and the co-existence of present perception, recollection, and the imagined, in the process of 
thought. The very timeliness of cinema is that it is always binding a subject to the moment of 
their depiction; even when a film is a fiction being made, it is always at the same time a 
document of the moment of that fiction's construction, a time machine. Philosophy is untimely, as 
Rodowick puts it, always too early or too late. Yet cinema gives to philosophy the power of un­
timeliness seen in crystalline form. This is why Rodowick names the cinema 'Gilles Deleuze's 
time machine.'
It is difficult to isolate my editing process for The Film. The edit is always a conflict 
between idea and schema. In any edit there is the rush of emergence in terms of the possibilities 
of the arrangement of the filmed material into an edit, which is near limitless, but this emergence 
is continually impeded by the template of the timeline and, to recapitulate, every editor edits at 
the top of the ever-growing pyramid of previously edited films. The crystalline image deviations
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within The Film, which are so uncommon to the documentary, are not edited automatically or 
arbitrarily but are based on the perceptual digressions and distractions observed when viewing the 
video and film rushes, where on-camera subjects glanced away, turned their heads, pointed or 
moved their bodies. This is where The Film differs from Mirror, Sans Soleil and die film poems 
of Margaret Tait The process is more manifestly a result of the properties and the situation of the 
shoot, and of the mental and physical suggestion of those who are on-camera. Its assemblage is 
similarly crystalline, interlacing actual and invented material, but there is a greater realization of 
free-association. Ours was an actual drift and our filmmaking transformed that actual. All of our 
attention was given over to the same virtual: the film in front of us that we were filming our way 
towards.
In The Film, the edit takes us back to the other film, which is the search for the film, the 
film on the way to the film. The nature of how The Film was arranged became a topic of 
considerable debate at the first test screening. It was suggested that the open set of the production 
had become a closed set in the over-determined and composed sequences of its completion, and 
that the collaboration had collapsed into the articulation of a single author, because I had 
completed the film by myself.25 In fact, the version I had screened was a rough-cut based on 
provisional assemblages, where I had tried out arrangements in the edit timeline based on ideas 
that came to me with the viewing of each tape. The version I screened has not been modified 
since. It is as though the public event of the screening acted as fixing of The Film, like the firing 
of a clay pot in a kiln. At the screening, Roy argued that the edit was in fact my conversational 
reply (albeit in an irrational vernacular) to his on-screen musings and observations. My 
understanding of this comment is that Roy had taken on co-ownership of the project, and that, in 
his estimation, he and Arrun had shown me physical spaces (movements through landscapes) and 
in return I had show them virtual spaces, (movements in time). I had in fact invited Roy and 
Arrun to be a part of the editing process, but they did not like the idea of spending that much time 
with a computer in a small room, and politely declined. It is my subjectivity and the immediacy 
of my own thinking that is given space in the edit. I am free to make time utterances, spatial
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expressions, and to produce both rational and non-rational assemblage from the material garnered 
on the shoot. This is a space of creativity granted to me by those whom I made the film with, but 
it is also a space of dialogic relations, because my own edit announcements are for the most part 
intuitive replies to the utterances of the camera and the people on camera.
I did bring a concept to the production of The Film, together with a filmmaking history 
and ability, but during the shoot (with the exception, perhaps, of the final 400ft take) I refused to 
situate The Film anywhere else than where it was and where it was going, which was always in 
the direction of another film, the film we invented as we went along. The Film attempted to use 
the dynamics of proliferation of a system, in this case a film-in-production system. As a finite, 
resolved, cultural object The Film is not strictly speaking complete, or closed. It is a rough draft, 
the potential of which is not necessarily fulfilled in the traditional sense of a viable film object. 
The credits, such as they are, are spoken by Roy White over a black screen, as an imageless 
signature of the bodies, intentions, and places the film traverses. There are no content curves, no 
introductions or conclusions, no stories, only events marked by edit and framing decisions, what 
Tarkovsky describes as pointers to life.
1 Carlos Guarita, a photojoumalist, Jess Wiley, a media arts student, and Doug Palmer, the owner of the photographic 
shop in town.
2 Their names are: Linda, Mutter, Cressida, Hunky, Jim, Nikki, Martin and Jules, Humphrey, The Town Clerk, Ian, 
Peter, Margery, Andy Head, Joan in the Square, Rachel, John.
3 Roy White was ushered into my makeshift studio one evening by Carlos Guarita, a stills photographer and militant 
direct cineaste I had come to know in the town, who was well aware of my predicament of “missing people." Carlos 
and I had agreed to work together on the film, with him loading and shooting 16mm.
4 A number of details concerning Amin's personal history inevitably came to light over the course of filming, although 
they are not commented on in The Film.
5 De Certeau writes that walking is an act of enunciation that 'detours and tours as turns of phrase [...] combines styles 
and phrases like ordinary language' (De Certeau 1984: 98-101)
6 Roy remarks 'I don't lay much store by the cranial brain. We're trying to get beyond ideation and the fiction house - 
the conditioned and the known, to a shared walkabout on film' (Roy White, The Film).
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7 Arrun was not comfortable on camera but I believe that he allowed the filming to happen from something like a 
Buddhist perspective - the film had come his way and why would he block it? He made this decision after much 
deliberation, and after an almost interrogative debate with me, in which I was made to feel psychologically unpacked 
and examined by the two men. This process had taken me into open territory and without brief. I became profoundly 
aware of the instability of asking strangers to make a journey with me with film, although this now reads like a rounded 
off narrative, which of course it was not. That is what tries to push through when one uses story as the format for the 
description of events.
8 The late Bernard Gale was the founder and instructor at the local ballroom dancing academy, a rare and antiquated 
building that was once the local Fleapit cinema. Jake Dodds, now a skilled fish chef in a local restaurant, was a 
hedonist on the Covent Garden transgressive fashion scene in the 1980s. Bernard and Jake were perfect subjects, but I 
was not looking for subjects, and at any rate neither of them could give over sufficient time to live a film with me.
9 What is it that constitutes a useful documentary image? Is it one that is indexical and therefore true, or one that 
remains indexical to an event even though the meaning of that event has been changed by rhetorical manipulation?9 
What constitutes a useful fiction image? Is it one that is symbolically meaningful and therefore true for the story that 
purports to form the whole of its diegetic reality?
10 Luce Irigaray, Speculum o f  the Other Woman. 1974: 64-65.
11 Rodowick writes that 'Framing detaches objects from the pro-filmic space, grouping actions, gestures, bodies and 
decors in a motivated ensemble [...] The continuity system of editing established one set of norms for the linkage of 
shots through rational divisions. But an enlarged conception of off-screen space is equally important for Deleuze 
because it expresses the essentially open character of sets' (Rodowick 1997: 11). Tarkovsky explains that editing 
cannot be the dominant structural element of a film, as the protagonists of Soviet montage cinema (Kuleshov and 
Eisenstein) maintained in the 1920s. The film image comes into being during shooting, and exists within the frame. As 
Donato Totaro explains, editing brings together shots that are already filled with time (Totaro 1992: 24). The function 
of editing is to organize the time-images into a wave structure inherent to film, that is, the time-pressure wave. 
Tarkovsky’s concept of time-pressure is like a meteorological time-front that propagates from shot-to-shot and 
throughout the film, or a caidiopulmonary time-pulse that thrust against the arterial walls of the scenes, bringing 
temporal oxygenation to the shots and overall meaning to the film-form. (Source: Film Theory Meets Physics. A 
Deleuzian Analysis o f Tarkovsky’s Theory o f Time-Pressure, Part 1: Tarkovsky’s theory o f  time-pressure as ‘cine- 
physics. David George Menard, http://www.horschamp.qc.ca/index_offscreen_essays.html [uploaded August 2003]). 
David Rodowick also writes of time's relation, or force in the image -  that which prevents each set (shot), however big 
it is, from closing in on itself; that which forces it to extend itself to a larger set (Rodowick, 1997).
12 In Bergson's theory of creative evolution such a disengaged vision (the seeing of the artist) is an intention towards 
the lived world, where mimetic striving is replaced by distracted looking, although in Sobchack's view, this mimetic
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striving has always been in fact to make a representation of the striving to represent: 'While the 'age-old striving' of the 
visual arts has always been a mimetic striving, it is bent less on imitating the nature of intentional objects than on 
imitating the function of human intentional subjects who engage those objects as significant' (Sobchack 1992:249).
13 See, Andrei Tarkovsky (1989) Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema.
14 See also Rodowick 1997: 85.
15 Antonioni, quoted in the interview Colloquo con Michaelangelo Antonioni for Blanco e Nero, June 1958. Deleuze 
has said that one of the defining characteristics of Italian neorealist time-image films is waiting. Not the drama of 
communication but the immense tiredness of the body [...] and which suggests to thought ‘something to 
communicate’, the ‘unthought’, life. (Deleuze 1989: 189). In regard to Antonioni in particular, he writes that, the idle 
periods in Antonioni do not merely show the banalities of daily life, they reap the consequences or the effect of a 
remarkable event which is reported only through itself without being explained [...] The method of report in Antonioni
always has this function of bringing idle periods and empty spaces together1 (Deleuze 1989: 7).
16 Kouvaros, Where Does it Happen? The Place o f  Performance in the Work o f John Cassavetes Screen 39: 3. Autumn 
1998.
17 Abbas Kiarostami, interviewed by Philip Lopate, Film Comment, July-August 1996:40.
18 Jean Eustache's Numero Zero (1971) is based on such an idea. The filmmaker records his blind eighty-year-old 
Grandmother, her testimony providing two hours of unedited recollection, a feet achieved through two cameras whose 
magazines were staggered.18 There are ten magazines to each camera, and the clapperboard intervenes in the shot 
midway through each magazine to mark the beginning of its counterpart. Cigarettes are lit and expire, day becomes 
night, and as Rodowick observes, immeasurable qualitative time accumulates (Rodowick, in conversation with the 
author, Harvard University May 2005).
19 In Incisions in History/Segments o f  Eternity (in Circles o f Confusion, 1983) Hollis Frampton provides a metaphorical 
picture: memory and its mirror image, conjecture, are a foggy foreground and background, folded over the plane of 
focus that is the present.
20 It was, however, difficult to explain to Roy and Arran exactly what I meant by this process. The supremacy of 
narrative within a common association of cinema meant that the two of them assumed I wanted them to tell me the 
story of our days together, to provide a history. I sought something altogether less teleologically resolved. My intention 
was that the conjectures and digressions, the details and inaccuracies of their testimony would provide some sort of text 
template for the film -  a tapestry of thought and unthought, of remembered and altered (dramatized).
* ' This is the meaning of Heidegger's statement that, in the twentieth century The world worlds cinematographically.' 
We remember cinema, newsreel, broadcast television, and so on. A clear example of this is again the Super8mm 
Zapruder footage of the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Regardless of whether we were in Dallas, Texas or on the
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other side of the world at that time, whether we were alive or not yet bom, our mental image of that historical event -
our memory of it - is that sequence of Super8mm film.
22
Arrun remarked to me that 'Thoughts don't think. There isn't experience and experiencer, there is just experience.'
23 See, Andrei Tarkovsky (1989) Sculpting in Time.
24 de Certeau adds that, in memory, 'details are never what they are: they are not objects for they are allusive as such; 
not fragments, for they yield the ensemble they forget; not totalities since they are not self-sufficient; not stable since 
each recall alters them' (De Certeau 1984: 88).
25 The convention of the documentary is that the final cut remains with the filmmaker and not the subject.
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...the fantastic world of equivocality, multi-signification, metaphor, simile, similitude, 
parable, and allegory are all legitimated and thus linked to the world of 'reality' as we 
phenomenally experience it. This expansion of the 'real' to include the phantasmagoir 
impregnates the veiy act of narrative with a manipulative power over all its claims to 
'Truth-Telling' [...] Thus amorphosized, the realm of reality becomes always already 
pregnant with modes...
(Hamid Dabashi 1999: 262)
The cinema author finds himself before a people which, from the point of view of culture, 
is doubly colonized, colonized by stories that have come from elsewhere, but also by 
their own myths become impersonal entities at the service of the colonizer. The author 
must not, then, make himself into the ethnologist of his people nor himself invent a 
fiction which would be one more private story: for every personal fiction, like every 
impersonal myth, is on the side of the 'masters'.
(Deleuze 1989:222)
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Act 2, Sc 10. Close-Up - the film practice of intervening in reality____
Rather than filmmaker being observer, there are two subjects transformed -  filmmaker
and situation. Each is in a transformative relationship with the other.
(D.N. Rodowick1)
What we are heading towards is a concept for filmmaking as die eventful site for 
becoming other than we are. Such an intervention into reality by the cinema is a means to make 
inventive use of this world now, using film ideas, film takes, filmed reenactments, the powers of 
the fictive through the context of filmmaking, and uncommon film assemblages. What can we 
make of the lived world if we take on the role of filmmaker, and who do we become when we 
film? Let us for a moment think of the act of filmmaking as something that temporarily clothes 
the real with fabulation.2 We can then regard filmmaking as a ritual, a latter-day form of 
‘quilting’ where a number of people come together to stitch time, and where the frame of a film 
in the making produces new behaviour from a situation where difference is licensed and where 
social histories have the opportunity for temporaiy suspension.
As we have seen, there are preexisting frames for conceiving of the subsets cinema, film 
and filmmaking. The frame of film production is arguably the most mobile of these and can be 
constantly shifting and blurring, its boundaries determined by the specific learned understanding 
of what a cinematic transaction is by the various participants. And within the film crew there are 
also differing levels of involvement in both the imagined and the produced film. For example, a 
director of photography will not commonly have read the script, choosing instead to approach the 
production in terms of the mise-en-scene (usually a lighting set-up or specific camera movement, 
followed by another set-up) without needing or wanting to conceive of the film as a whole. The 
director of photography, the sound recordist and all of the other members of the crew and the cast 
will thus each have different mental images of events during any given filmed take, and their 
mental images will be different in turn to the natural perception of those around the set who have 
no prior knowledge of the project or of the process of film production. The film set tolerates
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elastic levels of performativity because it requires that the crew and cast suspend large amounts 
of their identity and personal history so as to focus on the virtual film to come. The range and 
fluctuation of social frames during filmmaking is unprecedented in the arts. The film actor is 
other than themselves whilst also their self (this is the take as both subject and object), and the 
director and other crewmembers are afforded extraordinary (albeit temporary) powers for 
effecting change in space and behaviour. This may also be the case on the theatre stage, but the 
film set is not the space of its exhibition - it is the lived world at the same time that it is the lived 
world as difference. Filmmaking directly uses the material of the lived world it seeks to portray. 
The staged play, like other art forms such as painting, music and literature, has no danger of 
being mistaken for the lived world, and this is what makes the media of film or video, cinema or 
television, unique in terms of its chameleon properties. The agency of the video or film camera, 
and the powers of thought produced by the film-to-be-made, gives permission for otherwise 
socially unusual and even unacceptable behaviour. The medium is also particularly well suited to 
deception, always providing a provisional stage for alterity. For example, in a documentary, a 
person may be asked to repeat an actual action for the sake of a shot that has impact in terms of 
the film's narrative or argument. Whenever we see a telephone answered during a documentary it 
is highly unlikely that the camera crew waited around with their lens trained on the receiver in the 
hope that it might ring. There is certainly an appropriate manner and style of delivery in a 
documentary. Subjects do not usually have their backs to the cameras, and as viewers we are not 
often privy to parts of a testimony that were hesitant or incoherent.
We can look upon the levels of participation a documentary or fiction film production 
offers, for both the crew and the performers or subjects, as comparable to Irving Goffinan's 
example of the social construction and multiple frames of the sporting event, where the players 
are differently engaged in the spectacle than the supporters watching.3 Goffinan also gives the 
example of the rehearsal as a space of complex and overlapping social frames.4 In every social 
situation we encounter or self-produce sets of frames which determine our conduct within them. 
The frame of cinema, and within it the frame of its operation, filmmaking (the shoot) constitutes a
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particularly expansive means to perform as another, and, specifically by directing, to alter the 
patterns of particular aspects of the social world.
Close-Up (Abbas Kiarostami 1990)
Close-Up (Abbas Kiarostami 1990) has as its central principle the social frame of the 
cinema, and film directing as a life-altering (pre)-occupation. Hossein Sabzian is a working class 
father and divorcee who is frequently mistaken for the famous Iranian director Mohsen 
Makhmalbaf, whose films he reveres. On a bus in Tehran a woman (Mahrokh Ahankhah) notices 
sabzian reading the novel of Makhmalbaf s The Cyclist. She remarks to him how much her family 
enjoyed the film, and Sabzian spontaneously replies that he is in fact Makhmalbaf. Pretending to 
be Makhmalbaf, Sabzian befriends Mrs Ahankhah's family and makes several visits to their 
wealthy home under the pretext that he wishes to make a film about their lives, the script for 
which he has titled The House o f  the Spider. He particularly impresses and befriends the family’s 
two sons and, in keeping with the contemporary practice of Iranian filmmakers, intends for the 
family to play themselves in his film. Rehearsals begin, shots are planned and the director begins 
to spend the night at the house. Soon the family becomes suspicious, finally inviting their 
journalist friend Farazmand to visit on one of the rehearsal days in order to identify whether the 
man is in fact Makhmalbaf. Kiarostami’s interest in Farazmand's subsequent article, Bogus 
Makhmalbaf Arrested, prompts him to visit Sabzian in prison, where he is being detained 
awaiting a court hearing on the charge of fraud. During their extraordinary meeting, Sabzian 
makes an unusual appeal. When asked what the director might do to help him in his predicament, 
Sabzian answers 'Can you make a film about my suffering?'
Sometimes you can realize that the frame created for one individual maybe is just too 
tight and you have to extend it. And this is what Sabzian was trying to prove: that he 
needed a larger, an extended, frame.
(Abbas Kiarostami5)
The larger frame that Sabzian found for himself is the persona of a film director. 
Sabzian's form of identity shifting is what proponents of social construction theory, including 
Goffman, regard as essentially human. Social construction theory puts forward a post-structural 
understanding of the self as a mechanism for creative adaptation, in which identity appropriates 
and re-authors what it encounters in the other, the self now 'an impersonator,' as Barbara Socor 
phrases it, 'a role in eternal re-write' (Socor 20006). Theories of social construction repeatedly 
espouse the terms 'stage' and 'frame.' Berger and Luckman write that 'The (siren) call(s) of the 
(many) other(s) bid one "try out" some of the countless roles, and don some of the sundry guises 
that are so accessible as alternative "lifestyles'" (Berger & Luckman 19667). In The Saturated 
Self, Kenneth Gergen describes a society in which all manner of roles are available for the trying, 
where every stranger, or other, is a persona that can be acquired. He quotes Goffman, 'The self... 
is not an organic thing that has a specific location... it is a dramatic effect arising from the scene 
that is presented' (Goffman 1959: 253 quoted in Gergen 19918). Goffman examines the methods 
people have for positioning themselves and declaring their active nature to others - how people 
maintain an impression of themselves as social acceptable or not - and likens this activity to a 
staged play where representations form influence over other participants, and routines of 
behaviour are observed. This conception of contractual frames within social exchange is a 
sociological concept that relates to the individual's way of experiencing the current situation, 
regulating his or her own conduct and interpreting the behaviour of others. Goffman identifies 
how a frame can be a modality to one participant whilst a forgery to another, for example when a 
sporting contest becomes for one active member a fight, or when a charming visitor to one's door 
becomes revealed as a sales person. In modalisations, all those who participate share the same 
point of view, whereas forgery depends on differences in points of view. These social frames shift 
in their orders and we, in turn, shift in our attitude towards them. In the context of our inquiry, we
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can think of the frame o f filmmaking as simultaneously forgery and modality, in that different 
members of the ensemble have differing understandings of what is taking place.
Sabzian’s actions constitute forgery but they are also eloquent extensions and 
interpretations of what Michel Foucault calls, ’our participation in the present system.'9 Sabzian's 
uprising is temporary. His rental of space and nomadic use of his own self-image is inevitably 
contained. For a brief period of time, Sabzian had successfully modified his world, reversing its 
terms so that he was no longer a slave but a master. In response to this, and also for a limited 
period of time, Kiarostami makes a modification to Sabzian's world. Following his meeting with 
Sabzian in the prison, Kiarostami proceeds to appropriate actual events into a new narrative of the 
depiction of these events, casting Sabzian and the Ahankhah family as themselves in a series of 
filmed reenactments. The experimental frame of Sabzian's mode of cine carnival is re-composed, 
sanitized (or aestheticised, even) by Kiarostami, into the frame of cinema as psychodrama. In 
effect, he constructs a fence around Sabzian's cinema as carnival in order that it become 
something which Kiarostami can show to the world. Kiarostami's feat is that, in making Close- 
Up, he enables both Sabzian and the Ahankhah family to finally realize their mutual desire to 
participate in the production of a film, each of them now re-performing for the camera the 
situation they had previously lived through. As Alberto Elena writes, 'Like a real god, Kiarostami 
creates reality and makes Sabzian's dream come true' (Elena 2005: 45). Kiarostami finds an 
opening and makes with his film a space for ruminating on how cinema (specifically, the 
documentary) and the social lived world are constructed and maintained, and also examining 
what license the cinema gives us to transform the lived world.10 The conundrum offered to the 
viewer of whether to regard the film as factual or fictional throws the very notion of film realism 
- whether documentary or fiction - into question.
Kiarostami is, however, contradictory when he makes observations about his own 
filmmaking ideology in regard to Sabzian's behaviour. He paraphrases Oscar Wilde when in 
relation to Close-Up he remarks that 'We can never get close to the truth except by lying,'
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(Kiarostami11) and yet he qualifies Sabzian's actions as being psychologically unsound, stating
that Ultimately, what the film is dealing with is the difference between the "ideal self' and the
"real self;" the greater the difference, the more imbalanced the person' (Kiarostami, ibid12).
Perhaps the esteemed filmmaker draws a distinction between the conduct of actual directors and
chameleon ones. As Jonathan Rosenbaum writes, 'Kiarostami gets prizes and recognition for
persuading Sabzian, The Ahankhahs, the reporter, the judge, and others to impersonate
themselves' (Rosenbaum 2003).
Kiarostami seems to advocate a more indirect form of political cinema, a first-person 
cinema where "the people are missing," but instead the filmmaker, in just one person, is 
'a genuine collective agent, a collective fermenting agent, a catalyst'
(Elena 2005:193)
But is Kiarostami's concept not in fact Sabzian's concept, and therefore might we 
ultimately think of Close-Up as a collaboration? Certainly, Kiarostami has been known to play all 
manner of games with his performers. During the shooting of Taste o f Cherry (1997), for 
example, the director stood in for all of the off-camera parts during the shot/reverse-shot 
sequences filmed in the main character's car, which meant that almost none of the performers met 
one another. Kiarostami is infamous for never removing his sunglasses (on and off set), thus 
hyper-controlling the frame of his own social situation, reinforcing the stereotype of the film 
director as dictator whilst occupying the free play and license afforded to him as the arbiter of 
events. In Life and Nothing More and in Ten on Ten (2004), Kiarostami parodies himself as he 
perpetuates this attitude. The role of film director is the persona Kiarostami has acquired in order 
to become a speaking subject to his self. Like Nick Broomfield, he performs ‘Abbas Kiarostami’ 
as his own difference. Assuming the position of the film director as speaking subject in this way 
is necessitated by incontrovertible social distinctions and power relations between director-as- 
subject, and the object of the director’s address, the subject-as-object, thus demarcating and 
reinforcing conceptual and cultural boundaries. This persona, of the film director, can be highly 
manipulative (there are accounts of Sam Peckinpah and William Friedkin persecuting their cast, 
and Werner Herzog once famously pulled a gun on Klaus Kinski, threatening to shoot Kinski and 
then himself if the actor left the set of Fitzcarraldo [1982]), but the persona can also afford
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intensely positive changes in attitude towards the lived world. In fact, in Close-Up, Kiarostami 
the author, and Sabzian the subject, have assumed the same role. Sabzian has performed a 
mimesis of 'film director1, producing himself as an other, just as Kiarostami is already performing 
the role of Kiarostami.13
Beyond the true or the false, becoming of power of the false...Sometimes it is a character 
himself crossing a limit and becoming another, in an act of story telling which connects 
him to a people past or to come...and there is a double becoming superimposed for the 
author becomes another as much as his character does (as with Perrault who takes the 
character as 'intercessor1 or with Rouch who tends to become a black in a quite different 
non-symmetrical way).
(Deleuze 1989: 275)
At one point the real director, Mr. Makhmalbaf, came to visit the family, to impress them 
in Sabzian's behalf, and the mother said to Makhmalbaf when he was leaving the house: 
"Mr. Makhmalbaf, the other Mr. Makhmalbaf was more Makhmalbaf than you are." 
(Laughter.) I think the reason is that Sabzian wanted so desperately to be Makhmalbaf, 
but the real Makhmalbaf doesn't care to be Makhmalbaf any more.
(Kiarostami14)
The understanding that a film would be produced created a consensus between Sabzian 
and the Ahankhah family that would later manifest as a conflict. It is the conflict caused by 
Sabzian's ruse that ultimately constitutes the film Close-Up. Sabzian's forgery of Makhmalbaf 
enabled him to exert influence over the lives of a circle of people in a social environment 
otherwise closed off to him. His overthrowing of social hierarchies was temporary, the 
participatory frame of cinema that he constructed collapsing at the point in which he was found 
out. The model of Iranian cinema he so admired and chose to emulate thus operates within an 
anomalous attitude towards class. It’s social attitude negates the cult of celebrity, allows for non­
performers to play themselves in the place of actors and has as its objective the presentation of 
real-life through the collaboration with real-lives. Yet the practice of cinema in Iran, albeit a 
medium of popular culture, inevitably elevates its makers to a higher ranking in society, enabling 
Sabzian, as Makhmalbaf, to associate with another class. As Mehmaz Saeed-Vafa writes 'Close- 
Up shows how cinema, the most popular form of entertainment in Iran, has become perceived as 
a means to access power overnight (like basketball for American blacks) - a kind of work that
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requires no education and just a little luck' (Saeed-Vafa & Rosenbaum 2003: 4815). Not one 
person in Close-Up seems satisfied with who they are socially: Sabzian, Mr. Ahankhah, his son, 
the journalist who exposes Sabzian, the taxi driver who delivers the journalist, even Makhmalbaf 
and Kiarostami.
In a continually changing reality, adaptation to change can find its greatest flow in the 
performance of difference we can observe in Sabzian's extraordinary subterfuge. However, this 
flow is impeded by oedipal attitudes to identity that, according to Deleuze and Guattari in Anti- 
Oedipus (1986), herald merely the return of the same - the sameness of self that we perform to 
others on the understanding that sameness of self is returned to us. This is the contract of 
habituation. In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the Freudian self be replaced by a 
life. A Life (every life) consists of indefinite spatial and temporal distribution and continually 
passes through any-spaces-whatever and any-times-whatever, until its difference expires. 'Do not 
ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same' declares Foucault (1976: 1716). 'Identity is 
nothing more than a series of repetitive acts' Judith Butler writes in Gender Trouble (1990). 'I get 
the impression he is still acting, playing for our sympathy' remarks the eldest son in the 
Ahankhah family, Merhdad, during the court hearing in Close-Up. And Sabzian himself says ( To 
Mr. Ahankhah) 'do you f in d  me u n n a tu ra l? "  We see S abzian 's  fa ce  in  mid­
sh o t. His fa ce  r e g is te r s  both  co n v ic tio n  and d e c e it .  He i s  th in k in g . He 
i s  weighing up th e  necessa ry  honesty  and h u m ility  requ ired  fo r  the  
scene. When we see him released, having been pardoned by the Ahankhah family, Sabzian has 
a different character. As he is delivered on the back of a scooter by his idol, Makhmalbaf, to the 
family home the implication is that Sabzian must be rehabilitated, must find his former position 
on the stage of Tehran and return to a more sanctioned social role, the one of sick man, of 
impoverished man, who has descended into being once again the character of himself.
Close-Up is structured around a set of uncanny doublings: Sabzian is Makhmalbafs 
double and Kiarostami is Sabzian's double, in that he directs the same cast of characters playing
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themselves as Sabzian had done previously.17 Kiarostami presents the doubling of filmmaker as 
judge and arbiter of unfolding events; as Alberto Elena has noted, the entire film resembles a 
legal hearing. Much of Sabzian's testimony in the courtroom scene, which forms the spine of the 
film, is addressed to Kiarostami's camera rather than to the magistrate and in fact Kiarostami 
directed the trial in accordance to his own filming schedule and requirements, 'One of the biggest 
lies that I have ever allowed myself to tell' (Kiarostami 199518). The actual court hearing lasted 
one hour, but Kiarostami kept the participants on for an additional nine hours in order that he 
obtain his shots (Sabzian actually attempted to sue Kiarostami over the three extra days he spent 
in prison waiting for Kiarostami’s schedule to be freed up and the shoot to take place). The only 
person who did not remain for the extended session was the magistrate, who nevertheless remains 
active within the scene by way of fabricated cutaways.
Close-Up is a cinema palimpsest, an account of events that writes over those events, the 
story of a fabrication (Sabzian's pretense) that becomes a truth (the film Close-Up19). The film is 
not a documentary and it is not a fiction, it is an existence in itself, a history of its own writing, an 
event in time made into a film and a film that creates an event in time where the cinema and the 
lived world each author the other. Kiarostami has commented that 'The reason you like that 
character (Sabzian) is because he's an artist. That's why he can make up beautiful lies. And I like 
his lies better than the truth that the others have, because his lies reflect his inner reality better 
than the superficial truth that the other characters express' (Kiarostami 199620). During his 
testimony, Sabzian speaks to this point: 'I know that my behaviour can't be justified, but I also 
think that my love for art should be taken into account' (Sabzian, during the trial, Close-Up). 
Sabzian stands for the privileges of the artist, whose function it is to extend art into life and life 
into art, whose capacity it is to regard all things as predisposed to manipulation (what Bergson 
recognised as the ability to extend possibility of things), whose fallibility it is to indulge personal 
vision, who's task it is to dare to loose a sensible position on the stage of the actual. Sabzian is a 
director; he has directed life.
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Both Sabzian and Kiarostami seem to show the simple and complex ways in which we 
might still extend the possibility of the cinema, but to live in the social world made-over as a film 
in production is a difficult thing. A film that is always and everywhere verges on psychosis. 
Merely the thought of the world as a film  can bring about uncommon mental and social relations. 
Come as you Are (Eastwood 2005) proposes a film that is the world, where people are variously 
good and bad at playing themselves. Casting and performing, shooting and directing, are 
opportunities to be an other, and to re-think the space of one's environment as the place of a film.
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Momjan, a film
On Friday there will be an open pasting session for the 
lead characters in a full-length film production: Momjan, 
a film. No acting experience is required.
Fri Aug 12th 
ZAJENICA TALIJANA 
12-2pm
Characters sought:
A  TEEN A G E GfRL in f e a n s  s a t  o n  a  whrie w ooden  cfta*
HAN 1 « t t i  co n cn to  tntaar
M A H 2W »conrnito»nl<w
BOY m hrs esrty teens «teh concrete mum
LESLA. a  C roa tian  w om an  *< h e r  ( ta b e s
The FILMMAKER
N»4A. an artist m her twenfees 
ABOYONBMX 
a group of YOUNG CHILDREN 
a  S tart puppy
FLORiAN an arts! m hts twenties 
(VO. a  TV cameraman in his twenhes
An ELDERLY WOMAN s a l  o n  a  porch  «wth h e r  h a n d s  ower h e r  (ace
OAVORKA. a  curator
MARKO.aiM
T h e  8 £ J E  R W G E R
A group of artet*
EDI. a Croatian good wBi construction
Come 0 5  you Are began as a meander around Momjan, a quiet Croatian hill town, and 
became a walk as absurd transcription where as much as possible of what could be seen and heard 
during the course of several hours became notated as a film script. This was the barest beginning 
of an impossible inventory: Momjan as cinema. The semi-psychotic act of film writing in this 
way generated an extensive and diverse list of characters, including: a teenage girl in jeans sat on 
a white wooden chair; a boy on a bmx; an elderly woman sat on a porch with her hands over her 
face; workman number four, who stands motionless holding onto a rope; and a female cook, 
blond with bright ginger highlights and a banshee laugh. An open casting session was held for an 
afternoon in and around Momjan's town hall. Local residents and visitors to the town turned up to 
audition, either for the part of themselves, or for the part of someone else. Those auditioning were 
given the duration of one minute to call to mind their environment as cinema and imagine the 
town as a film, and to think of the film that might be made as a part of that continuum. Each 
period of imagining was recorded, and, in addition to this, the performers were asked to reenact 
the actual lived event of their counterparts or their selves as it was evidenced in the cursory script.
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When shooting Come as you Are I was performing the role of a director (much in the same way 
that Sabzian and Kiarostami had), in part masking my motivation as an artist to appropriate 
elements of the cinematic into a different kind of frame. For example, I was not explicit about the 
fact that I did not intend to make the film for which we were casting. I became Steven Eastwood 
as Steven Eastwood, just as each person auditioning adopted the role of a self who will be in a 
film.21 Come As You Are is a parody of the grandiose ambition (and the inevitably simplistic 
result) of any moving image media that purports to articulate the experience of the people(s) of a 
town, or any one person's experience.
When transcribing the emergent and chaotic events of the everyday as a film script, there 
is the immediate problem of replacing the socially centred self (the viewpoint of the person who 
was looking) with a camera-I or a camera-eye. A wide shot is not vision. People react differently 
to cameras than to people entering their social space. A film production always creates a tributary 
of modified behaviour either side of its lens. Many of the audition sequences include point-of- 
view shots ascribed to apparently historically determined subjects, and also what we might term 
'impossible point-of-view' shots, where the shot/reverse-shot which ordinarily tethers the POV to 
the subject doing the looking is complicated by a view which could not possibly be seen. For 
example, the barista who listens to Nirvana's 'Come As You Are' on the jukebox glances off into 
space and the sequence cuts to his view of the other side of the room. The shot then cuts back to 
the barista looking, in order to bind and locate the POV shot as a the 'seen 'of a person and not of 
a camera. After a time, the barista shifts his gaze back to the same eye-line as before. This time 
the sequence cuts to a locked-off shot of a middle-distance landscape with a fractionally different 
focal depth, before returning to the barista looking. The causal relationship of shots is the same, 
and the join of shot/reverse-shot is maintained, only now virtual and actual mental images are 
confused with one another, having already, by their very existence, created disruptions in the 
protocol of factual telling. The cinematic lexicon of the image of seen preceded by the image of 
seer is made doubly complicated: we know that it cannot be factual, but it also does not work 
even as a contrivance, owing to the disproportionate distance between the camera and the face of
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the person looking. In part borrowed from Andy Warhol’s screen tests, these are images of people 
who are inactive before the camera but active in thinking, and these images are inter-cut with 
, vistas that fail to be adequate as the images of either their thoughts or their present vision. And so 
an ostensibly documentary cinema (the recording of a series of auditions) fails to represent the 
interiority of the experience of being auditioned, or of thinking a film, and in doing so makes a 
playful virtue of its shortcomings. The viewer struggles to locate the image as a factual one, and 
this pushes the sequence away from the documentary into the realm of art. Not the image of 
thought then, but the image of a person thinking, which goes against the grain of the documentary 
by showing stasis rather than movement, the passing of time, the metaphysical restlessness of the 
live body at rest and the space of thought as that which cannot be documented. When each person 
imagines, their vision tilts up or down, in order to cut down on immediate present sensory data. 
This is in part the body of their thought, its exterior, how thought is embodied in time. These are 
the faces of interiority’s exteriority, what Stanley Cavell calls somatograms, interior states 
manifested as surface registers - the qualitative becoming of thought (in this case the thought of a 
town as a film).
Come As You Are (2005)
This model, of subjects playing themselves in the reenactment and re-envisioning of 
aspects of their lives, is, as we have noted, currently active in Iranian cinema and also manifests 
widely in television as well as cinema in the form of the docudrama. Such a practice belongs to a 
cinema tradition dating back through Italian neo realism to Soviet social realism.22 Filmmakers 
are also subjects, and it is fruitful to explore the possibility of filmmakers reenacting or parodying 
their own activity of filmmaking, which is what Kiaroastami does directly in Life and Nothing
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More. Different Systems o f  Chaos (Eastwood/Lewin. 2003) has as its founding principle the 
forgery of the documentary and the mocking of institutions, both educational and broadcast. The 
donning of the wig of the BBC (what De Certeau terms la perruque2S) is a means to approach an 
actual situation with the license to command alterations to it, in the name of a documentary film 
of implied significance. We made little effort to conceal our limited production skills and the 
absurdity of our being from any respected broadcast organization (in fact, to some extent we 
performed this limitation, as a way of donning the wig of bad television makers), and none of the 
staff or students believed for a moment that we were from the BBC. With the institution of the 
TV crew suitably ridiculed, the filmmakers, together with the teachers and students of the school, 
enter into a parallel critique, that of the education system and what we might understand to be a 
proper form of schooling. In the film, systems of education and of art making, together with the 
lead characters (the school's Director, artist Redas Dirysz, and the regular target of his art, 
Alexander Lukashenko, political leader of the Belarus Republic) are mischievously introduced to 
the audience by way of stamped title captions, inter-titles, the inclusion of directives from the 
filmmakers to the school's Director add to sense of parody and mockery.
D ifferent System s o f  Chaos (Eastwood & Lewin 2003)
Entire classes were invented as a result of the collaboration between the filmmakers and 
their subject: telepathic drawing classes; a class to train 12 year olds to be efficient 
administrators; peer-to-peer instructional support in the theories of Adomo & Horkheimer, and
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the Dada manifesto. In short, the convention of the documentary, along with the convention of a 
school, is turned upside down. A translator’s note informs the viewer that there was no translator; 
a title caption reveals that die students performed the role of students, and the staff performed die 
role of educators. In fact, the school was not open during the week of filming; both the students 
and the staff came in voluntarily to participate in a documentary as an art project. Both Dailies 
Mokykla the art school and Different Systems o f Chaos the film are testaments to Dirzys' ability to 
utilise the dictates and restrictions of the dominant political and cultural order as art material. In 
Different Systems o f Chaos, Diryzs reveals to the young students the role-play and the fictional 
elements within his own role as their head of school. He allows them to enter into the fiction he 
himself occupies, and, in a parallel fashion, the context of the film in the making made a space for 
inventive falsity.24
Reality TV and the diary film are further sites for forgery and falsity. The omnipresence 
of reality TV plays out the logic of television into absurdum, but it also shows us how reliant we 
are on mediating agencies to instigate change in our lives. In reality TV, video is change; the 
camera crew creates an enhanced social status in everyday life and constitutes location on a wider 
stage, it provides a platform for alterity. The Channel 4 commissioned documentary Daddy's Girl 
(Edmund Coulthard 1999) has as its remit the investigation into possibly incestuous relations 
between fathers and daughters. A team of researchers chose to concentrate their efforts on the 
Yorkshire region of the UK, a working class area selected as likely to yield people with a low 
income who wanted to appear on television. The researchers placed casting calls in modeling 
agencies and local newspapers that were cleverly worded to attract teenagers, particularly teenage 
girls. The director settled on one relationship, between Stuart Greetham and his daughter 
Victoria. Although the film was completed it was never aired because Victoria's actual father 
called the channel having seen the trailer broadcast for the program, and informed them that the 
man on screen was an imposter. Victoria and her boyfriend, Stuart Smith, had duped the entire 
production team, playing the media at its own game and supplying them with the images and 
situations that the broadcasters desired from the point of origin of the programme pitch: risque
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behaviour, drunken fights, jealous arguments, and so on. The couple did in fact want fame and 
notoriety; they simply chose to wear masks in order to achieve it, their forgery creating a 
temporary reversal of hierarchies. Channel 4 had no leverage in decrying the hoaxers who had so 
cleverly revealed the salacious machine of their reality television, and so opted to make a "how 
did they do it?" film instead, titled Who's Been Framed (Riete Oord, CH4. 1999). The shooting of 
Daddy's Girl was Stuart Smith and Victoria Greetham’s carnival time, the forgery they produced 
as a counter force to the modality of the broadcasters. They lived out a new life made possible by 
the agency and gullibility of the mediating order directed towards them. The reality TV of this 
nature that we have seen exploding across our screens in the past five to ten years reveals the 
salability of the everyday: the makeover show (whether it is the making-over of the body, the 
personality, the lifestyle, the profession, the house or the garden), the backstage making-of film, 
the music video EPK, the celebrity in a house, the fame academy, the switching lives programme, 
and so on. Clare Fox {The Institute o f Ideas) argues that this speaks to the diminished view of 
human aspiration and shows the hegemonic neo-liberal system in which television sells us 
ourselves via market populism. The real in TV terms involves removal from society (e.g., the Big 
Brother house). Documentaries are now almost exclusively about personal and not public crisis - 
the foregrounding of people, in preference of issues. 'Our gaze is distracted by narcissism,' (Clare 
Fox, speaking at The Eternal Frame conference, FACT, 2003).
The televised life is an indication of presence, in the way that appearing in somebody 
else's dream provides a further guarantee of our existence to the other. Our social connection to 
the mediating agency is such that if we encounter somebody recognizable from the television or 
cinema in the street, our sensory-motors often leap first of all to the conclusion that this must be 
somebody who we know in our lives. Jonathon Couaette's Tarnation (2005) is an I-Movie collage 
of a life lived almost entirely before the video camera. The filmmaker grew up in a tempestuous 
and possibly abusive family situation, but was handed a VHS camcorder when he was ten and 
began to record diary footage and also performances to the lens. Over the years, as he 
encountered the gay and underground film counter cultures, and battled with his mother and
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grandparents, this tactic of recording became an augmentation to his personality, the camera as 
company, and as permission to act-out. Sophie Calle and Greg Shephard's Double Blind (1992) is 
a deliberate inversion of the road movie and diary film. At the outset the two artists agree to go 
on a trip together with the intention of manying in Las Vegas at the end. Calle declares that she 
wants a life lived as fiction; the marriage is an element in the falsity to which she has surrendered. 
Shephard struggles to match her in this pursuit. The entire journey is mediated through their two 
video cameras, with Calle's nightly and cutting refrain about Shephard, 'No sex last night.' The 
diary as format is parodied, with monologues to camera and recorded thought processes throwing 
the viewer into uncertainty in regard to what was actually lived and genuinely thought rather than 
fabricated for the lens or added in the edit. Gaps occur because of these voiceover thoughts: they 
are edited as concurrent with the pro-filmic activity and yet we know that video cannot record 
thought, it can only give equivalence to it, crudely and after the fact. The camera is held up to the 
face of each protagonist as a mask, and only significantly lowered when the two reach the drive- 
in chapel and take their vows. 'We are each writing our own ending' comments Calle, 'the video 
kept us together. Now that is finished what will become of us?' Calle is asking, if the world is 
filtered through the performance of the self and its encounter with others, than why not surrender 
to fiction, why not abandon oneself to a masquerade and replace actuality with diegesis?
These variously moral, political, social and conceptual dilemmas shore up attitudes 
regarding the engagement between filmmaker and subject, and the porosity between these terms. 
As we have surveyed, there can be both motivated and cynical uses of the Active in the pursuit of 
the actual. The reflexive documentary takes these problems and uses them as a material, or as a 
determined position of uncertainty. The docudrama uses documentary-like images to lend 
authenticity to the entirely fictitious reenactment of historical events. The reality TV show makes 
an arena for a particular kind of acting-out that for the most part is confined to the fishbowl of 
specific formats and products, and almost entirely lacks true contingency. The method of using 
television and cinema as a psycho-dramatic vantage point on recent events, and as a means of 
overwriting those events, invites emulation, derivation, and parody. Some filmmakers scan global
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new reports in search of 'Sabzians' who will provide them with a stage for the unfolding film. 
Paul Berczeller and Glenn Luchford found their Sabzian in Alfred Merhan, the itinerant 
inhabitant of a particular bench in the Orly departure lounge of Charles de Gaulle airport. For 
more than ten years Merhan had remained in the airport without a passport and therefore a permit 
to enter or leave France. Having learned of Merhan's nomadic existence as a refugee in Orly, the 
filmmakers set out to tell his story and use the agency of the film production to enable Merhan to 
leave. Thanks to a human rights lawyer the man they eventually encountered now had all of the 
papers necessary to give up his temporary home, but had chosen not to, preferring to remain in 
the waiting space of the departure lounge, where he was now regarded as institutionalized. 
Median's life is an open duration, an interval, a waiting space filled by journalists who visit the 
departure lounge. The fact that Merhan remains in the airport even though he is now free to leave 
is an invitation: come here and author me. And Merhan is merely a passenger in the subsequent 
film Here to Where (Luchford & Berczeller 2001), a feature that gives us no historical details, 
does not represent Merhan's experience and barely includes its own subject. Instead we are 
presented with a hysteric director, Paul Hugo, (played by Berczeller) who is determined to make 
an award-winning documentary. Berczeller has commented that 'I did start Here to Where hoping 
I could revolutionize Alfred's life, and then along the way I understood the utter folly of that and 
so I played that folly out in my own character' (Berczeller25). Hugo's failed production forms the 
dominant subject of Here to Where, but we see only fragments, rehearsals and test shots for the 
actual film (which, we are to assume, was never made). Berczeller, Berczeller-as-Hugo, and 
Merhan, allow themselves to be used by each other in the advancement of their own particular 
narratives, sparring with one another for viable fictions. For Merhan, the gaze of the film camera 
constructs him and sustains him; for Berczeller, Merhan is already a fiction and therefore the only 
way to be with him is to be false. As Berczeller explains: 'When we got there we were the mother 
load (to Alfred) because he loves things about himself. It's the only thing that makes him feel like 
he exists. Otherwise, in a way, I think its fair to say he doesn't exist. Certainly people would not 
notice him' (Berczeller, ibid).
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Hugo has plans (which were formerly Berczeller’s intentions) for fiction to convey 
Merhan into a new fact and literally dramatize or 'act' him, with the aid of Supporting actors’ out 
of the aiiport. During one pivotal sequence, where the director asks the non-actor Abbas to 
accompany Merhan out of the building, Abbas, no longer playing his role of psychiatrist, says 
with some urgency ’This is not a scene in a movie, the project must stop.’ It remains unclear even 
to Berczeller whether by the time of the shoot this was an actual or an invented intention. As he 
remarks ’The thing about the whole process was it was so mixed up — fiction and reality — I 
literally have trouble sometimes remembering which was which. I still to this day don’t know and 
that’s the thing about Kiarostami: you will never know. When you start this process if you try to 
really, really find out what happened, then you’re being dishonest' (Paul Berczeller, ibid). 
Entering into such an irreverent attitude of filmmaking means that once inside its aberrant frame 
it is no longer possible to discern what is fact from what is fiction. Here to Where cannot be 
stabilized in our minds as documentary, its methods betrayed by the meta-positioning of the 
camera, and yet so much of what we are watching transpired in actuality.
The frame of filmmaking here is a double palimpsest, the writing over of a type of film - 
Iranian cinema - that already writes over the lived world through its use of social non-actors, 
reenactments and long takes. This idea of cinema as ecriture, what Pasolini referred to in 
Heretical Empiricism (Pasolini. 1972) as ’writing the real with the real,' suggests that film can 
also be thought as a chromotype (Bakhtin 1984), where filmmaking enters into dialogue with that 
which it seeks to register rather than remains removed from it as a representational tool. As Jean- 
Louis Comolli writes, 'the point is reached when the cinema is linked to life according to a system 
which is not one of reproduction, but of reciprocal production, so that the film [...] is 
simultaneously produced by and produces the events and situations’ (Comolli, quoted in 
Christopher Williams (Ed.) 1980). For Berczeller, what began as a project for social change 
became a stage for presenting the problems of such an incentive. The principal motivation for 
Here to Where changed from social transformation to parody, although clearly many of those 
participating in the film, including the crew, were not aware of this (and this again is an example
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of how forgery and modality can occur within the same film production). Berczeller’s mocking 
forgery of the hysteric director who is gradually losing grip of reality was not apparent to the 
crew. Almost none of the film we are watching is the pro-filmic of the film being made.
Here to Where (2001)
We see Merhan's face screen tested through the crosshair of the film camera viewfinder 
and he protests, 'Off, off, no more,' refusing to be directed to do anything he does not want to and 
complaining that Abbas (the fictional psychiatrist and his counterpart in the scene) is repeating 
the same question. When these series of ‘takes’ are explained to Merhan he appears fully 
cognizant of the film production process, but disinterested in it.26 Merhan is an intercedent, a 
category of non-fixity. Merhan as a subject is the centre of a glass-paneled maze. He is a crystal 
refracting back into the execution of the film that he is inversely directing, from within the 
interval he occupies and the gaps in the film’s execution. We can see him, and the film follows all 
manner of routes towards him, but he remains unreachable, his identity, his representation, 
blocked by the very film that is trying to capture him. He stands for the limit of the factual, and, 
as a subject, for the threshold of cinema’s ability to depict or describe. The same can be said of 
Sabzian in Kiarostami's film. All we can reliably say is that a film happened to all of those 
participating; who they are and what occurred outside of the film cannot be so accurately 
rendered. The most faithful representation a moving image can provide is that of itself. This is 
why films about films are more than rhetorical and reflexive devices; they are the pocket mirrors 
with which to stare at the Medusa behind us.
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Each of the films examined here demonstrates that the schema of a film in production can 
function as a site to improvise life anew. Deleuze's idea of a minor cinema is precisely this: a film 
watcher posing as a great film director; the use of a minor voice in a major language; a group of 
people electing to film anything and anywhere they please. The moving image is thus reclaimed, 
now utilized as a form of social hacking where the falsities of the moving image conjoin with 
fabrications at play in the social space. The powers of the false in Sabzian, Kiarostami, Merhan, 
Berczeller, Smith, Greetham and Calle are different in their contexts and execution, but there is 
confederacy in what they find as utility in the strange spaces and uncanny times of their own 
particular form of film or television. Each of them has adopted the persona of a mediated identity 
and found in film or in video a philosophical friend with which to concoct their inventions. Their 
cinema is an overwriting machine that writes over the actual and then in turn is overwritten by 
that actual. In this cinema everyone is the re-mediator of the everyday; everyone is a filmmaker.
I am suggesting that we think of the role of 'filmmaker1 as in the category of what 
Deleuze and Guattari call a conceptual persona, or a philosophical friend. Deleuze and Guattari 
state in What is Philosophy? (1991) that the philosopher is in fact the concept's friend; she or he 
is the conduit for, and the potentiality of, the concept. The conceptual persona, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, enables the philosopher and maker to engage in thinking beyond the molar 
subject, releasing new potentials at a level of molecular becoming, and transcending mind/body 
dualisms. When we invent a conceptual persona, we can enter into a dialogical relationship with 
its difference to us. This persona, or friend to an innovative set of ideas which might otherwise 
not manifest, is the mask Kiarostami celebrates in Sabzian. The conceptual persona I have 
adopted is filmmaker. He is the opportunity I find to be alien, to be a stranger within my own 
(cinematic) language, to conduct my attention as another - the other thinker in my thoughts.271 
fSknmake in order to be other than I am, in order to become filmmaker filnmaking, and this 
conceptual persona is a drifter navigating the lived world as an affect space, as a series of 
thoughts, as the film I am making, in order to encounter immanence (what will I find with this 
film?). An idea for a film is a set of thoughts that attempt to inscribe themselves, in mediation,
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and in actuality, on the actual. The various media used have properties that push back against this 
ideation. The actual asserts enormous force; the thought changes; the thinking mind returns to the 
idea for the film, and attempts again, with force, to condition the terms of the actual of 
filmmaking. And then in the edit, all kinds of thoughts, intuitions, and practicalities, push and 
pull, vie for fruition. The film tactic coupled with the conceptual persona is able to ignore this, to 
willfully think away from the result and head in the direction of the not finished. This avoids the 
trap of overly conditioned thoughts.
Bakhtin sees the world as activity; Deleuze sees being as an event, a life as a series of 
utterances. In Bakhtin, the term ’being' has die etymology of 'co,' in other words being is shared; 
we are always co-being, a centre and a non-centre in the perpetual oscillation which is a life. In 
Bakhtin, the other is, however, in the realm of completeness, whereas the T that is not the other 
experiences time as open and always as yet unfinished. In our present perception the other is hard 
edged, and the self is non-hgurative. The classical film as other to our thought and experience is 
regarded by our sensorium as a complete whole. This is the status of normative cinema, an 
obsession towards structural integrity, towards a whole, which necessitates endless thought and 
action subsets of validity, determinacy, and order. My interest is in how the event of filmmaking 
takes me beyond ontology. Who am I when I film? What has happened to my history, my identity 
and the capability of my imaginary when I film? How is my recognition altered and my capacity 
for memory diminished by the distraction and concentration of filmmaking? The emphasis I place 
on filmmaking as opposed to filmmaker, or film, echoes Deleuze and Guattari's focus on 
philosophy rather than philosopher. The destratifying from the psychoanalytic paradigm of 
Oedipal identity in their philosophy has the objective of releasing pre-personal possibilities.28 
This has direct application in the filmmaking process - hopping from film to film archipelago 
transverging territories, gathering and then losing knowledge, making mistakes and deploying 
falsities. And in terms of a missing people, filmmaking as intervention offers both the subject and 
filmmaker the possibility of emerging, as intercessors, through fictional frames into actual 
difference.
1 Conversation between D.N. Rodowick and Steven Eastwood, Harvard University, February 2005.
2 In literary criticism, the term fabulation was popularized by Robert Scholes, in his work The Fabulators (1967) to 
describe magical realist twentieth century novels that do not fit into the traditional categories of realism. They 
experiment with subject matter, form, style, temporal sequence, and fusions of the everyday, fantastic, mythical, and 
nightmarish, in renderings that blur traditional distinctions between what is serious or trivial, horrible or ludicrous, 
tragic or comic. Fabula is not so much an event chain underlying the subject, as a by-product of the interpretative 
process by which we throw into relief and assimilate the subject's rhetorical control of narrative information. Its 
integrity as a concept is not to be found in its relation to any given narrative, but to any given act of narrative 
interpretation (source, Wikipedia).
3 Gardin, Lorant and Cahour also write about the contexts of institutional and non-institutional frames, including the 
courtroom, which bring with them their own sets of linguistic behaviours.
4 Bernard Gardin writes that 'The notions of "frame", like the related notion of "footing", which refers to the 
implications of the way it is possible to move fluidly and rapidly between frames (Goffman 1981), is a sociological 
concept which relates to the individual’s way of experiencing the current situation, regulating his/her own conduct and 
interpreting the behaviour of others. However, aspects of the individual’s speech will be directly influenced by the 
frame in which they consider themselves to be operating' (Gardin, Bernard; Lorant, Fran$oise; Cahour, Beatrice, ibid).
5 Abbas Kiarostami interviewed by Philip Lopate, Film Comment, July - August 1996:40.
6 Barbara J. Socor, Ph.D. The S elf and its Constructions: A Narrative Faith in the Postmodern World. Retrieved 
March 4,2000 from: http://www.iona.edu/academic/artsscience/orgs/pastoral/issues/ 1997openingofiiarrativespace.pdf
7 Berger and Luckman. The Social Construction o f Reality. 1966.
8 Kenneth Gergen The Saturated Self. 1991.
9 Michel Foucault finds in Bakhtinian camivalization a behavioural intention that endures as a spirit that assists in the 
extension of 'our participation in the present system’ (Foucault 1977: 230-231). Within the considerable risk of 
Sabzian's pretense, and in the tenacity of his performance, we can find many elements of the upheaval and reversibility 
of terms theorized by Bakhtin in his analysis of the carnival of the middle ages: the non-finalizablity of human 
character, the overturning of institutions; forgery and parody; the creative act of an unrecognized producer; an 
utterance in anticipation of an interlocutor, the diacritical play of difference. The carnival is the very loosening of 
established frames, what Robert Stam describes as, 'a counter-model of cultural production and desire, generated by the 
oppressed' (Stam 1989: 94-95). Bakhtin writes that 'Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it, and 
everyone participates because its very idea embraces all the people. While carnival lasts, there is no other life outside it. 
During carnival time life is subject only to its laws, that is, the laws of its own freedom' (Bakhtin 1984: 7). Bakhtin 
points out that carnival occurrence ceases around the late Renaissance but the carnival's attitude of wild meaning 
remains as a theory of resistance.
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11 Kiarostami, quoted in Bruno Roberti (Ed.) Abbas Kiarostami. 1996:45.
12 Ibid.
13 Berger and Luckman (1966: 49) write that, 'While it is possible to say that man has a nature, it is more significant to 
say that man constructs his own nature, or more simply, that man produces himself.'
14 Kiarostami, interviewed by Philip Lopate, Film Comment, July-August 1996: 40.
15 Saeed-Vafa, Mehmaz and Rosenbaum, Jonathon. Abbas Kiarostami. 2003.
16 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology o f Knowledge (1969), Routledge, 1972.
17 For example, Kiarostami lifts the intimate story of how Sabzian and die eldest son took scooter trips together to the 
mountains and uses it as a device in his own narrative’s resolution, where Makhmalbaf drives Sabzian on a scooter 
from the prison to the Ahankhah house. We have seen Kiarostami meet Sabzian and now we see, for the purposes of 
Kiarostami's story and by his design, Sabzian meeting Makhmalbaf. This is a closure entirely orchestrated by 
Kiarostami, actually occurring and yet authored. On a finite scale every documentary does this, but Kiarostami pushes 
it to the level of scripting a life-changing event. As Alberto Elena has observed, this meeting is realized in the 
recognizable mode of a live report, in which we can hear the crew off-camera, anxious and disappointed about the slip­
shod results (a device Kiarostami used earlier, in Homework 1989). Is this a genuine error resulting from the haste 
surrounding such a pivotal event, or rather a device used to show that some events cannot (must not?) be captured on 
camera? Kiarostami maintains that the actual conversation between the two men on the scooter ride was very dull and 
so the 'error' in sound helped salvage the scene. Makhmalbaf claims that their dialogue consisted of Sabzian saying he 
no longer wanted to make the film.
18 Abbas Kiarostami, quoted in Stdphane Goudet (1995). Makhmalbaf accompanied Kiarostami to Ghasr prison for the 
initial meetings with Sabzian, a detail that of course alters the impact of their 'first' meeting at the end of the film. The 
two directors also met with the Ahankhahs to negotiate the production of the film, although this time the family made 
sure to check the men's credentials. The magistrate delayed the court hearing by several days to meet with the filming 
schedule (Sabzian later attempted to sue Kiarostami over the three additional days he spent in prison as a result). 
Kiarostami filmed the actual trial over one hour, and then did a further nine hours of filming once the judge had left 
(later inserting cut-away shots to make it appear as though he had been present throughout). Kiarostami then 
improvised five weeks of shooting based on his courtroom footage, saying that is was the court that produced the film. 
Kiarostami has commented, 'I shot the film dining the day and made notes at night. There wasn't much time to think, 
and when it was finished I watched the film like any other spectator, because it was new even to me,' (Kiarostami, 
quoted in Bruno Roberti [2003]).
19 Alberto Elena notes that 'Our expectation is always for the narrative to follow the character "laced" closer to the 
centre, the stage where things are happening, but this narrative seems to want to stay on die margin of things - each
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time it shifts away from the character who has the better access to the story' (Elena 2005: 88 quoting Gilberto Perez). 
David Oubina, during a lecture given at New York University in 2006, comments that, '[Kiarostami] ...catches the film 
on the verges of obscurity. In the whirlwind of superposition, duplications and rewritings, it is impossible to distinguish 
a single point of view, and so the subject matter of the film becomes singularity malleable, abandons conventional 
labels and is ready to take on new forms...it is impossible to take up a constant viewpoint, impossible to fix your 
attention.'
20 Kiarostami interviewed by Philip Lopate, Film Comment, July-August 1996: 39.
21 We might ask, if somebody had chosen to audition for the part of Steven Eastwood the film director, would they, as a 
part of their audition, have directed people who were auditioning? This is the labyrinthine relationship the cinema has 
to our lived experience. To audition to play that particular filmmaker would have been to unleash a duplicate of the
lived world as film within a film that was already proposed as duplicate of the lived world as a film.
22 Gillo Pontecorvo's The Battle o f Algiers (1965) was cast almost entirely from persons living in the same quarter 
where the violent events between the French and Algerians had taken place. Ken Loach and Tony Garnett’s The Big 
Flame (1969) performs the hypothetical outcome of a Dockers’ dispute and features actual people appearing alongside 
of trained actors, both reproducing and inventing, 'real-life situations,' as Raymond Williams (1976) puts it In The 
Legend o f Boggy Creek (Charles B. Pierce 1972), actual inhabitants of a small American town play themselves in the 
dramatized reenactment of their own traumatic encounter with what they describe as a Yeti. More recently, Fuckland 
(Jos6 Luis M&rques 2000), the first Latin American film of the avant-garde Dogme 95 movement, was recorded 
illegally in the Falkland Islands in 1999. The incendiary provocation of the film is that the only way to make the islands 
Argentine is to populate them with Argentinians, by making all the Falklander women pregnant. The film features 
seven professional actors who improvised their scenes with local residents, many of whom were not made aware that 
they were taking part in the production of a feature film. In The Blonds (Albertina Carri 2003) the director, Carri, is 
played by an actress whom Carri appears alongside of in many of the scenes.
23 La perruque is a French idiomatic expression meaning work one does for oneself in the guise of work done for an 
employer. De Certeau uses this idea to talk about the socially weak who make use of the socially strong by engineering 
an independent domain within the situation imposed on them.
24 The shoot was extra-curricular, but not in fact at odds with the teaching ideology of Dirzys, who makes an entire 
practice of critiquing the governmental systems he finds himself working within and against, and who has in the past 
involved his teenage students as political antagonists in his own art woik. When the school in Alytus was threatened 
with closure in 2004, Different Systems o f Chaos was instrumental in making a successful case for the school remaining 
open.
25 Paul Berczeller, in an interview conducted by Steven Eastwood, November 2004.
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26 Berczeller admits to not knowing whether the tears he cried at the end of the bathroom shaving scene were his own 
or Hugo’s. This sequence consists o f one long take, but Merhan is not taken. He leaves the ‘set’ first, and outside asks 
Luchford, “How did I do?” Berczeller believes it did not matter to Merhan whether he was in fact the director Paul 
Hugo; he was only concerned with his appearance in the film.
27 Alio is the root for alien, but it also means other.
28 Destratification is a process in which the air or water is mixed in order to eliminate stratified layers of temperature, 
plant, or animal life.
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What then, is left? The greatest 'agitprop' cinema that has ever been made: the 
agitprop is no longer a result of a becoming conscious, but consists of putting 
everything into a trance, the people and its masters, and the camera itself, pushing 
everything into a state of aberration...
(Deleuze 1989: 219)
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Act 3, Sc 11. Cinema into the Real
... if the brain was invented to surpass a closed plane of nature, does the human in 
turn invent cinema in order to surpass the closed duration of man?
(Lambert 2000: 288)
I have attempted to bring the body of cinema into the world, to see how it operates 
there and how it is received -  an old and new body of cinema coerced into meeting the old 
and the new of thought. The next thing to do is to make a film, and this for me is always the 
next thing to do - another film, always the place of that new film. What the next film will 
consist of cannot yet be determined, but within these pages I have outlined a number of tactics 
for its wayward mind and body: a fluid moving image that changes the utterance of the 
dominant cinema vernacular; a panic cinema that offers entry into the interval of thought; an 
itinerant cinema that rents space in the place of another; a palimpsest cinema that intervenes 
in and writes over existing social relations; a free indirect discourse between film and the 
lived world. The next film is a feature whose duration is not set. It is an unregulated and 
unfinished narrative that opens onto the world.
The irrational cinema of the time-image explores a world of affect in and around the 
individual, an aspect of time that is strange to us. Deleuze identified a reformation, a second 
modem of the cinematic body, where cinema is open to the outside. This philosophy gives us 
an invigorated belief in the world through the capability of a rogue moving image whose 
systems are not solely unified and whose art is inorganic and not a representation of reality. 
The rhizome is the dynamic engine of proliferation for the seriality of this image; it allows 
difference to emerge inexorably from repetition. This is Deleuze's explicit project - to develop 
the image of thought from merely that of a model of recognition to one founded on the logic 
of difference and multiplicity. He calls for a bodily deterritorialization as well as a conceptual
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deterritorialization. The practice of this new event of cinema is one that brings together 
conceptual thought with corporeal extensivity. This method of dissent is to detach from the 
classical cinema's proper body, so that the moving image moves towards the real and changes 
our prehension of it. Cinema into the Real is what we might call transfilmmaking (to adapt 
Novak’s term). It is the implication of the biological into the cinematic and of the cinematic 
into the biological. The film becomes other than a unity in the meeting of these bodies, it 
escapes cinematic language in order to dissipate into the filmed world, a space where, as 
Arthur Kroker writes, 'semiology acquires corporeality, where die sign finally breathes, taking 
possession of the bodily organs it thought it was only denoting from afar* (Kroker 19921). 
Cinema into the Real is thus the activity of conducting oneself towards the corporeal limit of 
cinema and the ideational limit of thought. I see a film and it is not my body, although it 
introduces to my body various sensations of augmentation. I see a film and it appears as my 
thought, but it cannot think without me -  the film and myself are powered by thinking and yet 
when we meet we are also strangely thought-less.
We know that the cinema is relatively new, and that the specific thought which is to 
think o f a film, or to think with a film, has not always existed. Conceiving of a film before 
making it, or completing the medium's cinematographic process in the mind, or, for that 
matter, thinking the thoughts that a film creates and commands, these are new kinds of 
thoughts. Before cinema, one could not think time and space cinematically. There is therefore 
an unthinkable in thought that is cinema, and this is how the cinema shows to us a remarkable 
set of openings. When in departure from fixed cinematic schemas we enter the noises of the 
image, the intervals of its assemblages, the wild contingencies of a film in production, and we 
discover what film and thought possibilities inhere. In terms of pre-production, production 
and post-production, which is the principal space of thought for the filmmaker, an idea for a 
film is a set of thoughts that attempt to inscribe themselves through mediation. The various 
media used have properties that push back against this ideation. The actual environment of the
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shoot also exerts considerable force, and we should not neglect the properties of this force, 
because it is as a result of these contingencies that the thoughts change. The thinking mind of 
the filmmaker returns to the originating idea for the film, and attempts again to condition the 
terms of the filmmaking. In the edit too, all manner of intuitive and practical thoughts emerge, 
assembling and disassembling the raw material. In Notes on the Cinematographer (1975) 
Robert Bresson describes the process of a film production as a series of deaths. The first death 
is that of the idea as it slips from its spark of thought, and from there follows the death of the 
idea to the page, the page to the shoot, the shoot to the edit and the edit to the exhibition (not 
to mention, nowadays, the exhibition to the digital compression). The idea had better be a 
good one then, and a good idea is one that acknowledges a schema as it moves beyond it and 
finds space in the not-yet-thought.
A film is always the forcing into being of a thought (from the virtual to the 
production) in the direction of another virtual (the finished film). Therefore, a film is always 
in a decline as it emerges and becomes, because it fails to be the real and equally it fails to 
resemble a film thought. But this failure is precisely where any filmmaker must concentrate 
their efforts, for it is here where new thoughts and new lived worlds reside. A cinematic 
thought is to imagine the world as temporally and figuratively different than it is customarily 
perceived. To then attempt to film the thought is to attempt the impossible, because film and 
the real are incompossible.2 A becoming cinema enters the affect state between filmmaker and 
film text, an agitated and antagonistic space of difference, where the practitioner of this space 
purposefully faces the not-yet-known, and the not-yet-thought. For a film practice to be 
emergent and a form of becoming it must release itself from the binds of the pre-determined 
or the preconceived. Purposefully thinking away from the result and conducting oneself as 
filmmaker in the direction of the not finished avoids the trap of overly conditioned thoughts. 
And yet this is not yet brought fully into critique by theories of cinema. None of the received
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modes of film criticism or of production regards filmmaking as a site for seeking to invent 
what is being lived, as it is lived.
The conceptual persona I adopt to think away from conditioned thoughts is 
filmmaker. I have used this persona to enter the space of affect and to think in the interval that 
is panic, without panicking. This is perhaps the greatest and yet least tapped resource the 
moving has to offer - its propensity for generating a state of affect without trauma - for this is 
the state from where intuition and innovation derives. The idea of a panic cinema has been the 
most elusive concept within the research. A panic cinema comprises of time-images so far 
from the anchorage of causality that they bring about momentary temporal disturbance, but 
the sheer virtuality of the cinema, and in particular the cinema's time-images, is what 
constitutes its comparative safety. The time-image is a potential rather than an actual. The 
cinema's absent centre is a gift. It can show to us how to trust an interval in thought. Affect 
does not only occur within the experience of the viewer; it is also the chief state of the 
filmmaker who relinquishes schema and courts loss of continuity. And so in addition to 
generating image relations which bring about absences, I am proposing a form of becoming- 
panic by being a filmmaker who is, dining the event of filmmaking, entering a becoming 
which is the film being made, an absence from customary activity. For Deleuze, creativity is 
panic, is life itself, matter in relation to other matter, the emergent and distressing differing of 
all things. To create is to panic matter, to be an emergent thinker who is foreign to one’s 
material presence and alien to one's own thoughts.3 In other words, we might endeavour to 
pass through the gaps opened up by cinema to get to the real that is a gap in our perception, an 
immanence that is in and of itself indivisible, the ever becoming of matter and of our thoughts 
and actions.
For Deleuze the time-image does not give to us action but rather what has not yet 
been thought. Where Bacchus rode drunkenly on the back of a donkey, Deleuze revels in the
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purely virtual. Anarchic actions in the lived world are for political activists, for artists also, 
but Deleuze's medium is thought itself - the virtual material of die philosopher. He asks, what 
has not yet been thought and what can possibly be thought? The cinema gave the twentieth- 
century mind its power of thought, its new means to think itself. It chose, predominantly, to 
continue to think itself as Cartesian, as Hegelian, not as Nietzschean4. Lambert writes that 
'Thought was enclosed in this resemblance (to cinema) and lost touch with the principle of 
thinking' (2000: 286).
Deleuze is... suggesting the emergence of a new subject that categorizes space-time: 
a purely cinematic subject, or I THINK, which is interposed between the brain and 
the world, or between the brain of a supra-intelligence and the “open” through which 
the whole itself undergoes a dialectical 'conflagration.'
(Lambert 2000: 265, quoting Deleuze 1989: 159)
Such a philosophy of cinema is not scientific, nor is it even rational, it is an 
experiment in the creative possibility of thought. A structural theory of the signs and 
responses in cinema can never constitute a creative movement of thought; it is a form of 
cataloguing, like the schemas it sorts; it is not a practice. The moving image is an aid in 
reconditioning the psychic system so that it may traverse the chaotic and the contingent 
without constructing cliched response through sensible filters. This is the time-image, the 
cinema as means to think and experience a gap or in-between in thought. It is neither fruitful 
nor possible to use Deleuze’s taxonomy to analyze other texts, in die way that film theorists 
use Lacanian theory, or the ideas of Derrida (although some theorists do attempt to use 
Deleuze’s terms in this way5).
Many claim that the cinema as an inventive site is in its death throes. This may be the 
case in terms of the monopoly industrial cinema has in the mode of its production and 
distribution. This may also be true of the received conventions of film or video as art object in 
the gallery, in spite of its current propagation. Certainly, many practitioners of film and video 
regard themselves as delimited by the constant problem of choosing between the auditorium
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and the black box or white cube. Another kind of space is needed. But from the very first 
ideas of cinema, before the medium had found its proper form, there has always been an other 
cinema, envisioned around its capability of liveness and duration, and premised on its acute 
disparity to how we think and observe. This other cinema is a machine for denaturing material 
indexes. It found a voice in the machinic eye of Vertov’s camera, in aspects of surrealist film, 
in the collective projects of amateur cineastes and the formalism of the avant-garde, and the 
aberrant fragmented arrangements of time in neo-realism, but the dialect of these minor 
voices became largely appropriated as styles and discourses into the production of art and 
commercial cinema. Time-images now most frequently occur as rapid flashing frames in 
television advertisements or as formulaic altered states of consciousness in large budget 
Hollywood features. Many of the processes in structural-materialist film or in video art have 
been appropriated as signs into populist and commercial forms such as the music video and 
club visuals, and the attitudes of the drift documentary or the essay film are re-used as styles 
in news reportage and infomercials. At this current point in history the mass media with its 
mass representations is omnipresent, and the nature of mediation it generates is inescapable. 
The ruin of such representations is precisely to make a problem of representation, in other 
words to not speak for another or require another to speak for oneself. I have proposed an 
itinerant, open-set process of filmmaking, and a cinema that delights in the act of denaturing 
the lived world, as one means for making mediation our own again. Re-mediating in this way 
we make a new sense of, and engagement with, the lived world. The moving image is freed 
up to us as the play of difference between die text and its outside, between the author and text, 
between the real and the imagined. Cinema into the Real, then, is the figural wrested from 
figuration. It is the figure in itself, unfettered by representations. A cinema into the real does 
not (cannot) speak using a proper language; it makes utterances from the mucous produced at 
the periphery of the body of the cinematic proper, child-like, porous, ungainly, but never 
entirely denying the language it does not properly speak.
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We might think of such a denatured form of filmmaking as similar in character to an 
earlier and often fantastical oral tradition involving the making and telling of stories in and for 
local communities. In many ways this would also involve a return to the personal, local and 
durational nature of the early cinema, where cinematographic apparatus traveled to diverse 
communities and provided images of lives without resorting to telling. The anti-spectacle 
credo of the amateur cineaste movement regarded the making of the film as more important 
than the film itself - the cineaste often resisting the role of consumer, instead occupying the 
roles of producer, projectionist, distributor and participant in one body, with participation 
being the most potent element.6 Digital cinema has created resurgence in moving image 
production by non-professionals and artists who work with the properties of their everyday 
and post the results on networked on-line outlets such as Youtube. Cheaper and smaller 
cameras, along with more sophisticated software and ever-growing moving image literacy 
have meant that a vast array of techniques and more spontaneous attitudes has become 
available to users of the everyday. The more that we make films which depict and/or invent 
our own personal daily lives, rather than rely on other agencies to do so, the more exciting 
and imaginative the world becomes. Daily life can be rendered unnatural and experimentally 
altered, and many more people can engage in die practice of filmmaking. Deleuze said that 
the people are missing in cinema but they are not missing in underground film events and on­
line. We have been given the illusion of a collective — the people — but the people are 
missing.7_Film can, and must, be mutable and a force for social engagement. Ways of 
becoming-imperceptible, or molecular, have been proposed. Hakim Bey declares the 
Temporal Autonomous Zone as a radical uprising in which a becoming can take place; the 
Situationists entered this state outside of fixed identity by drifting and appropriating; Artaud 
screamed for a radical form of anarchic poetry. Cinema into the Real seeks for the moving 
image to remain as an open set.
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The transformation of the moving image involves a shift in its use and function, on an 
exodus from the narrative security of the filmic text and on the transformation of the subject, 
both behind camera, on-camera, in theatre or through gallery. This transformation is not 
solely determined by the filmic text but by the agency of the subject as mental and social 
(film)-maker. Increasingly I mock myself as expert filmmaker, and mock my own attempts to 
evince something resolved or meaningful. The declaration that I am making a film that is 
'always and everywhere,' and the statement 'I make films wrong' have become tactics for 
simultaneously parodying the grandiose ambitions of the fiction auteur or direct cineaste and 
provoking a cinematic dislocation in the mind of the person the speech act is directed toward. 
The tactic of filmmaking that I have practiced offers the possibility for an uprising in thought 
and collective behaviour. This is a Assuring of a social continuum, where social relations and 
habitual thoughts are temporarily supplanted by the act of making a film. When filmmaking, 
the film thinks us - the people. In this space, everything is a material: the tiredness and 
waiting of the making process as much as the momentum of shooting; the room tone 
recorded; the cluttered positions in the pre and pro-filmic space; compositions such as the 
hitting of marks in front of and behind camera; decoupage, or the stopping and starting of 
actual and invented occurrences to re-set the camera; re-enactment and repetition; gaps in 
telling and cracks in representation. How this works may be unknowable. How I work, what 
the space of this filmmaking yields, or if the films from these spaces even speak, may all be 
unknowable. If a cinema into the real speaks it cannot yet be understood, because it is not 
complete; it is still open, a gap. And can we not think of the supreme gap as that of the 
situation of continual making, which can be ascribed as feminine because it is not solid and 
does not behave in closed-set form? I am referring to a form of cinema as open whole, or 
open work, never so much finished as 'enough for now.' I am not speaking of documenting 
our everyday, but regaining license to envision an everyday, by way of the moving image and 
its various touches. The Dionysian, nomadic principle in Nietzsche translates as filmmaking 
exuberance, as facing the everyday with the liberty to transform its appearances.
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Narrative is never without slippage and cannot contain all of the rogue elements its 
seeks to order or repress. Every film bears the trace of its inability to integrate the actual, to 
synthesize with the actual and yet equally every film bears the register of its inability to be 
anything other than actual and never fully a film.8 A film is always made incorrectly, is 
always an aberration that is forced on the everyday but can never find synthesis in the 
everyday. The cinema is nothing but a series of denaturings: the denaturing of the lived world 
as we experience it, which is already denatured by the sensory-motor schema and by 
language, and then the denaturing of the denaturing, where the film folds into its own 
becoming and resists an imposed proper o f telling. In spite of so much industrious effort, any 
film desires to remain open and celebrate its propensity for openness rather than its habitual 
tendency towards closure (the written page has far fewer vibrations to try to contain). The 
film's Whole, which is its identity (the tether of impossible continuity, of laws of diegesis, and 
so on) is forever on the verge of dissipating into contingency, towards nowhere, to the world, 
all of the world; a world which it would then be.
Of course, filmmakers are confined by the physical limitations of a required 
distributable film object, but to close a film is always to deny a film its potency. A finished 
film is the attempt at synthesizing thought and the lived world, but a thought, the lived world, 
and a film each have specific operations and different properties, and it is their very 
difference to one another that yields innovation.9 The result of ‘completed* or ‘closed' art - the 
art object - is always already old, and liable to cliche, but the ‘doing’ of art is less prone to 
habit than the engagement with its result. The essence of creativity is the extending of the 
possibility of a material and the ever emerging unthinkable in thought. The challenge for any 
filmmaker wishing to overthrow the dialectical hegemony inherent in their medium is to 
create voids, to prize open gaps, to tear apart regimes of unity, perhaps even to purposefully 
never finish films. This is the fluid space Irigaray calls for, to reveal the behind-the-scenes 
workings of the representations that are manifest in conscious experience, whilst
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understanding that to be completely released from such structures (or habits) is to deny the 
subject an experience of the limits, and illuminations, of language. Irigaray hints at a more 
fluid subject, one that is immersed in the lived world and whose boundaries are indistinct and 
always moving. A fluid filmmaker produces a haptic cinema that we can touch, using thick 
description to brush more closely with the flow of our movements. This is a cinema that 
resists definition as in opposition to, or rejecting language (classical cinema) and instead 
emerges from a proper language as the difference to it. This filmmaker takes the film 
production process, along with its textual offering and the viewer, towards its limit. The 
places of cinema become collapsed into the spaces of moving image making. The self is not 
erased, but updated, as a life.
The cinema's task is to propose absences to us, and for us to make use of these 
temporal and social differences to occupy a creative becoming, as disparate identities, as 
sentient bodies in time. Cinema has relied on particular currencies of absence, particularly 
narrative signifiers. I am speaking for a minor absence, die minor occurrence of lived film, a 
deterritorializing of the subject, not merely the deconstructing of cinema but the proposition 
of a new film nature, that of becoming filmmaking, that of merging the factual with the 
fictional in an open Whole of filmmaking. The I  Make Things Happen trilogy, the Actually 
trilogy, Like a House on Fire, Different Systems o f Chaos, and Come As You Are, are films 
objects that exist as fixed durations with titles, beginnings and ends. They are cultural objects 
for dissemination. What remains virtual is the excess of these films, the residual thoughts. It is 
the space of the film object as not-yet thought, and the space of the film shoot as not-yet film, 
which has commanded my interest as a researcher and a filmmaker. I am not merely making 
films reflexively, I am uttering the one certainty, that when filmmaking there is always a film 
utterance - an 'I film' - a speech act which renders image movement from the wild meaning of 
directing ones thoughts and one's camera to the lived world. It is the differences between film 
and the lived world that generate new dialogical relations. There is something of the
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impossible here - to put cinema into the real and the real into cinema - but to call out across 
the gap of the not possible makes for peculiar and iridescent utterances. I am speaking now 
for the moving image as an excess machine, the cinema as a frame for difference, a wig 
donned, an inverted order, a false world that a missing people bring to our own world. 
Cinema into the Real departs from Artaud's violence and cruelty by making a free indirect 
frame for the film production, through which the filmmaker-participant sees his or her own 
world as a film and film as a world. This frame for thought and conduct is an open set of 
intercessors and interstices, our new cinematic body, an unknown body that is the actual and 
the cinematic, an emergent poetics, a force from the outside. Such a fdm  is an open work and 
a process that thinks. It is a total film, a film only possible in a nature of thought that cannot 
yet be, but embodied nonetheless, as the line of flight towards the not-yet of its own cinematic 
nature.
We are reaching for an expanded understanding of the experience of cinema, a 
cinema whose circumference is everywhere and whose centre is nowhere. This is a cinema 
that does not yet exist, although it is already here. Roy White informed me the second day we 
met that, 'Steven, the film is already made.' To encounter immanence is to be a life. One 
method for this is to be a life as a film. What is a film if it is not a life? I once received a 
phone call from a woman of what sounded like Eastern European origin. 
She told me that she had a, "Three year long film" she wanted to show 
me. This small linguistic slip started a series of thoughts about 
film and the lived world...
2 8 7
Kroker writes that, 'Refusing the post-Cartesian inhibitions of the "language subordination" of post-structuralism, 
they (Deleuze and Guattan) went all the way by writing, that is, a schizo philosophy of the tattooed body. Tattooed 
not just on the outside (although that too), but on the inside: a signatured body written where semiology acquires 
corporeality, where the sign finally breathes, taking possession of the bodily organs it thought it was only denoting 
from afar* (Arthur Kroker 1992).
2 Eisenstein does give the example in Charles Dickens o f a carriage ride being a tracking shot. Renoir at the end of 
his life said 'Give my wheelchair a push [...] I’m like a slow moving camera' (Renoir, quoted in Virilio 1991: 63).
3 Art making is something that matters more to Deleuze than the artist who is creating or the object created (and 
this is also where Deleuze is anti-hermeneutic and anti-psychoanalytic). Philosophy and cinema (all things, in fact) 
have an inherent creativity within them, but for Deleuze the process must always be extracted from the result. This 
is why artists have taken so readily to Deleuze’s concepts, because they already think conceptually and materially, 
in response to the changing nature of the material or idea at hand. This is praxis, and this is why, in turn, Deleuze 
is drawn to artists, filmmakers, writers and musicians, because of their capability for experimentation with the 
excessive function of a thing, the possibility of a thing. In a paper given at the Time@20 conference in Harvard, 
2005, Raymond Bellour notes that Deleuze was working on a book on the virtual when he died, in which he was 
looking for a new philosophical form: an art of philosophy. Very few pages remain. As he wrote, he listened to the 
music of Ravel. He said that he didn't want to write in fragments, although he greatly admired the way Nietzsche 
had done so, Did Deleuze wish to become-artist, to use percepts as opposed to die systematic concepts of written 
argument?
4 Rodowick writes that 'Spinoza formulated this idea by defining the task of philosophy as giving knowledge of 
our powers of thought, as opposed to providing knowledge of things' (Rodowick 1997: 174).
5 Some scholars of Deleuze, echoing the popular criticism of post-structuralism in general, make the point that we 
have grown too contented rejecting interpretation. In the presentation of his paper at the 71me@20 conference in 
Harvard, 2005, Ian Buchanan went as far as to suggest a psychoanalytical take on Deleuze. For Deleuze, 
philosophy and cinema must create crises between concepts and their articulations. This is the space of the not-yet- 
thought - irrational intervals that produce dissociation rather than association. The cinema of the time-image 
produces a point outside the world capable of restoring our faith in the world. When the whole is conceptualized as 
'outside', it is rendered as 'becoming other in thought and becoming other in identity.' For Deleuze and Rodowick, 
philosophy is both a construction of concepts and the cartography of their relations. As Rodowick argues, Deleuze 
does not claim that the time-image transforms thought, because this would be to imply causation. There is nothing 
prescriptive in this way in the Cinema books, although there is, in the deep sense, an ethic - one must always strive
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to make room for the unthought or to keep thought moving. For Deleuze it is a question of our regaining contact 
with a world separated through the subject/object split. The time-image creates a situation where thought can 
happen. In this sense Deleuze is not like Artaud, or Debord, because he realizes that films must not impose 
thought. What they must do is open up the space for thought. (From a conversation with David Rodowick, Harvard 
February 2005).
6 Speaking at the Whitechapel Art Gallery on May 12 2005, Duncan Reekie argued that this societal practice 
subverted authorship by sharing or involving friends and family and producing family films, holiday films. Cine 
enthusiasts produced films not as work, but as leisure or play. People watched the films because they were in them, 
which is a counter form of spectacle, and a statement against the manufacture of leisure. This practice dates back 
to actuality films. The Lumier&s Bros would send out camera operators all over the world, to shoot and then project 
back the footage on the same day. Between 1895-6 and 1903-5 these cinematograph operators functioned as 
vaudeville acts, presenting films in bars and club rooms and village halls, and then sending negatives and prints 
back to the main offices from where they would be sent all over the world.
7 Raoul Vaneigem writes that 'real community remains to be created' (Vaneigem 1983: 39).
8 Films of pure abstraction and films that are entirely digitally generated, such as Monsters Inc (2001) from the 
Pixar studios are peihaps the exception.
9 Perhaps we can say this o f any art form of any form of invention (and of any action for that matter), but a film's 
particularity is its resemblance to the lived world. A painting does not perform like the actual. It may have 
figurative resemblance but it is always a-temporal. Music operates in a similar fashion to cinema in terms of its 
temporality, but it is always abstraction - no person can react to a piece of music as though it is the world.
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The Film  We D idn't M ake
Sc. 12. The chapter I didn’t finish on The Film We D id n 't Make
There remains the possibility of the author providing himself with ‘intercessors’, that is, 
o f taking real and not fictional characters, but putting these very characters in the 
condition of ‘making up fiction’, of ‘making legends’, of ‘story-telling’. The author takes 
a step towards the characters, but the characters take a step towards the author: double 
becoming.
(Deleuze 1989: 222)
Rather than beginning from a blank page, begin from cliche, for cliche is the last step on 
the platform o f stable narrative, and it is from here that we push off into this condition, of double 
becoming. Narrative is, after all, only a parenthesis, the bookend to contingency. O f Camera 
begins with a distressed phone call. The Film We D idn’t Make (2006) begins with a woman 
delivered by car to a remote coastal location, where she is stranded, a fictional character equipped 
with the suitably glaring prop of a red suitcase. Not only is she reluctant to be in this foreign 
place, she is also reluctant to be a character in a film. It is unclear whether she is the character 
from O f Camera, the performer Sharon Smith who played that character, or another character 
entirely. On a beach the woman encounters two players from the actual, Roy White and Amin 
Denman (previously seen in The Film). The three characters mix like oil and water, the woman 
complaining when the two men try to speak to her but remaining bound to them through a 
number of environments and poorly performed dramatic false starts. Events finally settle on a 
hillside at sunset in what appears to be the place of a natural and actual exchange. However, 
within the film is another film: the film we didn’t make.
The Film We Didn't Make is not the film Actually, which I set out to make with the 
principal performers from O f Camera and The Film, although, in a kind of Borgesian paradox, 
the failure to make Actually led to a film that nonetheless fulfilled the originating brief. In 
Actually, it was proposed that Sharon Smith would arrive in Bridport 'cinematically,' through a 
preposterous action-image device such as being washed-up on the beach or ejected from a car. 
Roy White and Amin Denman would encounter her somewhere in the landscape and she would
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temporarily be taken in by them and become a part of their everyday lives. Sharon would then 
progress from scripted fictional behaviour to occupying the contingency of the everyday Roy and 
Amm inhabit, and they in turn would progress from the nuances of their own actuality to a more 
mannered and fictional behaviour. Cinematic visual and aural cues initially attributed to Sharon 
would cross over to Amm and Roy, and the nature of the directions given to them would change 
also. In an explanatory set of letters sent to the performers I explained that the antagonism 
extending from this premise would determine on-screen events. O f Camera had described a 
protagonist encountering her own mediation. The Film described two protagonists encountering 
their mediation, only now through nonfiction. This third film would move from the self-reflexive 
haunted house trope {Of Camera) and the crystalline documentary {The Film) to what Roy would 
call the 'lumpy gravy,' where facets of the previous two films (camera movements, lighting 
properties, art dept details, musical motifs, even lines of dialogue, not to mention actual 
recognizable faces) would to coalesce in the present of a third film in-the-making. Where O f 
Camera had been a tightly controlled operation that for the most part replicated classical film 
production, and The Film had been an emergent drift, this final panel in the triptych proposed to 
have the two different approaches coinciding in the same frame, a film drift as orienteering, 
where each marker discovered would be both a lead and a cliche or dead end. This was my idea. 
But thought is a virtual and performs very differently to the actual. The idea for Actually was very
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The actual. The term actually: a real that is realer and more authentic. A stressing of the 
real over the Real, as that which is definitely not-virtual and not fabricated. The gritty piece of 
real - volatile, tedious, unusual in its usualness, unexpected and omnipresent. Flat. Very flat. The 
Act, and to act. Action! which is to be captured in the act. Also, to distract. ACTuality. The 
secondary image that supports the primary image. The image fact. Actually. I returned to the site 
of The Film some fourteen months after shooting it, having secured the involvement of the same 
crew and all three performers, and with the idea to attempt to combine two very different pro- 
filmic spaces, the one being fictional and the other being actual and contingent. I brought with me 
a piecemeal script that had one significant structural arc, outlined in the notebook drawing above. 
Each performer would help the other with the necessary mechanics and improvisation of this 
transition from fact to fiction and fiction to fact. The film's working title, Actually, was a two-fold 
play on words, evoking the early Lumiere Brothers' actualite films and also the semantic 
occurrence of the word as a precursor of authenticity to a statement (for example, 'She actually 
meant what she said').
To help the concept along I conceived of Sharon as a histrionic character, not so much a 
protagonist as an antagonist. She would arrive both fictionally and actually in the town of 
Bridport, and Roy and Arran would make whatever sense of her and the situation they saw fit. I 
did next to nothing to develop Sharon as a character; I ran no tests and no rehearsals; I did little in 
the way of mental preparation for what I would ask any of the performers or crew to do. I 
proposed some poorly written vignette scenes, based mainly on Sharon provoking Roy and 
Arran, and Arran dealing with Roy's low blood sugar and diabetes, and then did nothing to 
realize them. A cast and crew were assembled, film apparatus was erected, and then the 
filmmaker resisted directing anybody to do anything. This lack of direction created a shift in 
confidence, disposition, and activity within the pre-filmic space. The actuality and awkwardness I 
had imagined taking place on camera found a becoming instead behind it, where the camera 
could not catch it; between intention and contingency, it turned with the turn of the camera. Every
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planned scene collapsed at the point of execution and was replaced by the predicament of 
filmmaking. And so the group found themselves situated in the act of filmmaking., but without a 
film to make. We were left instead with the corporeality and ideation of a film in the 'not- 
making'. This was an attempt then to pitch the format of the script and the shot list against the 
phenomena of the Open Whole, one always vying to assert itself over the other; in other words, to 
try to 'produce' the event of the film not working and to continually re-integrate this failure into 
the plan for a success (and vice-versa).1 This in effect is the process of salvaging. Thus, the film 
Actually failed, and emerged instead as The Film We Didn't Make. The following dialogue is 
transcribed from video recordings made dining the shoot:
ARRUN
We had this idea that you would be this fictional character and 
Roy and I would meet you but we would remain natural. We 
wouldn't be drawn into your fiction. But it didn't work. Because 
Roy and I were dragged into your fiction... But that was like a 
thread of sorts through the film and what it lead to was the 
shoot on the top of the hill at the Look-out where we were just 
ourselves. So this idea was actually a failure, but that was the 
film, the fact that it failed.
SHARON
But the weird thing is that in Steven' s original proposal he said 
that I would arrive as a fictional character and that somehow 
we'd reverse roles.
ARRUN
But didn't we change that idea?
SHARON
Yeah, I didn't think it would work. I don't think anyone really 
thought it would work, but what actually happened was there was 
this kind of - without really wanting to - we ended up trying to 
enter or being dragged into the fictional, being compelled to try 
to pretend in the fiction, and it being uncomfortable, and then 
actually ending up with this really kind of natural conversation 
where I realized I'd sort of just got to know you a little bit 
and that we all felt quite relaxed, lying there. And that, that 
in a way somehow echoed the original proposal, but it went a very 
different way around and about it.
ARRUN
When we were shooting, the fact that Roy and I had to respond to 
your fiction, it immediately drew us into it, I mean its 
impossible for us to be natural.
SHARON
Yeah, because you're implied.
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ARRUN
The only time we probably - we could say - we did remain natural 
was when we ignored you at the Look-out. But then was that 
natural? Because we wouldn't normally ignore somebody.
SHARON
The problem is this word ' natural' is really weird because what 
does it mean, being yourself? You're a different version of 
yourself in different situations... when I was pretending to cry 
I was trying to not laugh and there was the moment when I think 
you turned away from me, which could be read as one thing, but I 
think it was to do with you trying to not laugh.
ARRUN
Yesterday, when there was a slight amount of despair, well 
perhaps that is an exaggeration, but we were kind of searching to 
kind of find something and at one point we were on the beach and 
you [Steven] said "Oh, well lets just roll and at least capture 
something," you seemed a bit downcast and my heart was starting^ , 
to sink because I thought, "it's going badly." But I mean all 
that clumsiness was part of the film and you can use that, I 
think. When I look at it now I actually think that the whole 
shoot has gone quite well and you can produce a good film, 
because the film is going to be that it wasn't going very well. I 
actually think you can go away and produce a good film with what 
we shot. And this film has ended up being something that I didn't 
expect it would be. We have reached somewhere and produced 
something, but I just wasn't aware of it at the time, I thought 
it was going badly and it was a mess, and it was, but that was 
actually quite good.
SHARON
I think there's that thing that there's two rules of something 
that is improvised or tries to be intuitive or spontaneous, like 
you said - find the film rather than dictate the film, and that, 
actually, it's not just about making it up as you go along, i.e. 
[that] its easy to just film anything - let it all hang out. It's 
actually really hard work to be that free.
STEVEN
It's so much easier to work from a story and a script.
SHARON
But then its like what Roy said, "We're just dollies in a field."
ROY
When Sharon went into acting mode, or what I thought was acting 
mode, because I wasn't sure actually... Most of the time I wasn't 
sure, and I was just saying to Sharon this morning, I wasn't 
sure, I don't think anyone was sure what we were doing half the
time. It just all fused up. I just felt that it had to run-on
somewhere else, with Sharon maybe, and someone else. I was hoping 
we could be dispensed with, well I could be, or me and Arrun 
could be. You know, the story could go on. As far as I can see
everything is going to be all right now anyways. It goes where it
will, as it were.
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The Film We Didn't Make
The Film We Didn't Make (Eastwood 2006)
Over the course of the production I deliberately courted mishap, doubt and confusion. 
The objective of placing fiction and actuality together in the same film frame served as a 
trajectory, but this line of flight was subject to all manner of counter-lines. The mental image I 
had of sequences and events for the film (the film I was thinking) gave-way to the immanence of 
my own inability to make the concept operate in the way that I had conceived. I was thus 
propelled into an affective space where I was forced to think from the outside of the concept. In 
addition to this, the clumsy 'making-do' from the cast and crew created new lines of flight, of 
various intensity. At different levels and at different times every member of the cast or crew 
attempted to rescue the film from its own implosion. In the rushes there are incomplete dramatic 
situations, mostly involving Sharon's character meeting Roy and Arrun: sequences of arrival, 
encounter, waiting, irritation, social unease and feigned indifference. Each variation manifested 
as amateur dramatics, with Sharon a guttural, glaring tear in the frame, and Roy and Arrun 
veering from acting-in, with Sharon, to acting-up and against the proceedings. 'May God guide us 
downhill,' Roy commented. We can begin to see in the actions of Roy, Amm and Sharon the 
fruitful partnership between non-schematic filmmaking and salvage. One scene devised by the 
ensemble involved Sharon being discovered by Roy and Arrun at the shoreline, wrapped in a 
clear tarpaulin and made-up with fake blood (pictured above). This scene was planned and 
executed by the group with the exception of the director, who waited with the equipment, further
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along the beach. This particular phenomenon, of recovery, occurs accidentally and cannot be 
orchestrated.
Jean-Louis Comolli writes that 'the spectacle is not life nor the film reality [...] the actor 
is not the character. [This] is a certainty we have to be able to doubt' (Comolli 1978: 452). In John 
Cassavetes' A Woman Under the Influence, Gena Rowlands' character Mabel cooks spaghetti for 
her husband and his work colleagues who are gathered around the dinner table exhausted from 
their shift. The scene plays out in time with improvisation, scripting and the actual behaviour of 
the cast co-existing, so much so that at one point a worker raises his glass and proposes a toast: 
'To Gena!' 'To Gena!' the other workers chime in reply. The boundary between diegesis, 
discourse and non-fictional activities is in this moment blurred - Mabel is Rowlands and isn't 
Rowlands, at the same time. In the opening sequence of The Film We Didn't Make, Sharon Smith 
is, similarly, at once character, intercessor, and performer. She is Sharon Smith inhabiting the 
situation of Sharon Smith who has been asked to perform, just as she is also the character 
performed who remains unnamed. This shifting disposition is in essence what improvisation is, 
the process whereby performer, character, and 'stage' rotate around one another in a constant 
movement of invention. Sharon, familiar to the viewer from O f Camera, is again subject to the 
manipulation of a film-in-production, trapped in the back of a car and commented on by the off­
screen voices of the director and camera operator, only now she voices her reluctance and 
disapproval, angered by the immanent imposition of fiction. The car sequence prefigures her 
apparent entry into a dramatic space where she is abandoned to artifice, in character.
'Marionettes in the fiction mill' is the expression Roy White had used during the 
recording of The Film to describe what he regarded as commonplace disingenuous behaviour in 
social encounters, and he expanded on this with two further expressions, 'Dollies in a field' and 
'the school play' to articulate how he felt when asked to falsely perform on camera. So why bring 
Roy, Amin and Sharon together in this way and ask them to shift between the actual and the 
fictional? I wanted three pre-existing film personas to occupy screen space together and to work
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with the awkwardness, inertia and narrative confusion that would inevitably result. The tension 
within the film frame between trained actors working from a script and people who are not actors 
(and therefore cannot affect the text with performance training) constitutes an additional, an 
unpredictable material, and this unpredicatble terrain has been traversed by such filmmakers as 
Wemer Herzog, Strosjek (1976) and Heart o f Glass (1976), and Harmony Korine, in Gummo 
(1997) and Julien Donkey Boy (1999). During the shoot Roy and Arran invariably attempted to 
act-in to Sharon's character's situation. The social order compels an individual to re-contextualize 
themselves to others, for to be social is to be on an improvisation continuum - 1 wipe my mouth, 
you wipe your mouth; you speak quietly, I lower my voice. Exceptions to this become social 
sirens, wailing with quietness, or with lack of eye contact, unable or unwilling to perform in­
context with others present. I set out to utilize the self-consciousness of non-trained participants 
caught ad-libbing in a ffeefall drama, searching for what was appropriate and contextual to the 
scene in order to fill up and replace the awkwardness. Arran and Roy took on dramatic personas 
that they felt would fit with Sharon's performed identity, with the intention of giving the film 
proceedings some form of consistency or content. They improvised towards Sharon, in the 
direction of correctness of context. They did not ignore her and neither could they be how they 
had previously been. In other words, when left with nothing but the situation of their own 
awkwardness, Roy and Arran acted-in to where Sharon, as a half-formed character, was acting- 
out from.
The resultant struggle for narrative belonging, for behavioural similarity, is both 
emblematic of the consensual manner in which we arrive at social attitudes to one another - 
whether for the lived world or in anticipation of the finished film - and also the register of a gap 
which can and does open up for differences in our identities.3 The natural pro-filmic space is 
rendered unnatural by the film apparatus and the attitudes addressing it, and this denatured space 
exists as a site for acting out these differences and emergent attitudes. The failing film enables an 
in-between of difference, where ideas are proffered and social attitudes take on unexpected 
directions. They are getting frustrated. They are upset. They are waiting for me to tell them, to 
tell them something. I only say that this film is a life - a life like any other life - a cluster of 
situations, within which I found myself sliding between the social compulsion to provide a 
worthwhile outcome (to make good, to make it right) and an opposing compulsion, to surrender 
to the emergence of the immediate situation, to become film and become filmmaker, painfully, 
misguidedly, dangerously; after all, the word experiment has origins in the word for danger. By 
appearing to fail or indeed by actually failing, an opening is created onto the space of affect, 
where awkwardness and discomfort must be carefully negotiated. This is the interval of doubt, 
and the event of this doubt is carried over in residual form to the event of watching the film. 
Indeed, it is this very aura o f doubt and discomfort that I find to be the most experimental of 
environs, for to bring to this zone a group of people on set, and a group of people in an audience, 
is to take them beyond habitual safety to an in-between where they must both doubt and trust, 
salvage and re-frame what they had quickly decided as bad as now in fact intentional. Affect 
floods into error and through failure, and if it can be contained by a film and not subside into the 
merely useless, then a specific nature of thought that would commonly be closed down is 
prolonged as open. It is possible to postulate a theory of bad acting here, because it is precisely a 
loss of faith in the integrity of the film text as good brought about by bad acting that will help to 
keep affect flowing. As Artaud wrote, ‘I put myself in this state of impossible absurdity in order 
to try to generate thought in myself [...] spaces for life, spaces which did not exist and which did 
not seem to belong in actual space’ (Artaud 1976: 79).
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This space is the situation of the will to make good in inventive conflict with the will to 
make-do; with social conventions of rescue and salvage, based on what any given person 
imagines to be a properly realised film.4 Such a lived film is dependent on the failure of its own 
narrative and purpose. The film object is a destiny, but one that collapses into various emergent 
lines of film flight brought into being by the unfolding and changing everyday of the filmmaking 
situation, and the new thoughts and ideas of those persons filmmaking. The reflexivity in O f 
Camera and the nomadicism of The Film , (with its cluster of becoming imperceptible subjects, 
subjects resisting representation) conflate in The Film We Didn't Make, not so much to forge 
another type of film as to dismantle the integrity of film as object altogether. In The Film We 
Didn't Make the veil which we called film  (the idea of film overlaid on the actual - a prismatic, 
crystalline, aberrant mental invention) finds its fullest register. The lived situation of filmmaking 
is taken one step further, to the level of predicament. This predicament is a film failing, or as Roy 
White has it, a 'Cul-de-sac'5 from where the film 'Perhaps won't go * We go wrong. The lived 
world rushes in without manners, the outside forcing its way in and offering a becoming. Deleuze 
has defined becoming as that 'which transforms an empirical sequence into a series: a burst of 
series' (Deleuze 1989: 275). In The Film We Didn't Make, the empirical sequence of the script 
gave way to die burst of series of the willful failure to come near to realizing that script, the burst 
of series of our own everyday around this breakdown. Every person tolerated the shambles, out of 
generosity, towards me perhaps, and perhaps from a belief in my ability as a filmmaker to make 
something of this predicament, but predominantly because of a delight found in affect through the 
conduit of the cinema.
Somebody commented that I could only be capable of making a film in as careless a 
manner as The Film We Didn't Make having made other films reasonably well. It is my assertion 
that no representational film is ever made well, and is never in synthesis with the everyday it 
attempts to depict. Documentaries and fictions rarely work in the way that they were conceived 
They are forces of will, battering machines of apparatus, crew, cast and design that bulldoze over 
the everyday, never wishing to fit within it. Eveiy representational film made, whether a high-
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production narrative or low-end documentary film, is an imposition on the everyday rather than 
an element belonging to it. And yet what it fails to represent through this force of imposition it 
nonetheless makes evident, in a sort of reverse-attraction.
The film picks up -  indicating by framing, shot angle, lighting, dialogue mention, 
musical underscoring, and so on — the notable elements (to be noted in and for the 
progress of the narrative which in return defines their notability) without for all that 
giving up what is thus left aside and which it seeks to retain — something of an available 
reserve of insignificant material — in order precisely to ring ‘true’, true to reality. In short, 
the film-narrative is a regulated loss, that loss becoming the sign of the real.
(Heath 1981: 135)
It is my particular interest that films are made and that the specific type of 
industrious social group called people who are filmmaking exists. Whereas most films woik 
extremely hard to erase the clumsy, ill-fitting, abortive nature of their manufacture, I revel in the 
entire performance of filmmaking, as a thing in my life. I make films. If we acknowledge that 
making moving images of our lives is one of many things we do, and that it is not something an 
industry need do for us, then this propensity for rendering time in a way that is different to the 
lived world can be an experiential prosthesis for the mind and the social body: film as another 
lived time, a thinking machine, a means to render abstraction and poetry rather than 
representation. During filmmaking - the active forgetting of how to make films habitually enables 
me to think and feel unhistorically; it saves me from history. This forgetting is not what Plato 
called the disaster at the very origin of thought, but rather thought's re-birth, Nietzsche's eternal 
return as cinematic affirmation - a creative destruction as affirmation, to engage with film and 
video and the world as a lover, as a fool, with head spinning into the unknown; to avoid 
stagnancy, by always remaining receptive to possible lines of flight, 'Our tendrils cantilevering 
into a future we are unlikely to recognize' (Marcos Novak 2002).
Thus, all I have to do is will myself again, no longer as the outcome of previous 
possibilities, not as one accomplishment out of a thousand, but as a fortuitous moment, 
the very fortuity of which implies the necessity of the integral return of the whole series.
(Deleuze, quoted in Analjdica.com7)
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In the letter that I sent to the cast members proposing the project I wrote, ’At the moment 
I'm imagining the Bridport landscape, two incongruous characters. They have met by chance and 
know nothing of each other. What are they thinking? [...] There will be one dramatic incident, 
when Roy, Sharon (and Amin if he is willing) are momentarily drafted into a deeper narrative.' It 
seemed to me, through all of the chaos of the shoot, that the important thing was to have brought 
film back into our lives; only this time in a way that meant emergence and happenstance had 
intersected with suggestion and artifice, but having dragged the actual along the coastline and 
hillside and into the fictional, and then stumbled, with half-developed derailed inventions, back 
into the everyday, I was suddenly keen to turn my back on the mess we had created, in the hope 
of the fortuitous moment Deleuze speaks of. And so I invited the cast and crew to rest on the 
hilltop in front of the Look-out and again offered them the space of a 400 foot magazine (film as 
potlatch), as a time that could roll away, and where the protagonists could do as they saw fit. In 
the sudden cut between the digital crispness in the scene by the Look-Out and what Roy White 
had called the ‘Lurid technicolour’ of celluloid now filling the frame of the three laying in the 
grass, the dialogism between film and video (the differential relation between the two mediums) 
is apparent, if contradictory. The celluloid signal of Activity is wrongly cast in this apparently 
verite sequence, as had the pixel precision been in the amateur dramatics that preceded it. The 
conversation in the grass plots an unexpected curve from artifice to actuality, and a shift in the 
disposition of the entire group, affected and changed by this long awaited indiscemibility 
between fiction and fact.
What happens? The clapperboard announces change, ushering in a new time, a fresh 
attitude. All of the characters are together and resting, awash with the rich colours of 16mm. 
Time draws out a new behaviour. The score, lifted from O f Camera makes a line through the 
take, running out of force as the first words are spoken. Roys says 'I am going to walk off-set a 
moment and have a gander at Portland [...] and you and Amin can be Stars.' A complex form of 
flirtation follows, as Sharon offers to feed Amin chocolate and he declines. Although she is still 
in costume and accompanied by the red suitcase, Sharon's disposition has changed. So too has
303
Arran s. He is no longer silent and begins to offer information about his former partner to Sharon, 
as their banal and at times humorous conversation unfolds. 'Sometimes do you wish that you ate 
chocolate though?' asks Sharon. Arran replies, 'No, not really. Don't you find once you've had - 1 
mean - you enjoy it as you eat it but you feel a bit crap afterwards. Don't you find that?' There is a 
feeling of relief, as though the viewer can also rest now in this duration, comforted by the 
absence of scenarios, reassured by the strong composition of the frame pointed down from above 
onto the players, who are laying side by side in the early evening wind-blown grass. And yet we 
cannot confidently shake off the residue of the previous histrionics and amateur dramatics. In 
spite of the seemingly natural content of the conversation, this exchange is complicated by 
subtitles, necessary owing to the poor sound recording of the scene. We have entered this natural 
and factual scene with the invitation of a musical quote and are now following its content through 
a textual device usually reserved for foreign language dramas.
Sharon appears as though still performing. She leans closer to Arran and asks what 
happened finally between he and his girlfriend. He replies 'Well, she died, sadly, but I don't really 
want to talk about it.' Consistently during screenings of The Film We Didn't Make the audience 
laughs collectively at this quiet declaration. Perhaps this is because the viewer reacts to Arran’s 
words in the context of the style of previous statements made by all three of the protagonists, and 
in the wider context of the former preposterous attitude of the film (it’s ‘bad’ acting), and 
therefore thinks of his reply as a scripted line. There is a tension that comes into existence around 
Arran’s statement, and one exerting force in several directions. It is accurate to say that this is the 
most eventful moment in the film and that it constitutes precisely the kind of confessional 
testimony that the normative documentary filmmaker obsessively looks for. And yet, this 
precious piece of content has the effect of causing discomfort, and issues of accountability, 
privacy and ownership rash to the fore. When a film that is willfully playing with falsity 
unwittingly makes a space for a truthful declaration, this declaration changes both the film and 
the filmmaker. It forces the filmmaker as arbiter of frames and assemblage into the role of an 
agent who is representing, who is suddenly the guardian of this moment, the person who
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represents an other. This sense of accountability is thrust into a complex dialogue with the 
realization that it was the falsity of the film and its foolish conduct that enabled the emergent 
encounter. Much in the same way as Kiarostami's Taste o f Cherry (19978), The Film We Didn’t 
Make comes to an end outside of its storyline, in a peculiar intermediary realm where characters 
and the players of those characters are permitted to fraternise with one another, to speak across 
chasm. Here, where cinema is well on its way into the real, the characters have merged with the 
world and left the film, and the subjects have merged with the film and left the world.
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The last im age is o f  the im pression left after the long take that forms the final third o f  The F ilm  
We D idn  7  M ake.
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1 Jess Wiley, one of the crew, renamed the production Lost in Bridport, after the documentary Lost in La Mancha 
which has as its subject the failed attempt by Terry Gilliam to make a feature film version of Don Quixote.
Jean-Louis Comolli, Historical Fiction: A Body Too Much, Screen Vol 19, no 2 1978: 45 Comolli describes this as 'a 
double game: it is him and it is not, always and at the same time. Neither of the terms ever really prevails over the 
other, each keeps the other as a ground against which it stands out' (Jean-Louis Comolli, (1978) Historical Fiction: A 
Body Too Much, Screen Vol 19, no 2: 45- 48) quoted in George Kouvaros (1998) Screen 39:3 autumn.
Goffman argues that, when faced with an interaction, the different partners try to maintain a consensus, or to avoid a 
breakdown. If this does not happen, the participants run the risk of becoming engaged in a power struggle. To do so, 
the different partners must first reach an initial agreement on the definition of the situation which is wide enough to 
avoid contradiction and which consists mainly in defining who can talk about what. This is what Goffman calls the 
'temporary consensus.' This consensus must be a socially satisfying solution for the participants whatever their status is. 
See, Goffman, 1959 and Goffman, 1981. In order to preserve this temporary consensus and to avoid breakdowns of 
definition, the participants bring into play preventive processes to avoid them and corrective processes to repair them. 
To preserve his own projection, the actor uses defensive techniques. A participant uses techniques of protection or tact 
to save the definition projected by somebody else. When somebody is in the presence of others, his activity has all the 
characteristics of a long term commitment: regardless of his precise aims, it is in his interest to control his interlocutors 
behaviour and especially the way they treat him in return' (Bernard Gardin, Franfoise Lorant, Beatrice Cahour, 
Theories o f Communicative Interaction (3)).
4 A pertinent question would be, is filmmaking consensus oriented or conflict oriented? This question relates to the 
differing attitudes Goffman and Vollochinov have towards the manner in which social situations achieve formation. 
Goffman regards social attitudes as consensually arrived at, Vollochinov rather sees them as arising from conflict. A 
film in production imposes itself on the everyday, creating upheaval and uprising. Its conflicting nature - its conflict 
with the natural - and its very difference in seeing, in behaving and in assembling, is what makes it transformative. The 
interaction between the virtual film (the idea), the situation of filmmaking in the lived world (the idea into practice), 
and the lived world in front of the film, is always one of antagonism. The containment of contingencies is the constant 
task, and the synthesis o f antagonism is the goal.
5 Roy White quoted from The Film (2004).
6 Ibid.
7 Scott, Analytica.com (April 2005).
8 Abbas Kiarostami commented wryly in an email to me that he would very much like to see the film I didn't make.
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Sc. 13. The Film To Come
The majority of my work over the past five years has dealt with the excess of the moving 
image, in both factual and fictional form. I have applied a cinematic vernacular to actual 
environments in a number of film shoot interventions into public places. I produced a series of 
reflexive video pieces, the I  Make Things Happen trilogy, in which characters encounter the limit 
of their own mediation. Larger scale pieces such as O f Camera and Like A House on Fire follow 
a process of cinematic fiction collapsing in on itself, turning inside out, so that characters become 
caught up in edits and traumatized by distress applied directly to the celluloid or video image. 
Different Systems o f Chaos, The Film , and The Film We Didn't Make, are more carnival and 
emergent in attitude, their content the lived world of being the subject of an ostensibly factual 
film, cut adrift. Together these pieces form a body making propositions towards an aberrant and 
embodied new cinema, one that is neither habitual nor representational but rather itinerant and 
excessive.
I am reaching the end (the limit) of my inquiry. I wish to fully deterritorialize cinema, 
and film my way out of the ends of this process. I want to fall off the cinema's edges. And so, I 
propose a not possible film, a film that would make Orson Welles' plans for Heart o f Darkness 
seem like shooting ten seconds of video on a mobile phone. This film, that is, the film  to come (a 
play on Blanchot's The Book to Come) is the de-naturing of the lived world into a perpetual film 
in progress. It runs the cinema off this world and into our minds. And so it comes to you as a 
provocation, a flight line, an idea ad absurdum...
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to  fu l ly  d e t e r r i t o r i a l i s e  cinema, to film our way out, to f a l l  off the cinema's 
edges. To propose a not possib le  film, a film th a t  would make Orson Welles' plans 
for Heart of Darkness seem, l ik e  a ten second c l ip  sent to You've Been Framed.
This is  the film to come, a perpetual film in progress. I t  runs the cinema off
th is  world and in to  our minds and comes to you as a provocation.. .  Spatially ,  the
film is  uncerta in . I t  i s  i l l  defined, a se t  of sh if t in g  tec tonic  p la te s .  We are 
thinking of i t  now. Characters are  being drafted , tes ted , and w rit ten . The char­
acters  are being w ri t ten  in to  a re a l  s i tu a t io n .  Ways to s t a r t  a film: dead body 
car crash got k i l le d  lo s t  love lo s t  home lo s t  hope d isa s te r .  Repetition and con­
sis tency . D isaster .  Always t e l l  them three times. Indian Jones hates snakes. Stan 
Laurel is  a f ra id .  Bruce W illis  i s  washed up and alone. We should find an old 
story, an adage, a good enough lack. Lets say: losing love. Losing love, and i t  
changes the depth of f ie ld ,  i t  is  her new lens on the p ro jec tor,  i t  i s  h is  clumsy 
continu ity . Lets say th a t  losing love i s  the lack tha t  d e ra i ls  our protagonist 
and propels them in to  d i s a s te r ,  so much so th a t  the ce llu lo id  material and video
tape i t s e l f  cannot hold on to  the image or possibly conduct the sound. Losing
love i s  a techn ica l  despair ,  a spreading of the world into  the unfamiliar, as the 
media corrupts and the fee l ings  go everywhere. There they are, burning again, in 
the gate, overwriting the s c r ip t ,  contravening the frame, the tim e-line, the room 
in the room, the p r o j e c t io n . . .  Our p ro jec tor hes i ta te s  to show i t .  This is  a ner­
vous p ro jec to r .  There are no sea ts  and there i s  no auditorium. These are s ca t­
tered  centres from where so many circumferences were given up. The centres are 
everywhere. The film cannot be found - i t  continually  s t a r t s  up again, from a 
dead stop. The s c r ip t  - d i s a s te r  - the s c r ip t  w ill  never m ater ia lize .  But, none­
the less ,  the film i s  "pitched". There are outlandish, in fu r ia t in g  meetings with 
film producers and g a l le ry  cu ra to rs .  We w ill  play the monster a t  i t s  own game. I 
w ill  get upset and so w il l  you. We are very d i f f i c u l t  to work with, because of 
our v is ion .  A lav ish  se t  i s  constructed . You w ill i n s i s t  upon a crane and I w ill  
get a wind machine and some ra in .  A composer should s t a r t  on a score. I t  is  an 
awful score, r e a l ly  awful. All of your fr iends are in i t ,  and mine, along with 
people we do not l ik e  and people we do not know. Here, there and everywhere, you 
w ill  find traces  of the film in production. Posters for the film are on b il lboard  
hoardings. There i s  one outside your window. I t  was pasted and removed but i t  
came back again. You are humming the score. The l ig h t  i s  extremely good around 
you. You are making love and there  are people watching but you manage to make i t  
seem re a l .  And now the audience and the film are having sex with each other and 
the screen i s  not big enough. But we are t i r e d  and the movements of the film 
slow. Today the shoot happened very quickly. Much of what was ca rried  out has 
been destroyed. Only pieces remain, some good takes, some bad takes. Ways to end 
a film: open road, a camera th a t  r i s e s ,  you and I kissing, waiting a t the s ta t ion  
and looking s t ra ig h t  ahead with our eye off camera and our thoughts on the next 
scene. Cut. Thank you. You and I are good in tha t  film to come.
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I can't know much about it, but I know it is called The film  to come. It will involve 
meeting people and asking them to enter into fictions - the ones we invent. This is a cinematic 
game of Knock Down Ginger, only we won't run away from private spaces, we will barge in 
through the doors, we will let loose protagonists as antagonists on an unfolding everyday. We 
make up stories, tell lies, and offer the chance to act-up and act-out — to re-experience what has 
occurred, only differently, through the crystalline prism of film. We will try to make a second 
skin for us. This skin would be film(making). The film will be a series of dead-ends (which open 
as we ignore the walls), o f non-events, interspersed with the veil of fiction, fiction like a faint that 
collapses into the actual, the inside out, where the borderlands and definitions of interior and 
exterior are disbanded. The film to come moves towards an event without knowing what that 
event will be. The film to come is what happens.
We are in a time when time itself mediates us and is re-mediated by us, where place 
seems absurd and identity sounds absurd. To be social is to be in a state of constant revision, of 
re-write. To have objectives, expectations, desires, is to frame a life not yet lived, and we 
characterize ourselves in order to make actual those stories of ourselves. Trying to hold ground is 
very difficult. The Film to Come is not about product or outcome but is, in itself, a temporary 
autonomous zone, a microform of upturning that turns the world upside down using film as the 
lever and pulley: the world and the real and the film are rendered as indistinct from one another. 
Excess, risk, and all of the sticky stuff and sticky situations, the ungainly body and the clumsy 
camera. Gramsci asked, what is the will outside of intellect? It is the force of action. When one 
decides to do something extraordinary, everything becomes charged. This often involves 
separating self from world. I have to make one more film, one more film, which begins as 
narrative, and becomes void.
I am innately genital, and if we examine closely what that means, it means that I have
never made the most of myself... O bitches of impossibility!
(Artaud, letter to Jacques Riviere, 1970-4, vol. 1:19)
I write for a species that does not yet exist.
(Nietzsche The Will To Power [1968])
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Screening feedback for The Film
Jenny Meltings
Did not know the original brief but understood that the residency was short - about one month and that 
Steven was not familiar with the town or the people. He seemed to be working with members of the 
community who had come forward to be involved with the project. Did not know the nature of the group 
he was working with but presumed there were no selection criteria other than their willingness to 
participate.
The (roughly edited) film seemed in one way deeply honest in that the film initiator or principal maker 
(recognised by most as the one in control) stood to one side, and instead of making a more predictable 
and straightforward documentary about the community he more or less filmed all that he had to go on at 
that time, which appeared to be about the practical and other preparations for making a film in a new 
environment in which he might have felt a little awkward and out of place. As the main cameraman he 
did not make himself a completely invisible (yet always potent) presence, but tried to be open about 
exactly who was around the camera and contributing to the resulting film. This highlighted the nature of 
each individual's involvement, but did it make him less in control of the outcome? This was one of the 
questions which was addressed in the talk after the screening.
Attention was drawn to the alienation of Steven from the place when he first arrived and the artificiality 
of the situation, but as the film went on, this feeling began to wear off as the process of making film 
created the possibility of more genuine interaction between the strangers. Meanwhile, the uncomfortable 
sensation of settling in (albeit briefly) as a visitor is laid bare - as was observed by others on watching the 
film.
In starting the film with "no content", Steven makes no assumptions about the place or the people, but 
allows them to "be" on the film. The generosity of the other participants, who had not presumable known 
him for very long, was apparent. The main character seemed almost to have been waiting for Steven to 
arrive in the town so as to publicly air certain spiritual /religious/ philosophical conclusions about life in 
general. It seemed clear that the experience was genuinely meaningful to him. The film seemed to 
provoke deep thinking and contemplation which may not otherwise have come to a head or been 
expressed.
It was suggested that the emergent content of the film was a record perhaps of the first interaction 
between Steven's arrival in a strange town and the hand of friendship, which was extended to him 
primarily by those who became involved with the film. This seemed to be quite strongly conveyed and 
was quite (for want of a better word!) 'touching.'
Some difficult questions arose in the discussion. Was the resident artist in some way using them? Had 
other potential participants sensed that and veered away? (or if not, were they happy about their footage 
not being shown as part of the edited version?). Someone not involved with the project suggested that the 
whole film idea could be viewed as a hoax - a non-film and doubted that it would be/was intended to be 
shown to a wider audience, which was perhaps to betray the expectations of the people of Bridport who 
were involved in making what could have been a straightforward summary of the significance and 
uniqueness of their lives.
Technically, the film quality varied because some old film stock had been used from a local shop. This 
ftgain martp the viewer more conscious of the contribution of film quality to the final result, and we ended 
up seeing the environs of Bridport through the matenals/media that it had to offer. It was also observed 
that Hollywood style production values had been used alongside hand-held camera qualities in the film.
The quite banal commentary reflected what the new friends/acquaintances had between them - the 
process of filming in the selected location, and the delicate balance of their individual contributions to 
this.
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Shots were lingering, varied in quality, sometimes soft and blurry. The images that have remained in my 
memory are of a bearded man and a youth walking up a narrow tree-lined lane, the same bearded man 
hoeing the soil in a small plot of land, the three men standing on misty hilltops around Bridport and a 
small empty looking stone building with the brief appearance of a female participant.
There was a discussion about the influence of reality TV on the chosen style of/approach to the project.
The fact that Steven undertook the final act of control or authorship of the film by taking complete 
control of the editing of the material was discussed. It was decided that it would be difficult to involve 
more people in this. It has to be done in a restricted environment and was not a group activity. It was also 
for one brain alone, one final vision had to be assembled from the vast amount of footage. This was quite 
widely understood., but not by all present. Why should Steven get the last say in the final result, but 
logically speaking why not - it was his film, they eventually established.
The overwhelming presence however in the film that we saw, seemed to be the man with the beard, and it 
also seemed that Steven had gone out of his way to allow the result to be shaped by his essential character 
and contributions, and was also clearly open to the opinions and criticism of others in a way that not all 
film-makers would allow themselves to be. The final(?) result was quietly intense and will also appreciate 
with time.
- Jenny Mellings, July 2004
Bridget Joslin
Hello Steven,
Here are our rather sketchy memories of the screening.
Issues: (some overlapping)
1. Ownership - who owns the various stages of the process - the walking experience, the film shot as part 
of that experience, of which we saw some (although partly edited by then), and the final edited film?
2. Process/product - should there be a final product in terms of the residency brief and in terms of the 
wishes of the participants? Did an edit convey a betrayal of the process or die expected and proper reward 
for it
3. Audience - in preparing/not preparing the final edited film, who should constitute the audience? Does 
this affect the form of the film and its content?
4. Aesthetics - Participants wanting a professional finish of which they could feel proud and you possibly 
wanting a low-tech finish/ your own 'late' aesthetic.
5. Lack of subject versus narrative development - once a strong character had been introduced, difficult to 
rein back to original aim??? The 'star' of the film seemed to be on a quest whereas you perhaps wanted a 
derive or figure in a landscape idea?? - the two might seem compatible during the process but become 
more difficult as the product takes shape. There is a satisfactory/unsatisfactory (depending on how you 
look at it) tension between the intention and effect i.e., some traditional elements e.g. strong 
characters/ beginning of a story/monologue and the flatness of a non-narrative non-event.
6. Real time Vs edited highlights- Real time disappears as soon as editing begins.
Nick finally ruminated that if the purpose of this film is to show nothing happening, is pointing the 
camera at nothing as persuasive as a film maker using his/her best skills to show nothing happening?
It was a very foggy night as we drove home. I hope this helps and makes sense.
Bridget Joslin 
July 2004
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The film we would have made
Paradogs 
August 21st 2006
Dear Roy, Arrun and Sharon (Carlos, Rozi, Doug and Jess)
I'm sitting in my studio in East London, alternating between working on my thesis and 
contemplating how on earth to get back to America given the current absurdity. I have 
enclosed x4 DVDs of The Actually Trilogy, which includes The Film and The Film We 
Didn't Make, a copy for each of you. This is close to a final version, but there a few 
extra changes I want to make which will destabilise the flow (something I think is 
necessary - at the moment I find it a little too straight forward and lacking the 
complexity of the shoot). I'm extremely pleased and proud of it as a film, and a cluster 
of films - I've had tremendous feedback on it and the trilogy. But there is an element 
missing, I've worked out what that is and I'd like to propose it to you for your 
contemplation and consideration...
There is the film we would have made.
I would like you to think of the film we would have made. Over a couple of years, and a 
number of very valuable and fruitful, drifting days, we have come to know one another 
and produced two films. Filmmaking is something I brought into your lives, and walking 
as meditation in Dorset is something you brought into my life. That is quite something.
In a way each of the two films we have made thus far contains within it (even if only as 
memory) a film we would have made, if we hadn't gone off on so many difficult and 
delightful tangents. I feel that your image of the film we would have made will complete 
this particular creative chapter. This does not require cameras (although it can), and 
need not be complicated (even though it might be).
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If you are agreeable, I would like you to write down, photograph and/or draw: 
images, shots and sequences, actions and words, transitions and dissolves, locations 
and scenarios, sound and score elements, dramatic activity, colours and camera 
movements...
These would combine as thumbnails for a film we will never make. Do not be critical of 
any of your ideas, no matter how random or unformed they may seem. I would 
assemble your script pages, notes and pictures and compile them into a dossier that I'd 
publish as a small book or pamphlet. We would all have a copy of this book and it will 
also be exhibited alongside of the projected three films {Of Camera, The Film, The Film 
We Didn't Make) in a gallery context. I'm not sure where yet. In terms of timescale, 
there is no hurry, and I'm expecting to answer questions from you about specifics 
before you begin anything. This might be a couple of hours activity for you, scrawling 
on napkins and the backs of envelopes, or something you dip in and out of over a six 
month period, producing refined themes, storylines, and designs. It really is up to you. 
By all means involve Doug and Carlos too. I'm imagining ideas and notations will be 
posted around, forwarded, revised, amongst all of us: a script by correspondence.
I am asking you to do this for a number of reasons. For me, the project we embarked 
on in 2003-2004 has to do with encountering the lived world through the veil of 
conceiving a film, the veil of setting out to make a film. That film was always in front of 
us - our destination - and still is, even though we have produced a number of 
marvellous pieces en route. I ask you, what is a film? What film is it? How do you see 
it, hear it, think it in your minds? How do you find its form in the faces, landscapes, 
words and activities of your locality? Where and how is it more than, or other than, the 
world you live in? How do you recollect it (your imagined film) when you think back to 
our five days together last summer?
This project fits into my wider process as an artist, which is to explore the relationship 
between the moving image, thought and everyday life, and to allow films to drift away 
from my control and authorship. This is a film you will invent, independently of me. It is 
about your ideas and your thoughts. My involvement or non-involvement is down to 
you. I am passing on the film baton. I would like very much for you to jot down that film 
that is in your memory, in your imagination, in your perception, in your creative 
walkabout. Please do not overly concern yourself with its coherence. It is the film we 
would have made, not a film we will or could ever make.
What a film.
I look forward to hearing from you. Please ask questions.
My very best,
Steven
p.s. I think its fitting somehow that I'm always revising The Film We Didn't Make, so 
that it is never finished.
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F i lm  C an H e lp  U s T h in k  T h o u g h t  
INTERVAL (1 )
University at Buffalo, Department of Media Study, Buffalo, NY 
Saturday, 5 November 2005
Conference Schedule
9.30 Coffee and introductory address by Stefani Bardin
10.00 - 12.15 THE PEOPLE ARE MISSING (The Ruin of Representation)
Hanna Rose Shell Locomotion in Water (film)
Nilima Rabl InDifferent Media - minor self-interruptions, cries, and 
modulated catastrophes (film, paper)
William Raban Continental drifts (film)
Deborah Stratman In Order Not To Be Here (film)
Steven Eastwood The lived time of film-unmaking (film/paper)
Moderated by Caroline Koebel
Break for lunch
Lunch for Moderators and Panelists on the Second Floor of the CFA Atrium
1.15 - 3.00 OF HISTORY: (The Mediation of Past as Future)
Natalie Frigo First Wives and Nov 22nd 1963 (film)
Sonja Milka Bertucci La Jetee: aiestesis of image, affect of memory (paper) 
Aaron Valdez Dissolve (film)
Jeff Netto Marcel Duchamp's Anemic-Cinema (1926) (paper)
Michelle Smith The Girl Who Lost Her Head (fragment) (film)
Moderated by Sarah Bay-Cheng
Break for coffee
3.30 - 6.00 THRESHOLDS OF NARRATIVE (Crystalline Stories)
Romeo Grunfelder Rallye (film and interview)
Catherine Wheatley Haneke and Unpleasure - a criticism of Deleuzian cinematic 
modernism (paper)
Abigail Child Dark Dark (film)
Norman Gendelman A Shock to the Sensory Motor: 'Memento' and the
Implosive Mode (paper)
Daniel Cockburn Mind the Gap: falling through the cracks in the present tense 
(film/paper)
Paul Tarrago Making Things Meaningful (film)
Moderated by Alan Rhodes
6.45 - 7.00 SPECIAL SCREENING OF THE BERLIN F ILE S BY JANET CARDIFF & GEORGE 
BURES MILLER
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Interval(2) confluence WOBURN SQUARE. Friday March 17th, 9am - 7pm
Room # 3 Confluence Room
9.00am coffee. 9.45am Confluence introduction
10am Intervening in Reality: (Moderator: Gareth Evans)
Nicole Hewitt (The Slade)
Foreign grammar - looking at the familiar in a different language
Stephen Connolly
The Whale (screening)
Michael Goddard (Lodz)
Irrational Intervals in Rolf de Heer1s "The Tracker"
Steven Eastwood (The Slade, DMS Buffalo)
The Film We Didn't Make 
Henry VIII's Wives
Mr. Hysteria - trailing phenomena
12.15 LUNCH
1.00 pm Contemporary Images and the Gap Moderator: (Penny Florence)
David Rodowick (Harvard)
Interval: The Two Cosmogonies of Contemporary Images 
Alan Rhodes (York University, Toronto)
Video essay: Metonymy & the Irrational Interval in Multi-channel 
Sophia Kosmaoglou (Goldsmiths)
Playing Dead
Maria Walsh (University of the Arts London, Chelsea)
The Irrational Interval and Film Installation 
3.00pm Coffee
3.30pm - 4.30 pm Keynote: Janet Cardiff & George Bures Miller (plus 
T he B e r l i n  F i l e s )
4.30pm Between screen, world and mind: (Moderator: Ian White)
Rob Grose
Irrational Thought and Political Aesthetics 
Firoza Elavia (York University, Canada)
Drifting at Time's Edge: Claire Denis' L'Intrus 
Hilary Koob Sassen
The Elaboration of Culture in Time is Towards Multiple Transnational
Infrastructure Economies
Duncan Reekie (Exploding Cinema)
Invisible Shrine Film/video essay
6pm - 7pm 0 & A: What next for the Moving Image?
Room # 1
Mr Hysteria (Henry VIII's Wives) x3 monitors
The Waltz and In Between (Nicole Hewitt) monitor and headphones 
Room # 2
Selected work by Michelle Smith
The Space Between (Karen Mirza & Brad Butler)
Inferno Remix (Nicola Woodham)
Room #4
Road Race (Clio Barnard)
Shock (Phillip Warnell)
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Room #5
Cafe and Lunch area 
Resonance FM (Mick Shaw)
The Posers and Playing Dead (Sophia Kosmaglou)
Les Evanescents (Cedric Noel)
Francis Summers
Office
Relative Time Management (Jamie O'Neil / Kurt Weibers)
I n t e r v a l ( 2 )  S a t u r d a y  s c r e e n i n g  
March 18th Cine Lumiere, Institut-Francais 
Queensbury Place, London SW7 2DT 
(nearest tube South Kensington)
1 2 . 0 0  -  1 . 4 5 p m  Cinema: screening #1
Holiday (Chris Ernst)
Outer Space (Peter Tscherkassky)
Metronome (Daniel Cockburn)
Relative Time Management (Jamie O'Neil/Kurt Weibers)
Resident of Earth (Paul Tarrago)
Suspicious Activity (Katherin Mclnnis)
Towards a Common Understanding (Doug Fishbone)
Down There (Ben Callaway)
10th Lesson (Joanna Raczynska)
Block (Emily Richardson)
Petite Salle Seminar Room:
2.00 - 4.00pm
Lunch and plenary discussion
Mark Aerial Waller - La Societe des Amis de Jude XI
4 . 0 0  -  5 . 4 5 p m  Cinema: screening #2 
Projector Obscura (Peter Miller)
Like a House on Fire (Steven Eastwood)
Instructions for a Light and Sound Machine (Peter Tscherkassky)
Desi're (Romeo Grunfelder)
Dinner with the Stranger (Natalie Frigo)
Paraculture / Future Garden State (Hilary Koob-Sassen)
Birthday (Victoria Fu)
Atlas (Chris Ernst)
Here (Fred Worden)
Errata, A Compendium of Errors (Alexander Stewart)
The Berlin Files (Janet Cardiff & George Bures Miller)
Programme subject to change.To book tickets, call 0 2 0 7  0 73  1 3 5 0
Interval (2) would like to thank the event sponsors:
UCL Graduate Fund, The Slade School of Fine Art, Penny Florence and
The Slade Research Centre, The Dept, of Media Study, SUNY at Buffalo 
Julien Plante and the Cine Lumiere, Institut-Francais, Aldgate Press, 
and all of the volunteers working on the event.
www.cinemaintothereal.org/interval2
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Review of Interval (2) by Steven Ball
S P H E R I C A L  O B J E C T I V E
A R O U N D  A ND A B O U T  AN A P P E N D I X  T O  W W W . S T E V E N - B A L L . N E T  
S A T U R D A Y ,  M A R C H  1 8 ,  2 0 0 6
Deleuzian Delusion and the Enigm atic C inem atic
About 15 years ago I becam e very interested in Gilles Deleuze and bought a copy of A 
Thousand Plateaus. I still have it. There it is as it is today, battered from wear after all 
these years. Deleuze and Guattari were all the rage back then, name checked and quoted 
aplenty throughout the post modern artcrit and artists’ crowds alike. At the time, as a 
relatively recent arriviste in Australia, steeped in ideas about nomadism, migration and 
mobility, I found A Thousand Plateaus full of analogous concepts, the rhizome as a 
metaphor for thought and idea formation, deterritorialization as an almost direct 
description of the migrant experience, becoming a body without organs in the context of 
questions of identity and individuality, all chimed with the post-colonial complexity of my 
Australian situation. My super 8 film Periscope 180° was the one that most directly picked 
up on these ideas, primarily through the voice over which in part lifts snatches of phrases 
from A Thousand Plateaus; in fact it quotes from many sources but reworks the references 
into its own sem i-poetic essayistic flow of tenuous unresolved concepts, open and 
connectable, inconclusive yet evocative and with the suggestion of a profundity, however 
unfounded.
Just over 11 years since he threw himself out of a window to his death, there seems to be 
been a definite resurgence of interest in D eleuze’s theories, in particular with regard to 
cinem a and artists’ moving im age here in London. A series of seminars at the 
Photographers’ Gallery, organised by Catherine Yass, is premised on Deleuze’s theories 
about the relationship of sound to im age, particularly how this might be used to elucidate  
contemporary artists’ work in the moving image.
And for the past two days I have been attending Interval 2, a conference and screening 
event organised by Steven Eastwood, taking Deleuze’s ideas about how the cinem atic  
must have a ‘shock effect’ on thought and the idea of the irrational interval, a cut between 
two moving images not motivated by movement or action which allows the brain to pass 
into the not yet thought. The presenters at the conference were an impressive and quite 
diverse range of professional international luminaries like David Rodowick and Janet 
Cardiff, alongside PhD students and artists. I haven’t had time to process the implications 
of all that I’ve seen and heard but a few particular impressions have formed.
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My first impression is that those speakers whose presentations were only tangentially  
related, or com pletely unrelated to D eleuze ’s theories, were actually the most interesting 
and developed. Rodowick’s presentation in particular dealt with his ideas about the 
different ‘cosmogenies’ of the digital and the analogue in the moving image and the 
implications of the transitional period we find ourselves in right now (this was a chapter 
from his next book so to save tim e and blogspace you can look forward to checking it out 
there!). Janet Cardiff and her partner Georges Bures M iller’s assured presentation of their 
work, which relies heavily on the relationship of sound to image and geographic situation 
was, particularly in The Berlin Files, full of irrational intervals, and made no reference 
whatsoever to Deleuze.
It seems though that D e leu ze ’s theories are indeed so open that they can be applied to 
more or less any work. This is due to an emphasis on non-conclusion, an interest in mid­
points rather than end-points, his own writing as experimental philosophy evinced a great 
interest in the creative act, creativity as thinking in action, and makes him all but 
impossible to pin down: in short producing a very useful and adaptable philosophy.
More related to D eleuze, a lbeit indirectly via Bergson, who was profoundly influencial on 
Deleuze, was Firoza E lav ia ’s presentation on Claire Denis’s film L’lntrus. Elavia used 
Bergson’s idea of the passage of intuition into intellect (or is it the other way around -  no 
matter I suppose) to identify the processes at work in L’lntrus, that somehow this idea that 
intuition results in an irrational interval that is equally intellectual was all very well but 
made for a very dull ‘exp lication ’ of the processes at work in what is a remarkable film 
actually influenced more by the post-Lacanian subjective metaphysical pyschoanalysis of 
Jean-Luc Nancy (the film being adapted from one of Nancy’s essays). But of course the 
point is that there can be a D eleuzian ‘reading’ of pretty much anything. When asked if 
her readings had actually  allowed her to reach an interpretation of the Denis film Elavia  
had to adm it not. But was quick to point out that that was not the point, because Deleuze 
encourages open readings.
So many years after their publication in the early 80s, Deleuze’s books Cinema 1: The  
Movem ent Im age and C inem a 2: The T im e Image are being used as texts to investigate 
cinem a and artists’ moving images. Perhaps in a time when film (specifically 35mm and 
16mm) is becom ing used by artists’ reinvention of the cinem atic wheel in a gallery 
context, this might be appropriate. D eleuze’s idea of the irrational interval was prompted 
by an exam ination of Godard, and his writings rarely stray far from a cinem a which, like 
Godard, while partially disrupting the codes of cinem atic dramatic narrative, relies on the
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understanding of c in em atic  sem iotic codes as a pre-condition in order to conceive of 
anything like an irrational (irrational in respect to the self-perpetuated rationality of an 
‘illusionistic’ c in em atic  lan gu ag e) interval as disruptive and worthy of investigation. So the  
veneer of radicalism  relies on a deep  conservatism, it is a theory that is ‘normative’, as 
wide ranging and im aginative  as it m ight be, it has to rely on a ground zero of c inem atic  
expression. This is why D eleu ze  was not equipped to deal with structural film  and other 
practices that eschew the norm alisation of c inem atic  language: partly because they were 
outside of his purview, and partly because in some ways they had already done the job of 
philosophy for him.
The kind of film  that best suits D eleuzian  c inem antics is the enigm atic, which can use 
that irrational interval in an indefinab le  and hence poetic way. This cinem a is very 
attractive and interesting precisely because it is either located in the realm  of cinem atic  
codes, or borrows those codes to enh an ce its sense of an internal, perhaps intuitive, and 
irrational logic which speaks to a subjective poeticism .
W hat interests me about the D eleuzian  irrational interval is how it speaks to contemporary 
conditions in rather com plex and problem atic  ways. On one hand it is a deeply western 
notion: w hile appearing rad ica l and in te llectually  challenging, it is deeply im bedded  
within the canon of western, particularly French, philosophical developm ent. Its re- 
em ergence as theoretical currency com es in a recent history of the retreat of post modern 
moral relativism and a rise of the clash of civilisations and the new religiosity. The failure  
of relativism was in its inability  to take account of a lack of relativism in other cultural 
formulations. The  D eleu zian  seems to suggest that it’s all good with a kind of liberal 
openness and inconclusiveness, but it shies away from idealism and determ inacy, this 
unfortunately seem s to be at odds with the contem porary social and political reality. It 
seems to date from a (pre-neocon, pre-Taliban) tim e when the (western) world thought it 
had finally  becom e secular. So perhaps Deleuzian theory, in its anachronism, ironically  
offers a kind of in te llec tua l certainty, a rem inder of a c inem atic  golden age when post­
enlightenm ent politics were straightforward and secular.
The idea of c in em atic  coherence, the Hollywood dream, the unproblem atic linear 
narrative, is an escapist myth, which is precisely why it is so attractive and continues to 
play a role in lowest com m on denom inator mainstream cinem a and television. But this is 
becom ing more rare at all levels of both m ediated and everyday contemporary 
experience (is all everyday experience m ediated now? I think mine might be), which is 
already located in the irrational interval. There is a continuous discontinuity in the urban 
experience assigns, symbols, sounds, referents, signifiers jum ble through the landscape,
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on the television, on the internet, on the radio, in m agazines, on the buses, on your 
Playstations, Gam eboys, m obile  phones and iPods, everywhere life is more than simple  
irrational intervals, it is m ultip le  coexisting and com peting moving images. Deleuze may 
prove a vital, im portant and illum inating  historical theoretical touchstone. But the world 
has moved on.
POSTED BY STEVEN BALL AT 1 1 : 3 9  PM
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Octopus, a cell-based international group of moving image artists
O ctopus, p.
Octopus
A many-tentacled auteur-killing monster from the deep.
Octopus is a unique creative hub. It is a fired-up collection of actual bodies, people sharing 
skills, space, equipment and concepts, working on each other's ideas and pooling resources. 
Octopus is a movement of our own design; a structure for greater output; a third way, between 
the cinema, television and the gallery. Rather than modifying what we produce to fit an existing 
structure, this is the formation of a new culture. Octopus is a union, an employer, a site for 
increased creativity.
You, the person reading this, are a maker of moving images. You know that you have to put in 
an Olympian effort to get your projects off the ground. You know that your ideas are 
exceptional, that you have acquired numerous skills and connections over the years, and that 
you feel passionate about straddling discourses and disciplines. You defiantly do not isolate 
yourself as filmmaker or artist, as an industry player or as an academic, and you have had 
success in many or all of these areas. You are bored with pushing your own name forward in 
the fame game, and with working alone.
- You are a maker who is working, or desires to work, across disciplines, producing art, fiction, 
documentary, essay film, asking critical questions about the culture of the moving image.
- You are at the point where it is time to take a risk and invest in a more ambitious phase, 
something larger and more effective.
- You bring to this a sense of daring, your concepts, and your skills.
Octopus is a space for collaboration and the development of large projects such as feature 
films, documentaries and installations. This creature has tentacles reaching into and curling 
around a diverse range of discourses, practices and industries. We write grants, script edit, 
assist in production and post-production. We originate revenue-generating projects and pass 
freelance work on to each other. But it is more than this. Octopus is a context, an environment. 
It is the film and art industry in a microcosm, its own culture, pitching unique projects to 
cinema funds and distributors, Television, galleries and curators... IT IS AMBITIOUS - a 
manifesto based cellular structure, a dynamic system; one that produces difference and 
proliferates in multiple directions; a production company that formalizes a cottage industry.
Are you Octopus?
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Caught up in loops, an encounter in thought without a thinker
. 1997
caught up in loops
(Transcribed from a dictaphone recording made several days after the event)
"I had time turned around for me, where it didn't run along the metronome 
which we are accustomed to where things move the way they move forward in a 
progression. Time was absolutely stretched and condensed and I couldn't stop 
it. I lay there, in the mud, close to Philip's camper van and I was trapped 
in an eternity of perceptual loops of sound and image, logical loops that were 
so pure and so advanced and so simple, they were perfect thoughts, perfect 
logical progressions which spiralled inwards in detail and perfection on such 
a scale that I felt I had to not think them because they ought not to be 
thought. Once you think on this scale with absolute abstract clarity you've 
crossed the line you should never cross, and I fought tooth and nail to not 
think these thoughts, because I knew that I was going to think my way too 
deep. I knew - I could feel, I could feel - my mind was becoming 
fundamentally aware of itself. And I knew I had to not do it.
Time became uncanny. I would lie down in the grass and look out under my arm, 
which was raised, and see somebody walking across the muddy field along the 
plastic path, and they were stretched. They were like a goblin but stretched, 
and walking so fast, three times normal speed. I put my head down in the 
earth. I thought, "I mustn't see that. I can't see these things". I sort of 
looked the other way and I saw the merry go round was turning on the opposite 
side of the valley. It just kept turning and turning, the same way, and I 
remember thinking, "It has been light for so long. This has been the longest 
day in the history of the Earth." The last time I knew the time it was about 
seven pm, and that had been a day or two ago. And there I was, lying on the 
earth, coming in and out of it, sickeningly. I felt so frightened. It's two 
or three days later now and I am out of it. I can still feel it sometimes, 
behind my eyes. I can still feel it. I have a headache. I can still feel it.
11A book is made of words in lines, and those words have a system that we 
understand as meaning, and we don't really pay any attention to the gaps 
[between the xvTords J . But if there were no gaps then we would have no words. 
There have to be gaps in order to define the words. It's like the way film 
moves through a projector gate. You have to have a black between each frame, 
otherwise the frames blur into each other and you have no image. I think that 
the w a y we process experience works in the same way, and we aren't supposed to 
be aware of the gaps. The brain does the same thing. It orders in a certain 
way and we are accustomed to that order. We are accustomed to that calibration 
in our minds, even though our minds have to skip the blanks. Our minds are 
told not to tell ourselves about the blanks. I think that hallucinogens make 
us privy to that process of choice and selection, so that reality is seen as 
all of the gaps. It is the other side. That isn't quite as outlandish as it 
sounds. When I mention an alternate reality I mean just that. And I can 
still feel it. I can't see it, I can't think it, I can't know it, but I ’m 
aware that it is there. It is a sensation. I think that if you know both 
completely, you aren't human any more. You aren't a self; you aren't a 
designated, defined singularity negotiating life, you are properly immersed.
I think that's what happens in a psychosis or when you trip out and you can't 
come back - your ability to process is broken down so that there is no 
selection. It is difficult to define all of this because I have to use a 
rationale - reasoning - and I think that reasoning is one side of the coin and 
the other side of the coin is pure abstraction. And we have glimpses of that 
but we keep it .in its proper place. Otherwise we couldn't properly move 
through time and space and personality, because it would all have combined
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into a seamless ever-present chaos. The chaos I experienced was nightmarish, 
bat it was pure, and abstract. I had very little consciousness left but I 
consciously fought to not think about it too much, although it was tempting, 
it was euphoric, if I had the strength. I fought not to think about it 
because I knew if I thought about it I would not come back.
So, I'm lying on my belly, my face is pressed in the mud, I look up and see
the guy ropes of the condemned tent. I can see the huge stake driven into the 
earth that is holding up the condemned tent. It is like a monolith above my 
head. I can see the discarded beer bottles at the bottom of the stake. I can 
see Philip's camper van. But I'm not in it. I'm not there. Wherever I look 
the order of the field is breaking up into symmetries and asymmetries 
repeating themselves and breaking up, around me and around me, and I can't 
hold it down, I can't stop it from expanding or repeating, the same with 
sound, with image and sound. I can hear somebody singing the line of a song, 
coming across the day from a tent, and the line is repeated - three or four 
words - and time is different. I think; I think, I must move through time 
ordinarily as a series of incidents in a line, a very clear narrative that 
moves ahead, evolves, and there's no replaying of any of it, it just moves 
ahead. And yet there I am, lying face down, and all of the incidents in a 
line have been fuckea-up, so that some of those incidents have lodged and are 
played again to me, played again to me, and the others were never even 
experienced, I never saw them, there were whole things I must have moved 
through that I didn't see or hear. I hear a line in a song played to me again, 
played to me again, and I'm pressing my hands in the mud and saying to myself 
"Hands on mud", but my fingers are white and green, putrid, and they're far
awray. I ’m thinking, "Keep a hold of your hands. Hands in mud," and I look
behind me. Philip is lying back in his camper van. He's scratching his 
belly. He's tired, but he's doing it indefinitely. It is taking a day. I've 
been here for days. How can this day have gone on for so long? Hovir can that 
Ferris wheel just keep turning and turning? I close my eyes but I don't want 
to close my eyes because I need a reference to keep here. And yet I don't
want to open my eyes because when I open my eyes I realise I'm not here. So I
keep closing and opening my eyes. I look under my arm, which is pressed 
against the grass. I lift my elbow slightly so I have a view. I see a woman 
walking across the mud path to another tent and she is so many colours - she's 
stretched and she's walking so fast her legs are like an animation, a puppet. 
And she's moving so fast I think, "This is wrong.” I'm muttering to myself, "I 
really want to come down now, really want to come down now," because I don't 
like it anymore. There's enough of me to feel that I want this to stop. It's
like, I made a bad decision and I think, "You fool, you've tripped, you're
gone, this is it forever, you're caught in these logic loops, these horrific 
pure logical loops where time is again and again but doesn't move forward the 
way you want it to." And I keep thinking, "I want to move forward. I want to 
come doxvn." I keep searching for a ground, for something to root me. I 
concentrate on my breathing. I breathe in and I breathe out. If I can just 
keep calm and not be afraid I can ride this. But there's no me anymore. And 
it moves in surges. I place my head in the mud and I look up and everything 
is clear and I think, "I'm sober. I'm out." and then I lurch again and I 
think, "I'm gone, this is the worst" and then I lurch again and it's more 
horrific and there's nothing to hold me in at all.
Then things got a whole lot worse- It is so difficult to find pictures to 
persuade you of where I was, to use metaphors, like: a mirror. A metaphor or 
simile would be that there was a mirror pushed between my eyes so that 
everything I saw on the left was mirrored on the right. Philip's camper van 
was on both sides of me. The field was perfectly symmetrical. I tried to 
burp and my burp was symmetrical, played to me again and again, like I was 
stuck in a rut. And I splashed my face, I rubbed my face, I splashed my face 
and I rubbed my face and my hands were exactly the same on both sides, like I 
was split.
This was still before I was properly tripping out.______________________________
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It was very pure.
I remember thinking, "They're all out there. They're all operating just fine. 
They're all moving around me and I'm not in it." I felt this pressure in my
bladder and I managed to stumble to the toilet blocks. The ground was shifting
and my legs were elastic and the time it took me to get to the trailer for the
toilets was extended, the whole field was a stretched form that I was
ploughing my way through and it was taking forever to get there, although 
outwardly I must have just walked to the toilets. But to me ~ to me, time and 
the way I moved through it was completely spastic, totally spastic. Time works 
as a system, if you're in it. It's there for us, but it is a construct, it’s 
something we assimilate, we move through it conveniently, and I was moving 
through it, discordantly. Everything v/as improper. My legs made it up the 
steps and there I am standing in a toilet cubicle and I'm laughing to myself 
thinking, this is it, you've done it, you've put yourself outside of your own 
brain. And I splashed my face with water and I felt more clear. I actually 
thought, "This is going to be all right, I'm going to come down soon". I 
stepped out and space was liquid and. space was horrid. Place was invalid. I 
realised I was afraid. I thought, [my voice sinks, sad] "I'm not going to 
come doi\m". I fell back towards the camper van. None of this is coming out 
clearly because it is so difficult to recount - but I remember coming back to 
the camper van and Philip was standing there and he said, "Oh hello" and I 
said, "I'm having a bad tripi", vehemently, as I fell on my face. And he 
tried to photograph me. And I was clear for a second then. And then I was 
crawling around in the earth on all fours like a crab, not wanting to look at 
anyone at all, not wanting to look up. And then I was putting my head down 
in the grass. I wanted to eat the grass. I wanted to stuff myself w7ith 
grounding."________________________________________________________________________
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Film synopses:
A Seminar in Film Sound
(Dir. Steven Eastwood. 16mm. 10 min# looped [currently mute]. UK/USA 2007) 
Performer: Kana S
A film production student presents a seminar on the relationship between 
dialogue, musical score and environmental sound/added sound effects in the 
fiction film. During her presentation there are long periods of silence where 
she pauses for thought, and these gaps produce attenuations of sound in the 
class and in the ear of the viewer. The film camera tracks around the speaker 
in ten timed revolutions, each pass behind the college chalkboard introducing 
new micro changes of behaviour in the room.
Hearsay
(Dir. Steven Eastwood. Mini DV.dur. 9 min. UK/CAN 2006)
Performers: Brenda Goldstein, Daniel Cockburn.
Waking from a disturbed sleep, caricatures of the curator and the neurotic 
artist-filmmaker ponder the current and historical predicament of the moving 
image: where it belongs, who it is for, when it articulates best. The editing, 
framing and sound design seem to respond to their tug-o-war of words, and the 
characters themselves are prone to the playback of another’s words, clutching 
at their video cameras and headphones in the hope of finding the greater 
point. H e a r s a y is misheard and rewritten from an emailed conversation between 
Benjamin Cook and Steven Eastwood. The tape was made for the TANK TV 
compilation in the UK. It is an interview as intervention. Although the 
performers frequently point, it never makes that much of a point itself. You 
will have heard the conversation before...
The Film We Didn't Make
(Dir. Steven Eastwood. 16mm/Mini DV. 16.30 min +1 0  min commentary. 2006)
A woman is delivered by car to a remote coastal location, a stranded fictional 
character equipped with suitable props. Not only is she reluctant to be in
this place, she is also reluctant to be a character in a film. Is she the same
woman from O f C am era , the performer Sharon Smith who played that character, or 
someone else? On a beach she encounters two players from the actual, Roy White
and Arrun Denman from The F i lm . The woman complains when they try to speak to
her but remains bound to them through a number of environments and dramatic 
false starts. The three characters from previous films mix like oil and water, 
marionettes in a school play on a hiding to nowhere, making their way to the 
actual through lumpy gravy. The voice of the filmmaker intervenes throughout, 
trying to make sense of his film as a fictional muscle that might be massaged 
until it becomes a fact. Events finally settle on a hillside at sunset in what 
appears to be the place of a natural exchange. But inside the film is another 
film - The F i lm  We D i d n ' t  M ake -  that became the film we did make. Which parts 
of this film are life and which parts are not? What is a film if it is not a 
life?
Made by Steven Eastwood, Arrun Denman, Sharon Smith, Roy White, Carlos 
Guarita, Rosalind Peters, Doug Palmer, Jess Wiley; score by Jim Kirby & Conor 
Kelly.
Like a House on Fire
(Dir. Steven Eastwood.16mm / Minidv. 16.45 min.2006)
At the centre of this film labyrinth is a tarot reading in which the invented 
cards seem to determine or reflect unfolding events on screen. There is a 
filmmaker trying to write a film, but the house in which he writes is 
cohabited by the film's crew, cast and the characters they are playing.
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Everyone is banging around on and off camera, trying to get into the bathroom, 
or waiting for the film and its story to happen. This is not a story however, 
but rather a sequential turning of nonsensical cards: the tampon in the toilet 
bowl, a light repositioned causing shadow, a man on the floor who cannot 
separate hxmself from the house (which may or may not be on fire). This film 
is L ik e  a H ou se on F i r e , a cinematic game of C lu e d o in which the lead piping 
murdered the ballroom using a Colonel Mustard. Every detail is meaningless 
sign, in shuffle. A film can go anywhere it wants~
Featuring: Chris Barr, Megan Piret, Jeffrey White. Dir. Of Photography: 
Vincenzo Mistretta. Feature track: T ow er o f  L o v e by Jim Noir
Come as you Are
(Dir. Steven Eastwood. Mini DV. 11 min. Croatia/UK. 2005)
The filmmaker wandered Momjan, a quiet Croatian hill town, transcribing as 
much as possible of what he could see and hear into a film script. This semi- 
psychotic act of film writing generated an extensive and diverse list of 
characters, including: a teenage girl in jeans sat on a white wooden chair, a 
boy on a bmx, an elderly woman sat on a porch with her hands over her face, 
workman number 4 who stands motionless holding onto a rope, and a female cook, 
blond with bright ginger highlights and a banshee laugh. An open casting 
session was held for an afternoon in and around the town hall. Local residents 
and visitors to Momjan turned up to audition for the part of themselves or 
someone else. In this film, which is a potential film and always and 
everywhere, people are variously good and bad at playing themselves. Casting 
is an opportunity to be other and to think of a town as a film. This is the 
barest beginnings of an impossible inventory, an always and everywhere Momjan 
as cinema.
The Film
(Dir. Steven Eastwood.16mm/Minidv. 28 min. 2004)
The result of a month-long residency at PVA Artists' Media Resource in 
Bridport, Dorset, 'The Film' is a neither a documentary nor a fiction, but 
rather an open-ended free-associative collaboration between filmmaker and 
members of the Bridport community. Arriving as a stranger I met with 
strangers, and asked them to enter into a n ew  r e a l  l i f e  — the making of this 
film, 'The Film' — with me. Together we devised and improvised a film as a 
becoming of thought and duration and a way of passing time together. 'The 
Film' is not narrative, character or content driven. The process was closer to 
what might be termed automatic, structured around happenstance and made by way 
of a collective cinematic wandering. "Last of the Summer Wine meets Chris 
Marker."
Of Camera
(Dir. Steven Eastwood, dur. 14.40 min. Original format S16mm. 2003)
’Of Camera’ explores the abortive attempts of two people to be together in the 
same space. Their disagreement is fuelled by technical difference: the woman 
exists on videotape and the man on celluloid. The story corrupts as the two 
realise they are incompatible and that they are being filmed and watched.
Different Systems of Chaos
(Dirs: Steven Eastwood and Anya Lewin. 27.40 min. DV. 2003)
A film about the artist versus the administrator and the director of a post 
soviet Eastern European art school who refuses to repeat anything, even for 
BBC. This is a playful examination of a Lithuanian school for 12-18 year olds 
and the role of bureaucracy in education and art.
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/ Make Things Happen
(Dir: Steven Eastwood, performer: Jo Cripps. 6 min. Mini DV/Beta. 2001)
In the belief that through sheer force of will she can change what goes on 
around her, a young woman wanders South London. Her efforts range from the 
tedious to the hilarious and the uncomfortable. Gradually, her will leads her 
to try and change the very film she is in...
The End
(Dir: Steven Eastwood, performer: Ava Hervier. 9 min. Mini DV. 2002)
A young French woman treads Soho, London asking passers-by directions to, "The 
End". She is met with a range of responses, from the good-natured and helpful 
to the bemused and philosophical. Nobody suspects however that she is asking 
directions to the end of the film.
Chris Crossing
(Dir. Steven Eastwood, dur.4 min. Mini dv. 2003)
Performers: Tom Haines, Chris Branch.
Tom and Chris find themselves down a back alley and stop by the side of the 
broken white line down the centre of the street. Chris begins to explain to 
Tom the crossing-the-line rule in cinematography. He isn't very good at 
explaining it however, and as he and Tom speak their respective over-the- 
shoulder and point-of-view shots get tangled up, until both the line and Tom 
get cross. Chris never gets cross.
Auditorium
(Dir. Steven Eastwood.7 min. Hi8mm completed to Mini-dv. 1999/2002) 
'Auditorium' is a single angle, single take video which presents in real time 
the total eclipse of the sun in the summer of '99. The title is suggestive of 
how a phenomenon is mediated through language; of how the eclipse was 
experienced as e v e n t. Increasingly cinema is a facet of language, with moving 
image/narrative film used as a way of describing the real. As a bystander 
commented just before totality, "It's like the lights going down in a cinema". 
Screened as a part of the GATE film programme on the open land of Dartmoor, 
October 2002.
Cinema into the Real, Test 3 (fix 02, Belfast. 2002) and Test 4 (Adhoc
Urban Festival, Zagreb. 2003)
For a number of hours a bus and tram stop became elaborate film sets, co­
opting members of the public into a place of film fiction. This film is the 
real world - its fictional coherence and dramatic impact consisted entirely of 
the unforeseeable events that transpired in reaction to the context. In 
pulling cinema into a real and ostensibly unmediated context, the project 
attempts to create a situation in which the real is recognised as being an 
elaborate and covert theatre of multiple and continually revised fictions.
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